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Cornell University 2008 
 
Do social movements matter in security politics? Connecting the international 
relations literature with social movement theories, my research examines how bilateral 
security alliances influence state-society interaction and social movement outcomes in 
the politics of overseas U.S military bases. Investigating how host governments react 
to anti-base movement pressure while managing alliance relations with the U.S., I 
argue that the host government's response in finding a balance depends on the level of 
security consensus held by political elites regarding national security. When host 
government political elites are significantly divided regarding their perception of 
national security and U.S.-host state security relations, elites sympathetic to anti-base 
movements cooperatively engage anti-base activists. Thus a weak security consensus 
opens the possibility for major base policy changes by anti-base movements.  
Conversely, when a common consensus regarding security relations with the 
U.S. exists among domestic political elites, the host government strategically responds 
to anti-base pressure by either ignoring, foot-dragging, co-opting, or at best, making 
token concessions to anti-base groups. By providing minimal concessions, host 
governments are able to maintain positive relations with the U.S. while mollifying 
major anti-base protests. Social movements, therefore, have little effect on base policy 
outcomes under conditions of strong security consensus.  
 
 I use movement episodes in five different countries - Philippines, Japan, Italy, 
Ecuador, and South Korea - to support my argument. The findings are based on 
government reports and documents, internal activist documents, participant 
observation, and in-depth interviews with activists, host government elites, and U.S. 
officials.   
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CHAPTER 1 
ANTI-BASE MOVEMENTS AND THE SECURITY CONSENSUS 
FRAMEWORK 
 
On May 8, 2000, an A-10 aircraft performing low altitude strafing exercises 
released its six 500 pound bombs to reduce weight after facing engine trouble off the 
coast of a small fishing village in South Korea.  Although local activists had 
complained for years about the dangers of firing and bombing exercises conducted at 
the U.S. military-operated Kooni Firing Range in Maehyangri, their protests fell 
largely on deaf ears. However, the bombing accident in 2000 garnered widespread 
media attention as civic groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) joined 
forces with local residents to protest against the bombing range and United States 
Forces Korea (USFK).
1
  
 South Korean officials were caught in an awkward bind.  From below, angry 
anti-base activists demanded base closure. From above, U.S. officials expected Seoul 
to fulfill certain alliance obligations by providing USFK a suitable firing range. After 
months of intense anti-base protests, the Korean government defused the crisis by 
offering partial concessions. The South Korean Ministry of Defense and USFK agreed 
to move the firing range 1.5 km further out into the sea, restrict training hours, and 
refrain from using live ammunition. 
The South Korean government’s balancing act between international and 
domestic forces has replayed itself in different corners of the world. However, host 
government responses to anti-base pressure and base policy outcomes have varied. 
Needless to say, base politics have not always concluded favorably for the United 
                                                 
1
 Aside from property damage, no serious injuries were actually reported. 
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States.  As the U.S. reshuffles its network of overseas bases in the post-9/11 world, we 
should expect more drama in the politics of overseas military bases. 
Addressing domestic political challenges to overseas U.S. military bases, my 
dissertation investigates two key questions. First, do social movements matter in base 
politics, and second, how do host governments respond to domestic pressure from 
below while managing alliance relations with the U.S.? When host government 
political elites are significantly divided regarding their perception of national security 
and U.S.-host state security relations, elites sympathetic to anti-base movements 
cooperatively engage anti-base activists. In other words, a weak security consensus 
opens the possibility for major base policy changes by anti-base movements. 
Conversely, when a powerful, collective consensus regarding security relations with 
the U.S. exists among domestic political elites, the host government responds to anti-
base pressure by either ignoring, foot-dragging, co-opting, or at best, making token 
concessions to anti-base groups. By providing minimal concessions, host governments 
are able to maintain positive relations with the U.S. while mollifying major anti-base 
protests.  Social movements, therefore, have little effect on base policy outcomes 
under conditions of strong security consensus.  In sum, the degree of security 
consensus held by host state political elites shapes or constrains the strategies 
employed by movement and government actors, thereby affecting basing policy 
outcomes. 
The Politics of Overseas Military Bases 
Why should anyone care about U.S. military bases and anti-base movements? 
Recent shifts in U.S. global basing strategy, underlined by the Pentagon’s 2004 Global 
Defense Posture Review (GDPR), have drawn significant attention on the politics of 
  3 
overseas U.S. military bases.
2
  This interest is driven by the strategic and political 
implications of overseas military bases for the United States and its host government 
allies.  Placing a premium on mobility and rapid deployment, a key component of the 
GDPR is the shift from large, permanent bases of the Cold War era to fewer and 
smaller overseas installations. Coined as “lily pads,” Department of Defense (DOD) 
planners envision post 9-11 bases as expandable, “lightly staffed facilities for use as 
jumping-off points in a crisis.”3 Although the GDPR is first and foremost a military 
plan, base realignment and relocation also carry political ramifications. Changes in 
global force posture require coordination with host state allies.  As one senior State 
Department official remarked, “It is a military plan, in the first instance, but the 
political dimension of it is equally important. It revitalizes the U.S. ability to be a 
faithful, strong, and reliable security partner and it positions the United States to work 
very closely and cooperatively with friendly military forces around the world.”4   
The future of U.S. grand strategy is underpinned by its overseas basing system. 
Unfortunately, twenty-first century U.S. power projection, most visibly manifest in 
overseas bases, has heightened the domestic political sensitivity of U.S. military 
                                                 
2
 For example, see Kurt Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward. "New Battle Stations?" Foreign Affairs 
82, no. 5 (2003): 95-103; Kent E. Calder. Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and 
American Globalism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007; Alexander Cooley. "Base 
Politics." Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (2005): 79-92; Alexander Cooley. Base Politics: Democratic 
Change and the U.S. Military Overseas. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008; Robert Harkavy. 
"Thinking About Basing." Naval War College Review 58, no. 3 (2005): 13-42; Michael O’Hanlon. 
Unfinished Business: U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century Washington DC: Center for 
a New American Security, 2008. 
Sheila Smith. "Shifting Terrain: The Domestic Politics of U.S. Military Presence in Asia."  Honolulu, 
HI: East-West Center, 2006. 
3
 Campbell and Ward 2003. The U.S. intends to retain a smaller number of main operating bases while 
also establishing forward operating sites and cooperative security locations. Forward operating sites are 
installations with pre-positioned equipment ready for use and minimal troop presence. Cooperative 
security locations are created through pre-arranged agreements with the host state. This arrangement 
provides the U.S. access to host government facilities for training and operation purposes, but requires 
little or no permanent troops in peacetime. The new basing arrangements along the “arc of instability” 
provide greater flexibility in meeting new global security threats. See U.S. State Department,  Foreign 
Press Center Briefing. “Senior Administration Officials from the Departments of State and Defense.” 
Washington D.C. August 16, 2004. <http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/35246.htm> [accessed 10/18/06]. 
4
 Ibid. 
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activity in several host nations. In the Czech Republic, peace activists in 2007 
demanded a national referendum in hopes of blocking plans to construct a U.S. missile 
defense base on Czech soil.  In Ecuador, anti-base activists applauded President Rafael 
Correa’s pledge not to renew an agreement giving the U.S. access to a key air base in 
its war on drugs. Most notably, in Turkey, U.S. officials expressed frustration after 
Ankara’s month-long vacillation and eventual denial of basing access for U.S. aircraft 
prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion.  These are just a few examples which suggest the need 
for a broader study on anti-base movements and the politics of overseas military bases.  
From a theoretical standpoint, anti-base movements challenge well-established 
assumptions in the field of international relations. How do social movement actors 
abroad thwart the strategic basing preferences of the most powerful military in the 
world? Assuming states remain relatively autonomous in foreign and national security 
policy-making, this question is all the more puzzling given that these foreign anti-base 
actors are thousands of miles away with no direct mechanism to influence 
Washington. A common assumption that civil society has relatively little impact on 
security policy stems from several facts. Given the sensitive nature of “high politics,” 
government and military officials are often insulated from societal pressure when 
making decisions concerning national security.
5
  Policymakers may occasionally be 
swayed by public opinion on foreign policy issues of mass appeal, such as the decision 
to go to war.
6
  However, societal actors are excluded or often unaware of more 
technical issues related to national security such as combat training, force structure, or 
                                                 
5
 Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page. "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?" American Political 
Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005): 107-23. Stephen Krasner. Defending the National Interest: Raw 
Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978, p.11. 
Often, domestic security institutions particular to the state further isolate security policymakers from 
civil society.  For instance, in South Korea, the National Security Laws, the institutionalization of the 
U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command, and the subordinate role of the ROK military in the chain of 
command system limits the role civil society plays in security policy. 
6
 Jacobs and Page 2005; Richard Sobel. The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since 
Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
  5 
base realignment. Regarding overseas bases, U.S. and host government officials often 
conclude basing agreements even before societal actors have time to react or voice 
their concerns.  
Despite the autonomous nature of security policy decision-making, intense 
anti-base protests in several regions have led to a various range of policy shifts and 
outcomes.  Thus one might question whether the politics of overseas military bases is 
really devoid of societal influence.  Given certain political opportunity structures, anti-
base movements have the power to induce change in policy outcomes.
7
  This 
observation is consistent with those found by transnational movement scholars who 
demonstrate how civil society influences “high politics” in issue areas such as arms 
control and disarmament.
8
   
Using data collected from fieldwork in the Philippines, Japan (Okinawa), 
Ecuador, Italy, and South Korea, my dissertation develops a theoretical framework 
which integrates the international relations literature with social movement theories.  
Under the context of U.S.-host state security relations, I explore the process of 
interaction between the U.S., host governments, and anti-base movements, and the 
strategic responses which lead to varying base policy outcomes.  I find that the level of 
security consensus among host state political elites, particularly those within the 
                                                 
7
 Sidney Tarrow. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious. Politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998; Doug McAdam. "Political Opportunities: Conceptual Origins, 
Current Problems, Future Directions." In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements : Political 
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. 
McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 23-40. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. David Meyer and 
Debra Minkoff. "Conceptualizing Political Opportunity." Social Forces 82, no. 4 (2004): 1457-92. 
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
8
 Thomas Risse. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and 
International Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; Matthew Evangelista. 
Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1999. Richard Price. "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets 
Landmines." International Organization 52, no. 3 (1998): 613-44; Thomas Rochon. "Three Faces of the 
Freeze: Arenas of Success and Failure." In Coalitions and Political Movements: The Lessons of the 
Nuclear Freeze, edited by Thomas Rochon, and David Meyer, 163-76, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
1997. 
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foreign policy establishment, shapes 1) how host states respond to domestic pressure 
against bases and 2) the relative success of anti-base movements in gaining significant 
concessions from the host state and U.S. on base policy decisions. Table 1.1 below 
lays out a preview of the cases used to test the theoretical argument. 
 
Table 1.1: Preview of cases used to test the security consensus framework 
Movement Episode 
  
Strategic Value 
of Base  
Movement 
Strength 
Security consensus 
among domestic 
elites 
Base Policy 
Outcome 
Philippines:  
Subic Bay (1990-91) 
High High Weak Closure  (+) 
Japan:  
Futenma (1995-96) 
High High Strong 
Minor 
concessions; 
status quo  (-) 
Ecuador: 
Manta (2005-06) 
Medium 
Medium-
High 
Weak 
Anticipated 
closure in 2009 
(+) 
Italy:  
Vicenza (2006-07) 
Medium High Strong 
Approval of base 
construction, no 
concessions (-) 
South Korea: 
SOFA (1999-2001) 
------------ High 
Moderate 
 
Minor concessions 
(+/-) 
South Korea: 
Maehyangri (2000) 
Medium High Moderate 
Minor concessions  
(+/-) 
South Korea: 
Pyeongtaek (2005-
06) 
High  High Moderate 
Delayed process, 
but no 
concessions (-) 
Philippines: 
VFA (1998-99) 
------------ Medium Strong 
No concessions; 
status quo 
 (-) 
Japan: 
Henoko off-shore 
facility/Camp 
Schwab (1997-2007) 
High Medium Strong 
Minor concessions 
(-) 
As Table 1.1. suggests, the impact of anti-base movements on base policy outcomes is 
limited when domestic elites exhibit either a strong or moderate degree of consensus 
during a particular episode. Thus, anti-base movements in Japan, Italy, or South Korea 
were at best only able to obtain minor policy concessions from the government. 
Conversely, domestic elites in the Philippines (in 1990-1991) and Ecuador did not 
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subscribe to a dominant pro-U.S. consensus, opening the opportunity for anti-base 
movements to shut down strategically significant U.S. bases.
9
  
Security Consensus Framework 
I attempt to link theories from two different sets of literature rarely examined 
together in a single framework. For social movement scholars who tend to focus on 
domestic political structures, the security consensus framework suggests that variables 
in the international system, such as bilateral alliances, shape or constrain 
movements.
10
 For international relations scholars, my theoretical framework 
highlights the role of civil society in world politics, a group often under-theorized in 
the literature.
11
 I do not naively suggest that civil society always matters in security 
politics. However, anti-base movements on several occasion have extracted 
concessions from powerful states.  Such empirical puzzles warrant a study on the role 
of anti-base movements in the politics of bases. Unfortunately, existing theories in 
international relations are ill-equipped in helping us understand when and how anti-
base movements matter. Nor do they help us accurately predict the type of response 
produced by host-states when balancing between international and domestic forces. 
The security consensus framework addresses this lacuna by providing a theoretical 
framework outlining the conditions in which we expect anti-base movement success, 
and changes in overseas basing policies.  
 My research suggests that host government response to anti-base movement 
pressure is largely shaped by domestic elites’ understanding of the U.S.-host state 
security alliance. More concretely, government response and social movement 
                                                 
9
 The section on research methods and design provides further explanation of the “strategic value” and 
“movement strength” categories.  
10
 But see David Meyer. "Political Opportunity and Nested Institutions." Social Movement Studies 2, no. 
1 (2003): 17-35. 
11
 See Richard Price. "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics." World Politics 55 
(2003): 579-606. 
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outcomes vary based on the level of “security consensus” held by political elites 
regarding U.S.-host state security relations. The model used to analyze the dynamics 
between host governments, civil society, and the U.S. can be regarded as a two stage 
model.  I approach the politics of overseas bases by first looking at structural factors - 
in this case, the security consensus built around bilateral alliances - and then move 
towards agency where overseas base policies are influenced by patterns of state-
society interaction.  Policy change requires a window of opportunity (a weak security 
consensus) at the international level. Social movement actors must then jump through 
the window by forming selective ties with elites to gain leverage in base policy 
decisions.  As Bear Braumoeller argues when investigating causal complexity and 
multiple paths of non-occurrence to policy change, either the absence of this window 
(a strong security consensus), or the inability of activists to jump through the window 
of opportunity (mobilize and form ties with sympathetic elites) precludes any major 
change in base policy outcomes.
12
  The theoretical framework I present proposes when 
social movements matter in base politics. However, given that major U.S. military 
bases are positioned in states closely allied with the U.S., the theory also suggests that 
the hurdles anti-base movements face are fairly high when challenging the host 
government and the U.S. on basing policy decisions.  
Defining the Security Consensus 
I define security consensus as the shared perception and intersubjective 
understanding of the concept of national security held by host government elites.
13
   
                                                 
12
 Bear Braumoeller. "Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics." Political Analysis 11, no. 3 (2003), 
p.212.  I thank Christopher Way for pointing out Bear Braumoller’s analogy of actors jumping through 
an open political window in outlining the necessary conditions for anti-base movement success.  The 
framework is also reminiscent of Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions. Structural constraints 
at the international level in conjunction with various combinations of domestic factors between state 
and society produce social outcomes. See Theda Skocpol. States and Social Revolutions: A 
Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
13
 In a similar vein, Randall Schweller introduces an “elite consensus” variable when examining 
balancing behavior among states. He describes elite consensus as “a measure of the similarity of elites’ 
preferences over outcomes and their beliefs about the preferences and anticipated actions of others.”  
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For the purpose of my dissertation, “security consensus” is construed more narrowly 
as a pro-U.S. security consensus, based on the shared perception and understanding of 
U.S.-host state alliance relations among national elites. For example, do political elites 
agree that the U.S. alliance functions as an integral component of their national 
security strategy? Do host government elites value a long-term strategic partnership 
with the U.S?  As a corollary, states characterized by a high degree of security 
consensus tend to accept the hosting of U.S. military bases as an important component 
of their alliance relationship with the U.S.   
 Although all national elites may hold particular beliefs about U.S.-host state 
relations, the relevant “holders” of the security consensus, are government or political 
elites within the foreign policy or national security establishment.
14
 These elites 
include heads of state or government such as the president or the prime minister, 
cabinet officials with a stake in base politics, bureaucrats in relevant agencies such as 
those in the foreign affairs ministry or department of defense, and government 
advisors, such as members of the national security council. Elites also include 
politicians and lawmakers, especially in cases where parliament ratifies the budget 
appropriating funds for U.S. bases, or the basing agreement itself. Opposition 
politicians who occasionally make their way into the foreign policy establishment may 
also be considered as legitimate holders of the security consensus.  
As I elaborate on the concept of security consensus below, three important 
points are worth keeping in mind.  First, the security consensus is fundamentally an 
ideational variable.
15
 Second, the security consensus is intersubjective in nature. Third, 
                                                                                                                                            
See Randall L. Schweller. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 2006, p.48-49. 
14
 I define “foreign policy and security establishment” as a broad set of political elites capable of 
influencing foreign policy and national security decisions. This term should not be equated with a pro-
U.S. security consensus.  
15
 The following works were particularly useful when thinking about “security consensus” as an 
ideational variable: Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, 
  10 
although it is important to identify the derivatives of the security consensus, the 
theoretical framework in this dissertation is more concerned in evaluating the strength 
(or weakness) of the consensus rather than its origins.  Inevitably, I must discuss 
where the security consensus comes from in the empirical chapters, but I do so without 
providing a nuanced theory of security consensus formation beyond the cursory 
treatment given below.
16
  
The security consensus is inextricably linked to alliance relations, and thus, 
many of the same factors leading to alliance formation. Threat perceptions, therefore, 
play a central role in shaping the security consensus. Threat perceptions are based on 
the material capabilities of adversaries.
17
  They are also rooted in identities and 
ideological differences.
18
  As constructivist international relations theorists note, by 
relying on perceptions and acknowledging the role of ideology in a theory of alliances, 
realists unwittingly move from the systemic to domestic level by “shifting analysis 
from material capabilities to ideational factors.”19  Hence, rather than assuming 
national security and elite preferences as given based on threat capabilities, I direct our 
attention towards internal, endogenous factors and the process of alliance formation.   
                                                                                                                                            
Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993; Jeffrey Legro. Rethinking the 
World : Great Power Strategies and International Order. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005; 
Mark Haas. The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989, Cornell. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005; Albert Yee. "The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies." International 
Organization 50, no. 1 (1996): 69-108. Sheri Berman. The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and 
Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
16
 In other words, the security consensus is treated as an independent variable throughout the 
dissertation. However, Chapter 7, which explores variation in the security consensus over time, attempts 
to offer a brief “theory of security consensus.” Here, the concept  is treated as a dependent variable.  
17
 Stephen Walt. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987; Patricia A. Weitsman. 
Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2004.  
18
 Michael Barnett. "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East." In The Culture of National Security: 
Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 400-50. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996, p. p.413. For ideological differences and threat perception, see Haas 2005. For 
identity and threat construction, see Jutta Weldes. "Constructing National Interests." European Journal 
of International Relations 2, no. 3 (1996): 275-318; Alexander Wendt. Social Theory of International 
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Chapter  6.   
19
 Katzenstein 1996, p.27. 
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Endogenous factors such as identity, ideology, domestic institutions, and 
historical legacies have an intervening effect on any elite consensus via threat 
perceptions. For example, regarding ideology, Mark Haas writes, “Ideological 
variables shape leaders’ understandings of the security environment in which they 
operate, in terms of which states constitute the greatest threats to leaders’ key interests 
and the level of this perceived threat.”20 In addition to their intervening effect, 
however, these endogenous factors also directly shape or sustain the security 
consensus. Once formed, the security consensus profoundly affects the domestic and 
foreign policy choices of elites.  
In studying elite consensus, I am interested in collective rather than individual 
perceptions and beliefs.
21
 This is not to argue that perceptions of individuals are 
unimportant or unrelated to group ideas. However, as Jeffrey Legro notes, “Dominant 
ideas are often embedded in public discourse and symbols that also represent 
intersubjective phenomena that attach to group, not individual orientation.”22 The 
security consensus functions as a “dominant idea,” precisely because it is held by the 
majority of key elites within the state. A consensus identifying particular threats, and 
favoring strong ties to the U.S. as an appropriate response, may reify over time 
through processes of institutionalization.
23
 Furthermore, powerful actors or groups, 
either within or outside the foreign policy and national security establishment, may 
develop vested interests in maintaining the security consensus. The interests of 
powerful elites may become embedded in the institutionalization process. Alternative 
ideas to national security, ones less reliant on the U.S. alliance and its basing network 
                                                 
20
 Haas 2005, p.2. 
21
 Legro’s discussion of collective ideas in international relations is particularly instructive. See Legro 
2005, pp.4-7. Also See Alexander Wendt. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 150-64.  
22
 Legro 2005, p.5. 
23
 On the impact of institutionalized ideas, see Kathryn Sikkink. Ideas and Institutions: 
Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
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may certainly co-exist within the polity. However, political, institutional, and 
normative forces perpetuating a powerful consensus will often drown out these 
alternative security views at the policy decision-making level. Even if numerous 
individuals hold ideas contrary to the consensus, the “collective orthodoxy” may still 
prevail, shaping state responses.
24
 This is particularly true if ideas, values, and beliefs 
central to the consensus are wrapped within legal and institutional frameworks. For 
example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the U.S.-Japan Mutual 
Defense Treaty play an important role in sustaining elite perceptions and beliefs about 
the U.S. alliance in Italian or Japanese defense policy. This is not to argue that the 
security consensus never changes over time, an issue raised in Chapter Seven. 
However, the intersubjective nature of the security consensus produces an inherent 
“stickiness.” 
In sum, the elite security consensus, while often derived from external threats 
in the international system, is also driven by internal factors.  Moreover, the 
intersubjective nature of the security consensus implies that material and ideational 
variables often interact as actors interpret their security environment.
25
 For instance, 
ideology or historical legacies may reinforce or heighten existing threat perceptions. 
These perceptions may persist long after objective material threat capabilities subside. 
Furthermore, external threat perceptions may strengthen over time, constructing 
particular identities between actors. For example, in South Korea, the reproduction of 
identities based on hostile interaction with North Korea, and the security dependence 
                                                 
24
 Legro 2005, p.26.  
25
 If non-material and ideational factors play such a large role, one might wonder why I choose to focus 
narrowly on host government elites while ignoring mass perceptions of national security. After all, if 
the security consensus is based on shared intersubjective understandings, mass public opinion should 
also factor into the security consensus.  To a certain degree, mass perceptions are reflected in the policy 
preferences of political elites and vice-versa.  Thus a common consensus regarding national security 
issues will often pervade both elites and the masses, particularly in a democratic polity. For the 
purposes of my dissertation, however, I privilege the security consensus among elites because it is elites 
who make and ultimately implement national security decisions.  
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formed after the Korean War between South Korea and the United States, bear 
significant influence today on South Korean security policy.  Likewise, the 
asymmetric relationship forged between the two countries since the Korean War has a 
bearing on the attitude of host state elites towards U.S.-South Korean relations – an 
attitude which favors U.S. military bases.  Japan’s defeat in World War II and its 
renouncement of the use of force in settling global disputes has also significantly 
shaped Japanese security policy. Reliance on the U.S security umbrella and its existing 
network of bases has become an accepted part of Japanese national security.  
The concept of security consensus may strike readers as a bit unsettling; it acts 
as a catch-all variable, encompassing everything from threat perceptions to domestic 
institutions to identity and norms. As argued above, however, my theoretical 
framework only needs to demonstrate whether a strong or weak consensus exists 
among host government elites.  Moreover, what constitutes the consensus will 
undoubtedly vary within the specific context of each country and the historical 
trajectory of U.S.-host state relations. For instance, the role of norms and domestic 
institutions will be much more pronounced in Japan, whereas the dominance of 
internal over external security concerns in the Philippines will play prominently in 
Philippine elites’ understanding of their security alliance with the U.S.  I provide a 
more concrete explanation of the coding and operationlization of the security 
consensus later in the chapter.  
Anti-Base Movement Mobilization  
 Before explaining how the security consensus relates to social movement 
outcomes, I first define the parameters of “anti-base mobilization.” I borrow 
extensively from the political process model in the social movement literature to 
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explain mobilization patterns in the empirical chapters.
26
 This school of thought 
contends that the political context surrounding movement mobilization significantly 
impacts movement development and outcomes. In particular, open political systems, 
divisions within elites, the presence of elite allies, and reduced state repression all help 
facilitate social movements.
27
  Often referred to as political opportunity structure 
(POS), these exogenous factors enhance or constrain a movement’s ability to mobilize, 
advance particular claims, build alliances, use certain strategies and tactics, and 
influence policy.
28
 It is important to note, however, that POS does not completely 
determine outcomes. Other factors, particularly the role of agency, must be calculated 
into the equation. We can thus approach POS as a variable which “influences the 
choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their 
environments.”29 
Anti-base movements are comprised of NGOs, grassroots actors, local 
residents, and civic groups protesting against bases over various claims of injustice.  
Needless to say, as Figure 1.1 below suggests, various types and levels of anti-base 
activism exist.
30
  Some anti-base movements only operate at the local level as a simple 
“not in my backyard” (NIMBY) protest. The movement to shut down Kooni Firing 
Range in South Korea  by the Maehyangri Resident’s Task Force in the late 1980s  is 
one example. 
                                                 
26
 Tarrow 1998; Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly. How Social Movements Matter. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999; Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. 
Zald. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movement: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, 
and Cultural Framings. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
27
 McAdam 1996. 
28
 David Meyer. "Protest and Political Opportunities." Annual Review of Sociology 30 (2004), pp.125-
26.  
29
 Herbert Kitschelt. "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in 
Four Democracies." British Journal of Political Science 16 (1986), p.58. 
30
 For an alternative typology of anti-base protests, see Calder 2007, p.84. Calder’s identifies three 
varieties of anti-base protests  based on actors’ motives: ideological, nationalistic, and pragmatic. 
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Figure 1.1: Typology of anti-base movements 
 
Although many anti-base movements begin at the local level, successful campaigns 
generally shape into broader coalition movements at the national or transnational 
level.
31
 Two examples include the national campaign to close down Kooni Firing 
Range, and the anti-base movement led by the Ecuador No Bases Coalition.  
The arrow in figure 1.1 represents the typical trajectory of anti-base 
movements. Different movement sectors such as peace groups, labor unions, 
environmental groups, student unions,  farmers, religious groups, or women’s groups 
usually coalesce under a common, albeit loose umbrella against U.S. bases or base 
policies.  Successful mobilization thus entails forming a broad-based coalition across 
different sectors at the local and national level.
32
 Moreover, it requires movement 
                                                 
31
 See McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001 and Tarrow 2005 on scale shift.  
32
 This does not mean that broad-based coalitions are without their own problems, such as factionalism 
across different organizations or sectors.  Some of this tension is highlighted in the empirical chapters. 
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leaders to incorporate broader frames and expand at the national level without 
neglecting the local origins of anti-base movements.
33
  
 Anti-base movements use various strategies to pressure the host state regime 
on basing policies. To gain media and national attention, activists will organize several 
large, mass rallies to publicize their campaign. Protests are organized in highly public 
or symbolic venues such as city hall, government agency buildings (i.e. the defense 
and foreign affairs department), or outside U.S. bases to capture attention.  Anti-base 
movements will organize other events such as press conferences, public forums, music 
concerts, festivals, and educational campaigns to promote their cause. More radical 
tactics entail physical occupation of military bases in an effort to disrupt military 
operations or damage U.S. base property. In rare instances, anti-base activists engage 
in violence against U.S. personnel or host government forces.   
 Activists employ several tactics to influence the host government both 
indirectly and directly. Anti-base movements may pressure key host government 
officials indirectly by swaying domestic public opinion against U.S. bases, or creating 
tension at the alliance level by engaging in what the media often portrays as anti-
American protests.  These movements also attempt to influence policymakers more 
directly by providing sustained, vocal opposition over base-related issues such as 
crime, public safety, environmental pollution, or sovereignty rights. Additionally, 
movement activists may meet with government officials in public or private forums to 
discuss base problems, attempt to “educate” officials by providing information, or in 
some cases, lobby politicians and political candidates.  
                                                 
33
 Andrew Yeo. "Local National Dynamics and Framing in South Korean Anti-Base Movements." 
Kasarinlan 21, no. 2 (2006): 34-69; Herbert Docena. "Plenary Panel Four Presentation: How Do We 
Strengthen the International Network for the Abolition of Foreign Military Bases?". Quito, Ecuador, 
2007. 
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The Security Consensus as a Political Opportunity Structure 
How does civil society penetrate the state, particularly on issues concerning 
national security policy? Conversely, how do states react to social movement 
pressure?  I highlight two key insights borrowed from previous research in the social 
movements and transnational relations literature: domestic structure and elite access. 
First, civil society is more likely to gain access to elites under open domestic 
structures such as those found in democracies.
34
  Second, anti-base movements must 
“penetrate” the state and gain access to elites if they are to play a direct role in base 
policy outcomes – certainly no easy feat given the strong capacities of states to control 
national security policy.   
The political opportunity model employed by social movement theorists view 
opportunities and state-society interaction from the perspective of social movement 
actors.
35
 For example, Herbert Kitschelt observes that regime openness and state 
capacity affects the strategy and overall effectiveness of social movements.
36
 The state 
autonomy literature inverts this perspective, with state-society interaction observed 
from the vantage point of states. Thus, the domestic structures which translate to 
political opportunities for social movements function as the same institutional tools 
which provide states the autonomy and strong capacity necessary to stave off social 
movements and other forms of domestic pressure.   
                                                 
34
 Kitschelt 1986, p.68. Although social movement theorists tend to see open political structures as 
favorable to social movements outcomes, this is not always case. As Matthew Evangelista has 
demonstrated, transnational actors working under open, decentralized political environments, while able 
to gain elite access, are actually less effective in implementing policy because of the numerous 
competing voices in a more open system. Evangelista 1999. 
35
  The security consensus functions as a political opportunity structure (POS) at the national level.  
Although POS scholars tend to examine the entire institutional system (i.e. institutional structures at the 
local, regional, and national level) to determine degree of closure or openness, I part ways with 
traditional notions of POS by limiting my discussion of “open” or “closed” structures to the national 
elite level. While this may raise valid criticism from the social movement crowd, it is the state which 
acts as the common denominator in the security consensus framework, allowing me to link social 
movement analysis with the international relations literature.   
36
 ibid, p.64. 
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International relations and comparative politics scholars coming from the 
statist tradition point to institutional features of state agencies which make states more 
or less prone to societal pressure.
37
 State autonomy and capacity are underpinned by 
factors such as stable administrative-military control of territory, loyal and skilled 
bureaucrats, a large treasury, and strong institutions.
38
  Rather than focusing on 
institutional structures, however, I point to ideational features which enable key state 
actors to remain autonomous in the national security policy-making process. In 
particular, prevailing perceptions and ideology which underpin the security consensus 
among host government elites prevent societal actors from penetrating the state and 
finding common allies with sympathetic elites.
39
  In addition to institutional features, 
ideological structures enable the state to remain insulated when making important 
national security decisions, including those pertaining to the U.S. alliance.  
 The security consensus framework emphasizes that shared perceptions, 
beliefs, and ideas which promote the U.S.-host state alliance lead political elites’ to 
reject activist demands, ultimately undermining anti-base movement mobilization. On 
the other hand, a weak security consensus, characterized by elite division over the role 
of the U.S. alliance and bases for host state security, enables activists to exert greater 
influence on policy elites, and subsequently basing outcomes. In short, the security 
consensus operates as a political opportunity, constraining or facilitating movement 
effectiveness on base policy outcomes. Table 1.2 below summarizes the relationship 
                                                 
37
 Jack Snyder. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1991; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Skocpol 1985, p.16. 
38
 Skocpol 1985, p.16.  
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 The logic here is reminiscent of Jack Snyder’s Myths of Empire, where Snyder discusses the ability of 
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Contrary to my argument, however, Snyder argues that ruling elites form ties with parochial interest 
groups in perpetuating the expansion myth when elites have an interest in promoting overexpansion. In 
my argument, it is the absence of certain perceptions, beliefs, or ideology – the security consensus – 
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between the security consensus, patterns of state-societal interaction, and movement 
effectiveness regarding policy shifts.   
 
Table 1.2: Relationship between Security Consensus and Movement Effectiveness 
Security Consensus State-Societal Interaction Movement Effectiveness 
 
Strong (Majority of host state 
elites believe U.S. alliance plays 
key role in national security 
strategy) 
 
 
Anti-base movements unable to 
penetrate state. State attempts to 
diffuse anti-base movement pressure 
 
No: Minimal base policy 
change or status quo. 
Moderate A significant number 
of host state elites believe the 
U.S. alliance plays key role in 
national security strategy.  
However, the consensus may not 
be deeply rooted. Other elites 
may also contest the consensus. 
 
A few key elites may be receptive to 
anti-base movement pressure and 
persuasion. However, movements 
still face difficulty penetrating the 
state.   
Maybe: Movements may 
gain minor concessions. 
However, impact is still 
limited. 
Weak (Elites divided in role of 
U.S. alliance for its national 
security strategy)  
Anti-base movements penetrate the 
state, forming ties with sympathetic 
elites. Anti-base discourse diffuses to 
key elites 
Yes: Significant base 
policy change. 
 
Those expecting to read a dissertation on anti-base movements may find 
themselves sorely disappointed with this overwhelmingly structural account thus far. 
Where is agency?   Although the proposed theoretical framework hinges on the 
security consensus, I steer away from making any direct causal claim between elite 
consensus and policy outcomes.
40
 Rather than determining outcomes, the security 
consensus delineates the boundaries of interaction between state and society. In other 
words, the consensus influences how political elites interpret and react to anti-base 
pressure.  The core of my argument captures the dynamic relations between movement 
and government actors within the limits of the security consensus.  
                                                 
40
 On this point, see Goldstein and Keohane 1993, p.11; Yee 1996, p.71. Both scholars note the 
“egregious error” made by scholars working on ideas in international relations who purport that a direct 
causal link exists. 
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Where I argue that social movements do matter, anti-base movements make a 
difference not only because of favorable opportunity structures (a weak security 
consensus permitting elite access), but because they employ powerful framing 
strategies, take advantage of mobilization structures and networks, use effective and 
creative tactics, and form ties with elite allies. Thus, a weak security consensus does 
not guarantee that anti-base pressure will translate into real policy changes. Activists 
must actually take advantage of favorable political opportunities. And even though 
anti-base movements are relatively ineffective under a strong security consensus, the 
development of movement strategies and government counter-strategies shaped by the 
consensus produces a riveting account of base politics. The take home point is that 
structure and agency interact to produce particular outcomes. As I demonstrate later in 
the empirical chapters, the most exciting story of anti-base movements are woven into 
the patterns of interaction between government and movement actors, shaped by the 
security consensus (see Figure 1.2 below).  
 
Figure 1.2: Structure and agency in anti-base movement outcomes 
 
As a final word before proceeding with the specific causal mechanisms of my 
argument, the link bridging social movement analysis with international relations 
theory is the concept of political opportunity structure (POS).  More specifically, by 
conceptualizing national elite perceptions of alliance relations as a POS, I am able to 
draw social movement analysis into international relations theory. The inclusion of 
social movements presents an argument quite different from the standard variants of 
SECURITY 
CONSENSUS 
 
     OUTCOME 
State-
Societal 
Interaction 
Structure Agency 
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realism, liberalism, or constructivism. And while the security consensus framework 
resonates with the literature on domestic-international linkages, the addition of social 
movements brings a fresh perspective on the role of domestic politics in international 
relations. The result is an approach to base politics different from current power or 
regime-based explanations. 
The fusion of social movement analysis with international relations theory is 
not without its own set of problems, however. As I discuss later, any research design 
which attempts to adequately address issues from both disciplines must maneuver 
between the level of movement episodes and the level of states.
41
 Furthermore, 
scholars grounded in the social movement literature may find the connection between 
the security consensus and POS too narrow, opting to interpret a national elite 
consensus as only one aspect of a broader set of POS within the entire institutional 
system.
42
 Therefore, other “political opportunities” such as local elite relations, public 
opinion, the stability of political alignments, or a decline in the state’s repressive 
capacity, may also affect base policy outcomes. Finally, from the standpoint of 
international relations, scholars accustomed to macro-level theorizing may find the 
security consensus framework banal, focusing too narrowly on one aspect of base 
politics. Why bother with social movements if power or political-economic based 
arguments explain the majority of base politics? 
In the empirical chapters, I take into consideration cross-discipline challenges, 
exploring base politics from both the level of movement episodes as well as the level 
of states. This analytical move inevitably shifts us away from the lofty goal of 
parsimony, and the type of international relations theorizing which ultimately 
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 See McAdam 1996, p.27. Those advocating cultural or constructivist social movement perspectives 
may altogether dismiss the structural bias of the security consensus framework.  
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subsumes every other variable under the sun.  By disaggregating to the level of 
movement episodes, however, I propose a much richer, complex narrative of base 
politics. At the same time, a “statist” account of the security consensus framework, 
and comparisons between anti-base movements in different countries are possible. 
After all, domestic anti-base movements are still embedded within national contexts.  
 
The Causal Logic of the Security Consensus Framework 
The following section provides a more nuanced discussion of the theoretical 
framework, specifying the actors and the causal mechanisms linking movements, host 
government response, and policy outcomes granted by the U.S. and the host 
government.   
Actors 
Anti-base movement: For illustrative purposes, I treat anti-base movements as a 
unitary actor. In the empirical chapters, I discuss in greater length the tension, friction, 
and different ideological factions which exist within national anti-base movements. 
While different ideological strands between moderate and more radical groups 
certainly complicates the story, treating anti-base movements as a single unit in my 
framework enhances the analytical power of my theory. In each case, a core group of 
anti-base activists, often associated with broader, left-leaning ideological movements, 
are usually identifiable. Although the host government is aware of different factions 
within anti-base movements, and at times takes advantage of movement tension and 
factionalism, the state tends to treat and confront anti-base movements as a single unit.  
 Host state:  The “host state” refers to political or government elites43 within the 
foreign policy and national security establishment. As argued earlier, these elites 
include officials and politicians in both the executive and legislative branches of 
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government responsible for foreign and policy decision-making.
44
  The government 
elites which matter the most in base politics will vary in each case depending on 
specific domestic institutional arrangements. For instance, in the Philippines, a new 
base treaty required ratification by the Philippine Senate, thus giving Senators 
significant influence in base politics. In Japan, executive and bureaucratic agencies 
such as the Defense Facilities Administration Agency handle base policy decisions. 
Although movements may choose to target the U.S. in hopes of swaying 
Washington, empirically anti-base movements almost always designate the host state 
as their key target. Assuming the U.S. prefers retaining bases of high strategic value, 
the host state ultimately decides whether U.S. bases should stay or go.
45
  The host state 
makes this decision during negotiations with the U.S., and in parliamentary procedures 
approving basing arrangements or funding for U.S. bases. Therefore, anti-base 
movements prefer targeting the more immediate and tangible host state, rather than 
challenging Washington when both the host state and the U.S. perceive bases as 
critical for security. 
 United States:  It might strike the reader as somewhat odd that the U.S. has 
remained outside of base politics to this point. From a systemic perspective, the United 
States is indeed the most important player in the politics of overseas U.S. military 
bases. The opening and closure of most bases around the world are heavily dictated by 
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 At a secondary level, host state elites might also include epistemic communities and other 
knowledge-based experts in academia, think tanks, or business. These groups influence foreign policy 
through informal channels and networks. Although not formally part of the state, epistemic 
communities and business elites help identify and address policy interests for government elites. The 
lines are often blurred between these informal state actors and government officials as non-government 
foreign policy experts and business leaders cross-over into policy and vice-versa. Although I 
acknowledge that the security consensus stems from the intersubjective understanding of national 
security by both sets of elites, in this study, I privilege host government officials; ultimately, host 
government officials engage and formulate policy responses to anti-base movements. See Lawrence and 
Page, 2005, p.108. 
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 In other words, when the strategic value of bases are low, the U.S. will ultimately decide whether 
U.S. bases remain.  
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the strategic needs of the U.S. military. In many cases, the U.S. initiates basing policy 
changes due to changes in the strategic environment or technological improvements.  
In this dissertation, I make several analytical moves in the research design 
which allow us to incorporate the role of the U.S., but without washing out the 
important dynamics between anti-base movements and the host government.
46
 First, I 
select movement episodes around bases of high strategic value to the U.S. Given the 
importance of the base, we can assume that the U.S. prefers maintaining the status quo 
regarding basing policies. Second, I examine episodes of contention which reflect 
changes to basing policies initiated domestically, either by anti-base movements or the 
host government. Lastly, it is worth noting that the U.S. and anti-base movements 
never interact directly. Legally, the U.S. cannot negotiate with anti-base movement 
activists. Thus the host state becomes the central arena for base politics, with the most 
intense action located at the intersection between state and society.  
While the role of the U.S. remains “bounded” with these caveats in place, the 
U.S. still exerts its influence on base hosts, often in the form of economic incentives or 
diplomatic pressure. We should keep in mind that the definition of a pro-U.S. security 
consensus – elite perceptions and beliefs regarding the importance of U.S. security 
relations - implies that the U.S. commands significant leverage over host governments. 
Although the empirical narratives focus more closely on the interaction between anti-
base movements and host governments, where relevant, I discuss the diplomatic 
pressure and negotiating tactics used by the U.S. to sway host nation actors. While not 
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 Admittedly, my theory does not encompass a comprehensive explanation for the closure or relocation 
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the three different actors (the U.S., host government, and civil society) diverge, and where politics is 
most inherent. There is little to say about anti-base movements in cases where base policy changes were 
clearly dictated by U.S. strategic preferences. For instance, the massive withdrawal of U.S. forces in 
Europe after World War II was unrelated to any domestic opposition against U.S. bases.   
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always the case, the U.S. may alter incentives of both movement and government 
actors. 
Conditions of Strong Security Consensus 
Figure 1.3 diagrams the interaction process between the U.S., host state, and 
anti-base movements when a strong security consensus exists among host state elites.   
 
Figure 1.3: Host state response to anti-base movements under conditions of strong  
security consensus 
 
Under conditions of strong security consensus, anti-base movements are unable to 
penetrate the state and remain relatively ineffective in achieving significant policy 
gains (T1). The existence of a strong security consensus among host state political 
elites (denoted by the solid circle) prevents or discourages anti-base movements from 
effectively pressuring elites. A dominant national security discourse and pro-U.S. 
security consensus permeates the foreign policy establishment, creating obstacles for 
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anti-base movements. Under a strong consensus, activists are unable to find political 
allies or gain any traction among elites involved in the base policy decision-making 
process.  Complicating anti-base movement efforts, at T2, the host government 
responds to movement pressure by employing various strategies and tactics of its own 
to co-opt or weaken anti-base movements. Host governments are aware that domestic 
opposition to bases is often cyclical, triggered by accidents, high profile crimes, or 
other external events related to U.S. bases. The host government will therefore release 
its own public media campaign, drag out negotiations with activists until the 
movement loses steam, or make minimal concessions to mitigate any potential crisis 
between state and civil society. In short, anti-base movement efforts are thwarted 
because of the existing security consensus. In effect, the security consensus shapes the 
patterns of interaction between state and society. The confrontation between activists 
and government officials at best leads to token concessions amounting to marginal 
changes in basing policies, and at worst movement defeat and the status quo.  
The effectiveness of anti-base movements
47
 is significantly reduced without 
access to key elites. This does not mean, however, that anti-base movements never 
have any impact under conditions of strong security consensus. Figure 1.3 indicates 
that at T1, anti-base movements may also pressure the host government by creating 
tensions in host state- U.S. relations. Paradoxically, anti-base activists are capable of 
exerting pressure because elites value strong security ties to the U.S.
48
  Domestic 
opposition against bases sends negative signals to the U.S. Large scale protests such as 
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 I equate movement effectiveness or movement success with base policy outcomes. Admittedly, this is 
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other levels such as raising issue awareness or shifting public opinion. Moreover, movement “success” 
is subjective. What movements might define as success (i.e. winning token concessions or delaying 
base expansion) the state may not. Defining movement success from the vantage point of the state (and 
hence policy outcomes) rather than social movement actors partially alleviates this problem.  
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 If host government elites carried ambivalent attitudes towards bilateral U.S. relations, elites would 
feel significantly less pressure and public embarrassment from widespread anti-U.S. protests.  
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those in Okinawa in 1995 after the rape of a twelve year old girl, or in South Korea in 
2002 when two schoolgirls were run over by an armored vehicle, eventually reach 
proportions which if left unchecked, have the potential to damage U.S.-host state 
alliance relations.  Thus, the host government may respond to anti-base movements 
not necessarily out of domestic political concerns, but out of fear that U.S. alliance 
relations will deteriorate if base protests persist or grow.  Sensitive to souring alliance 
relations, the host state will feel pressure to make at least partial concessions to anti-
base movements to quell opposition. Therefore, anti-base pressure will occasionally 
lead to a negotiated response from both the U.S. and host state, partially addressing 
some of the demands of anti-base movements. These partial concessions may be 
regarded as token policy changes.  Under conditions of strong security consensus, the 
state reacts as, what Jack Snyder describes, “a pivot adjudicating between international 
and domestic pressures.”49  Here, however, the logic of security, and ideas about 
bilateral U.S. relations are deeply engrained in the perceptions of host state elites. 
Although anti-base movements are capable of pressuring the state, the role of civil 
society in overseas base politics under these conditions is relatively limited.  
Conditions of Weak Security Consensus 
When is civil society capable of penetrating the state on national security 
policy issues?  As Figure 1.4 indicates below, I argue that social movements are able 
to penetrate the state and gain access to elites when the security consensus is weak 
(denoted by the dashed circle).  The interaction between host government elites and 
anti-base movements is more complex under a weak security consensus. While the 
host government may want to maintain alliance relations with the U.S., the security 
logic for maintaining U.S. bases for national defense may not be readily apparent. 
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Figure 1.4: Host state response to anti-base movements under conditions of  
weak security consensus 
 
Political elites in states characterized by a weak security consensus tend to hold lower 
external threat perceptions. Bases may be bargained with the U.S. in a quid pro quo, 
but host governments have no strong incentive to maintain the status quo if U.S. bases 
present a political liability. Thus, at T1, anti-base movements are able to “penetrate” 
the state and influence key decision-makers. 
 In the absence of a strong security consensus, anti-base activists find potential 
allies among elites who are opposed to U.S. bases or sympathetic to movement 
demands (denoted by the “Xs” within the solid circle in Figure 1.4). Host state 
response is therefore fragmented at T2. Political elites in favor of U.S. bases challenge 
or attempt to co-opt social movements. On the other hand, political elites ambivalent 
or opposed to bases may encourage or even join anti-base activists.   
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Under conditions of weak consensus, access to elites gives anti-base 
movements leverage in the base policy process.  Activists influence base policy 
outcomes by pressuring and altering the political calculations of elites who, in the 
absence of significant base opposition, would otherwise tolerate the status quo. 
Additionally, anti-base activists indirectly influence policy outcomes by providing 
host state elites of like-mind a domestic support base. Under these conditions, 
substantial changes in base policy outcomes become possible.   
In sum, the degree of security consensus influences the different choices and 
strategies of anti-base movement and government actors, which in turn, produce 
particular policy outcomes. The security consensus functions as a political opportunity 
structure constraining or enabling the ability of social movement actors to penetrate 
the state and gain elite access.  A weak security consensus provides an open window, 
enabling anti-base activists to shape outcomes in their interaction with the host 
government. It is the combination of a weak security consensus and the movement 
strategies employed by anti-base activists, particularly the ability to find support from 
sympathetic elites, which lead to movement success at the policy level. Conversely, 
under a strong security consensus, anti-base movements have difficulty penetrating the 
state. Influenced by a strong security consensus, dominant host government elites 
counter anti-base movement pressure by employing strategies which undermine 
activist efforts.  
Alternative Explanations 
What alternative explanations challenge or falsify the security consensus 
framework? The empirical and concluding chapters address competing approaches to 
base politics in greater detail. For now, I briefly present major alternatives arising 
from different analytical traditions found in international relations and comparative 
politics.  
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Social movement explanations 
The first alternative is the social movement explanation, or more specifically 
the resource mobilization perspective of social movements.
50
 According to the 
resource mobilization perspective, the impact of anti-base movements depends on 
internal movement dynamics and overall mobilization strength. Why might 
movements succeed or fail according to this approach? Upon deeper examination of 
movement mobilization, internal issues such as fractionalization over movement 
strategy, or weak organizational structure may suggest that failed anti-base movements 
were simply too weak to ever influence U.S. basing policies.  For instance, the rapid 
decline of the student and labor movements in South Korea in recent years may have 
led to a general decline in movement mobilization across all issues.  Moreover, anti-
base activists must often compete with other movement coalitions for limited human 
and material resources. Even though different movement coalitions may share many of 
the same organizational members, smaller NGOs and civic groups must limit their 
resources and attention to the coalitional issues they deem most important at any given 
time. On the other hand, anti-base movements such as those in the Philippines may 
have been more successful in influencing policy outcomes simply because they were 
better mobilized and capable of pooling large amounts of political and material 
resources.  
Yet as argued above, successful mobilization does not sufficiently lead to 
major changes in basing policy. Movements may rally hundreds of thousands of 
protestors, use all the right frames, remain relatively united, and even find allies inside 
the government. However, movements must still sway political elites who must not 
only contend with domestic opposition, but also fulfill international alliance 
obligations. Guided by a dominant consensus in support of the U.S. alliance, elites 
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will devise counter-strategies against movements to undermine their credibility and 
political clout. Successful collective action is obviously a necessary component of any 
successful anti-base outcome. However, as the two-stage security consensus 
framework suggests, social movement factors must work in conjunction with 
ideational structures generated by elite perceptions of bilateral alliances. 
Power explanations 
 The second alternative explanation hinges on the role of U.S. power and 
interests in overseas base politics. This explanation is rooted in the realist school of 
thought in international relations. Given that the U.S. overseas basing system is 
intended to address U.S. strategic interests, the U.S. exercises significant political 
weight in any basing policy decision.  Focusing on U.S. strategic objectives and the 
distribution of power in the international system, a structural realist would dismiss 
social movements as largely irrelevant. Any policy changes which occur regarding 
overseas bases are largely a function of U.S. geopolitical interests.  Realists would 
therefore explain the closure of bases such as Subic Bay Naval Station in the 
Philippines as a result of declined threats with the unraveling of the Soviet Union. On 
the other hand, U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan remain critical to regional 
security and U.S. strategic objectives. As long as U.S. bases remain strategically 
important, anti-base movements have little effect in influencing U.S. basing policies in 
these two countries.  
 Power-based theories offer a compelling alternative to the security consensus 
framework. I certainly do not ignore the role of power, particularly U.S. interests. On 
one hand, realist explanations are not antithetical to my own argument. In fact, if elite 
security consensus were only based on threat perceptions, we could easily substitute 
“consensus” with Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory into my causal framework.51 
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Differences in the distribution of material capabilities would lead to higher or lower 
threat perceptions. Under low threat perceptions, the host government may feel 
ambivalent about its asymmetric alliance relationship with the United States, enabling 
activists to form ties with elites in bringing down U.S. bases.  
 Without denying the role of power, I take a more eclectic approach.  I include 
ideology, norms, and institutions as the foundations of the security consensus in 
addition to threat perceptions based on material capabilities. Likewise, my theoretical 
framework draws from numerous insights from statist or neoclassical realists who take 
into account domestic factors and the role of perceptions.
52
 Yet power-based theories, 
particularly the systemic variant, do not provide the proper theoretical tools to assess 
the role of social movements in world politics. Civil societal actors are simply 
ignored.
53
 Even statist realists, when acknowledging civil societal pressure, will treat 
social movements as a domestic interest group without engaging the nuances revealing 
interactive effects between mobilization strategies and other international relations 
variables such as alliances. 
Regime type explanations 
The third alternative explanation to base politics is one dominated by regime 
types.
54
  For instance, Alexander Cooley contends that the stability of basing 
agreements, and hence base policy outcomes, are shaped by the institutional credibility 
of the contractual environment and the host regime’s level of political dependence on 
U.S. bases. Cooley finds that basing agreements are most stable under consolidated 
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democracies. Bases are depoliticized in firm democracies with credible political 
institutions legitimizing any basing contract.
55
 However, when host governments are 
relatively independent from U.S. security arrangements, and transitioning from 
autocratic to democratic regimes - conditions where the contractual environment is 
most unstable - U.S. bases become much more contested. We expect to find greater 
anti-base activity and the possibility of major base policy shifts during 
democratization. 
While regime type explanations offer a compelling account of base politics, 
they deemphasize the role of bilateral security alliances when accounting for basing 
outcomes.
56
  Admittedly, my theoretical framework also privileges the domestic arena 
when analyzing base politics. However, host government elites, particularly those 
operating under a strong security consensus, are under constant pressure to maintain 
positive alliance relations as they attempt to address domestic criticism against bases. 
A focus on regime type skirts this important dilemma faced by host governments, one 
where elites are tied to international obligations, but pressed from below by civil 
societal actors. How this dilemma is resolved requires closer investigation of alliance 
relationships.  
To counter regime type explanations, I must demonstrate that the security 
consensus affects elite response to domestic base opposition irrespective of regime 
type. For example, under conditions of strong security consensus, regardless of regime 
type or orientation, anti-base movements should remain ineffective, with basing 
policies remaining relatively unchanged.
57
 I address this point further in Chapter Four, 
as well as the concluding chapter.  
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Rather than pitting regime type and security consensus as competing 
arguments, scholars may find it more constructive to explore parallels and avenues for 
synthesis. Regime type may actually help inform whether a security consensus exists 
among host government elites. For instance, one might argue ceteris paribus that the 
security consensus shared amongst host state elites appears stronger in autocratic 
rather than democratic regimes given the decentralized domestic structure of 
democracies. As the empirical chapters demonstrate, many of the predictions found in 
the regime type analysis of base politics correspond with my own theoretical 
framework. However, the mechanisms which explain or predict base policy outcomes 
differ. In certain cases, regime type explanations will provide greater analytical 
leverage, while in other episodes, the security consensus will offer a more compelling 
account. If the preceding statement appears overly conciliatory, we should be 
reminded that rarely, if ever, does one find a fail-proof scientific theory in political 
science. Instead we rely on theories which, when tested and substantiated with 
thorough evidence, appear to offer the best interpretation of empirical reality.  
Research Design and Methods 
Operationaliztion of Variables 
Security Consensus: Measuring concepts such as perceptions, beliefs, or 
ideology is a fuzzy science. The security consensus, based largely on collective 
perceptions and beliefs, is no exception. Although loose quantitative indicators 
correlated with security dependence, such as the number of U.S. troops per host state 
capita, the number of U.S. installations, or alliance burden sharing costs may point 
towards a security consensus, the concept is better understood and operationalized by 
using qualitative indicators. Table 1.3 below presents a simple framework used to 
evaluate the strength or weakness of the security consensus among host government 
elites.  
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     Table 1.3: Coding of the Security Consensus 
 
                              BREADTH 
            Narrow                                  Wide 
Maximum 
 
    DEPTH 
 
Minimum  
Moderate Consensus Strong Consensus 
Weak Consensus Moderate Consensus 
 
The degree of security consensus among elites can be captured in terms of two 
dimensions: breadth and depth. “Breadth” refers to the number of elites in the foreign 
policy and security establishment who share a pro-U.S. security consensus. In other 
words, how widespread is the security consensus among political elites. Wide breadth 
implies that virtually all political elites favor strong security relations with the U.S., 
and support U.S. basing policy. Conversely, narrow breadth suggests that a few key 
elites hold onto the security consensus, but it may not be widely shared among the 
larger foreign policy or security establishment. Narrow breadth is characterized by 
greater contention among political elites regarding U.S. alliance issues.  
“Depth” refers to the security consensus embodied in domestic institutions. 
Maximum depth implies that the security consensus is deeply embedded within 
institutions or ideology. Domestic political and ideological constraints prevent 
political elites from deviating too far from a pro-U.S. security consensus, even if these 
elites privately prefer loosening security ties to the U.S.  On the contrary, minimum 
depth suggests that the security consensus operates at a more superficial level. 
Although elites may share a common perception of the U.S. alliance, the consensus 
rests on more fragile ground if it lacks the institutions, historical legacies, norms, or 
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ideologies which often help solidify collective beliefs about security relations over 
time. 
Table 1.3 indicates that the security consensus is strongest when breadth is 
wide and depth is at a maximum. Conversely, the consensus is weakest when breadth 
is narrow and depth is at a minimum. Naturally, a strong correlation exists between 
depth and breadth. A higher percentage of elites will favor strong U.S. alliance 
policies and U.S. bases if the consensus is deeply embedded in institutions and 
ideology. However, the two dimensions of security consensus are not always 
congruent. For instance, opposition politicians may challenge U.S.-centered foreign 
policies advocated by the ruling elite, indicating narrower breadth.  At the core, 
however, ideology and institutions may prevent a pro-U.S. security consensus from 
completely unraveling, suggesting maximum depth. Institutional and ideological 
factors constrain the political choices of oppositional elites, requiring them to 
acquiesce to the broader foreign policy and national security establishment supportive 
of the U.S. alliance.
58
 This combination of narrow breadth and maximum depth results 
in a “moderate” coding of the security consensus. 
Likewise, the security consensus is coded as moderate when breadth is wide 
and depth is at a minimum. An example of this scenario may occur when a state 
previously ambivalent towards U.S. security relations experiences a sharp increase in 
external threats. Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War provides one such 
example. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Saudi elites previously ambivalent to 
U.S. military presence in the Middle East suddenly perceived U.S. forces in a much 
more favorable light. At the Saudi government’s request, the U.S. dispatched U.S. 
troops to protect Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi invasion. However, this widespread 
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consensus favoring security commitment from the U.S was not deeply institutionalized 
within Saudi domestic institutions.
59
  
What observable implications help us measure the dimensions of breadth and 
depth, determining whether the security consensus is coded as strong, weak, or 
moderate? To the extent that the security consensus exists as a dominant foreign 
policy idea guiding state behavior, one will find evidence of an elite security 
consensus (or lack of) – embedded in national debates, policy discussions, speeches, 
and institutional arrangements.
60
 I use elite interviews, policy documents, legislative 
transcripts, government records, and official statements to gauge whether the host 
government believes U.S. forces are a necessary component of national security. More 
generally, if government elites support U.S. troop presence, U.S. bases, and a greater 
role in general for the U.S. in host state security, the security consensus should be 
coded as strong.  Additionally, the security consensus is interpreted as strong if 
government elites explicitly state that U.S. forces guarantee host state national 
security. Often, the security consensus will be correlated with high degrees of threat 
perception. On the dimension of depth, institutionalized agreements such as mutual 
defense treaties or formalized bilateral security arrangements, as well as domestic 
institutions which legitimate the U.S. alliance and bases also point towards a strong (or 
at least moderate) security consensus.  For instance, the creation of the Defense 
Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) in Japan handling U.S. base issues, or 
provisions in South Korea’s National Security Laws tacitly directed against North 
Korea, help legitimate strong alliance relations and U.S. bases. 
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On the other hand, coding the security consensus as weak can be justified if 
government documents and elite statements indicate intense debates among 
government elites and academic circles regarding the extent of external threat 
perceptions and the role of U.S. forces and bases in national security. National 
discourse and debates, elite statements and attitudes, media reports, and opinion 
surveys should point towards major rifts on the issue of the U.S. alliance and bases. 
Elite statements rejecting U.S. bases, downgrading the importance of the U.S. alliance, 
or proposing alternative security arrangements reducing U.S. influence would marshal 
support for narrow breadth and minimal depth, and hence a weak security consensus.  
Figure 1.5 below codes the security consensus for each country evaluated in 
the empirical chapters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Coding the strength or weakness of a pro.-U.S. security consensus 
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Although the security consensus is coded as a categorical variable, for the 
purpose of illustration, breadth and depth are conceptualized continuously in Figure 
1.5.  This scheme helps clarify the coding of the elite security consensus in countries 
such as Italy (and perhaps South Korea), which most likely fall in-between the 
categories of strong and moderate.  Minor contention regarding the direction of U.S. 
alliance policies may exist within the foreign policy establishment, implying narrower 
breadth. However, the security consensus is still deeply embedded in institutions, 
ideology, and historical legacies in these two countries, suggesting maximum depth. 
Regarding South Korea, although alternative views calling for greater foreign policy 
independence exist in Seoul, the institutionalization and embedded nature of the 
security consensus suggests, at the very least, the presence of a moderate security 
consensus. The security consensus in Japan, coded as “strong”, is straight-forward. 
Japanese political elites are largely in favor of strong U.S. alliance relations, with a 
pro-U.S. consensus deeply embedded in Japanese domestic norms and institutions.  
On the contrary, the consensus in Ecuador and the Philippines (1991) is coded as 
weak. The security consensus is neither deep nor wide in these two countries. In the 
late 1990s, however, the Philippines is characterized by a strong elite security 
consensus. Chinese aggression in the South China Sea in the mid-1990s, and political 
economic constraints plaguing the Philippines’ military modernization program helped 
rally the majority of Philippine elites to support strengthened security ties to the U.S. 
by the late 1990s.  
Base Policy Outcome:  Base policy outcomes depend on the interaction 
between movement and government actors, which in turn, are influenced by the 
strength or weakness of the security consensus.  A range of base policy outcomes are 
possible. The spectrum ranges from the maintenance of the status quo on one end, to 
the complete removal of U.S. forces on the other. When a strong security consensus 
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exists among elites, the host state responds to anti-base movements by employing 
strategies which delay, co-opt, disrupt, or confront anti-base movements. Under these 
circumstances, the host state may grant minor concessions to movements at best, but 
no substantial base policy changes are made. When elites are divided, however, host 
state responses to anti-base movements are variegated. Under these conditions, 
sympathetic elites support and align with movements politically. Genuine interaction 
and dialogue takes place between government elites opposed to U.S. bases and anti-
base movement activists. Thus, more substantive changes in base policies are 
expected, such as significant changes to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the 
closure of major military installations, or the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces.  
Unit of Analysis: Movement Episodes  
 Incorporating social movement analysis into international relations theory 
creates a bit of ambiguity, if not tension, in the choice of a proper unit of analysis. For 
international relations scholars, the use of states as the primary unit of analysis is the 
default choice.
61
  Likewise, the concept of security consensus privileges states by 
focusing on the perception of national elites. From a social movement perspective, 
however, the choice of states as the primary unit of analysis is problematic. A study of 
anti-base movements requires shifting our primary focus from the national level to the 
sub-national level by examining episodes, loosely defined as “bounded sequences of 
continuous interaction.”62 The security consensus framework must therefore account 
for both movement episodes and states as a unit of analysis.   
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 Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979; J. 
David Singer. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." World Politics 14, no. 1 
(1961): 77-92. 
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 An episode can range from something simple such as a two week hunger strike by students 
demanding a minority studies program, to “major cycles of contention, revolution, and civil wars.” See 
Charles Tillly and Sidney G. Tarrow. Contentious Politics. Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm Publishers, 2007, 
p.36. 
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 Throughout the dissertation, I use anti-base movement episodes to examine the 
relationship between movement dynamics, their impact on U.S.-host state relations, 
and base policy outcomes. Using a more precise definition, movement episodes are 
understood as “a period of emergent, sustained, contentious interaction between at 
least two collective actors.”63 The use of movement episodes as a unit of analysis 
offers several analytical advantages.  First, examining movement episodes targeting 
specific policy demands (i.e. base closure, SOFA revisions, the ending of live 
bombing exercises), enables me to track specific mechanisms linking anti-base 
movements, the security consensus, and base policy outcomes. Second, while civil 
disturbances, small-scale protests, and “noise” occur daily in front of several military 
bases, of greater importance for this project are sustained, large-scale anti-base 
protests over a longer period of time.  Third, studying movement episodes raises the 
possibility of increasing the number of observations in a single country across time. 
These episodes and the corresponding policy outcome stemming from movements 
may then be used to extrapolate generalizations about movement dynamics and 
alliance relations in specific countries.
64
 Lastly, an analysis of movement episodes 
allows us to examine possible intervening variables which may affect base policy 
outcomes. 
 The use of episodes as the unit of analysis does not discredit the important role 
of the state, nor should it prevent us from making comparisons about base politics 
across countries in addition to movement episodes. Anti-base movement strategy and 
effectiveness are affected by bilateral security relations and the existence (or absence) 
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base movements in Japan.  As long as a strong security consensus exists in Japan, anti-base movements 
will remain largely ineffective in terms of policy outcomes.    
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of an elite security consensus at the national level. As argued earlier, movement 
episodes are nested within the context of a particular state. Although a comparison of 
political opportunities across countries cannot be easily made, comparisons regarding 
the breadth and depth of elite cohesion regarding host state-U.S. security relations are 
possible.  
Case Selection 
 To convince skeptics that social movements really matter, I need to 
demonstrate that anti-base movements are capable of influencing policy outcomes for 
bases of high strategic value. Anti-base movements are expected to have the least 
impact on policy outcomes when bases are strategically important to the U.S. (and the 
host state, depending on the degree of security dependence). The U.S. will insist that 
bases remain open in order to maintain national and international security.  Therefore, 
the most interesting and important cases in this study are the hard tests: movement 
episodes targeting bases of high strategic value. Next, I limit my case selection to 
episodes of high movement strength and mobilization.  Inherent in this choice is the 
assumption that the host government ignores poorly mobilized protests and minor civil 
disturbances.65  I assume, therefore, that anti-base mobilization of low movement 
strength have little impact on base policy decisions.  In short, movement episodes 
involving bases of high strategic value and high movement strength (i.e major 
mobilization episodes) constitute theoretically “interesting” cases.  Although a total of 
nine possible types of cases exist using these parameters, I try to select primarily hard 
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Those skeptical about anti-base movements argue that the U.S. would have eventually shut down bases 
with low strategic value even without any domestic opposition.   
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test cases to maximize analytical leverage, providing variation only on the security 
consensus variable (See Table 1.1 on p.6 for the full list of cases).
66
  
 Dealing with rare events, case selection for this study required, to some extent, 
selecting on the dependent variable. While some social scientists might find this 
selection process troubling, case selection was partially motivated by the need for 
variation on the independent and dependent variables to strengthen the robustness of 
the theory.
67
 Using movement episodes as the primary unit of analysis also helps 
explain variation across time within a single country. In each case, I first determine the 
degree of elite security consensus at the onset of a movement episode using a variety 
of evidence cited above. I then process trace the sequence of events, highlighting the 
interaction between movement and government actors to test whether the security 
consensus variable leads to the outcomes hypothesized earlier in Table 1.1. 
Scope Conditions 
 How far does the security consensus framework travel across the entire 
universe of possible cases? The argument potentially applies anywhere anti-base 
protests have been (or are currently) present. Currently, the Pentagon’s 2007 Base 
Structure Report cites 823 overseas bases scattered across 39 countries. Figure 1.6 
below provides a global map of U.S. base locations, highlighting the present,  
potential universe of cases.   
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  44 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Countries hosting U.S. military facilities as of September 2006 
Source: Data from DOD 2007 Base Structure Report. Cooley 2008. GlobalSecurity.org. 
 
Relevant cases imply large protests against strategically important bases which 
the U.S. intends to maintain. Regarding strategically important bases, the number of 
large and medium bases, defined by the total plant replacement value (PVR) in 2007, 
totaled thirty-four.
68
  This does not necessarily exclude, however, strategically or 
functionally important bases which do not meet the Pentagon’s definition of a large or 
medium size base.  
Because my theoretical framework focuses on high levels of movement 
mobilization, my argument is most acute in post-democratization periods. The 
potential for successful mobilization is reduced as authoritarian regimes often clamp 
down on protests. Nevertheless, limited anti-base protests do exist in non-democracies. 
Thus, potential cases operating under non-democratic regimes are not immediate 
grounds for exclusion.  
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 DOD 2007, p.22. A large site is defined as a total PRV greater than or equal to $1.640B. A medium 
site is define as a base with a total PRV less than $1.640B and greater than or equal to $875M. 
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Even though the universe of relevant cases appears narrowly restricted, the  
major political implications of base politics concerning several key installations in 
important host nations warrants a careful analysis of anti-base movements and the 
security consensus framework. Moreover, with the U.S. pushing for increased basing 
access in Eastern Europe, Central Asian, and Africa, my analysis may shed light on 
future hot spots ripe for anti-base or anti-American protests.   
Preview of the Empirical Cases 
 I use anti-base movement episodes in five different countries - Philippines, 
Japan, Ecuador, Italy, and South Korea - to test my theory. Two central questions 
guide our discussion of the empirical chapters: 1) Why were anti-base movements in 
the Philippines and Ecuador more successful in shutting down bases, whereas anti-
base movements in Okinawa, Italy, and South Korea were relatively unsuccessful? 2) 
Why and how did host state elites in Japan, Italy, and South Korea respond differently 
in balancing between domestic pressure and international alliance commitments 
compared to elites in the Philippines and Ecuador? 
 As Table 1.1 (see p.6) indicates, anti-base movements were most effective 
under conditions of weak security consensus. In the Philippines and Ecuador, elite 
statements, policy documents, interview records, and parliamentary transcripts 
highlight the division among government officials and policy-makers regarding the 
role of U.S. bases. Key elites influential in the politics of bases rejected the idea that 
U.S. military presence was needed for host state national security.  Unlike countries 
characterized by a strong or moderate security consensus, no dominant national 
security discourse dictated U.S.-host state relations in the Philippines in the early 
1990s or Ecuador in the past decade. Thus a significant number of Philippine and 
Ecuadorian political elites were receptive to anti-base sentiments. In both countries, 
activists formulated a strategy targeting elites.  This resulted in much more interaction 
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and coalition building between anti-base movement activists and domestic political 
elites, giving activists the leverage needed to influence base policy outcomes.  
 On the contrary, in Japan, Italy, and South Korea, a dominant national security 
discourse and pro-U.S. security consensus permeated the security and foreign policy 
establishment.  The inability to penetrate elite ranks became a major obstacle for 
Okinawan, Italian, and South Korean anti-base movements in their struggle against 
U.S. bases. To their credit, anti-base movements pressured the government, 
occasionally winning “partial concessions.”  For the most part, however, the 
government tended to ignore activists’ core demands.  Government officials were 
aware that domestic pressure and anti-base mobilization operated cyclically. Token 
concessions usually quelled anti-base activity until the next mobilization cycle, 
triggered by an accident, crime, death, or some other unforeseen external event.  
Observing the interaction between anti-base movements and government forces unfold 
in these three movement episodes demonstrates that the host government responded 
strategically to anti-base groups in an effort to co-opt, weaken, and demobilize anti-
base movements.  
 Interestingly, in these three cases, the state allowed significant space for 
pressure groups to oppose U.S. bases, attested by the successful mobilization of anti-
base coalition groups from various sectors. Activists even formed ties with minority 
party government elites. Occasionally, the state gave partial concessions to movement 
demands. But even though the state entertained anti-base movements to a certain 
degree, using both muscle and tact, the state ultimately overpowered any mobilization 
effort when U.S. alliance relations were put in jeopardy by massive anti-U.S. base 
demonstrations. 
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Outline of the Following Chapters 
Following this introductory theoretical chapter, Chapter Two focuses on the 
interaction between anti-base movements and the host government under weak levels 
of security consensus. The primary case in this chapter is the 1990-91 Anti-Treaty 
movement against Subic Bay Naval Station in the Philippines. Chapter Three 
examines base politics under strong levels of security consensus, using the 1995-1996 
Okinawan movement episode as an “ideal” type case. Chapter Four extends the 
application of my theory to additional regions. To increase the validity and robustness 
of the security consensus framework, I investigate recent anti-base movements in 
Manta, Ecuador and Vicenza, Italy. The variation in outcomes based on the different 
levels of security consensus in the two cases provides further support for my theory. 
Chapters Five and Six examine the security consensus and anti-base movements, 
respectively, in South Korea.  Relaxing the fixed assumption of the security 
consensus, Chapter Seven explores in greater depth how variation over time in the 
security consensus alters movement and government strategies and varying policy 
outcomes.  Through a paired comparison between the Philippines and Japan, I 
illustrate how the re-emergence of a security consensus in the mid-late 1990s 
weakened the impact of Philippine protests against U.S. military presence.  Finally, 
Chapter Eight summarizes the findings of the dissertation. I also evaluate the security 
consensus framework with competing explanations in the base politics literature, 
highlighting both points of tension and areas of complement. I conclude by providing 
insights for anti-base activists, and drawing policy implications from my research to 
U.S. overseas basing strategy in the post-9/11 period. 
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CHAPTER 2 
UNDER A WEAK SECURITY CONSENSUS:  
PHILIPPINE ANTI-BASE MOVEMENTS, 1990-1991  
 
 
 
“September 16, 1991, may well be the day when we in this Senate found the soul, the 
true spirit of this nation because we mustered the courage and the will to declare the 
end of foreign military presence in the Philippines…Therefore, I vote No to this 
Treaty, and if it were only possible, I would vote 203 million times No.
1
 
 
With a resounding “No,” Senate President Jovito Salonga cast the final vote 
against the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security between the Republic of 
the Philippines (R.P.) and the United States. The final tally totaled 12-11 against the 
Treaty, effectively ending over ninety years of U.S. military presence in the 
Philippines.  Salonga‟s vote was perhaps less suspenseful than the 12-11 margin 
would suggest since the Philippine Senate only needed eight out of twenty-three “No” 
votes to reject the Treaty.
2
  Nevertheless, the rejection of the Treaty and U.S. bases in 
the Philippines was a monumental day for Filipinos.  The decision was all the more 
astonishing given that a traditionally conservative institution such as the Senate 
ultimately snubbed its nose against its primary international benefactor.  Asking how 
an economically deprived, politically unstable country held its own against a world 
superpower, Roland Simbulan, a long-time Philippine activist and scholar, and advisor 
to Senator Wigerbto Tan͂ada during the R.P.-U.S. base negotiations replied, “The real 
moving spirit behind the twelve Senators was the broad and unified people‟s 
movement outside the Senate…the Anti-Treaty Movement was forged with the 
                                                 
1
 Speech given before voting on the Senate Resolution of Non-Concurrence to the proposed bases 
treaty, September 16, 1991. Staff, Senate Legislative Publications.  The bases of their decisions: how 
the senators voted on the treaty of friendship between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines 
and the government of the United States of America. Manila: Senate of the Philippines, 1991, p.242-43. 
2
 The Senate required a 2/3 majority to pass the new bases Treaty. 
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broadest unity possible among organized forces and individuals.   In the end, it was the 
power of the people that ended the most visible symbols of our colonial legacy and the 
Cold War in the Philippines.”3 
One cannot attribute the rejection of the R.P.-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Security and the subsequent closure of Subic Bay Naval Station, 
strategically the most important base in the Philippines, to a single explanation. 
Numerous interacting factors most likely led to the closure of U.S. bases.  Immediate 
factors highlighting the importance of agency focus on the negotiations between U.S. 
and Philippine officials. Base critics argued that a “lopsided treaty,” coupled with the 
“arrogant negotiating behavior” of the U.S. delegation headed by Richard Armitage, 
would never pass through the Senate.  The revised 1987 Philippine constitution also 
factored into the closure of Subic Bay Naval Station in 1991.  Article 15, Section 25 of 
the revised constitution required both Senate ratification and the passage of a national 
referendum on any new base treaty. This institutional change shifted decision power 
from the executive to the legislative, providing Philippine Senators and civil society 
greater leverage in the base policy-making process. Others argue that structural factors, 
such as the end of the Cold War or economic recession in the U.S., reduced 
Washington‟s political will to continue operating bases with declining strategic value, 
thus leading to base closures.  Finally, unforeseeable events, or “acts of gods” such as 
the explosion of Mount Pinatubo and the destruction of Clark Air Base affected the 
decision calculus of elites and the outcome of Subic Bay.  
 While Simbulan‟s preceding quote regarding the role of anti-base movements 
should be placed within the context of other proximate and distal factors explaining 
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base closures, I concur with Simbulan that social movements played a pivotal role in 
the Senate‟s fateful decision on September 1991. The burden of proof, however, rests 
on those who contend civil society and anti-base movements mattered in the 
Philippines. What was the relationship between anti-base coalition movements and the 
Senators of the Eighth Congress who were given veto power over the new negotiated 
bases treaty? Why were Philippine elites divided over the issue of U.S. bases and the 
future of R.P.-U.S. relations, with the president leading the pro-base faction and the 
Senate leading the anti-base faction, and how did this affect their response to anti-base 
movements?  How were anti-base activists, agents considered peripheral to state 
security policy-making, able to oust U.S. bases? Finally, how did the relationship 
between state and civil society interact with alliance politics to produce particular 
responses and outcomes which would alter the future direction of R.P.-U.S. relations?   
I argue that a weak security consensus enabled anti-base movements to 
penetrate the state by taking advantage of divisions among Philippine elites over the 
fate of U.S. bases. In the absence of any strong security consensus, anti-base activists 
and nationalist politicians provided an alternative national security discourse which 
distinguished their position from the traditional pro-U.S. line previously embraced by 
the Philippine government.  Thus, the weak security consensus functioned as a 
political opportunity, enabling activists to form ties with sympathetic elites. This in 
turn provided activists the leverage necessary to influence base policy outcomes – 
most significantly, the closure of Subic Bay Naval Station.  
 This chapter begins with a brief background on U.S. bases and the rise of anti-
base coalition movements in the Philippines.  The next section describes Philippine 
national security and the nature of R.P.-U.S. security relations between 1988-1991 
from the perspective of host government political elites. Evidence based on 
government policy documents, Senate legislative transcripts, public opinion surveys, 
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and military data all suggest a lack of consensus among Philippine government elites 
regarding Philippine national security, and specifically strategic thinking towards its 
alliance partnership with the U.S.  This position is substantiated by the Philippine 
security literature as well as interviews with former and current Philippine 
policymakers and scholars.  Section three focuses on the interaction between anti-base 
movements and the state. Here I describe the tactics and strategies anti-base activists 
employed and the response to anti-base movements from both pro and anti-base 
government factions. In particular, I focus on the relationship between activists and 
anti-base Senators to trace the mechanisms linking the weak security consensus to 
movement strategies, government reactions, and policy outcomes.  
U.S. Military Bases and the Rise of Philippine Anti-Base Movements 
U.S. Bases in the Philippines 
 Contrary to the expectations of Filipino revolutionaries, Spain‟s defeat in the 
Battle of Manila in May 1898 and its ultimate defeat in the Spanish-American War did 
not lead to Philippine independence. Excluding Filipino representation at the Treaty of 
Paris, Spain merely transferred (at the price of twenty million dollars) colonial power 
from the Spanish to the Americans.
4
 The U.S. also acquired Spanish military posts, 
including Subic Bay, and established several new military facilities during and after 
the Philippine-American War from 1899-1901.  
 Gaining independence in 1946, the Philippines and the United States signed 
the 1947 R.P.-U.S. Military Bases Agreement (MBA) which gave the US rent free 
“certain lands of the public domain” for a period of ninety-nine years.  The MBA 
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provided the U.S. with twenty-three facilities covering approximately 250,000 
hectares.
5
 However, between 1947 and 1991, the MBA underwent at least forty 
amendments which returned base land to the Philippines and provided the Philippine 
government greater control over U.S. bases.
6
  Most notably, the 1966 Ramos-Rusk 
Agreement signed on September 16, 1966 changed the terms of the base limit from 99 
to 25 years. Thus the MBA was set to expire on September 16, 1991.  Later, the 1979 
Romulo-Murphy Exchange of Notes transferred nominal control of U.S. bases to the 
Philippine government. The U.S. also agreed to provide $500 million of security 
assistance to the Philippines between 1979-1984. Both sides agreed to review the 
MBA every five years until its termination.   
The revised Philippine Constitution in February 1987 gave the Philippine 
Senate considerable influence over the retention of U.S. bases after 1991.  Under 
Section 25, Article 18, the revised constitution stated, “After the expiration in 1991 of 
the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of 
America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall 
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred by the Senate 
and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the 
people in a national referendum.”7  
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7
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Function of Subic and Clark Bases 
Subic Bay Naval Station in Zambales Province and Clark Air Base in Angeles 
City were the two largest U.S. installations in the Philippines. In 1986, Subic and 
Clark bases hosted 7,000 and 8,500 U.S. military personnel, respectively.
8
 The number 
of U.S. military personnel, civilians, and dependents on both bases totaled 38,550.
9
  
Both bases provided logistical support, staging areas, fuel and porting, repair facilities, 
training facilities, military communications, ammunition and supply depots, and rest 
and recreation. Subic Bay was the largest overseas Navy installation in the Pacific, and 
served as the primary port, training facility, and logistics hub for the U.S. Seventh 
Fleet which operated in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
10
 Cubic Point in Subic also 
functioned as the land base for the Seventh Fleet‟s strike force, Task Force 77. 
Meanwhile, Clark Air Base served as the headquarters of the 13
th
 Air Force, the 
tactical arm of the U.S. Air Force in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Clark also 
acted as a staging point for strategic airlifts in to the Indian Ocean.  From a strategic 
perspective, bases in the Philippines were used to secure air and sea lanes, balance 
Soviet military presence in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, and provide regional defense for 
Southeast Asia.
11
 
Strategic Value of Subic Bay Naval Station 
Realists skeptical of anti-base movements argue that the end of the Cold War 
and reduced threat perceptions ultimately led to base closures in the Philippines. Thus, 
any analysis of anti-base movement impact in the Philippines must address the context 
of regional strategic change. Certainly, the strategic environment shifted with the 
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disappearance of the Soviet threat. Despite looming questions regarding the future 
strategic utility of Subic Bay among U.S. military planners, however, the evidence 
below suggests that the closure of Subic Bay was far from inevitable.  
First, throughout all seven rounds of the Philippine American Cooperation 
Talks (PACT) between 1990-91, the U.S. panel firmly insisted on a ten year renewal 
agreement. This insistence suggests that Washington had no intention of shutting 
down Subic Bay in the immediate future.
12
 Second, Subic Bay‟s strategic value and 
assets, and the enormous opportunity and financial costs in finding a replacement 
facility placed unacceptable demands on the U.S. to phase out Subic Bay under the 
preferred terms of the Philippine government.
13
  The naval supply depot at Subic Bay 
served as a logistics hub for all naval forces between Hawaii and the Persian Gulf. 
Furthermore, Subic was one of only two deep-water ports in the entire Pacific and 
Indian Ocean large enough to support aircraft carrier and air wing support facilities.
14
  
In a prepared report on the status of overseas basing in the Asia-Pacific region, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl Ford Jr. testified in March 1991, “U.S. interests in 
sustaining a presence in the Philippines remains undiminished. The facilities host the 
greatest concentration of U.S. logistics, communication, and training facilities in the 
world. The synergism of these functions and facilities provides the U.S. maximum 
operational effectiveness, but also an important presence that signifies…our 
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April 17, 1991. 
  55 
immediate and potential capabilities in a time of crisis.”15  Ford did concede to the 
possibility of reductions at Subic, but he insisted that “no single site would be capable 
of assimilating all the functions that are presently conducted in the Philippines.” He 
continued, “the impact of the loss of Subic would depend upon where and how 
functions at Subic were dispersed, but at a minimum, annual operating costs would 
increase…and Seventh Fleet war-fighting readiness would be reduced by the loss of 
access to the Philippine training ranges.”16  Shutting down Subic Bay, even after 
Mount Pinatubo‟s explosion “was not the expressed desire of the administration.”17  
 
 
Figure 2.1: U.S. troop deployment from 1975-2005 by region 
Source: The Heritage Foundation. Calculations by Tim Kane, Ph.D, based on annual records from 
Department of Defense, DIOR.  
 
Third, as Figure 2.1 above indicates, troop deployment levels in Asia after the Cold 
War remained around the 100,000 level. Unlike the dramatic decrease in U.S. troop 
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 Ibid, p.816. 
16
 ibid, p.817. 
17
 Congressional Quarterly.  “Philippine base closings, 1991-1992 legislative chronology.” In Congress 
and the Nation, 89-92.  Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1992,  p.411. Mount Pinatubo‟s explosion did, 
however, result in the closure of Clark Air Base. 
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levels in Europe beginning in the late 1980s, the consistent level of U.S. forces in Asia 
imply less strategic change in the Asia-Pacific region than predicted, even with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.
18
 In sum, the closure of Subic Bay Naval Station 
presents a hard test for anti-base movements.  
Origins of the Anti-Base Movement 
 The historical roots of the anti-base movement begin with U.S. colonial rule in 
the Philippines. Although the Philippines declared their “independence” in 1898, the 
U.S. did not transfer full government authority to the Filipinos until 1946.  Prior to 
independence, Philippine political elites collaborated with the Americans, but at the 
same time, publicly promoted Philippine autonomy under colonial rule.  These 
conservative nationalists presented a political alternative to armed resistance and 
revolution.
19
  Former revolutionaries, intellectuals, and the urban middle class 
gradually re-entered Philippine politics after the Philippine-American War, organizing 
the Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist Party) in 1907. Whereas some conservative 
nationalists privately hoped for Philippine annexation to the United States, the Partido 
Nacionalista‟s main goal was the eventual independence of the Philippines.  
 After independence in 1946, nationalist criticism against American rule 
transformed into opposition against American neo-colonial influence in the 
Philippines. The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) were the most visible group 
voicing its criticism against neo-colonialism. The call for independence from 
American influence was also carried by those not necessarily aligned with the 
ideological left. Most notable were nationalist politicians in the 1950s and 1960s, such 
as Senators Claro Recto, Jose Laurel, Jose Diokno, and Lorenzo Tan͂ada . In the 1950s, 
Claro Recto was one of the first prominent nationalist politicians to challenge the neo-
                                                 
18
 For example, the potential for conflict continued to exist across the Taiwan Straits and the 
demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. 
19
 Abinales 2005, p.106. 
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colonial mentality prevalent in Philippine political society.
20
 Recto‟s nationalist call 
for true independence and the removal of U.S. bases was later taken up by Diokno and 
Tan͂ada  until the Marcos dictatorship purged them from Philippine politics.  Although 
the early anti-base movement was taken up by other elites such as professors or 
lawyers, the leadership tended to rest with Senators given their national prominence.  
 President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, thereby silencing 
nationalist politicians‟ calls for the removal of U.S. bases. However, the growth of the 
Philippine Left during this period helped fuel a growing underground movement 
calling for the overthrow of the Marcos regime. As Philippine political scientist 
Miriam Ferrer argues, the Philippine Left “evolved as the most consistent 
oppositionist to the bases.”21  With U.S. bases viewed as a key pillar propping up the 
Marcos regime, the removal of bases and imperial foreign influence developed into a 
major agenda for the Philippine Left. For instance, in their ten point policy agenda, the 
National Democratic Front (NDF), the above-ground intellectual movement of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), made it clear that one of their goals was to 
rid the Philippines of U.S. bases and establish an independent foreign policy.
22
  
Moreover, the Left argued that U.S. bases were being utilized for counter-insurgency 
operations and direct and indirect repression against Filipinos.
23
  
 The involvement of the Left helped bring the anti-base movement to the 
masses.  Nationalists across multiple sectors, including professionals, students, 
                                                 
20
 See the following speeches by Recto: “American Bases and National Freedom and Security.” Speech 
delivered before the Philippine Chamber of Commerce, Oct 29, 1950; “The Problem of Our National 
Physical Survival.” Speech delivered on the Senate Floor, May 21, 1958. Found in For Philippine 
Survival: Nationalist Essays by Claro Recto and Renato Constantino. Manila: Friends of the Filipino 
People, no publication date.  
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 Miriam Ferrer. “Anti-Bases Coalition.” In Studies on Coalition Experiences, edited by C. Cala and J. 
Grageda. Manila: Bookmark, 1994, p.5.  Also see Miriam Ferrer. "The Dynamics of the Opposition to 
the US Bases in the Philippines." Kasarinlan 7, no. 4 (1992): 62-87. 
22
 See National Democratic Front. Our vision of a just and democratic society. Philippines: National 
Democratic Front Publishing House, 1987. 
23
 Simbulan, 1989, p.35. 
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workers, and farmers banded together in February 1967 to form the Movement for the 
Advancement of Nationalism.
24
 Anti-base movements also sustained themselves 
within university campuses. Formed in the 1960s, student organizations such as the 
Kabataang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth) and the Samahan ng Demokratikong 
Kabagtaan (Association of Democratic Youth) all evoked strong nationalist tendencies. 
About 350 students from thirty schools around Manila launched an anti-base campaign 
on January 1979.
25
 In accordance with global peace and demilitarization goals, church 
groups in the Philippines such as the National Council of Churches in the Philippines 
(NCCP) also grew more vocal against U.S. bases in the early 1980s. In sum, by the 
1980s, a growing minority voice against U.S. bases influenced by leftist ideology and 
nationalism had developed across various sectors in Philippine society. 
Development of Anti-Base Coalition Campaigns, 1981-1991 
 Groups predominantly on the left-end of the political spectrum addressed anti-
base issues. Rather than focusing exclusively on bases, these groups tended to 
advocate several issues and platform goals.
26
 For instance, in addition to the removal 
of U.S. bases, coalition groups added to their agenda issues such as democratic 
reforms and the end of U.S. support for the Marcos regime.  The first coalition 
movement to target U.S. bases almost exclusively was the Nuclear Free Philippines 
Coalition (NFPC), formed in 1981. As the name suggests, NFPC‟s primary goal was 
the abolishment of nuclear power in the Philippines. NFPC initially focused on the 
                                                 
24
 Ferrer 1994, p.6. Ferrer notes, however, that the anti-base movement was less successful in 
mobilizing the unorganized working class whose immediate concerns were economic rather than 
political. The anti-base movement, foremost a political-ideological struggle, mobilized its working class 
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 Ibid 1994, p.7. 
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 For a general overview of Philippines civil-society and coalition movements, see Marlon Wui, and 
Glenda Lopez, eds. State-civil society relations in policy-making. Diliman, Quezon City: University of 
the Philippines Press, 1994; Josephine Dionisio. Enhanced Documentation on National Peace Coalitions 
and Citizens' Groups Peace-Building Experiences in the Philippines. Manila: UNDP, 2005; Sidney G. 
Silliman and Lela Garner Noble, eds. Organizing for democracy: NGOs, civil society, and the 
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construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, but the movement expanded to 
include the opposition of nuclear weapons and U.S. bases which stored such weapons. 
As a precursor to the anti-base coalition movement, NFPC would later devote its 
entire energy to U.S. bases after the closure of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. 
Anti-base leaders organized the first formal anti-base coalition movement in 
February 1983 under the name Anti-Bases Coalition (ABC). Under the guidance of 
former Senator Jose Diokno, ABC was represented by the political left as well as non-
left nationalists within the professional class who were part of the anti-Marcos 
campaign. Over the next eight years, the anti-base movement evolved through periods 
of four different coalition groups: the Campaign for a Sovereign Philippines (CSP) in 
1986, Kasarinlan in 1988, ABAKADA in 1989, and the Anti-Treaty Movement 
(ATM) in 1991. Anti-base coalitions were generally led by activists from the national 
democrat strand of the Left, often supported by prominent national elite figures.
27
  
Although these coalition groups existed as separate entities at different points in time, 
the Philippine anti-base coalition movement can be viewed as an evolutionary process 
with the start of each campaign coalition acting as a new juncture point in the anti-
base movement. For example, rather than dissolving completely after a period of 
inactivity, ABC acted as a convener for subsequent anti-base campaigns such as CSP, 
and became a member organization of broader anti-base coalitions such as 
                                                 
27
 The exception was Kasarinlan, formed by activists within the social democrat camp of the Philippine 
Left. The social democrats used Kasarinlan to distinguish their own anti-base activity from the national 
democrats.  See Ferrer 1994, pp.12-13 for a discussion on social democrat involvement in the anti-bases 
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coalition building. The national democrats (ND)s view themselves as the “voice of the marginalized 
majority” who demand “substantive and radical changes,” confronting repressive regimes with more 
militant action.  Social democrats (SDs) view themselves as an alternative to the state and the CPP-
NPA-NDF faction. They are supported by  “the silent and non-ideological majority” of Filipinos. See 
Dionisio 2005, pp.25-26. 
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ABAKADA or ATM.  Thus many of the same key groups and actors tended to appear 
in each subsequent coalition campaign across time.
28
 
Both internal and external reasons account for the formation of five anti-base 
coalition campaigns in only an eight year span of time. Internally, the loose 
organizational structure of coalitions and lack of institutionalization made it difficult 
for anti-base movements to sustain themselves over a longer period of time.
29
 Pressing 
external events, such as Ninoy Aquino‟s assassination in 1983 or the People Power 
revolution in 1986 also detracted attention away from U.S. base issues. On the other 
hand, political opportunities following Philippine democratization in 1986 such as the 
Constitutional revisions in 1987, or the renegotiation of U.S. bases under PACT in 
1990-91, served as focal points for anti-base activists to regroup and initiate a fresh 
round of anti-base campaign activity.
30
  Although anti-base coalitions proceeded in a 
stop-and-go fashion, the movement itself followed an evolutionary trajectory.  
The Anti-Treaty Movement, organized in preparation for PACT, is of 
particular importance in this chapter. While not significantly different from previous 
anti-base campaigns, the timing of the movement prior to the Senate vote on the new 
base treaty, and ATM‟s ability to find allies among political elites opposed to U.S. 
bases, provided activists the leverage necessary to defeat any new basing agreement.  
In other words, anti-base activists penetrated the state. Forming ties with anti-base 
government elites, activists helped establish a new era of Philippine security without 
U.S. bases.   
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 Interview with ABC Co-Chair, Ma Socorro Diokno, April 10, 2006. UP-Diliman, Quezon City, 
Philippines. 
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 Ferrer 1994, p.22. 
30
 Interview with former Bayan secretary general Lidy Nacpil. April 28, 2006. Quezon City, Philippines. 
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The Weak Security Consensus and Philippine Political Elites 
 How did anti-base activists penetrate the state and form ties with sympathetic 
elites? More importantly, how were social movements, often considered tangential to 
the security decision-making process, able to oust the U.S. military from the 
Philippines?  The success of anti-base movements and the ability of activists to 
penetrate the state and influence key political elites required movement actors to take 
advantage of the weak security consensus within the Philippine government. Thus 
activists employed mobilization frames and strategies which resonated with 
sympathetic anti-base political leaders. In this section, I marshal evidence supporting 
my contention that important Philippine political elites were divided on issues of 
national security.  
The breadth and depth of the security consensus were relatively low in the 
Philippines. Regarding breadth, elites important to the base policy-making process, 
particularly a core group of anti-base Senators, opposed U.S. bases. The lack of 
security consensus was most pronounced in Senate debates on the renewal of the bases 
Treaty, and in the different preferences held by the pro-base Philippine president, 
Corazon Aquino, and the predominantly anti-base Senate. On the dimension of depth, 
the security consensus following the overthrow of Marcos in 1986 was mixed. 
Although ruling elites accepted the U.S. security umbrella during the Cold War, two 
factors made the basis for a deep-rooted security consensus more tenuous. First, 
nationalist elites continually challenged Manila‟s neo-colonial dependence on 
Washington. Although marginalized during the height of the Cold War, the nationalist 
position gained strong legitimacy in the 1980s. Many of the political and ideological 
constraints perpetuating pro-U.S. foreign policies were removed with the rise of the 
People Power movement and the overthrow of the American-backed Marcos regime. 
Second, in a country historically focused on internal rather than external security, the 
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future role of the U.S. alliance in the post-Marcos era remained unclear. As anti-base 
Senators cited, and a few pro-base elites tacitly agreed, no clear security rationale 
existed for major U.S. military presence in the Philippines.  
Orientation towards internal security 
The divergent discourse regarding the future of R.P.- U.S. relations among 
Philippine elites, and the sudden departure of the U.S. military in 1991 is initially 
puzzling. Filipinos fought side-by-side with Americans against the Japanese in World 
War II. Filipinos lived under the U.S. security umbrella during the Cold War. Like 
other close Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea, the Philippines signed a 
mutual defense treaty with the U.S. in 1951, and hosted a substantial number of U.S. 
troops and bases. Moreover, internal political stability and national security in the 
Philippines, was always contingent on U.S. support throughout the Cold War.
31
 These 
factors alone would suggest a moderate degree of security consensus among 
Philippine elites.  
On the other hand, this finding is less surprising if we place R.P.-U.S. relations 
under the context of Philippine sovereignty and national security. Unlike South Korea 
or Japan, the Philippines has historically been concerned with internal, not external 
security.  In what Renato de Castro labels as “the legacy of internal defense,” the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) traditionally directed military operations 
around internal security threats. This included armed insurgencies from the New 
People‟s Army (NPA), the armed faction of the Communist Party Philippines,32 
communist rebel groups such as the Hukbalahap, and Muslim separatist groups such 
as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
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 See Cooley 2008, Chapter 3. 
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 Along with the NDF, this faction is often referred to as CPP-NPA-NDF.  See Dominique Caouette. 
"Persevering revolutionaries: armed struggle in the 21st century, exploring the revolution of the 
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(MILF), and most recently, Abu Sayyaf.
33
 As one security analyst quotes, “The 
communist insurgency and Muslim separatist movement in Mindanao have been the 
principal security preoccupation of the Philippine government for the last three 
decades.”34  
Under the Marcos regime, the Philippine government only intensified its 
preoccupation with internal security and domestic stability.  Likewise, the AFP 
expanded its role in counterinsurgency operations to include the administration of 
martial law.
35
  The fall of Marcos and the onset of Philippine democracy in 1986 did 
not fundamentally alter the Philippine‟s preoccupation with internal security. 
Although the CPP-NPA insurgency was on the decline after reaching its peak in 1987, 
the government continued to direct military resources towards domestic security in the 
wake of a growing Muslim insurgency and several attempted military coups.
36
   Tables 
2.1 and 2.2 provide survey data from Social Weather Station (SWS) regarding internal 
threat perceptions from communist insurgency and Muslim rebel groups between 
1986-1993.  Both survey data indicate that internal threat perceptions were relative 
highly in the Philippines.  
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Table 2.1: Internal Threat Perceptions: Communist Insurgency37 
 Oct. 
86 
Mar. 
87
38
 
Sept. 
88 
Feb. 
89 
July 
89
39
 
Sept. 
89 
Sept. 
93 
Great 68 71 61 64 62 56 75 
Small  25 19 17 23 26 20 24 
None 1 8 1 12 11 --- --- 
Maybe/Don‟t 
Know 
--- 2 20 1 1 23 --- 
Source: Social Weather Report Survey, Philippines: 1986-1993 
  
 
Table 2.2: Internal Threat Perceptions: Muslim Rebels40 
 Oct. 86 Mar. 87 Sept. 88 Feb. 89 Sept. 89 Sept. 93 
Great 65 60 54 63 54 77 
Small  28 26 25 16 20 22 
None 2 8 18 19 --- --- 
Maybe/Don‟t Know --- 5 2 0 24 --- 
Source: Social Weather Report Survey, Philippines: 1986-1993 
 
An Underdeveloped National Security Agenda 
The U.S. security umbrella also explains the internal focus of Philippine 
security. Guaranteed protection from outside aggression under the 1951 Mutual 
Defense Treaty, the Philippine government could afford to allocate its resources 
towards internal security while the U.S. alliance guaranteed protection against external 
threats.  However, over-reliance on the U.S. and the preoccupation with internal 
security did come at the expense of formulating any overarching, comprehensive 
national security agenda.  De Castro notes how four decades of focus on internal 
security threats undermined the AFP‟s ability to adequately address potential external 
security threats after the removal of U.S. bases in 1991.  Poorly funded, the AFP 
weapons arsenal consisted largely of outdated equipment such as UH-1 Huey 
                                                 
37
 Question worded in the survey as follows: “Please tell me how great or small is the danger of the 
following to the government of President Corazon Aquino: Rebel communists and communist 
supporters (very great, big, small, very small, none)? 
38
 Tables 2.1 and 2.2. aggregate  “very great” and “big” responses into “great,” and “small” and “very 
small” responses into “small”. 
39
 Survey only conducted in the National Capital Region (Manila). 
40
 Question worded in the survey as follows: “Please tell me how great or small is the danger of the 
following to the government of President Corazon Aquino: Muslim rebels (very great, big, small, very 
small, none)? 
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helicopters and armored vehicles geared towards counterinsurgency.
41
 Former 
Philippine Secretary of Defense Orlando Mercado, who pushed for AFP 
modernization while still chair of the Senate Defense Committee, stated: 
 
“The Department of National Defense, whose [responsibility is to] 
chart the policy direction as well as strategic vision [of the armed 
forces], was historically short on strategic thinking. This resulted from 
decades of preoccupation with fighting insurgency and separatism. 
External defense was left to the managers of the „security umbrella‟ 
provided by the Americans. While this made political sense for a cash 
strapped third world country, it in effect was an abdication of the raison 
d'etre of a military organization.”42  
 
 In light of Mercado‟s comments, it is interesting to note that the Department 
of National Defense (DND) did not regularly publish defense white papers or any 
other overarching national security strategy agenda. According to political scientist 
Herman Kraft, the only year the DND conducted any comprehensive systematic study 
formulating a national security agenda was in the mid-1990s, published in 1998 as a 
defense policy paper titled, “In Defense of the Philippines.”43   Mercado, then still the 
Senate Chairman of the Defense Committee, advocated outlining a national security 
strategy as a means to gather funds for the AFP modernization program.  Devising a 
concrete national security strategy provided the justification necessary for an 
expanded budget and new equipment requests.
44
  However, this suggests that the 1998 
Defense Paper was motivated less by the pressing need for a new overarching security 
strategy, and more for the appropriation of funds for AFP modernization.   
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 De Catro 1999, p. 121.  
42
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 Department of National Defense, Republic of the Philippines. In Defense of the Philippines: 1998 
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 Interview with Herman Joseph Kraft. UP-Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. March 28, 2006.  
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The lack of external threat perceptions in the Philippines are confirmed by low 
defense spending trends in the Philippines. Figure 2.2 below indicates low defense 
expenditures in the Philippines relative to other ASEAN countries.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: ASEAN defense expenditure as percent GDP 
Source: IISS The Military Balance  
 
Although one might argue that the U.S. security umbrella enabled the Philippines to 
maintain a low military budget, Figure 2.2 indicates that Philippine defense spending 
remained low even after U.S. withdrawal in 1991. This suggests that the Philippines 
continued to place low priority in purchasing the expensive equipment necessary to 
maintain a grand strategy oriented towards external security threats.  
National security priorities were less clear without the presence of any looming 
external threat. Therefore, the absence of perceived external threats, and the lack of 
any clear sense of direction in grand strategy weakened political support for U.S. bases. 
In the following weeks prior to the Senate vote on the Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Security, numerous Senators repeated that no clear security rationale 
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existed for maintaining U.S. bases. The most telling speech was given by Senator Juan 
Ponce Enrile, former Secretary of Defense under Marcos. Enrile quoted: 
 
“In considering the draft Treaty, Mr. President, the first thing we must 
consider is this: Do we have an external enemy against whom we must 
be defended with the full panoply of U.S. military power: None that we 
may know of Mr. President. I have been a Secretary of National 
Defense of this Republic. I have the good fortune to be so for 17 years, 
and no one can tell me truthfully that today, in the next 10 years, we 
will have an external enemy for which we must have the security 
umbrella of the United States of America. No country in the region has 
any conceivable interest in invading the Philippines.”45 
 
Even Senators who voted to retain U.S. bases questioned the need for bases from a 
security standpoint. Senate Chairwoman of the Foreign Relations Committee Leticia 
Ramos-Shahani recalled: 
 
“The world situation wasn‟t so bad. Gorbachev was talking about 
perestroika. The Soviet Union was collapsing, and thus the U.S. 
bogeyman disappeared. China had opened up. I visited China, and they 
welcomed us with open arms. The ideological threat was gone, so why 
did we need the Seventh Fleet. What threat is there to defend us from. 
During that time, we were debating what do we really need the bases 
for.”46 
 
The absence of perceived external security threats, and the focus on internal 
security certainly weakened political support for U.S. bases. This provided activists 
the political space necessary to enter the debate over U.S. bases and forge ties with 
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 Republic of the Philippines, Record of the Senate.  Fifth Regular Session, Vol 1, No. 24. 
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government elites. Even among the executive-led pro-base faction,
47
 the security 
rationale for bases appeared ambiguous at best.  Although some officials cited security 
issues as a reason to maintain bases, many of those inside the Aquino Administration, 
including Aquino herself, were more interested in the potential economic benefits 
reaped by the bases.
48
 Until July 1991, the Philippine panel requested a minimum 
annual compensation of $825 million for a seven year duration period.
49
  Foreign 
Secretary Manglapus expressed this sentiment at a meeting sponsored by Senate 
President Jovito Salonga‟s summer retreat in what came to be known as the Pansol 
Reflections. He quotes, “Our optimum position is to eliminate both bases immediately; 
but the interest of our citizens as has been already clarified here by congressmen, labor 
leaders, and others, demand that we negotiate something that will take care of the 
welfare of our citizens.”50  The Philippine government eventually signed the Treaty at 
a much lower cost ($325 million).  The lower compensation package certainly did not 
help ratification of the Treaty in the Senate, but it is still important to highlight that 
economic benefits alone were unable to generate the political will necessary to 
maintain U.S. bases.   
Would the Philippine Senate have voted “yes” to U.S. bases had a strong 
security consensus existed?  The theory I propose in this dissertation suggests such a 
possibility. One theoretical implication is that the presence of a strong security 
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consensus among government elites – that is, a shared perception and intersubjective 
understanding of national security embedded in R.P.-U.S. security relations and U.S. 
bases – would have resulted in the retention of Subic Bay Naval Station regardless of 
the low economic compensation. Implicit here is the assumption that security trumps 
economics. In short, the Philippine state lacked a strong security consensus. This lack 
of consensus among government leaders, contributed by low external threat 
perceptions and the focus on internal security, produced divergent attitudes regarding 
U.S. bases and R.P.-U.S. relations among Philippine elites.  Anti-base activists were 
thus able to take advantage of divided elites by supporting anti-base Senators and 
forming ties with political elites sympathetic to their cause. Figure 2.3 below diagrams 
the factors and the resulting implications of a lack of security consensus for anti-base 
movements and their interaction with the Philippine state.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Factors underpinning the lack of security consensus in the Philippines 
 
Focus on Internal 
Security 
Low external 
threat perceptions 
Colonial past, 
Marcos regime 
No security 
consensus 
regarding R.P.-
U.S. relations and 
US bases 
Ill-defined National 
Security Strategy 
Divided Elites on 
R.P.-U.S. security 
relations and base 
issue 
  70 
Interaction between state and society 
 While the degree of security consensus serves as an important variable for base 
policy outcomes, a complete picture is only provided by examining structural 
variables such as the security consensus in conjunction with agency. In the Philippines, 
the causal mechanisms linking the security consensus to movement outcomes were 
embedded in the relationship between anti-base movements and sympathetic elites.  
The absence or presence of a security consensus did not produce outcomes per se, but 
rather, provided a favorable opportunity structure for movements to penetrate the state 
and form ties with key elites.
51
  Activists, in turn, needed to make the right strategic 
decisions and tactical choices to successfully promote their anti-base agenda at the 
policy level. In sum, the combination of a permissive structural environment (the weak 
security consensus) and the movement strategies of anti-base actors led to the 
withdrawal of U.S. bases in the Philippines. This section proceeds with an analysis of 
anti-base mobilization strategies and the interaction between ATM and the anti-base 
Senators under the context of a weak security consensus.  
Anti-Treaty Movement (ATM) 
 Formed in 1990 in preparation for PACT negotiations and the expiration of the 
1947 Mutual Base Agreement (MBA), ATM held one major advantage over previous 
anti-base coalition groups: after MBA‟s expiration, any new agreement negotiated 
between Washington and Manila required ratification from the Senate by a two-thirds 
majority. This provision, stipulated in the 1987 amended Constitution, suddenly 
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 The security consensus (or lack thereof) in the Philippines may have been shaped to some degree by 
nationalist leaders and activists during the formative period of anti-base movements. In other words, the 
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problematic for my argument since I only need to demonstrate whether the security consensus is weak 
or strong rather than the formation of the security consensus itself. I am more interested in the 
interaction between activists and elites once I determine the degree of elite security consensus.  
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enhanced the political clout of Senators as the MBA approached its September 16, 
1991 expiration date. ATM activists recognized the Senate‟s pivotal role, 
understanding that the fate of bases, if not terminated or negotiated favorably by 
President Aquino‟s base panel negotiating team, rested with the twenty-three Senators. 
Additionally, the amended Constitution also called for a national referendum on any 
new base agreement approved by the Senate. Important constitutional revisions, 
therefore, provided Senators, and to a lesser extent civil society, political power in the 
politics of bases.  The lack of security consensus and the ensuing division regarding 
the role of U.S. bases thus worked to the advantage of ATM.  
Mobilization 
 ATM was an extension of the previous coalition group, ABAKADA, which 
had grown relatively inactive by 1991. As with previous coalitions, the National 
Democrat (ND) faction of the political left organized and directed the coalition.
52
  The 
political bloc Bayan, and coalition groups traditionally involved in anti-base 
movements such as NFPC and ABC, spearheaded mobilization efforts.  Figure 2.4 
diagrams the coalition structure of ATM and its relationship with Bayan, as well as 
other groups, sectors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and people‟s 
organizations (POs).     
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 Despite its ND orientation, ATM did manage to convince some social democrat (SD) factions to 
work together in blocking the passage of the new negotiated base treaty. See fn. 25 on the SD/ND 
distinction. 
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Figure 2.4: Membership of the Anti-Treaty Movement Coalition 
 
Similar to previous coalitions, ATM membership consisted of various NGOs, POs, 
interest groups, and individual political and community leaders. Sectors represented in 
the coalition included peace, environment, women, student, religious, intellectual, and 
labor groups. Note the degree of overlap among various groups and organizations, 
indicating that none of the groups were necessarily mutually exclusive.  
Anti-base activists used existing mobilizing structures, such as social networks 
and institutions, to expand their coalition.  Bayan, with its large political network 
across multiple sectors such as labor and peace groups, directed much of the 
mobilization work at the grassroots level. Also, groups affiliated with Bayan organized 
committees and sent representatives to the larger ATM meeting, who in turn directly 
mobilized their own members.  Lidy Nacpil, former general secretary of Bayan, notes 
that many of the “personalities,” the recognizable faces of the movement such as 
politicians or celebrities, had little to do with the actual mobilization effort.  However, 
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their presence as prominent public leaders or celebrity status did help gather crowds. 
This was particularly true for the unorganized masses.
53
 
Framing 
 In addition to mobilization structures, anti-base activists employed cognitive 
frames which resonated with various sectors of Philippine civil society.  Nacpil states, 
“If for example you mobilize the labor group, you have to frame it in their language 
and how it affects them.”54 Like other movements, activists faced an uphill battle 
mobilizing the masses since the heart of the base issue rested on more abstract 
principles such as sovereignty or respect. Nevertheless, ATM utilized nationalist and 
sovereignty rights frames in the larger anti-base debate. These frames were visible in 
ATM‟s community discussion groups and the literature on bases distributed to the 
public.  Nacpil and other movement leaders noted that a clear explanation of the issues 
through public forums, position statements, and media coverage was essential for mass 
mobilization.  
 Paradoxically, ATM conveners narrowed their focus from an anti-base to anti-
Treaty position to form the broadest coalition possible.  The coalition‟s name, “Anti-
Treaty Movement,” was indicative of this conscious shift in strategy.  As Nacpil, 
Diokno, Simbulan and other key anti-base activists commented, forming ATM was a 
strategy which focused on the narrowest target possible; defeating the Treaty equaled 
a defeat for the bases. Nacpil argued, “To frustrate the extension of the life of the 
bases, this Treaty [had to] be junked. It didn‟t matter if others would be [rejecting] it 
for reasons not as comprehensive as ours. What was important was that we mobilized 
the broadest opposition to the Treaty to [remove] the bases.”55  By focusing on the 
Treaty rather than bases, ATM drew in other groups and individuals who were not 
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necessarily opposed to U.S. bases, but opposed to the unequal terms of the Treaty.  
The “paltry” $203 million annual compensation particularly drew the ire of many 
Filipinos. By low-balling Filipinos, the U.S. negotiators underestimated the reactions 
of nationalist elites. Simbulan writes, “The lopsided treaty sealed the unexpected 
alliance between the Senators who were pro-bases but anti-treaty, and the core group 
of anti-base Senators.”56  For example, Senator Teofisto Guingona states in his Senate 
speech of non-concurrence, “We want friendship with America. We want cooperation. 
We want trade. But we do not want servitude. We do not want an agreement that 
debases us as a nation. We do not want terms that degrade our dignity as a people.”57  
Senator Rene Saguisag argued, “Saying yes to the Treaty, in its present form (italics 
mine), is, in my view, to condemn the Philippines to another ten years of exploitation 
under a one-sided, unequal, invidiously discriminatory arrangement.”58 The more 
progressive media outlets, sympathetic to anti-base movements, printed scathing 
editorials criticizing the unequal terms of the Treaty.  Nacpil remarks, “One of the 
most important decisions made at the time was the shift in framing the issue to an anti-
Treaty movement. Whether you were opposing the Treaty for the right reasons or not, 
for the comprehensive reasons or not, if we were divided at that time we would not 
have succeeded.”59  
Strategy 
ATM took advantage of the political opportunity provided under conditions of 
weak security consensus. Activists recognized divisions among Philippine elites 
regarding the future role of U.S. bases, particularly within the Philippine Senate. As 
part of a two prong-strategy, activists first targeted elites. The immediate goal was to 
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block ratification of any new base treaty in the Senate. Thus a significant amount of 
time and energy were directed at lobbying Senators, or providing Senators information 
about the ongoing PACT negotiations and the implications of a lopsided Treaty 
favoring the U.S.  For instance, ATM obtained an early draft of the Treaty proposed 
by the R.P-U.S. panel and provided this information to Senators.  Activists also leaked 
the unfavorable Treaty terms to the press in the early rounds of PACT.
 60
  Highlighting 
the lack of respect from “arrogant” American negotiators and their insultingly low 
base compensation package, activists publicized the unfair terms of the Treaty.  By 
feeding Senators detailed analyses of the draft and publicizing the unfair Treaty terms 
in the media, activists provided fuel for anti-base Senators in their call to remove U.S. 
bases.   
Realizing the large stake Senators held in deciding the future of U.S. bases, 
ATM activists immediately devised a lobbying strategy towards Senators. The first 
task was an analysis of the Senate “straw vote.” Senate President Jovito Salonga held 
two informal surveys, the first on February 21, and the second on July 30, 1991, to 
assess where the other Senators stood on the bases issue. In the first straw vote, twelve 
Senators indicated in writing they were against the bases without any qualification. 
The majority of the other Senators positioned themselves ambiguously stating they 
wanted to study the draft treaty before coming to any conclusion.
61
 Anti-base activists 
obtained a record of the informal straw vote held by Salonga, and in a document dated 
March 1, 1991, drafted a strategy and various tactics to influence the Senate vote in 
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 Interview with Ma Socorro Diokno. April 10, 2006. This information was confirmed by Roland 
Simbulan during a panel discussion at the Third World Roundtable, “Alliances, Anti-Base Movements 
and the Politics of US Military Bases: The Philippines Case in Comparative Perspective.” UP-Diliman, 
Quezon City. May 2, 2006. Reportedly, a Philippine government official sympathetic to movements had 
provided this information. Also see Ma Socorro Diokno. 1991. “Analysis of the Bases Talks,” and 
“Outline of Objections to Draft Agreement on Installations and Military Operating Procedures.” 
Internal ATM documents obtained from personal collection of Corazon Fabros. 
61
 Jovito R. Salonga. The Senate that said no: a four-year record of the first post-EDSA senate. Quezon 
City: University of the Philippines Press, 1995, p.209. 
  76 
September. In the draft, ATM grouped the Senators into five columns based on their 
stance towards the bases and how committed they were to their stated position. In 
other words, activists gauged the probability Senators could be swayed by ATM 
lobbying. The five categories and the respective movement strategy are detailed 
below:
62
 
 
Column 1: Senators voting no. Those listed in column 1 above need 
support by the different anti-base groups: their voting positions need to 
be reinforced. Senators Aquino, Enrile, Estrada, Guingona, Laurel, 
Mercado, Romulo, Saguisag, Tan͂ada, Ziga, Salonga 
 
Column 2: Senators voting no on current terms with option to 
change vote subject to final terms. Those listed in column 2 need 
reinforcement of their voting positions. They need to be furnished more 
information. They need to be lobbied personally. Senators Alvarez, 
Lina, Pimentel. 
 
Column 3: Judgment reserved pending review of final draft. Those 
listed in column 3 can be classified into a) Pro-bases and least likely to 
change their vote, regardless of the outcome of the talk and the terms 
and conditions of the new treaty. Senators Maceda, Paterno, Shahani, 
Angara, Gonzales. b)  Still undecided, and open to the possibility of 
changing their vote, given more information. Senators Rasul, Herrera, 
Tamano. Little or no efforts at all should be expended towards reaching 
or trying to influence those listed under column 3a and column 4. On 
the other hand, every effort should be exerted towards influencing those 
listed under Column 3b. 
 
Column 4: Tentative Yes, subject to compensation and other terms.  
Senator Osmena. 
 
Column 5: Yes. No senators.  
 
Activists then proposed contacting various anti-base groups to “adopt” a bloc 
of Senators to target, and listed various tactics to be used to influence Senators. For 
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 The following comes from an internal ATM document: “Senate Straw Vote, 01 March 1991”.  Copy 
obtained from personal collection of Corazon Fabros. Document currently being archived in UP-
Diliman Library Archives.  
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example, activists were encouraged to maintain support for Senators who were clearly 
going to vote “no” by sending letters, postcards, and telegrams of support and 
congratulations, and by “holding rallies, pickets, and other mass actions of support.”  
Meanwhile, ATM proposed spending a bulk of its resources and energy on the 
“wavering” or “swing vote” Senators. Activists formed a “Special Lobby Task Force” 
with three subcommittees: 1) Research 2) Lobby/Delegation 3) Writers/Media.
63
  
ATM‟s second, broader goal was the mass public campaign to educate 
Filipinos about the negative impact of U.S. military bases. As mentioned above, if the 
base treaty passed through the Senate, the Treaty would then have to pass through a 
national referendum. Thus anti-base groups needed to sway public opinion against U.S. 
military bases in case the Senate did not reject the Treaty.  Anti-base movement 
leaders traveled around different regions of the Philippines, giving presentations or 
organizing forums to educate the public about U.S. bases and present reasons why 
base removal was in the best interest of Filipinos. Groups opposed to bases such as the 
National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) or NFPC also produced 
primers, pamphlets, and other literature to raise awareness about bases.  Lastly, mass 
rallies were held in Manila and around Central Luzon. While the majority of Filipinos 
were in favor of U.S. bases, large anti-base rallies signaled the presence of a strong, 
vocal minority opposed to bases.
64
  Figure 2.5 recreates the flow chart drawn by ATM 
activists demonstrating how the two-prong strategy, Senate lobbying and mass action, 
were timed and coordinated as responses to specific government activity.  
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 In July 1991, perhaps the height of the anti-base debate, 25% opposed U.S. bases while 44% were in 
favor of U.S. presence (Social Weather Station 1991). Anti-base activists argue, however, that more 
than numbers, mobilization capacity and the composition of movement activists were just as important. 
Participating in anti-base campaigns were notable intellectuals, politicians, and lawyers who carried 
significant political weight beyond their numbers. As one activist remarked, who was protesting was 
just as important as “how many” Interview with Cora Fabros, March 6, 2006. 
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Figure 2.5: Flow chart of ATM coordinated strategy 
Source: Internal ATM document. “Senate Straw Vote,  01 March 1991”.  Copy obtained from personal 
collection of Corazon Fabros. 
 
Host State Response: Anti-base Elites and the Anti-Treaty Movement 
The preceding section discussed anti-base movement strategies and tactics 
aimed at both government officials and the mass public. Did any of this lobbying, 
media reporting, picketing, or marching have any bearing on actual policy outcomes?  
If the final Treaty vote rested with the Senate, how much influence did anti-base 
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activists have over the base policy-making process?  Can a link be established between 
ATM pressure and the decision of key political elites? What was the nature of the 
relationship between anti-base Senators and activists?  These questions must be 
addressed to substantiate the claim that social movements mattered in the closing of 
Subic Bay Naval Station.  
As suggested in the February 21 straw vote, at least twelve of the Senators 
already held an anti-base stance before any formal ATM lobbying efforts. The fact 
that more than half the Senators were already open to anti-base arguments 
significantly aided the ATM campaign. In addition to having valuable activist 
resources towards lobbying, ATM activists found potential allies among key 
government elites with significant power in the base policy process. Nationally 
respected, with many coming from privileged backgrounds, the formal participation of 
Senators within the anti-base campaign increased the legitimacy, mobilizing capacity, 
and power of ATM. In particular, three anti-base Senators would become crucial 
players within ATM: Senators Wigberto “Bobby” Tan͂ada, Joseph Estrada, and Juan 
Ponce Enrile. Tan͂ada, whose father Lorenzo Tan͂ada served as a key organizer in 
previous anti-base coalitions, was the most active of the three and played a crucial role 
in updating ATM with information from the Senate.
65
  The addition of Enrile and 
Estrada into the movement also boosted the image and credibility of ATM. Their 
addition invited the possibility of broader support by signaling to both the masses and 
other political elites that the anti-base movement travelled beyond leftist political 
rhetoric.
66
  As mentioned earlier, former defense secretary Enrile represented the 
established political right. Meanwhile, Senator (and later President) Estrada, a former 
action movie star, carried widespread popularity among the masses. Regarding the 
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involvement of Enrile and Estrada in ATM, Senator Rene Saguisag noted, “Since they 
stood for the right and the masses, the nation more easily accepted our vote. Enrile 
brought in the right, and Estrada brought in the masses. Some of the anti-base Senators 
were perceived as Communists so their presence gave us a tremendous boost”.67 
The active participation of Senators Tan͂ada, Enrile, and Estrada also helped 
ATM activists coordinate their tactical campaign against other Senators. The most 
important battleground for ATM was not necessarily on the streets, but inside 
Parliament with all attention focused on the Senate vote on September 16, 1991.
68
 As 
argued above, rather than blanket lobbying the Senators, ATM activists strategically 
lobbied political elites based on information from “insiders” like Senator Bobby 
Tan͂ada .     
One should note that the collaboration between ATM activists and anti-base 
Senators were not an automatic given simply because activists and elites shared 
similar positions regarding U.S. bases.  Activists made a conscious, strategic decision 
to reach out to Philippine elites, even those formerly associated with the Marcos 
dictatorship. For instance, many activists were initially wary of Senator Enrile‟s 
participation in ATM because of his ties to the Marcos regime. Activists suspicious of 
Enrile‟s role during the Marcos era questioned whether the movement should allow 
his active participation. Etta Rosales, an official with Partido ng Bayan (PnB) states, 
“It was Bobby Tan͂ada  who invited Enrile to the launching [of ABAKADA] and even 
asked him to sit in front. He ended up wedged between Crispin Beltran and Nathaniel 
Santiago.  The rest didn‟t want to sit beside him at all. Of course, we had to shake 
hands with him.”69 Also, some anti-base Senators, aware of ATM‟s political left 
leanings, were cautious not to tie themselves too closely with groups associated with 
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the extreme left.
70
 Nevertheless, ATM worked hard to reach out to all elites, putting 
aside former ideological differences.  
In addition to the three Senators active inside ATM, several other Senators 
who eventually voted against the Treaty tacitly supported the anti-base movement. For 
instance, although Senate President Salonga stated that his “no” vote was independent 
of any anti-base movement pressure, he did welcome anti-base activity from the “legal 
left” since it strengthened his own position.71  Activists also note the immense 
pressure faced by Senators, particularly from pro-base groups, the business lobby, and 
public opinion which was generally in favor of bases. After reaching its peak in April 
1990 with 43% of Filipinos expressing their desire for base closures on or before 1991, 
anti-base public opinion declined to 25% in July 1991.
72
 Figure 2.6 below presents 
survey data on the desired length of stay for U.S. bases in the metro Manila area. 
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Figure 2.6: Public opinion indicating desired length of stay for U.S. bases in Metro  
Manila, 1987-1991.73  Source: Social Weather Report Survey 
 
Activists feared that Senators not firmly committed to an anti-base position would 
cave into public opinion or the business lobby. To counter pro-base pressure, anti-base 
activists made their presence known, making sure the base issue would not go down 
quietly. Thus, support for anti-base Senators, and the constant presence of ATM in 
public debates, helped provide moral support and sustain the position of anti-base 
Senators.
74
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thereafter removed if the benefits offered by the US are not increased; 4) Should be retained beyond 
1991 because present set-up provide huge benefits to the Philippines from the US. 
74
 The significance of ATM support in sustaining the position of anti-base Senators is debatable. The 
anti-base Senators I interviewed acknowledged that ATM support was “welcome” and “helpful,” but 
most stated or implied that their own position and vote was based on their own conscious. While this is 
true, activists emphasized that without their role and public support, Senators would have possibly 
caved under pressure to vote in favor of bases. For example, one activist noted his disappointment with 
Senator Heherson Alvarez  (who had an activist background) and Senator Jose Lina; activists assumed 
both would vote against the base, but on September 16, both Senators voted “yes” to the Treaty. 
Interview with ATM activist, March 10, 2006.  
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Assessing or “proving” anti-base movement effectiveness is difficult 
considering the prior preferences held by Senators. The February and July 1991 straw 
votes indicate more than eight Senators, or the one-third necessary to reject Treaty 
ratification, were planning to vote against the bases. Thus even without anti-base 
movement activity, one might argue that the Senate would have voted “no” to U.S. 
bases anyway. Many Senators agree with this statement. Anti-base activists all 
staunchly disagree. Adjudicating the “correct” position ex post facto  is difficult.  
Rather than debating whether anti-base movements independently played an effective 
role, Cookie Diokno suggests another approach to effectiveness by arguing that the 
relationship between anti-base Senators and activists were symbiotic. Noting the 
relationship between the masses and Senators as a two-way process, she observes, “It 
was symbiotic. I don‟t think one could have won without the other.  You needed a 
mass movement… even though Senators [held the decision-making power]. If they 
didn‟t have anyone listening to them, they didn‟t have an audience, or if they didn‟t 
have any group organizing the forums or people…would they have gotten 
anywhere?”75  In other words, Diokno implies that the presence of a core anti-base 
group within civil society helped reaffirm Senators‟ anti-base stance. Additionally, 
Diokno, who analyzed the Treaty terms in detail, provided information to the other 
Senators through Senator Tan͂ada . She argues that Senators themselves did not have 
time to study all the details of the agreements, and thus relied on ATM‟s analysis. 
Simbulan attests this by noting that portions of ATM‟s position paper and anti-base 
literature were used in the speeches of many of the anti-base Senators.
76
  
Senators are correct in stating they probably would have received their eight 
votes regardless of anti-base movement activity. In hindsight, one can argue that the 
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outcome was clearly in favor of the anti-base faction. However, the months preceding 
September 16, 1991 were filled with uncertainty and suspense. Two pieces of 
evidence help adjudicate between several Senators‟ claims that Treaty rejection was 
inevitable, and anti-base activist claims that the outcome was much more contested.  
First, public opinion polls consistently indicated a pro-base majority in the Philippines, 
placing enormous pressure on Senators to vote in favor of bases (see Figure 2.6 above).  
Fighting against majority opinion, ATM advocated a position which would require 
Senators to vote contrary to the electoral majority.
77
 Senator Salonga and other anti-
base Senators also acknowledged extensive pressure from the U.S. and other 
Philippine elites.  In addition to pressure from chief U.S. negotiator Richard Armitage, 
Salonga notes how several U.S. officials, including Congressman Stephen Solarz, 
Ambassador Frank Wisner and embassy officials Kenneth Quinn, and John Maisto, all 
made personal appeals to him, and most likely other Senators as well.
78
 President 
Aquino and government officials favoring a five to seven year phase-out of Subic Bay 
also employed pressure tactics by organizing their own pro-base protests and 
threatening anti-base Senators. Alfredo Bengzon, the vice chairman of the Philippines 
bases negotiating panel, states in his narrative of the PACT process how the President 
had rallied thousands on September 10, 1991 in Manila under national television to 
coerce Senators into voting in favor of the Treaty.
79
 The government bused state 
employees “complete with packed lunches paid for with government funds” to the 
Luneta, the site of the pro-base rally. At the rally, “speakers delivered a message to the 
anti-treaty Senators that would strike fear into the heart of any politician determined to 
hang on to his position at all costs.”80  Senate President Salonga also wrote in his 
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memoirs, “I received a number of veiled threats in the Senate. I was told that 
businessmen from my town were going to picket my residence…For a while, I thought 
that we, the anti-Treaty senators, were engaged in a lonely struggle against our own 
people.”81 
Second, several Senators who stated they were originally anti-base did switch 
their position in the final September 16 vote. Whether due to immense pressure from 
pro-base factions or their own ambiguous preferences, Table 2.3 on the following page 
shows that four Senators who initially stated they would vote against the bases 
switched their position over the course of time. Table 2.3 confirms activist claims that 
even as late as August 1991, there was no guarantee that eight Senators would vote no, 
hence requiring activists to continue their campaign efforts. Movement claims that 
Senators would have been more tempted to vote in favor of U.S. bases had there been 
no public support organized by anti-base movements, and no interaction between 
ATM and the Philippine Senate, are therefore substantiated. Cookie Diokno comments, 
“If there were no loud, critical voices against bases, the Treaty may have just passed 
quietly without much debate. The fact that there was a vocal anti-base faction opened 
up a real debate on the bases issue.”82 
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Table 2.3:  Preference and voting behavior of Senators of the Eighth Congress on   
   the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security 
Senator Feb 21, 1991 July 30, 1991 September 16, 1991 
Alvairez, Heherson No, but w/revision No Yes 
Angara, Edgardo     Yes 
Gonzales, Neptali Study final 
agreement 
Refuse to participate Yes 
Herrera, Ernesto Study final 
agreement  
No Yes 
Lina Jr., Jose No, but study final 
agreement 
  Yes 
Osmena, John Tentative yes, but 
w/revision 
  Yes 
Paterno, Vicente Study final 
agreement  
Yes Yes 
Rasul, Santanina Study final 
agreement 
  Yes 
Romulo, Alberto No Absent Yes 
Ramos-Shahani, Leticia Study final 
agreement  
Undecided Yes 
Tamano, Mamintal Study final 
agreement 
Yes, w/reservation Yes 
Aquino, Agapito No No No 
Enrile, Juan Ponce No No No 
Estrada, Joseph No No No 
Guingona, Teofisto No No No 
Laurel, Sotero No No No 
Maceda, Ernesto Reserve opinion No No 
Mercado, Orlando No No No 
Pimentel, Aquilino No No No 
Salonga, Jovito No No No 
Saguisag, Rene No No No 
Tan͂ada , Wigberto No No No 
Ziga, Victor No No No 
Sources: Salonga 1995, p.213; Senate Legislative Publications Staff 1991; Anti-Treaty 
Movement Internal Documents. Highlights indicate Senators who switched preferences on 
basing issue.  
 
Conclusion: Security Consensus and State Penetration 
State penetration is rather remarkable since military base decisions are often 
decided by the executive, or bureaucracies such as the foreign affairs or defense 
agencies. Relatively well-insulated from civil society, activists are often unable to 
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penetrate the more conservative foreign affairs and defense establishment, or even 
institutions such as the Philippine Senate, and therefore find it difficult to influence 
policy outcomes. In the Philippines, the executive and foreign affairs department were 
largely in favor of retaining U.S. bases, and particularly Subic Bay Naval Station.
83
 
However, as argued earlier in this chapter, forming allies with domestic political elites 
was possible because of elite divisions under a weak security consensus. While this 
may appear banal at first, it is a crucial point which determines whether anti-base 
movements are capable of penetrating the state and forming ties with key political 
figures in the bases debate. Too often civil society is marginalized in security policy 
because political elites, especially those within the foreign policy establishment, reject 
alternative security discourses contrary to the status quo. This is particularly true in 
asymmetric alliance patterns, where the weaker power lacks the leverage and political 
will to propose an alternative path diverging from the interests of the greater power.   
Although the Marcos regime helped promote a common security consensus by 
silencing opposition and dissent through martial law, in the post-Marcos era, no strong 
security consensus existed regarding U.S.-Philippine relations and the role of U.S. 
bases.  Even some elites favoring U.S. bases admitted that no external threats 
warranted bases for security reasons. As argued earlier, the debates regarding military 
bases in the Philippines Record of the Senate largely revolved around sovereignty and 
economic issues, not security incentives stemming from U.S. military presence. The 
pro-base Aquino Administration and the majority of business elites were in favor of 
bases because of their implications for trade, investment, and U.S. economic 
assistance rather than security.  During negotiations with the R.P. negotiating panel, 
Armitage complained that his counterparts were engaging in “cash-register” 
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diplomacy.  Without a strong security consensus, and consequently any security 
rational for maintaining U.S. bases, political elites remained divided on the issue. 
Additionally, nationalist sentiments pushed forward by middle-class intelligentsia and 
the organized Left further fragmented elites.
84
 The weak security consensus, divided 
elites, and the presence of strong nationalist sentiments among several Philippine 
Senators provided the political space necessary for ATM activists and political elites 
to cooperate.  
Activists, of course, had to make the right strategic choices and jump through 
the window opened by conditions of a weak security consensus.  Again, in hindsight, 
it appears easy to convey ATM‟s success story with a sense of historical determinism. 
Upon deeper reflection, however, activists could have selected poor strategies and 
made “wrong” choices which would have weakened movement effectiveness and their 
ability to influence base policy outcomes. What if ATM resisted putting aside 
ideological differences to join forces with anti-base elites who were not necessarily 
coming from the political left? What if activists decided to devote more resources on 
the mass public campaign rather than narrowly targeting Senators? What if ATM 
failed to capitalize on information from the leaked draft Treaty proposal, or decided 
not to reframe their agenda  as “anti-Treaty”? Raising these counterfactuals forces us 
to question whether the closure of Subic Bay Naval Station was simply pre-
determined by the existence of a weak security consensus and the presence of anti-
base Senators. Instead, the weak security consensus provided an open window for 
activists to form ties with sympathetic elites and influence outcomes.  Movements 
took advantage of this window by employing proper framing strategies, mobilizing 
resources, and targeting both elites and masses using various tactics. 
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In the absence of a strong security consensus, key government elites 
sympathetic to anti-base sentiments responded to activist efforts by embracing the 
anti-base movement cause.  On the other hand, the pro-base faction in government, led 
by the executive, promoted various tactics to confront, disrupt, or co-opt anti-base 
movements via persuasion and pressure tactics.  The lack of security consensus among 
Philippine elites, however, posed obstacles for the President and other pro-base groups 
in forging any cohesive policy to counter anti-base rhetoric. Granted, in the final week 
prior to the Senate vote, public opinion had swung clearly in favor of pro-base groups. 
However, anti-base activists had already penetrated elite ranks long before September 
16, and found a core group of Senators willing to align themselves with ATM to 
promote the anti-base cause. A former Embassy official  in Manila noted how the anti-
base movement “shaped the whole discussion of bases.”85 Government elites held 
“widely disparate views” on the bases and the future of U.S.-Philippine relations, thus 
providing activists the opportunity to form ties with sympathetic elites. In a symbiotic 
relationship between activists and government elites, anti-base movements were able 
to affect the policy direction of the government in shutting down Subic Bay Naval 
Station.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE  
AND ANTI-BASE MOVEMENTS IN OKINAWA, 1995-1996 
 
 On September 4, 1995, two U.S. Marines and a Navy seaman snatched a 
twelve-year old girl while driving their rented vehicle through a residential area in 
Northern Okinawa. Dragging her into the vehicle, they taped her mouth and eyes shut, 
and bound her hands and feet. The men then drove to an isolated beach and raped her.  
 The rape of an innocent schoolgirl galvanized what would become the “third 
wave” of Okinawan resistance against U.S. bases. Peaking on October 21 with 
approximately 85,000 protestors, the incident placed Okinawa Prefecture in the 
national spotlight, evoking sympathy from mainland Japan.  The media’s focus on 
Okinawa revealed to the rest of Japan the heavy burden borne by Okinawans in 
maintaining the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Okinawa Prefecture hosted 75% of all 
U.S. bases in Japan.  
 For the United States and Japan, the rape and ensuing wave of anti-base 
protests arrived at an inopportune time. President Clinton was scheduled to meet 
Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in Tokyo in November to reaffirm and 
strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Anti-base protests in Okinawa put the 
Japanese government in a particularly awkward position, with Tokyo caught in the 
nexus between domestic opposition against bases and its alliance commitments to the 
U.S.  From below, anti-base protestors pressed for revisions to the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) and a reduction of U.S. military presence. From above, the U.S., 
while contrite over the tragic rape incident, still expected Tokyo to push forward with 
alliance strengthening measures. How, then, did Tokyo elites balance their response 
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between domestic anti-base opposition while maintaining their commitment to the 
U.S.-Japan security alliance? 
A key question raised in this chapter asks why massive protests in Okinawa in 
1995, large enough to reverberate in the halls of government in Tokyo, failed to 
produce significant shifts in basing policy outcomes as in the Philippines. Anti-base 
protests in Okinawa did initially pressure Washington and Tokyo, leading to 
government concessions and partial victory for anti-base movements. However, 
contrary to anti-base movements in the Philippines, the existence of a strong security 
consensus among Japanese political elites prevented Okinawan anti-base movements 
from winning substantial long-term gains on basing policy outcomes. In particular, 
heightened anti-base opposition triggered by the rape coincided with a period of 
alliance tightening between Tokyo and Washington, making it difficult for activists to 
gain any traction or leverage in their struggle against U.S. bases.  Tokyo elites, 
influenced by a pervading consensus defining the U.S.-Japan alliance as a pillar of 
Japan’s national security strategy, resorted to token concessions and economic 
incentives to pacify anti-base sentiment without reneging on its alliance commitments 
to the U.S. The government’s use of economic incentives and coercive legal measures 
undermined the unity of anti-base movements in the long run. Thus, the strong 
security consensus, prevalent among Japanese political elites, helped shape Tokyo’s 
response towards anti-base movements.  
Before proceeding, I should clarify where my interpretation of Okinawan anti-
base movements situates with other existing accounts, and reveal the limited aims of 
my analysis. Depending on whose point of view and which time frame, Okinawan 
anti-base movements over the past ten years have been assessed as both a success and 
failure. Consistent with other chapters, I define “success” in this chapter in terms of 
policy outcomes. While token policy changes may be viewed as a success at the 
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tactical level, in my account, this does not constitute a “victory” for anti-base 
movements. As a reminder from the theory chapter, the definition of “success” does 
not necessarily come from the perspective of movements, but from the vantage point 
of the state.  
Further complicating base politics in Japan is the combination of multiple 
actors, interests, and identities across three different levels of analysis – local, 
national, and international. Unsurprisingly, based on the level of interaction, different 
scholars have offered different interpretations of anti-base movements and the politics 
of bases in Okinawa.  I do not attempt to unpack all these complex relationships, and 
rely on the analysis of numerous other scholars and activists to help clarify Okinawan 
base politics.  Although the tension between different local groups at the micro-level 
adds a fascinating dynamic to the politics of bases, for the purposes of my argument, 
more attention will be given at the macro-level (Tokyo and Washington) and meso-
level (Tokyo and Okinawa) of interaction. Particularly important is the challenge of 
anti-base movements and the ability of the central government to balance between 
international and domestic forces. My goal is to demonstrate that on the whole, anti-
base movements have found it difficult to win significant concessions from Tokyo 
because of various factors pinned to the structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the 
prevailing security consensus among Tokyo elites.  
U.S. Bases and the Okinawan Resistance Movement 
 Understanding anti-base movements in Okinawa requires examining 
Okinawa’s historical and cultural antecedents in relation to their struggle with 
mainland Japan.  Formerly known as the independent Ryukyu Kingdom, the Ryukyu 
Islands were annexed by Japan in 1872, and formally incorporated into Japan as 
Okinawan Prefecture in 1879. The Japanese government pursued a policy of 
assimilation in Okinawa to civilize what they perceived as a backwards group. 
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Although many Okinawan elites supported assimilation with Japan, Japan’s growing 
imperial ambitions and the Pacific War dramatically altered the attitudes and 
collective memory of Okinawans, and their relationship with the mainland.1   
Battle of Okinawa and the first wave 
U.S. Marines set foot on Okinawa on April 1, 1945. In preparation for a major 
battle with the U.S., the Japanese military conscripted Okinawan men into the Imperial 
Army, and mobilized women and children to build airfields and defense fortifications. 
What stands out in the Battle of Okinawa is not the thousands of Okinawan casualties 
by American troops, but the atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers against 
Okinawans. Japanese soldiers raped, looted, and extracted rations from the civilian 
population. The soldiers fortified themselves in the most secure caves as Okinawan 
civilians were left exposed to the “typhoon of steel.” The Japanese military also 
recruited thousands of women into “comfort stations” as sex slaves.  Soldiers executed 
Okinawans communicating in the Okinawan dialect under the pretense that they were 
spying on behalf of the Americans. Finally, with defeat imminent, Japanese troops 
either encouraged or forced residents to commit suicide rather than surrender to the 
U.S. In a matter of months, a third of the entire Okinawan population perished.2   
The Battle of Okinawa is significant in two respects. First, Okinawa’s aversion 
to war stems directly from the collective memory of the Battle of Okinawa. Thus the 
battle “punctuates and articulates meanings of protest against war . . . and against the 
existence of U.S. military bases on Okinawa.”3  Second, the mobilization of 
Okinawans to fight for the Emperor while still demanding assimilation highlighted the 
duality of Okinawan identity. As Julia Yonentani argues, the multiple and 
                                                 
1 Masamichi S Inoue. Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p.56; Miyume Tanji. Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa. 
London: Routledge, 2006, p.27.  
2 Tanji 2007, p.40. 
3 ibid 2007, p.41. 
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contradictory meanings of “Okinawa” and “Japan” have been replayed in Okinawa’s 
struggle against U.S. bases.4 
 After the war, Japan regained its full independence in 1951 under the terms of 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, the U.S. maintained its right to govern 
Okinawa under the United States Civilian Administration of the Ryukyu Islands 
(USCAR).  In addition to the use of former Japanese bases, USCAR expropriated 
Okinawan land to expand U.S. military presence. The confiscation of private property 
for base construction often resulted in local protests against U.S. bases.  Thus the “first 
wave” of Okinawan struggle was directed against U.S. military land acquisition. The 
first wave culminated in June 1956 with the release of the U.S. House Armed Service 
Committee’s “Price Report.” The report justified the permanent leasing of base land as 
well as further land expropriation.  The initial sense of unity in the “all-island 
struggle,” however, proved to be weak and temporary.5  The broad coalition formed 
by various groups - political parties, labor unions, teachers’ organizations, landowners, 
and farmers - eventually fragmented. Okinawans were split between conservative 
groups who wanted to cooperate with the U.S. while demanding maximum rent for 
bases, and other groups such as the Okinawa’s Teacher Association (OTA) and the 
Okinawa People’s Party (OPP) who sought Okinawa’s reversion back to Japan.6  
Although failing to mobilize a cohesive coalition, the “first wave” Okinawan struggle 
did help solidify “the foundations of a new postwar identity and movement against 
marginalization.”7 
 
                                                 
4 Julia Yonentani. "Future Asset, but at What Price? The Okinawa Initiative Debate." In Islands of 
Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power, edited by Laura Hein and Mark 
Selden, pp. 243-72. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
5 Tanji 2007, p.53. 
6 Ibid 2007, pp.72-73. 
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Second Wave 
 Land disputes with the U.S. military subsided as landowners signed contracts 
in exchange for large economic benefits. However, the Okinawan reversion movement 
continued into the 1960s in the “second wave” of Okinawan struggle. Led by the 
Okinawa Prefecture Council for Reversion to the Home Country, a coalition headed 
by members from the OTA, local political parties, and labor unions, the reversion 
movement raised three specific grievances: crimes and accidents stemming from U.S. 
military presence, the suspected deployment of nuclear weapons on U.S. bases, and 
the use of Okinawan bases to launch B-52 strikes in Vietnam.8  Okinawans believed 
that the island’s reversion to Japan would resolve these outstanding grievances.  
Framed as “reversion nationalism,” Okinawans united with progressive nationalist 
groups on mainland Japan opposed to the renewal of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. 
However, in the mid-1960’s, U.S. and pro-U.S. Japanese government officials 
managed to negotiate legal and political arrangements enabling U.S. bases to remain 
in Okinawa.9 This undoubtedly led to criticism against “reversion” as the basis of 
movement framing. Moreover, the onset of the Vietnam War forced pacifists within 
the reversion movement to reconsider Okinawa’s return to a state which supported 
U.S. military action in Vietnam. Realizing that reversion would no longer achieve 
Okinawans’ goal of reducing U.S. military presence, the Council of Reversion 
attempted to fuse “reversion” with “anti-war” frames.  
The Third Wave 
 Okinawa reverted back to Japan in 1972. Anti-base protests remained 
relatively sparse over the next two decades. However, the silence did not remove the 
                                                 
8 Ibid 2006, p.77. 
9 For a detailed discussion of U.S-Japan negotiations regarding reversion movements, see Robert 
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Studies of Modern Japan. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2004.  
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tension between U.S. and Japan’s desire to maintain regional order and security, and 
Okinawa’s hope for life without U.S. bases.10  It took the rape of a twelve year old girl 
in September 1995 to rekindle anti-U.S. military sentiment in Okinawa, thus ending 
the “low period” of Okinawan resistance.11  
 Report of the rape did not immediately elicit reactions in Okinawa.  Political 
parties and anti-base groups remained silent, most likely due to the sense of shame 
attached to the young rape victim.12  The first group to break public silence and 
generate momentum against U.S. bases were women’s groups, such as the Okinawnan 
Women Act against Military And Violence (OWAAMV), and the League of 
Okinawan Women’s Groups (Okifuren). Okifuren voiced their anger in a public 
statement on September 11.  Other Okinawan organizations soon followed Okifuren’s 
lead, incensed over the rape case and the U.S. military’s refusal in handing over the 
three suspects. Reminiscent of earlier coalition groups, labor unions, political parties, 
teachers’ unions, peace groups, and environmental groups organized rallies, 
participated in sit-ins, and formulated public statements against the U.S. military and 
the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).13 
The local and prefectural government’s involvement in the anti-base struggle 
aided activists tremendously. Reformist political parties and city and village 
assemblies took part in protests. More importantly, the Okinawa Prefecture governor’s 
direct actions and confrontation against the central government served as a rallying 
point for Okinawans. On September 20, Governor Masahide Ota met Foreign Minister 
Yohei Kono, and presented a formal appeal to the Japanese government to revise 
SOFA.14  As argued below, Ota single-handedly triggered a domestic and diplomatic 
                                                 
10 Inoue 2006, p.38. 
11 Tanji 2007, p.106.  
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crisis by refusing to sign the land lease which permitted the U.S. military to maintain 
bases in Okinawa. 
 Meanwhile, as Ota confronted Tokyo, anti-base protests in Okinawa continued 
to grow. On September 25, about 1,000 Okinawans protested in Naha, Okinawa’s 
capital. The following day, 3,000 Okinawans representing forty-three organizations 
and civic groups, organized by Heiwa Undo (Peace Movement Center), protested in 
Ginowan.15 Okinawans also received support from anti-base groups in mainland 
Japan. Thirty-five local assemblies in seventeen prefectures approved resolutions or 
produced statements requesting the Japanese government to review the SOFA 
agreement.16  The high point of this movement episode took place on October 21, 
1995 with 85,000 protestors taking part in the “People’s Rally.”  Denouncing the rape, 
the rally put forth a protest resolution with four demands: 1) imposing strict discipline 
on American military personnel in an effort to eradicate crime; 2) providing  the rape 
victim immediate and full compensation in addition to an apology; 3) revising the 
Status of Forces Agreement; 4) reducing and realigning the number of military bases 
in Okinawa.17  
Mass protests in Okinawa, and support from local governments and NGOs on 
the mainland provided Ota additional leverage in negotiations with Tokyo.  In an act 
of protest and defiance, Ota rejected the government’s request to sign the land lease 
contracts on behalf of Okinawan citizens who were unwilling to grant their land to the 
U.S. military.18  Ota stated, “In the past fifty years, Okinawa has always cooperated 
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17 Masahide Ota. Essays on Okinawa Problems. Okinawa, Japan: Yui Shuppan, 2000. 
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with the Japanese and U.S. governments, but they did not listen to Okinawan voices. 
This time, they should listen to us.”19 The conjunction of mass protests and Ota’s 
defiance finally opened Tokyo’s ears to Okinawan voices.20  
Under the leadership of Ota and support from the prefectural government, 
Okinawan anti-base activists successfully mobilized citizens to form an island-wide 
anti-base movement. Mass mobilization and Ota’s defiance of Tokyo not only 
publicized Okinawan base issues in mainland Japan, but also attracted their sympathy 
and support. Anti-base movement demands were directed primarily against the central 
government rather than the U.S. Mass protests signaling increasing antagonism against 
bases, compounded by Governor Ota’s refusal to sign the base lease, threatened to 
undermine Tokyo’s post- Cold War security strategy and efforts to strengthen alliance 
ties with Washington. With the crisis reaching a boiling point, U.S. and Japanese 
officials established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to address 
Okinawan grievances. The SACO Report eventually recommended the return of 21% 
of U.S. military base land, as well as the implementation of several operational and 
noise abatement measures.21  
Did the December 1996 SACO Report indicate movement success? While 
Okinawans achieved successful mobilization, and extracted several concessions from 
Tokyo and Washington, further examination of this episode suggests that movements 
were less successful on the level of outcomes. As argued later, the SACO 
recommendations amounted to nothing more than token concessions. Many larger 
demands such as SOFA revisions were unmet. The central government’s use of 
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21 GAO. "Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on 
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compensation politics in later movement episodes also indicated where Tokyo’s 
priorities lay when balancing between domestic and international forces. Undoubtedly, 
numerous factors such as fragmentation within the anti-base movement, the 
marginalization of Okinawa, or the government’s use of selective incentives to counter 
base opposition may all have curtailed movement effectiveness. However, I argue that 
one factor in particular, the presence of a strong security consensus, played a heavy 
role in shaping the host government’s response to anti-base opposition. An elite 
consensus which elevated the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance acted as a barrier, 
preventing Okinawan activists from penetrating the state. Thus anti-base movements 
were unable to effectively push for changes on basing policy issues. 
Security Consensus 
 Although it is often assumed that most Japanese elites support the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, it is worth examining where this consensus comes from and why it persists. 
That scholars and policy-makers have reaffirmed Tokyo’s strong alignment toward 
Washington for the past decade only makes my task easier.22  With the strength of the 
alliance rooted in Japan’s security norms and postwar domestic institutional 
arrangements, I marshal evidence from elite statements, policy documents, and public 
opinion polls confirming the breadth and depth of an elite consensus regarding the 
U.S.-Japan alliance from the mid-1990s to the present.  Questions pertaining to the 
U.S alliance arise as Japanese officials periodically recalibrate national security policy 
to international events and domestic political trends. On the whole, however, the 
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consensus surrounding the U.S.-Japan alliance and the role of U.S. bases in Japanese 
national security strategy has rarely been challenged.    
Thinking about Consensus 
Thinking about Japanese security in terms of “consensus” is not a novel 
approach. For instance, Richard Samuels traces the trajectory of Japanese grand 
strategy by connecting different “ideological dots” which highlight alternating periods 
of debate and consensus regarding Japanese security policy.23 The use of consensus as 
an analytical concept is most appropriate in Japan because security politics is often 
dictated by the dominant consensus held by powerful political elites. Broadly 
speaking, the post-war consensus takes into account Japan’s comprehensive approach 
to security, encompassing economic and political dimensions of security.  More 
narrowly, the security consensus reflects Japan’s staunch support of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance in its national defense strategy. 
My analysis begins with Japan’s defeat in World War II. Physically, mentally, 
and spiritually broken, Japan’s disastrous imperial East Asia Co-Prosperity project 
ended with the occupation of Japan by foreigners. At the mercy of the U.S. military, 
the occupation quashed any lingering hopes of re-establishing Japan as a military 
power. The demilitarization of Japan carried out by U.S. forces was both a “physical 
as well as a psychological project.”24  Japan’s defeat would eventually pave the 
growing consensus around the Yoshida Doctrine - the emphasis on economic 
development as a means to national power while relying on the U.S. alliance for 
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national security. The Yoshida consensus effectively institutionalized Japan’s post-war 
“cheap ride” to security under the U.S. security umbrella.25   
Through 1952, the U.S. military laid the foundations of Japan’s political 
institutions, as well as the social and legal norms preventing Japan’s military from 
reemerging as a powerful force.26  Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution provided the 
cornerstone of Japan’s postwar security arrangement. Under Article 9, Japan 
renounced war as a sovereign right and the use of force as a means to resolve 
international disputes. Transcending mere legal rhetoric, the Article developed over 
time as a norm, entrenched in Japan’s political culture. Although revisionists today 
continue to test its limits, normative constraints have thus far made attempts at 
revising Article 9 extremely difficult.27  
The Japanese government used institutions, such as the Cabinet Legislative 
Bureau (CLB), to curb its military ambition. To ensure that military-oriented 
revisionists would not usurp Article 9, bureaucrats and politicians formed the CLB as 
a civilian institution interpreting and legitimating Japanese national security.  In 
addition to its function as an advisory body inside the prime minister’s secretariat, the 
CLB interpreted Article 9 and dictated the scope and limitations of the use of Japan’s 
Self Defense Force (SDF). Over the years, the CLB reinterpreted the Article numerous 
times to fit Japan’s security needs as defined by mainstream elites, giving it an elastic 
quality.28  
In addition to the CLB, several other institutional procedures were built to 
prevent the military from gaining the upper-hand on national security policy-making. 
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 102 
For instance, the Japanese Defense Agency’s (JDA) autonomy and capacity was 
limited by placing the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) officials within the 
JDA.29  To ensure civilian control of the military, Prime Minister Yoshida placed the 
JDA under jurisdiction of his own office, thwarting any attempts to give the JDA full 
ministerial status. Yoshida also ordered the CLB to form “internal bureaus” within the 
JDA. These bureaus were headed by officials without prior military experience.30   
In sum, Japanese mainstream pragmatists, cultivating institutional and 
normative constraints, consolidated the postwar security consensus by alienating 
ultranationalists, and pacifying revisionists.31 The pragmatists’ comprehensive 
approach to security, underscoring economic over military power, was made possible 
under U.S. protection and the U.S.-Japan security alliance. This comes as no surprise 
considering that the development of Japan’s postwar security norms and institutions 
were borne out of Japan’s military defeat in World War II and the political order 
established by U.S. occupation forces. While postwar domestic institutions were 
implanted by the U.S. military, over time, Japanese leaders learned to embrace the 
U.S. as a key pillar to their national defense. These elites cultivated security norms and 
institutions around the U.S.-Japan security alliance, expanding the breadth and depth 
of the security consensus. 
End of the Cold War 
Did the elite security consensus regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance significantly 
evolve over time? The end of the Cold War did create an initial degree of uncertainty 
concerning the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  Catalyzed by international criticism 
regarding Japan’s tepid response to the Persian Gulf War and the first North Korean 
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nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, Japanese policymakers reexamined their global 
security role and alliance partnership with the U.S.  Although some critics predicted a 
loosening of the U.S.-Japan alliance with the end of the Cold War, a review of defense 
policies inside Japanese and American policy circles in the mid-1990s foreshadowed a 
renewed commitment to the alliance heading into the new millennium.  In February 
1994, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa appointed an advisory group with the 
intention of revising the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). The advisory 
panel advocated a comprehensive security policy while expanding its multilateral role 
in international affairs.32  The group report also suggested increasing U.S.-Japanese 
security cooperation by improving bilateral policy consultations and promoting joint 
training and operational planning.33 Draft reports of the advisory panel signaled to the 
U.S. that Japan was looking to redefine its security role in the post-Cold War era.   
In the United States, the Clinton Administration conducted its own strategic 
assessment of East Asia. The 1995 East Asian Strategic Review (EASR) committed 
100,000 troops to the region.  Intended to provide a stable U.S. presence in Asia, the 
EASR was partially in response to the first North Korean nuclear crisis and the rise of 
China.  The U.S. also expected Japan to increase its own contribution to the alliance. 
The EASR restated the importance of Japan as a security partner, declaring, “Our 
security alliance with Japan is the linchpin of U.S. security policy in Asia.”34 But even 
prior to the EASR’s release, the U.S. was already seeking ways to strengthen its 
relationship with Japan.  Joseph Nye, then the assistant secretary of defense for 
international security, initiated a bilateral process encouraging greater Japanese 
                                                 
32 Hisayoshi Ina. "The Japan-U.S. Security Alliance in a New Era of International Relations." In Japan-
U.S. Security Alliance for the 21st Century : Cornerstone of Democracy, Peace and Prosperity for Our 
Future Generations, edited by Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3-14. Japan: Overseas Public 
Relations Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996; Also see Mochizuki 1997, p.9. 
33 Mochizuki 1997, p.9. 
34 Daily Yomiuri. “The Pentagon's recipe for peace in Asia and the Pacific.” February 28, 1995. 
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defense cooperation with the U.S.  The working-level discussions under the Nye 
initiative influenced Japan’s own NDPO revision by reiterating the value of the U.S.-
Japan security alliance and suggesting the geographic expansion of Japan’s national 
defense boundaries. Implying the elevated status of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the 
new NDPO made thirteen specific references to the U.S.-Japan alliance, compared 
with only two references in the previous defense outline.35 
It was under this context of alliance affirmation when public outrage over the 
rape in Okinawa reverberated throughout Japan. Support for the security alliance and 
U.S. bases in Japan dropped in public opinion polls. The November bilateral summit 
between Clinton and Murayama was also postponed.36 Reactions to the rape had 
relatively little impact on the larger framework of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. 
Nevertheless, friction between Tokyo and Washington generated by the rape incident 
required both governments to address Okinawan base issues.   
The consensus regarding U.S.-Japan security relations was manifest in the 
U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, forged during the April 16, 1996 summit 
between Murayama’s successor, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, and President 
Clinton. The declaration reaffirmed the importance of the alliance stating, “The Prime 
Minister and the President recognize that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security is the core of the Japan-U.S. alliance, and underlies the mutual confidence 
that constitutes the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues.”37  As the 
MOFA Deputy Director General of North American Affairs Bureau discussed, the 
Joint Declaration reaffirmed that “the framework for the defense of Japan will 
continue to rest on the twin pillars of appropriate defense capabilities and the Japan-
                                                 
35 Ina 1996, p.34.  
36 Domestic issues in the U.S. were cited as reasons for Clinton’s cancellation to the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation meeting and his summit meeting with Prime Minister Murayama.  
37 “Japan-U.S. Declaration on Joint Security – Alliance for the Twenty-First Century.”  April 16, 1996. 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html> [last accessed October 4, 2007]. 
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U.S. security arrangements.”38 The declaration paved the way for strengthened 
alliance relations in the twenty-first century, concluding: 
 
 “The three legs of the Japan-U.S. relationship - security, political, and 
economic - are based on shared values and interests and rest on the 
mutual confidence embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their strong 
determination, on the eve of the twenty-first century, to build on the 
successful history of security cooperation and to work hand-in-hand to 
secure peace and prosperity for future generations.”39    
 
In addition to strengthened alliance ties, Japan sought to expand the role of its 
military in national security affairs. The expansion of the military’s role was not 
contradictory to the alliance, but rather working in conjunction with strengthened ties 
between Washington and Tokyo.  For example, prior to the April 1996 summit, Tokyo 
and Washington signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The 
agreement enabled Japan to provide logistical support to the U.S. military in 
peacekeeping efforts, humanitarian missions, joint exercises, and other U.S. operations 
during peacetime.40   In 1997, the U.S. and Japan produced the “Interim Report on the 
Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.” Produced by the joint 
government Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), the interim report 
reviewed the new guidelines for cooperation on the basis of Japan’s NDPO and the 
1996 Hashimoto-Clinton Joint Declaration. The document aimed at improving 
coordinated responses to an armed attack against Japan.41  Moreover, the SDC’s 
interim report confirmed the underlying trend of increased security cooperation 
between the U.S. and Japan in the mid-late 1990s.  On basic defense postures, both 
                                                 
38 Tanaka 1996, p.9. 
39 “Japan-U.S. Declaration on Joint Security – Alliance for the Twenty-First Century.”  April 16, 1996.  
40 Mochizuki 1997, p.15.  
41 “Report on the Interim Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.” June 17, 
1997. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline.html [last accessed October 4, 
2007].  
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sides would “firmly maintain U.S.- Japan security arrangements,” by developing 
procedures to increase cooperation in bilateral and multilateral operations in areas 
such as transportation, medical services, information sharing, education, and training. 
The interim report also permitted the SDF to provide rear-area support to U.S. forces 
in a military crisis around Japan. Under the threat of imminent attack, Japan and the 
U.S. agreed to “intensify intelligence sharing and policy consultations and initiate at 
an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism.”42  
The string of bilateral agreements produced in the mid-late 1990s suggests that 
the strong consensus held by elites regarding U.S.-Japan security relations continued 
to exist after the Cold War.  Elite statements and policy documents reflected a security 
discourse in Japan which favored close alignment to Washington. The persistence of 
an elite security consensus partially stemmed from external threats, such as a rising 
China or North Korean nuclear missiles. More importantly, internal factors, such as 
Japan’s domestic security institutions, norms, and culture  played a significant role in 
perpetuating a strong consensus throughout the 1990s.  Figure 3.1 below illustrates 
how the existence of external security threats, coupled with domestic norms and 
institutions, have helped forge a strong elite consensus centered around the U.S.-Japan 
alliance.  
                                                 
42 ibid.  
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Figure 3.1: Factors underpinning security consensus among Japanese elites 
Public Opinion  
The consensus held by elites is also paralleled by the majority of the Japanese 
public. Figure 3.2 below presents data in the mid-late 1990s regarding Japanese 
attitudes towards the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Although attitudes towards the U.S.-
Japan alliance dipped slightly in November 1995, attributed to the rape in Okinawa 
and negative publicity for the U.S. military, on the whole, the majority of Japanese 
tended to view the U.S. alliance positively. 
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          Figure 3.2: Public Support for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
            Source: Yomirui Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun. Public opinion data cross-tabulation available at  
            Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Japanese Data Archive 43 
 
Moreover, in a January 1997 poll, 57% of Japanese stated that military cooperation 
between the United States and Japan based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty should 
remain at its current level.44 In the mid-late 1990s, a slight majority of Japanese also 
believed U.S. military presence in Asia should remain (50%) or increase (4%), 
whereas 41% indicated U.S. troop presence should decrease.45 
In sum, Japan’s security policy did evolve in the immediate post-Cold War 
period. Although Japan pushed the limits of Article 9 by seeking to expand it military 
role in the region, the U.S-Japan alliance remained deeply embedded in Japan’s 
                                                 
43 Questions from November 1991, April 1992, and September 1996 are from the Asahi Shimbun.  All 
other years are from Yomirui Shimbun. Although variation in wording changed slightly from year to 
year, poll questions referred specifically to the usefulness or benefit of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. 
Question wording from the Asahi Shimbun read, “Japan has signed a security treaty with the United 
States. Do you think the Japan-US Security Treaty has been good for Japan, or not?” Wording from the 
Yomirui Shimbun read, “Do you think the United States-Japan Security Treaty is very useful, somewhat 
useful, or not useful at all with regard to providing Japan with national security.” “Useful” and 
“somewhat useful” responses in the Yomirui poll were aggregated into the “positive” category in Figure 
4.1.  
44 Yomirui Shimbun. Survey conducted between January 18, 1997 to January 19, 1997. N=2,030.  
45 Yomirui Shimbun. Survey conducted between October 25, 1997 to October 26, 1997. N=1,952. 
   
 
 109 
overall national security framework. Yuko Okamoto, the former MOFA Director of 
the National Security Affairs Division, North American Affairs Bureau, highlighted 
the strong consensus held by Tokyo elites in the following commentary at the close of 
the Hashimoto-Clinton summit: 
 
“A collective security structure in Asia is still at least twenty years away. 
Until then, Japan in theory has only two alternatives: we can attempt to 
provide our own protection, or we can enter into an alliance with another, 
stronger country. Given the current military concentration in the 
surrounding regions, protecting ourselves would necessitates a Self-
Defense Force several time larger than we have now…which in turn 
would require changes to the Constitution. It is unlikely that the Japanese 
people would accept this alternative. Thus the security alliance with the 
United States represents the only real alternative.”46 
 
The historical legacy of Japan’s imperial past and the postwar institutional security 
arrangements imposed by the U.S. helped produce norms and domestic structures 
which prevented Japan from pursuing a military-first security policy.47  Relying 
instead on the U.S. security umbrella for external defense, these structures led Japan to 
formulate a security policy in more comprehensive terms, focusing heavily on 
economic power.48   In other words, prevailing norms and institutional arrangements 
required Japanese policymakers to embed the structure of the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance into Japan’s national security framework. For these reasons, the security 
consensus among Japanese political elites has remained strong for over sixty years.  
Government Response to Anti-Base Movements 
How does the security consensus help explain the interaction between the state 
and anti-base movements, and the ensuing outcome on base policy issues? In this 
                                                 
46 Yukio Okamoto. "Searching for a Solution to the Okinawan Problem." In Japan-U.S. Security 
Alliance for the 21st Century : Cornerstone of Democracy, Peace and Prosperity for Our Future 
Generations, edited by Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3-14. Japan: Overseas Public Relations 
Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996. 
47 Katzenstein and Okawara, p.92.  
48 Ibid, p.92. 
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section, I demonstrate how the strong security consensus influenced the government’s 
response towards Okinawan anti-base opposition. More concretely, Tokyo employed 
strategies undermining anti-base activity, rendering anti-base movements relatively 
ineffective on the policy front. While anti-base movements were able to extract several 
concessions (most notably the promised return of Futenma Air Station) by threatening 
to unravel Tokyo and Washington’s desire for a strengthened alliance, movement 
success was only partial at best.  
From the Rape Incident  to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa  
As discussed earlier, thousands of Okinawan citizens mobilized to protest 
against U.S. military presence in Okinawa following the rape incident in 1995. Anti-
base groups demanded revisions to SOFA, and a reduction in Okinawa’s burden share 
of bases. What impact did anti-base protests have on basing policy decisions?  How 
did the Japanese and U.S. governments respond to such widespread opposition? In the 
wake of the 1995 East Asia Strategic Review and strengthening alliance ties between 
Washington and Tokyo, Japan’s initial response to anti-base demands were 
predictable.  Despite bearing the brunt of Okinawan demands and a dip in Japanese 
support for U.S. military presence, Tokyo remained firm in its support for the alliance. 
Although Prime Minister Murayama publicly announced his willingness to open a 
review for SOFA revisions, the JDA and MOFA quickly asserted that SOFA revisions 
were a non-issue. Negating Murayama’s position, Foreign Minister Kono restated 
Japan’s position that SOFA revisions were off the table. The bureaucracies prevailed. 
As one Foreign Ministry official commented, MOFA  “had no intention of conducting 
a full-scale review of the status agreement . . . The agreement and the Japan-U.S. 
   
 
 111 
Security Treaty are two sides of the same coin . . . reviewing the framework of the 
status agreement would have a large impact on Japan’s national-security policy.”49  
Governor Ota’s refusal to sign the land lease contracts, however, generated 
concern among Japanese policy circles working to strengthen the alliance and the 
U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty.50 Takeshi Ozawa of the Defense Facilities 
Administration Agency (DFAA) conceded, ''The timing of all this is really bad.”51 
MOFA officials feared that Okinawa’s recalcitrance would jeopardize the security 
alliance.  After an emergency meeting, the prime minister’s office dispatched officials 
from the DFAA to Okinawa to resolve the impasse. Tokyo also sent the DFAA 
general director to Okinawa in hopes of directly negotiating with Ota. In another 
national embarrassment, however, Ota rebuffed Tokyo by refusing to meet with the 
general director.52  
Over growing public opposition to bases, and the embarrassing row created by 
Ota, MOFA officials began consulting Washington to discuss the implementation of 
criminal procedures under SOFA. Foreign Minister Kono asked Walter Mondale, the 
U.S. Ambassador to Japan, for further base reductions, hoping that U.S. concessions 
on military bases and SOFA revisions would placate Okinawan anger.53  Although the 
meeting between Mondale and Kono produced an agreement to study further base 
reductions, activists viewed Tokyo’s motives skeptically. An editorial in the Asahi 
Shimbun criticized Tokyo, stating, “Embarrassed by the seriousness of problems 
arising since the rape of a schoolgirl… the government, simply eager to avoid 
                                                 
49 Aurelia George Mulgan. “Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese 
Democracy.” Department of International Relations, Australia National University, Working Paper No. 
2000/1. Canberra, Australia. January, 2000, p.27. 
50 Of the 2,900 landowners required to sign the land lease contract, 2,000 landowners refused to sign. 
Tokyo, therefore, expected Ota to sign the leases on their behalf.  
51 Asaihi Shimbun “Okinawa says no to base leases.” September 29, 1995.  
52 Daily Yomiuri. “Okinawa governor  refuses to meet defense official.” October 1, 1995.  
53 Asahi Shimbun. “Okinawa bases cutbacks asked.” October 3, 1995. Daily Yomiuri. “Mondale vows to 
help cut bases in Okinawa.” October 4, 1995.  
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inconvenience to the Japan-U.S. military alliance, dithered miserably.”54 Citing 
Tokyo’s past broken promises to Okinawa on base issues, the editorial continued, “Is 
the Japanese government serious in addressing the cutback issue? The Okinawa 
prefectural government is very wary of the central government, out of long experience 
in dealing with [U.S. bases].”  A September 20, 1995, editorial in the Asahi Shimbun 
also criticized Tokyo for showing, “no sign of being prepared to make a proper 
response to the pleas of the Okinawan people or to begin to try to ameliorate the 
situation.”55 
With Ota’s actions still threatening diplomatic relations between Tokyo and 
Washington, the Prime Minister sent JDA Director Seishiro Eto to Okinawa to seek 
Okinawan cooperation.  The central government also exercised its authority by taking 
legal action against Ota. Traditionally supporting the executive branch on issues of 
defense and security policy, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Japanese 
government.56 The Court argued that the special law created to legalize the acquisition 
of private land for U.S. military use was constitutional. Adding that Ota’s refusal to 
sign the lease jeopardized the public interest, the Supreme Court ordered Ota to sign 
the lease contracts. 
Rhetorically at least, Tokyo appeared ready to provide some concessions to 
Okinawa to break the impasse with Ota and mollify anti-base sentiment.  Speaking at a 
House of Councilors’ Budget Committee hearing, Prime Minister Murayama quoted, 
"The Japan-U.S. security arrangements are for the security of [all of] Japan, and it is 
important for the whole nation to share the sentiments of Okinawa residents [over the 
base issue] who have borne the lingering impacts of their wartime hardships."57 Tokyo 
                                                 
54 Asahi Shimbun. “Specific base cutback plan essential to placate.” October 5, 1995.  
55 Asahi Shimbun.” Okinawa rape case spurs review of base accords.” September 20, 1995.  
56 Aurelia George Mulgan. "Managing the U.S. Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese 
Democracy." Japanese Studies 20, no. 2 (2000): 159-77. 
57 Daily Yomiuri. “Government to transfer U.S. base functions from Okinawa.” October 17, 1995 
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also stated it would initiate studies to relocate firing ranges from Okinawa to other 
existing SDF ranges within Japan. Furthermore, the government, led by Murayama’s 
Social Democratic Party, decided to revise its earlier position in a joint comminque 
pertaining to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty by requesting base reductions in 
Okinawa.  Anti-base opposition thus compelled Tokyo to provide at least token 
concessions to prevent a domestic crisis from boiling over. More importantly, 
concessions were needed to placate swelling anti-American sentiment in Okinawa 
which threatened to disrupt positive alliance relations with the U.S.58   
Tokyo and Washington moved quickly to form the Special Action Committee 
on Okinawa (SACO) in November in response to the rape incident and massive 
demonstrations. SACO worked to develop solutions which would ensure Japan’s 
security while minimizing the impact of bases on Okinawans. SACO released an 
interim report on April 15, 1995, two days before the Clinton-Hashimoto summit 
where the two leaders were expected to produce the Joint Declaration on the U.S.-
Japan security alliance. The report recommended that the U.S. return portions of base 
land, adjust training and operational procedures, implement noise reduction initiatives, 
and improve status of forces agreement procedures.59 The interim report’s release was 
undoubtedly timed to prevent Okinawan issues from trumping public affirmations of a 
strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance during the summit. As one Japanese MOFA official 
commented, “Had we not been able to release anything on Okinawa prior to the 
summit…the summit would probably have been dominated by this one issue. 
                                                 
58 Mary Jordan. Washington Post. “Japan to Seek Cutbacks In U.S. Military Bases; Tokyo Responds to 
Furor Over Okinawa Rape.” October 20, 1995. 
59 The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report. Found in Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Japan. Japan-U.S. Security Alliance for the 21st Century : Cornerstone of Democracy, Peace 
and Prosperity for Our Future Generations. Japan: Overseas Public Relations Division Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1996. 
   
 
 114 
Furthermore, I doubt it would have presented how the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance 
should be.”60 
 In the final report, released in December 1996, SACO requested that the U.S. 
return Futenma Air Station and portions of land from other camp sites and training 
areas. The report also included changes to three operational and five noise abatement 
procedures.61  Through SACO,  Tokyo granted several concessions to anti-base 
movement demands. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below present the specific recommendations 
on base reductions and noise reduction initiatives presented by SACO. 
 
Table 3.1 Base land returned under SACO 
Land Return Proportion 
Returned 
Date 
 
Replacement Facility 
MCAS Futenma All Between 2001-2003 Sea-based facility 
Northern training area 
(9,000 acres) 
More than half March 2003 Remaining Northern 
Training Area 
Aha training area All March 1998 Acreage added to Northern 
Training Area 
Gimbaru training area All March 1998 Kin Blue Beach training area 
and Camp Hansen 
Sobe communications site All March 2001 Camp Hansen 
Yomitan auxiliary airfield All March 2001 Ie Jima auxiliary airfield 
Camp Kuwae A major portion March 2008 Camp Zukeran and other 
facilities 
Senaha Communication 
Station 
Nearly All March 2001 Torti communications 
station 
Makiminato service area Some Between 1998-2000 Remaining Makiminato area 
Naha Port All No date established Urasce pier area 
Housing Consolidation on 
Camps Kuwae and 
Zukeran 
 March 2008 Remaining portions of 
Camps Kuwae and Zukeran 
Source: Military Base Affairs Office, Department of General Affairs, Okinawa Prefectural Government; 
GAO. "Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on 
Okinawa." 1-61. Washington DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998, p.26. 
                                                 
60 Tanaka 1996, p.8. 
61 GAO. "Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on 
Okinawa." 1-61. Washington DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998, p.3. 
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Table 3.2: Noise reduction initiatives under SACO 
Noise Reduction Initiatives  
Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena and Futenma Air Base 
Transfer of KC-130 Hercules  and AV-8 Harrier Aircraftfrom Futenama to Iwakuni Air Base 
Relocation of Navy Aircraft and MC-130 Operations at Kadena Air Base to opposite side 
 Install sound insulation walls at Kadena Air Base 
Limit night flight training operation at Futenma Air Station 
Source: GAO. "Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military 
Presence on Okinawa." 1-61. Washington DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998, p.53. 
 
Paradoxically, anti-base movements were able to gain these concessions, however 
minimal, because of Washington and Tokyo’s commitment to the security alliance. As 
a thorn in the U.S.-Japan alliance’s side, Okinawan anti-base movements threatened to 
unravel the newly strengthened alliance. Moreover, while a strong security consensus 
at the national level prevented activists from forming ties with political elites, activists 
did take advantage of other political opportunities at the sub-national level.62   In 
particular, access to elites within the prefectural government, most importantly 
Governor Ota, helped the anti-base movement apply real pressure on Tokyo. Ota’s 
support for the Okinawan anti-base movement raised the diplomatic stakes for 
Washington and Tokyo. SACO recommendations were offered, in part, to avoid any 
further diplomatic fallout. 
Reduction or Relocation?: SACO’s Token Concessions 
Although the return of 21% of military base land is not insignificant, with the 
exception of Futenma Air Station, the promised returns still only amounted to token 
concessions. Most of the facilities returned were strategically unimportant, such as 
Senaha Communication Station or the Sobe Communication site, where base functions 
                                                 
62 A more traditional approach to social movement analysis, one which includes the entire institutional 
system as part of the political opportunity structure (POS), offers a different interpretation of the Japan 
case. Presently, the security consensus framework only takes into account POS at the national level (see 
Chapter 1, fn. 35, p.18). Therefore, the security consensus held by national level elites is coded as 
strong. However, for the specific movement episode in 1995-96, one could code the security consensus 
in Japan as “moderate” if POS were expanded to include government institutions and actors at the 
prefectural and local level. Under a “semi-open” opportunity structure, anti-base movements formed 
ties with the sympathetic prefectural government, giving them greater leverage in the policy arena. This 
helps explain the partial concessions (or “mixed” outcome) represented by the SACO agreement.  
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could easily be relocated to another facility. A GAO study assessing the impact of 
SACO’s base reductions on U.S. operational capabilities concluded that ten of the 
eleven base return recommendations presented “minimal risks to operations.” The 
GAO report quoted, “The services can maintain training opportunities and deployment 
plans and schedules, because land to be returned is no longer needed or will be 
returned only after Japan provides adequate replacement facilities on existing bases or 
adds land by extending other base boundaries.”63 Furthemore, base consolidations 
were in many ways beneficial to the U.S.   Through the SACO agreement, Japan 
agreed to build 2,041 new or reconstructed housing units at Camp Zukeran. Outside 
the SACO process, Japan agreed to build an additional 1,473 units near Kadena Air 
Base.64 As part of Camp Zukeran and Camp Kuwae’s consolidation process, the 
Japanese also agreed to replace the aging hospital at Kuwae with a new medical center 
in Zukeran at the cost of $300 million.  
Base policy changes under the SACO Report were relatively minor, and did 
not necessarily reduce the strategic or operational capabilities of the U.S. military. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the return of Futenma Air Station presented the one 
major concession offered by the U.S. and Japanese governments. Both officials and 
activists alike viewed Futenma Air Station’s return as the capstone of the SACO report. 
As one MOFA official noted, “Futenma Air Station has an extremely important 
function for the security of Japan and the Far East… It took us about a month . . . to 
evoke a response from the U.S. side on Futenma.”65 The GAO’s own study of U.S. 
military presence in Okinawa dwells on Futenma’s strategic importance and the 
difficulty in finding or constructing an appropriate replacement facility. The GAO 
stated:  
                                                 
63 GAO 1998, p.40. 
64 GAO 1998, p.42. 
65 Tanaka 1996, p.7. 
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The most significant land deal involves the planned closure and return 
of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. The installation is a 
critical component of the Marine Corps’ forward deployment because it 
is the home base of the 1st Marine Air Wing.The Wing’s primary 
mission is to participate as the air component of the III Marine 
Expeditionary Force. The wing’s Marine Air Group-36 provides 
tactical fixed and rotary wing aircraft and flies about 70 aircraft, 
including CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters and KC-130 aerial refueling 
airplanes. Futenma’s primary mission is to maintain and operate 
facilities and provide services and materials to support Marine aircraft 
operations.66 
 
Situated squarely in the center of urban growth in Ginowan City, Okinawans 
had requestsed Futenma’s return since the 1980s (see Figure 3.3 below).  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Aerial photo of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Ginowan City 
Source: MCAS Futenma Master Plan 
 
                                                 
66 GAO 1998, p.7. 
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For Okinawans, Futenma represented all that was wrong with U.S. military bases: 
noise, pollution, safety hazards, crime, and the unfair burden of bases imposed by the 
Japanese government on Okinawans.  
At a first glance, Tokyo and Washington’s conditional return of Futenma 
appeared to be a major victory for anti-base movements. Under greater scrutiny, 
however, the return required significant trade-offs for Okinawans. At stake was the 
conditional nature of Futenma’s return. Tokyo and Washington stated they would 
make reasonable efforts to implement the recommendation provided by SACO.  
However, the report did not function as a bilateral agreement, and was therefore non-
binding. USFJ officials stated if “Japan does not provide adequate replacement 
facilities or complete action needed to implement some recommendations, the United 
States will not be obligated to implement those particular recommendations.”67 In an 
interview with Asahi Shimbun, Morietsu Arasaki, an activist and leading scholar on 
Okinawan anti-base movements, questioned the significance of concessions regarding 
Futenma Air Station. Arasaki stated, “If you look at the contents of the agreement to 
return the Futenma base you will find several drawbacks. While the U.S. agreed to 
return the land of the base, its functions are to be transferred to other U.S. bases on 
Okinawa, such as Kadena Air base, and on the mainland. This is not the reduction of 
the U.S. military presence that we are demanding.”68  Kuwae Teruko, secretary 
general of a women’s group opposed to U.S. bases added, “The return of the land by 
itself does little to solve the problems…We want to see a reduction of the functions of 
the bases, not the size of the land.”69 Thus many anti-base activists viewed the SACO 
                                                 
67 GAO 1998, p.18-19. 
68 Mayumi Maruyama. “Okinawa bluff pulls Japan tighter into U.S. Strategy.”  Asahi New Service. 
April 16, 1996.  
69 Mulgan 2000, p.33. 
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agreement as a deal  merely shifting the problems associated with Futenma to different 
parts of the island rather than promoting any real base reduction. Moreover, the 
secrecy of SACO negotiations also raised suspicion that the U.S. was using the 
Futenma deal to replace the outdated base with a new facility capable of 
accommodating the MV-22 Osprey tilt-wing aircraft.70  
Influenced by the pervading security consensus, Tokyo struck a balance 
between domestic anti-base pressure and its international alliance obligations by 
working out a deal with the U.S. on Futenma Air Station. The deal helped pacify anti-
base sentiment for the time being. At the same time, the deal negotiated with the U.S. 
under SACO helped Japan maintain positive alliance ties with the U.S.  Reflecting on 
Prime Minister Hashimoto’s motive in announcing the return of Futenma, Arasaki 
quoted: 
 
 “(He) wanted to calm the fierce and persistent protest of  Okinawans to 
smooth the way for redefining the Security Treaty during U.S. President 
Bill Clinton's visit. Although the return of Futenma base is just cosmetic, 
it was announced with a big fanfare. Firstly, Tokyo hoped it would sway 
deliberation by the land expropriation committee of Okinawa prefecture 
on the central government's request for a six-month emergency use of a 
land plot--occupied by the U.S. military Sobe communication facility--in 
Yomitan village. Secondly, it hoped to influence a likely referendum by 
Okinawans on the whole U.S. bases issue. It appears that yet another 
purpose was to divide public opinion in Okinawa. The results can be seen 
in the immediate opposition from residents near the Kadena air base to 
accepting the transfer of Futenma's functions…”71 
 
Arasaki’s words suggesting that Futenma was nothing more than a token concession 
are echoed by other scholars. Masamichi Inoue writes that the Futenama replacement 
plan did not arise out of “the benevolence of the U.S.-Japan alliance as its cunning 
                                                 
70 Julia Yonentani. "Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theater." Critical Asian Studies 33, no. 
1 (2001), p.72. 
71 Ibid.  
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manipulation of Okinawa’s protest.”72  Inoue, Selden, and Purves state “Japan had 
requested America’s assistance in providing some symbolic morsel to give to the 
people of Okinawa, and Washington had complied.”73  
Token concessions in the form of returned base land was merely one aspect of 
Tokyo’s response to anti-base pressure.  The central government used the politics of 
compensation as another strategy to pacify strong anti-base opposition.  Taking 
advantage of Okinawa’s economic dependence on Tokyo, the Japanese government 
applied  “soft coercion” to obtain local support for bases.74  First, the government 
allocated 7.5 billion yen to each local district hosting U.S. military bases. Second, 
large endowments were distributed to communities accepting bases slated for 
relocation within Okinawa. Third, the government offered 100 billion yen over a 
seven year period for projects proposed under the Informal Council on Okinawa 
Municipialities Hosting U.S. Bases, an advisory body to the Hashimoto Cabinet 
headed by prime ministerial aide Okamoko Yukiko.75   The Council helped implement 
Tokyo’s preferred policy by circumventing the National Diet and the prefectural 
assembly. Although the Council endorsed base reductions, it provided a “direct 
financial pipeline from the cabinet to local municipalities and preferctural business 
interest,” and hence made no genuine effort to reduce Okianwa’s base burden share.76   
The central government’s response is best summed by Masamichi Inoue: 
“Tokyo responded …by disclosing the view that global/American interests, rather than 
strictly national or local concerns, should take precedence.”77  The strong security 
                                                 
72 Inoue 2007, p.128. 
73 Masamichi Inoue, Mark Selden, and John Purves. "Okinawa Citizens, Us Bases, and the Dugong." 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 29, no. 4 (1997). Similar to base expansion in Camp Humphreys 
in South Korea, the U.S. viewed Futenma’s relocation as primarily a domestic issue, and therefore left it 
to Japan to secure the land necessary for U.S. bases. 
74 Yonentani 2001, p.74. 
75 Ibid 2001, p.75. 
76 Ibid 2001, p.75.  
77 Inoue 2006, p.37. 
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consensus regarding U.S.-Japan relations acted as an ideological barrier preventing 
activists from penetrating the state. While Tokyo responded to anti-base movements 
by offering partial concessions and economic incentives, the government failed to 
satisfy the majority of core activist demands on SOFA revisions and base reduction. 
From the perspective of anti-base movements, activists were unable to form ties with 
elites within the central government to promote significant changes on basing issues. 
In fact, the powerful security consensus privileging strengthened U.S.-Japan relations 
in the late 1990s meant very few, if any, sympathetic elites were willing to form ties 
with activists.78 Unable to gain access to elites necessary to implement policy changes, 
and severely hampered by the island’s economic dependence on Tokyo, activists faced 
significant challenges. The difficulty in instituting any significant policy victory on 
Futenma’s relocation becomes even more apparent through examination of later anti-
base movement episodes in Chapter 6.  
Conclusion 
The prevailing security consensus surrounding Japanese elite strategic thinking 
presented a formidable obstacle for anti-base activists. Eleven years have passed since 
the SACO Agreement, yet Futenma Air Base continues to operate. Anti-base 
movements have not completely “failed,” winning several tactical concessions over 
the past decade.   However, “victory” remains elusive as Japanese and U.S. officials 
present new proposals to maintain significant U.S. military presence on the island. As 
Gavan McCormack argues, “the crucial point in the Futenma negotiations has been 
Japanese government determination to serve U.S. military design.”79 Thus the 
Japanese government has largely circumvented post-SACO Okinawan protests in 
                                                 
78 This is especially true in Japan where security and U.S. base policy decisions were conducted almost 
exclusively by the bureaucracies rather than the Diet. 
79Gavan  McCormack. “The Okinawan Election and Resistance to Japan's Military First Politics.” 
Japan Focus #688. November 15, 2006. < http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/2275> [last 
accessed 11/27/07].  
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Henoko. Through compensation politics, the central government has managed to split 
the anti-base struggle into different local factions.  
Tokyo’s response to anti-base protests is driven by a security logic. The central 
government’s strategy of co-optation and legal coercion against anti-base movements 
is motivated by its desire to maintain a strong U.S.-Japan alliance. The majority of 
Tokyo elites, particularly those responsible for national defense and foreign policy, 
contend that the U.S. alliance and U.S. bases serve a critical role in Japan’s national 
security strategy. This consensus is formed by actors’ external threat perceptions. But 
more significantly in Japan, the consensus rests on internal factors such as the norms 
and domestic institutions which have shaped national security thinking since the end 
of World War II. Given the strong security consensus among Japanese government 
elites, Okinawan anti-base activists find it tremendously difficult to sway base policy 
decisions. McCormack writes that, “Japan sees its primary policy imperative as 
submission to Washington, it has to ‘deliver’ Okinawa to the Pentagon, and to do that 
it must somehow ensure the submission of Okinawa’s restive local government and 
civil society.”80  By muddling through the Futenma relocation process, the Japanese 
government was able to strike a balance between its alliance obligations to the U.S. 
while staving off anti-base pressure. The SACO agreement was designed to ensure 
that the U.S. would retain its strategic effectiveness in Japan and the Asia-Pacific.  As 
I later discuss in Chapter Seven, the elite security consensus continued to operate in 
the post-9/11 period, with Okinawan anti-base activists making little progress pushing 
beyond the status quo.  
                                                 
80Gavan  McCormack. “Abe and Okinawa: Collision Course?” Japan Focus #914. September 1, 2007. 
<http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/2512> [last accessed  11/27/07]. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANTI-BASE MOVEMENTS IN ECUADOR AND ITALY 
 
 
"We'll renew the base on one condition: that they let us put a base in Miami -- an 
Ecuadorian base….if there's no problem having foreign soldiers on a country's soil, 
surely they'll let us have an Ecuadorian base in the United States."
1
        
 -Rafael Correa, President of Ecuador 
 
 
 
“I am about to tell the U.S. Ambassador that the Italian government won't oppose the 
decision by the previous government and the town council of Vicenza to allow the 
expansion of the military base . . . Our attitude in regards to the U.S. is that of friend 
and ally."
2
    
- Romano Prodi, Prime Minister of Italy 
 
 
The preceding two chapters examined anti-base movement episodes from the 
Asia-Pacific region. Movement episodes from the Philippines and Okinawa suggest 
that alliance relations and the degree of security consensus shape government 
responses to civil societal pressure. More specifically, host government elite 
perceptions and beliefs regarding the U.S. alliance affects the likelihood of anti-base 
movement success in winning concessions from governments. This chapter extends 
the security consensus framework to anti-base movement episodes in other regions. 
Two recent cases, the No Bases movement in Manta, Ecuador, and the No Dal Molin 
movement in Vicenza, Italy, are used to test the validity and robustness of my 
theoretical argument. In Ecuador, a weak security consensus among political elites, 
and the ties formed between sympathetic politicians and activists, paralleled the 1991 
                                                 
1
 Phil Stewart. “Ecuador wants military base in Miami.” Reuters. March 22, 2007. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUKADD25267520071022. [Last accessed 2/1/08].  
2
 Stephen Brown. “Italy to give green light to U.S. air base expansion.” Reuters. January 16, 2007. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1623937220070116 [Last accessed 1/31/08].  
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Anti-Treaty Movement in the Philippines. Conversely, a relatively strong security 
consensus among Italian government officials raised serious obstacles for anti-base 
protestors. The Italian case echoes the challenges faced by anti-base movements in 
Japan/Okinawa. Activists were unable to win significant concessions on basing issues 
when a consensus favoring strong ties with the U.S. pervaded elite ranks.   
PART I: ECUADOR 
I begin the Ecuador anti-base saga between 1999-2007 with a spoiler. In March 
2007, President Rafael Correa  reaffirmed his election pledge not to renew the Manta 
base agreement with the United States. In a formal letter addressed to activists 
attending the International No Bases Conference in Quito, Correa wrote, “I confirm 
the firm position of the Ecuadorian government to not renew the Agreement 
(allowing) the use of Manta Base by the United States of America…Ecuador joins the 
social movements that fight for peace, justice, human rights and environmental 
sustainability.”3 Having already rejected the renewal of the Manta Agreement even 
before formal negotiations with the U.S., Correa snubbed Washington further by 
offering the use of Manta‟s airport facilities to Beijing.   
The Ecuadorian government will most likely send the U.S. military packing 
from Manta in 2009, thus fulfilling a long-standing goal of Ecuadorian anti-base 
movements.  The important question, however, is whether anti-base movements had 
any impact on this outcome.  Similar questions were confronted in the Philippines 
case: did the preferences of elites and the voting behavior of the Philippine Senate 
dictate the eventual closure of Subic Bay Naval Station, thereby making the role of 
anti-base movements irrelevant or unimportant?  The same alternative explanation can 
be used to evaluate the (future) withdrawal of U.S. forces in Manta: Quito‟s decision 
                                                 
3
 Letter from Rafael Correa to participants of the International No Base Conference. March 6, 2007. 
Official letter # DPR-0-07-8 
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not to renew the Manta base agreement may be explained by President Correa‟s left-
leaning convictions rather than anti-base protests. After all, Ecuadorian anti-base 
groups had challenged the U.S. since 1999, but had not achieved “victory” until the 
rise of a center-left government.
4
  How successful were anti-base activists?  Did the 
Ecuadorian government attempt to co-opt or undermine movements using strategies 
similar to those used by the Japanese government. Or were elites divided in their 
support for U.S.-related policies as in the Philippines, enabling activists to “penetrate” 
the state and form ties with sympathetic elites?  
The Manta anti-base movement episode follows the latter case. Unlike highly 
institutionalized bilateral alliances found in U.S. relations with Japan, the substance of 
U.S.-Ecuador relations has been historically thin. Ecuador did face external threats 
from neighboring Peru throughout the twentieth century. However, Quito has not 
relied on the U.S. for military assistance or support, nor has it depended on the U.S. 
for protection against external threats. Hence no strong security consensus regarding 
U.S.-Ecuador relations or the role of U.S. bases ever pervaded the ranks of Ecuadorian 
political elites. Under conditions of weak security consensus, elites were divided (or 
perhaps indifferent) in their articulation of foreign or national security policies 
concerning U.S. related issues. This lack of strong security consensus among 
Ecuadorian elites enabled anti-base activists to penetrate the state, and find common 
ground with sympathetic elites. Activists supported, lobbied, and encouraged elites to 
reject the Manta base agreement with the United States. Meanwhile, ties to key 
government elites responsible for setting base policies boosted the credibility and 
leverage of anti-base activists. 
                                                 
4
 Anti-base activists, who generally associate with the political left, did help elect the center-left Correa 
into power. Assuming that Correa would have been voted into power even without the support of anti-
base groups, however, an elite-driven alternative explanation suggests that base closure hinges on 
Correa‟s own personal conviction rather than anti-base pressure. 
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Background on the Manta Base Agreement 
 How did the U.S. military end up in Ecuador in the first place? For U.S. 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Panama had always played an important 
strategic role. However, the U.S. military‟s departure in 1999 left Washington 
scouring the region for replacement sites.
5
 In particular, the loss of Howard Air Force 
Base two years earlier required the U.S to find replacement facilities to continue its 
regional counter-narcotics operations.  After consultation with the governments of El 
Salvador, Antilles-Netherlands, and Ecuador, the U.S. chose three locations to 
function as replacement facilities.  In Central America, the U.S. placed a forward 
operating location (FOL) in Comalapa, El Salvador. In the Caribbean, two FOLSs 
were established in Aruba and Curacao.
6
 Finally, in the South American Andes, the 
U.S. acquired Eloy Alfaro Air Base in Manta, Ecuador. Negotiations with Ecuador 
began in February 1999.
7
  The two sides initially signed an interim agreement in April 
1999,  later replaced by a ten year pact signed in November 1999.
8
  In addition to Eloy 
Alfaro Air Base, the agreement authorized the United States to utilize Manta‟s port 
and military installations within the surrounding vicinity. 
Unlike Subic Bay, the Manta FOL is not a main operating base. Selecting 
Manta as a comparable case study, therefore, warrants some brief discussion.  The 
bases examined in the previous chapters were all hard tests for anti-base movements. 
                                                 
5
 The U.S. agreed to withdraw its forces from Panama under the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty. 
6
 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). “Forward Operating Locations: ONDCP Fact 
Sheet.” 
<http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/international/factsht/forw_oper_locat.html> [Last 
accessed 2/3/08]. It is important to note that these FOLs were built on existing airfields used by the host 
government.  
7
 Activists state discussions began in January 1999. See Luis Ángel  Saavedra. Operaciones De 
Avansada O Base Militar Operativa? Un Análisis De La Base De Manta.  [Operations of  Outpost  or 
Operative Military Base? An Analysis of the Manta Base].  Quito, Ecuador: Fundación Regional de 
Asesoría en Derechos Humanos, INREDH, 2007, p.16. 
8
 Center for International Policy. "Just the Facts: A Civilian's Guide to U.S. Defense and Security 
Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean," 2003. <http://www.ciponline.org/facts/fol.htm>  [Last 
accessed 2/3/08]. 
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All three movement episodes revolved around major U.S. military bases of high 
strategic value. On the contrary, the Manta base is relatively small, hosting on average 
only 250 military personnel, 65 U.S. civilians, and 180 Ecuadorian contractors.
9 
Moreover, as an FOL, the Manta base is used jointly between the Ecuadorian and U.S. 
Air Force. 
Despite its relatively small size and FOL status, the U.S. military recognized 
the strategic utility of Manta in the war on drugs. SOUTHCOM used the base for 
counter-drug surveillance flights over Central and South America. Washington noted 
that missions involving the Manta FOL in the Eastern Pacific and the Andean 
mountains significantly contributed to U.S. counter-drug strategy policies in Latin 
America. SOUTHCOM spokesperson Jose Ruiz quoted, “Since 1999, the FOL has 
conducted more than 3,300 counter-drug missions, totaling over 18,000 flight hours 
and has contributed directly or indirectly to the seizure of more than 52,000 kg of 
illegal drugs with a street value exceeding $2 billion.”10  In a prepared testimony 
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources, Ana Maria Salazar, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug 
Enforcement Policy and Support stressed the importance of Manta FOL in the war on 
drugs. She stated, “The Manta FOL is the key to enhancing our source zone and 
Eastern Pacific counter-drug presence. It is the only FOL that can support counter-
drug missions throughout the source zone, providing the necessary reach into southern 
Peru, Bolivia, and most importantly Colombia which supplies the largest percentage of 
cocaine shipped to the United States.”11   
                                                 
9
 Sam Logan. “U.S. faces eviction from Ecuadorian base.” ISN Security Watch. January 12, 2007 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/archive.cfm?task=cats&Parent=589 [last accessed 3/8/07]. 
10
 Logan 2007. 
11
 Federal News Service. "Counter-drug implications of the U.S. leaving Panama.” Prepared testimony 
by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, Ana Marie 
Salazar before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources, June 9. 2000.  
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Additionally, sunk costs were invested in the Manta base. The U.S. spent $63.3 
million to upgrade facilities at Eloy Alfaro. Improvements included expanding the 
runway to increase load-bearing capacity necessary for landing an AWACS Airborne 
Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, constructing additional hangars, and building new 
dining and maintenance facilities.
12
  In short, while the Manta base was strategically 
less significant than the bases discussed in previous chapters and functionally easier to 
replace, the FOL was not so insignificant that the U.S. would give up its claim to 
Manta without providing some pressure or incentives to Quito.
13
   
U.S.-Ecuador Relations 
The history of U.S.-Ecuador relations is relatively thin compared to countries 
with deeper U.S. alliance ties, such as Japan, South Korea, or even the Philippines. 
Unsurprisingly, the weak security consensus among Ecuadorian elites is characterized 
by narrow breadth and minimum depth. Ecuador remained a low priority for the U.S., 
and opportunities for interaction between Quito and Washington were fairly limited.  
Even when confronted by major security threats from neighboring Peru, Ecuador 
received minimal support from the U.S. For instance, the U.S. maintained neutrality 
during Ecuador‟s border crisis with Peru in 1941, rejecting Quito‟s appeal to dispatch 
a U.S. warship near Ecuador‟s shore as a warning to Peru. Likewise, the U.S. refused 
Ecuador‟s request for forty million rounds of ammunition during the ensuing Ecuador-
Peruvian War.
14
 While brokering peace negotiations between the two sides, the U.S. 
failed to bring a case against Peru‟s aggression, nor did it raise the issue of Peru‟s 
bombing of civilians.  The U.S. certainly sympathized with Ecuador, and in principle, 
                                                 
12
 United States General Accounting Office. "Briefing Report to the Chairman, Caucus of International 
Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate: Drug Control, International Counterdrug Sites Being Developed." 
Washington D.C.: GAO, 2000, p. 4. Also see Center for International Policy 2003; Monte Hayes. 
“American airmen get warm welcome in Ecuador port.” Associated Press. March 15, 2001. 
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 Interview with FLACSO-Ecuador director Adrian Bonilla. March 9, 2006, Quito, Ecuador.  
14
 Ronn F. Pineo. Ecuador and the United States: Useful Strangers, The United States and the Americas. 
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007, p.115. 
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opposed territorial expansion through the use of force. However, the U.S. wanted to 
quickly resolve the border conflict to focus on the larger concern of building South 
American support for the Allied war effort.
15
 
During World War II, Ecuador permitted the U.S. to build two military bases 
on its territory. The U.S. built an air refueling base in Salinas on the western coast of 
Ecuador, and an air base on the Galapagos Islands as a forward defense  against 
potential Japanese attacks targeting the Panama Canal. After the war, U.S. officials 
reasoned with Quito that the U.S. should be able to retain the bases rent-free. After all, 
the U.S. had borne all costs in building the bases. Moreover, Ecuador did not have the 
resources to keep the facilities running. As Secretary of War Robert Patterson and 
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal wrote, offering the Galapagos base to the U.S. 
“would be a fitting contribution of Ecuador to hemispheric security.”16 The 
Ecuadorian government thought otherwise. With no financial incentives and public 
opinion against the Galapagos base, Quito turned down Washington‟s base proposal in 
1946.  
 During the Cold War, Ecuadorian political elites did not share Washington‟s 
preoccupation with the Soviet threat. Instead, Peru continued to remain Ecuador‟s top 
security concern. However, the U.S. stayed outside of the longstanding territorial 
dispute, remaining on the sidelines during the brief 1995 Alto-Cenepa War between 
Peru and Ecuador.  Even as the Andean region attracted more attention in the 1990s 
with increasing drug trafficking concerns, Ecuador remained neglected compared to its 
Andean neighbors Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. As Figure 4.1 indicates, of the four 
countries, Ecuador received the least amount of military and police aid from the 
United States in the war on drugs.   
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 Pieno 2007, p.114.  
16
 Pineo 2007, p.128. 
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Figure 4.1: Military and police aid from the United States 
Source: Center for International Policy. Figure for 2006 and 2007 are estimated and requested amount, 
respectively.  
 
Having traditionally remained on the fringe of U.S. strategy in Latin America, 
Quito never developed strong security ties to the U.S.  Unlike countries such as Japan 
or Italy, alliance relations were never institutionalized within Ecuador‟s national 
security framework. Thus Ecuadorian political elites never converged on a U.S. 
alliance-centered security policy. In sum, marked by narrow breadth and minimal 
depth, the security consensus remained weak (or absent) among political elites. True, 
the asymmetric nature of U.S.-Ecuador relations has often led Quito to adopt a 
position of “compliance and consensual acceptance” on foreign policy.17  However, 
Ecuadorian security expert Adrian Bonilla adds that Quito does not blindly follow 
Washington‟s foreign policy directives, as is often the criticism in Japan and South 
Korea (see Chapter 5) where the security consensus remains strong among elites.
18
  
Given the lack of historical or institutional ties between Ecuador and the U.S., Quito 
was less compelled, or constrained, to follow the policy preferences of Washington. 
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 Interview with Adrian Bonilla. March 8, 2007. Quito, Ecuador.  
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Mobilization against the Manta Base 
Did the anti-base campaign in Ecuador matter? I argue below that anti-base 
movements did make a difference in base policy outcomes. The absence of a strong 
security consensus provided a favorable political opportunity for anti-base activists. 
Pro-U.S. political leaders certainly resided in Quito, but government elites as a whole 
never shared a common understanding or fixed perception of U.S.-Ecuador relations. 
This enabled activists and political elites sympathetic to the anti-base cause to align 
with one another on the Manta base issue. Although Ecuadorian anti-base movements 
first mobilized in 1999 with inauspicious beginnings, by 2005, top government 
officials were beginning to advocate the non-renewal of the Manta base agreement. 
This position was eventually carried by presidential candidate Rafael Correa during 
his 2006 campaign.  
Origins 
Unlike other movement episodes, the Manta anti-base movement did not begin 
as a local NIMBY phenomenon. Rather, the movement emerged at the national level, 
and only later shifted downward to the local level.
19
 Peace and Justice Service of 
Ecuador (SERPAJ) was the first group to latch onto the Manta base issue. In March 
1999, SERPAJ posted an alert to other social groups announcing that Ecuador would 
grant the U.S. basing rights in Manta.
20
  Despite slow mobilization, activist groups did 
attempt to protest U.S. military presence along with a slate of other issues, such as 
debt relief and privatization. In this vein, the Confederation of Indigenous 
                                                 
19
 Most local communities in Manta were initially pro-base. However, land displacement issues did 
constitute one major grievance for a small group of residents in Manabí Province. Similar to the local 
resistance movement in Daechuri Village in Pyeongtaek, South Korea (see Chapter 6), these residents 
formed the Land Defense Committee of Portoviejo. The committee formed decades earlier to protest the 
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government. See Luis Ángel Saavedra. “The Manta Base: A U.S. Military Fort in Ecuador.” 
Fellowship, Winter 2007b, p.20-21. 
20
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Nationalities (CONAIE) organized one of the first large-scale demonstrations against 
the Manta Agreement in July 1999. CONAIE had recently won a seat to participate in 
formal dialogue with the Ecuadorian government by engaging in two-weeks of 
militant protest.
21
  However, the Manta issue was quickly overshadowed by Ecuador‟s 
financial crisis and the dollarization of the economy in early 2000.
22
  
Although the ten year agreement signed in November 1999 immediately 
prompted several peace and human rights organizations to take action, a broader 
coalition with greater cooperation from local groups did not begin to take shape until 
2001. Joining forces with local groups, this formation included organizations such as 
the Provincial Union of Farmers‟ Organization of Manabí (UPOCAM), Tohalí Anti-
Imperialism Movement, Ecumenical Commission of Human Rights (CEDHU), 
Andean Program of Human Rights (PADH), International Observance for Peace 
(OIPAZ), SERPAJ, the Anti-Corruption Network, the Young Men‟s Christian 
Association– Ecuador (ACJ - Ecuador), and the Regional Foundation of Consultant's 
Office in Human Rights (INREDH).  Activist groups also filed several lawsuits in the 
Constitutional Court challenging the Manta Agreement as unconstitutional in 2001.  
In addition to national protests, anti-base groups invested significant amounts 
of time mobilizing citizens within Manabí Province. The Tohalli Anti-Imperialist 
Movement, the Land Defense Committee of Portoviejo, and later ACJ-Ecuador were 
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foundational in promoting resistance against the Manta base at the local level.
23
 
Groups such as UPOCAM, ACJ- Ecuador, and SERPAJ hosted forums, cultural 
activities, and public debates in Portoviejo and Manta to raise awareness about base 
related issues and problems. ACJ, through its Manta branch, focused on educating 
local youth and peasants about the dangers associated with U.S. bases.   
Human rights groups such as INREDH and the Andean Committee of Services 
promoted the anti-base cause by lobbying officials, providing communication through 
its networks, and conducting research on bases and militarization. These groups had 
compiled enough evidence to present cases of human rights violations on behalf of 
local residents. Issues of concern included “the right of fishermen to accede to port, 
the recovery of illegally expropriated land, damages resulting from the sinking and 
destroying of boats, and the control and access of waterways for military purpose.”24 
Anti-base groups were especially concerned about the use of Manta base as a 
launching pad to aid Colombia in its fight against rebel insurgents such as the FARC. 
Activists feared that U.S. military presence would eventually drag Ecuador into a 
regionalized military conflict as Colombian rebels traversed Ecuador‟s borders. By 
educating Manabí Province residents on the potential dangers of U.S. military 
presence, activists hoped to build public opinion against base renewal in 2009.
25
 
Activists cited that support for the non-renewal of the Manta Agreement increased as 
more citizens grew aware of U.S. military presence and militarization through 
Ecuador‟s involvement in Plan Colombia.  
Transnational Collaboration 
One key difference in the Manta anti-base movement compared to other 
episodes discussed in previous chapters is the movement‟s degree of 
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internationalization. Transnational links played a greater role in Ecuador than in other 
anti-base movements. The movement maintained close ties to groups outside of 
Ecuador, particularly those working on peace and demilitarization issues. For 
example, through personal contacts with the Tohalli Movement, the American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC) visited Manta in 2002 to study the political, economic, 
and cultural impact of Manta base.  Later, AFSC, the Regional Foundation of 
Consultancy in Human Rights, and the Network of the Colombian-Ecuadorian 
Brotherhood held workshops in Manta to discuss links between the Manta base and 
Plan Colombia.  The Network of Friendship and Solidarity with Colombia (REDHER) 
organized similar meetings focused on the Manta base.   
In January 2004, Ecuadorian anti-base activists  gave a presentation on bases at 
the World Social Forum (WSF) in Mumbai, India. In the following WSF in Porte 
Allegre, the emerging network of global anti-base activists discussed potential 
locations to host the first international anti-base meeting.  Ecuadorian anti-base groups 
grabbed the opportunity to propose their country as a possible location.  At the request 
of the network‟s International Organization Committee (IOC), several Ecuadorian 
groups with existing ties at the transnational level submitted a proposal on behalf of 
Ecuadorian activists. Once approved, these groups formally established the No Bases 
Ecuador Coalition. AFSC and INREDH acted as the initial coordinators, with ACJ-
Ecuador replacing AFSC in 2006.
26
  The No Bases Ecuador Coalition coordinated 
with the global No Bases network to host a major international conference in Quito in 
March 2007. The conference concluded with a caravan from Quito to Manta where 
400 international delegates joined thousands of protestors in Manta. The international 
conference, supported by the Mayor‟s Office in Quito and blessed by President 
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Correa, attracted national media attention from all major news sources in Ecuador.  In 
sum, anti-base groups were able to sustain their campaign over a relatively long period, 
maintain at least a semblance of movement unity, and reach a broad audience through 
the international conference. 
State-Society Interaction 
Anti-base protests mattered. However, having powerful leaders backing the 
anti-base stance may have mattered even more. After all, base politics and the renewal 
of the Manta Agreement were decisions made by political elites. This raises a problem 
of causal inference, making it difficult to assess the weighted impact of social 
movements. The absence of any security consensus may simply have led powerful 
anti-base elites, such as President Correa, to reject U.S. bases based on their own 
preferences, regardless of social movement pressure. Thus President Correa would 
have rejected U.S. bases, even if activists never mobilized. I offer a slightly different 
causal story which takes into account social movements: a weak security consensus 
provided activists the political space necessary to form ties with elites. Hence, the U.S. 
military‟s withdrawal from Manta was spurred by the combination of both social 
movement and elite forces.   
If anti-base movements truly mattered, some doubt should be cast on whether 
Ecuador government officials would have committed to a position of base non-
renewal had anti-base movements not existed. The answer to base policy outcomes is 
clearly not mono-causal, and certainly not attributed to anti-base movements alone. 
The crucial question here is whether an actual link existed between state and society, 
or if anti-base movements were merely cheerleaders on the sideline rooting for 
politicians to say no to U.S. bases. The security consensus framework helps us think 
about the connection between anti-base movements and government elites. Here I 
process trace events throughout the Manta base episode to show how activists and 
  136 
sympathetic elites reinforced one another‟s position, leading to the (future) removal of 
U.S. troops.  
Legal action with sympathetic elites 
As argued above, in the formative stages of the anti-base campaign, human 
rights, religious, and indigenous groups took legal action against the Manta base 
agreement. That members of the Ecuadorian Armed Forces, National Congress, and 
Constitutional Court also questioned the Manta Agreement added to the credibility of 
activists‟  legal challenge.27 For example, in September 2000, military officials 
requested that the government review the Manta Agreement, arguing that U.S. troops 
were taking on functions belonging to the Ecuadorian Armed Forces.
28
   Several 
months later, Hugo Moreno, the International Relations Committee Chair, also 
requested that the Foreign and Defense Ministers explain the implications of U.S. 
military presence in Manta.
29
   
Aside from street demonstrations, in the first stage of the anti-base campaign, 
several human rights organizations such as CEDHU and the Permanent Assembly of 
Human Rights, in conjunction with political parties, decided to challenge the Manta 
Agreement through the Constitutional Court. Discussions pertaining to legal action 
were first raised at the Anti-Imperialism Meeting, organized by the Tohalli Movement 
in July 2000.  Activists presented their case before the Constitutional Court on January 
15, 2001. Human rights lawyers claimed that the Manta Agreement required approval 
from the National Congress.  Activist groups argued that the Manta Agreement 
violated Article 161, Number 2, of Ecuador's Constitution, which authorized the 
National Congress to approve international treaties and agreements, including those 
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which established political or military alliances.
30
  As representative Gilberto Talahua, 
chair of the Indigenous Affairs Committee maintained, "The accord was signed in 
violation of constitutional norms and without citizen discussion or participation."
31
 
Moreover, activists claimed that the base served as an outpost for military actions tied 
to Plan Colombia.
 32
  Although the Court ruled in favor of the government, anti-base 
activists had taken the first step in challenging the Manta Agreement through formal 
channels.
33
 
The Pro-U.S. Gutierrez Period 
With anti-base groups defeated in court, activists turned their attention towards 
the link between Plan Colombia and the Manta base. Human rights groups began to 
research and closely monitor social tensions taking place near the Colombian-Ecuador 
border, fueled by increasing violence and an influx of refugees beginning in late 
2000.
34
   Acknowledging rising tensions on the borderland, the Ecuadorian 
government stationed approximately 10,000 troops to secure the Colombian-
Ecuadorian border. The decision to deploy troops came after the termination of 
negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC.  Wanting to steer 
clear from the Colombian conflict, Ecuadorians voiced concern that Manta‟s 
surveillance capabilities were being used to monitor rebel activity in Colombia. 
Ecuadorians feared that Washington‟s increasing involvement in Colombia‟s struggle 
against insurgents would inadvertently drag Quito into the conflict.
35
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In November 2002, Lucio Gutierrez, who briefly headed the junta government 
after Jamil Mahuad‟s ouster in 2000, was voted into power with the backing of 
indigenous and leftist groups. Much to the consternation of some of his political 
supporters, Gutierrez quickly established a pro-U.S. stance. The indigenous political 
group, Pachakutik, criticized Gutierrez‟s comments during a February 2003  trip to 
Washington in which he declared his intention to be “the best ally of the United 
States.”36 Given Gutierrez‟s pro-U.S. position, it became clear that the U.S. military 
would remain in Manta until at least the expiration of the bilateral base agreement in 
2009.  Under these political constraints, anti-base groups shifted their strategy to 
promote the non-renewal of the Manta Agreement in 2009.  Monitoring activity near 
Manta base and the Colombian-Ecuadorian border, activists conducted extensive 
research, gathering as much information as possible to build a case for non-renewal.   
Under the Gutierrez period, major protests were less visible. However, anti-base 
groups organized conferences, such as the International Peace Camp, to reach out to 
Manabi Province residents. Additionally, civic groups documented base-related 
incidents around Manta port and the northern border.  In particular, Rafael Jaque of 
the Latin American Association of Human Rights (ALDHU) investigated the alleged 
sinking of fishing boats by U.S. ships. Miguel Moran, leader of the Tohalli movement, 
also compiled a series of detailed reports implicating Manta to activities in Colombia 
to be sent to the Ecuadorian National Congress.
37
   
More significantly, it was during this period that the No Bases Ecuador 
Coalition began to coalesce, pooling together groups involved in earlier anti-base 
initiatives such as the First Imperial Movement, or the International Peace Camp, into 
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a broader coalition linked with international anti-base groups.
38
 Anti-base groups also 
redoubled their efforts to educate the Manta population to undermine the city 
government‟s support for continued U.S. military presence. Middle-class citizens had 
invested in businesses in hopes of profiting from U.S. military presence and the $70 
million renovation and upgrades to the Manta base. However, the economic benefits 
promised by local pro-base officials never materialized.  Unfulfilled promises, coupled 
with safety issues and disruptions in the fishing economy, led to increasing 
dissatisfaction with U.S. base presence among Manta residents.
39
  
Growing elite dissatisfaction  
Concerned over growing political instability, the National Congress voted to 
replace President Gutierrez with his Vice-President, Alfredo Palacio, in April 2005. 
Activists contend that Gutierrez‟s ouster allowed anti-base groups to make public the 
information compiled by various organizations. Under the Gutierrez Administration, 
Foreign Minister Patricio Zuquilanda refused to engage in dialogue with specific anti-
base groups and their representatives, working to undermine and discredit their 
evidence against U.S. military presence.
40
  Demands to address the sinking of fishing 
ships and health hazards created by Colombia‟s fumigation of cocoa plants were 
largely ignored by the Gutierrez government.
41
 In contrast, key cabinet officials in the 
Palacio Administration hinted that the agreement would not continue beyond 2009. On 
July 15, 2005, Foreign Minister Antonio Parra commented he would rather cut his 
hand off than sign a renewed base agreement.
42
 Parra made clear that national 
sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs would guide Ecuadorian foreign 
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policy.
43
   Although Parra promised to respect the current base agreement, the new 
government‟s emphasis on sovereignty made base renewal less tenable in the future.  
Parra‟s words were tested when a U.S. naval ship damaged a fishing boat on May 21, 
2005. Indeed, Foreign Minister Parra protested the detainment of the boat‟s crew, and 
requested compensation for the damaged ship. The Ecuador government also refused 
to bow before U.S. pressure to grant U.S. soldiers immunity from the International 
Criminal Court, a move which cost the government $7 million in U.S. economic aid.
44
 
Foreign Minister Parra was replaced  halfway into Palacio‟s tenure by 
Francisco Carrión.  Carrión‟s position was even clearer than Parra‟s on the Manta 
Agreement. Appearing before the International Affairs Committee in the National 
Congress on February 1, 2006, Carrión stated, “If I were foreign minister in 2009, I 
would not sign a renewal of the Manta Base agreement (with the United States) 
because I do not consider that it benefits the country's interests.”45 This position was 
echoed by Deputy Foreign Minister Diego Ribadeneira, who added, "I do not think 
that, the Manta Base [agreement] will be extended, whoever is foreign minister in 
2009."
46
  Minister of Defense Marcelo Delgado, speaking as a private citizen, also 
expressed his disappointment with the current Manta Agreement. He argued, "We 
have received almost nothing in exchange for Manta Base…[Ecuador] must receive 
something in exchange. If we do not have that, there should be no negotiation [for 
renewal]."
47
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Weak security consensus and movement-government ties 
 The lack of consensus among Ecuadorian elites regarding U.S.-Ecuador 
security relations is attested by the varying positions of the Nobua and Gutierrez 
government on one hand, and the Palacio government on the other.  Under the Palacio 
government, activists found key elites sympathetic to their cause.  For instance, 
Foreign Minister Carrión met with No Bases Ecuador Coalition  members to discuss 
his position not to renew the Manta Base Agreement. Carrion‟s National Plan of 
Foreign Policy (PLANEX 2020) was also established with input from various sectors 
of society, including anti-base groups and other civil societal organizations.
48
  In 
effect, demands from Ecuadorian pacifist groups were satisfied in PLANEX 2020, 
which stated that “Ecuadorian territory [would] not house foreign troops.”49  As a sign 
of commitment to PLANEX 2020, the Palacio Administration rejected signing an 
agreement granting U.S. soldiers immunity from criminal jurisdiction while on-duty. 
This decision was announced following a meeting between Minister of Government 
Mauricio Gandara and members of human rights groups.
50
 
More importantly, the connection between social movements and elites 
became more apparent in the rhetoric of elites.  In 1999, U.S. military presence in 
Manta was unproblematic. Prior to the Palacio regime, Quito vehemently denied any 
link between the Manta base and the Colombian insurgency. By 2005, however, policy 
circles contemplating the future of Manta raised arguments similar to those previously 
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presented only by activists - sovereignty and escalation of the Colombian conflict – as 
reasons not to resign the Manta deal.
51
   
It was under this shifting political environment that presidential candidate 
Rafael Correa ran on a platform announcing his pledge of non-renewal during the 
2006 election campaign. According to a report by the Center for Security Studies in 
Zurich, the pledge against U.S. military presence in Ecuador struck a popular chord 
among numerous constituents.
52
 Correa‟s primary challenger was the conservative 
Alvaro Noboa, who favored U.S. military presence in Manta. As No Base Ecuador 
coalition members contend, the 2006 elections enabled the Manta Base issue to move 
beyond activist circles and into mainstream public debates. The fate of U.S. military 
presence would rest with the electorate, based on the outcome of the election.  
Correa‟s electoral victory struck a blow against U.S. geopolitical interests.  
Still, some argued that Correa‟s position was only a pledge, and not policy. Some 
skeptics argued that Correa‟s hard-line position on the Manta Agreement renewal was 
nothing more than a bargaining strategy. By beginning with a position of non-renewal, 
Correa could leverage additional concessions such as foreign aid or preferential trade 
agreements.
53
 A few activists also expressed uncertainty as to whether Correa would 
hold onto his electoral pledge.  Thus No Base Ecuador members continued to lobby 
and write support letters to keep Correa accountable to his pledge. Doubt was finally 
cast aside when Correa reaffirmed his position publicly during the International No 
Bases Conference held in Quito. The Ecuador government also delegated Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Miguel Carvajal to speak at the No Bases Conference plenary 
session, where he restated Correa‟s pledge.  In addition to Correa, the  No Bases 
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Ecuador Coalition kept in contact with government allies such as the Minister of 
Government and Police, Fernando Bustamante, and the National Security Advisor, 
Gustavo Larrea.   
In sum, under conditions of weak security consensus, elites remained divided 
on issues of national security and their foreign relations with the U.S.  Likewise, 
political elites and presidential candidates held varying positions regarding the 
renewal of the Manta Agreement. Taking advantage of this political opportunity, 
activists gained considerable leverage in their struggle by forming ties with 
sympathetic elites within the central government.  
One might argue that anti-base movements were epiphenomenal in the Manta 
Base outcome. Base policy decisions were determined by key elites irrespective of 
anti-base pressure. Once the position of key elites shifted, prospects of base renewal 
dimmed. Much like the Philippines case, however, without strong, organized anti-base 
opposition, the Manta base issue would have likely maintained a low profile. Instead, 
anti-base groups challenged the legality of the base agreement in the Constitutional 
Court, mobilized mass demonstrations, and educated citizens within Manabí Province 
about the security risks associated with Manta.  Conducting extensive research, human 
rights organizations constantly fed government officials information pertaining to 
Manta Base and Plan Colombia. By 2005, major political figures, including Palacio‟s 
foreign and defense ministers, hinted they would not resign the Manta base agreement 
with the United States. These sympathetic elites became potential allies in the battle to 
terminate the Manta base agreement in 2009. Activists had raised the Manta base issue 
to a level of national importance, attested by the inclusion of base non-renewal into 
Rafael Correa‟s 2006 presidential campaign platform. Through a drawn-out campaign, 
anti-base movements helped shape a national security discourse built against U.S. 
military presence, ultimately leading to the non-renewal of the Manta base.  
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Part II: Italy 
As the Manta anti-base campaign took a step closer in achieving its goal of 
non-renewal, capped by Correa‟s electoral victory in late 2006, another anti-base 
struggle was rapidly gaining momentum in Europe. On February 21, 2007, Italy‟s frail 
center-left ruling coalition crumbled over foreign policy issues. Failing to gain Senate 
majority approval supporting Italy‟s NATO mission in Afghanistan and the expansion 
of a U.S. military base, Prime Minister Romano Prodi stepped down as head of 
government. However, this crisis, one of many triggered by radical left parties in the 
center-left coalition, lasted only briefly.  After discussion with Italian President 
Giorgio Napolitano, Prodi returned to the helm of government the following week.  To 
bolster his coalition, Prodi required each party to sign a twelve point memorandum 
which included unconditional support for his foreign policy.  
 Accustomed to frequent government turnover, most Italians remained 
unphased by Prodi‟s temporary fall.54 However, the brief crisis did turn public 
attention towards Italy‟s foreign policy, and specifically Italy‟s commitment to the 
United States and the larger international community. Local resistance had been 
brewing since May 2006 when Vicenza city officials publicly revealed base 
construction plans at Dal Molin airfield. Due largely to anti-base protestors, the 
Vicenza issue quickly rose to national prominence in the months preceding Prodi‟s 
fall. Four days prior to Prodi‟s resignation, the No Dal Molin campaign had already 
launched its second major national protest. Far-left parties inside Prodi‟s own coalition 
government supported this demonstration. What threat did anti-base movements pose 
to the Italian government and the future of U.S. base plans in northern Italy? How did 
the Italian government balance between its international commitments and domestic 
pressure?  
                                                 
54
 Prodi‟s victory in the April 2006 election represented the sixtieth government since 1946. 
  145 
The Vicenza episode parallels the Okinawan anti-base movement episodes in 
several respects.  Although the internal dynamics of the No Dal Molin campaign differ 
from Okinawan activists‟ later efforts to block the expansion of Camp Schwab (see 
Chapter 7), the cycle of anti-base action and government reaction follow similar 
patterns. In the face of anti-base pressure, the Italian government initially dragged its 
feet on the matter, passing the buck to local city officials. Like Tokyo, Rome resorted 
to numerous political tactics to keep a lid on domestic opposition, and in particular, 
far-left party officials. Activists thus found it much more difficult to form ties with 
sympathetic elites. As I argued in previous cases, the Italian government‟s response, 
and the movement‟s difficulty in penetrating the state ultimately stemmed from U.S. 
alliance relations and the influence of a strong security consensus among Italian elites. 
Contrary to Ecuador, the historical development of U.S.-Italian relations, and the 
institutional framework of NATO helped foster a security “consensus” among elites. 
What made the Vicenza anti-base movement episode unique from similar cases such 
as Japan and South Korea (as discussed in Chapter 6) however, was the role of 
coalition politics. Coalition dynamics and a slim parliamentary majority initially 
provided activists an opportunity to broaden their anti-base agenda. However, Italian 
coalitional politics acted as double edged sword, eventually reinforcing the position of 
the security consensus.  
U.S. Bases in Italy 
Although U.S. military presence in Italy traces back to the post-war 
occupation, the current system of U.S. bases is more closely associated with Italy‟s 
acceptance into NATO.
55
 In the south, Naples hosted the headquarters of Allied Joint 
Forces Command in Southern Europe and Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe.  
Installations in Sicily, such as the Sigonella and Comiso base, took an increasingly 
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important role in the 1970s as U.S. strategic priorities expanded in the Middle East. In 
the north, the U.S. built Camp Ederle in Vicenza, which functioned as the Southern 
European Task Force headquarters. The U.S. also established a major air base in 
Aviano in northeast Italy. These bases were intended to protect Italy from Soviet and 
Yugoslavian threats across the eastern border.
56
    
Most bases were established as NATO facilities with U.S. troops operating 
under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.  Basing access and jurisdiction of U.S. 
troops were regulated by the Basic Infrastructure Agreement signed by Rome and 
Washington in 1954. Rome and Washington signed additional agreements in the mid-
1990s placing U.S. bases under Italian command, and limiting their use to NATO 
operations.  Although U.S. troops in Italy were under an American commander, Italy 
still retained sovereignty over U.S. bases.  
  The 2004 Global Defense Posture Review recommended reducing force 
levels in Western Europe from 100,000 to 50,000 troops, with most reductions coming 
from Germany. Despite significant cuts across Europe, troop levels have remained 
relatively constant in Italy at around 12,000 troops since the mid-1990‟s.57 In 2006, 
11,653 U.S. military personnel were stationed in Italy with major bases located in 
Aviano, Naples, Vicenza, and Sigonella.
58
  Sigonella functions as a critical point for 
air mobility routes.
59
  Its strategic location by the Mediterranean also enables the base 
to serve as a major naval logistics hub through the Fleet and Industrial Supply 
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Center.
60
  In the north, Aviano and Vicenza host the 173
rd
 Airborne Combat Brigade 
Team (ACBT). Reactivated in 2000, the 173
rd
 ACBT has grown from one to six 
battalions.
61
 Camp Ederle in Vicenza currently hosts two battalions. The remaining 
four brigades are located in Germany.  As part of ongoing plans for U.S. military 
restructuring in Southern Europe, the Army plans to consolidate the entire 173
rd
 
ACBT to Italy.  
Anti-Base Mobilization in Vicenza 
From Formal to Informal Politics 
Limited space at Camp Ederle required the U.S. military to construct a new 
base facility in Vicenza to accommodate the relocation of 2,000 troops.
62
   The U.S. 
approached the Berlusconi government in late 2003, inquiring about the use of the Dal 
Molin airfield in Vicenza.
63
 In April 2005, the U.S. ambassador to Italy announced 
that the Berlusconi government had agreed to set aside part of  Dal Molin airfield for 
U.S. military use.  Stars and Stripes reported that negotiations between the U.S. and 
Italian government had taken place over the past two years.
64
  
The base negotiations were conducted behind closed doors, leaving Vicenza 
residents in the dark about the Dal Molin project. Rumors and public speculation 
about base expansion were finally confirmed by the city government on May 25, 
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2006.
65
 A U.S. military representative and a Vicenza city official presented details 
about the project during a city council meeting. Vicenza citizens criticized the 
secretive manner in which base negotiations were conducted between the U.S., Italian, 
and Vicenza governments. Echoing grievances by South Korean (see Chapter 6) and 
Ecuadorean activists, citizens were notified only after negotiations had been 
concluded.  
Initially focusing on NIMBY issues, local citizens raised several grievances 
regarding the Dal Molin project. Activists claimed the increase in U.S. soldiers would 
adversely impact the environment, increase resource consumption such as water and 
electricity, congest traffic, and heighten safety risks. Later, activists increasingly 
focused on anti-militarization frames to broaden their reach.  Noting Vicenza‟s 
recognition as a UNESCO world heritage site, activists condemned the idea of 
polluting a historical city with another military base.
66
   
In response to the city‟s announcement in May 2006, residents in Vicenza and 
surrounding communities coordinated their opposition through several local 
community councils.
67
 Since details of the base expansion were still relatively 
unknown to the general public, the community councils provided information, 
solicited opinions, and communicated their concerns to city officials. The community 
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councils also used several tactics to try and block base expansion, such as organizing 
protest marches, voicing opposition at city council meetings, and gathering signatures.  
Taking advantage of formal channels of politics, opposition community members also 
held discussions with city council officials throughout the summer of 2006.  Citizens 
demanded a thorough study of the base‟s environmental and economic impact before 
passing an agreement. More importantly, opposition groups requested that the city 
pass any base decision through a public referendum.   
Unfortunately, the path of formal politics led Vicenza citizens to a dead end.  
On October 26, the Vicenza city council voted in favor of base expansion with 21 in 
favor and 17 opposed (three abstained).
68
 Additionally, the Vicenza city council 
rejected the use of a public referendum. The No Dal Molin campaign thus declared, 
“In the face of silence, and generic assurances on the political side, (anti-base) 
committees (began) active protests in October 2006 in front of the mayor‟s office. 
Deaf to the various requests of democratic participation of local people, the 
government had already decided in favor of the base without any type of popular 
referendum.”69  Reaching the limits of institutional politics, Vicenza citizens now 
turned towards informal politics by mobilizing a broad campaign against base 
expansion.   
The No Dal Molin Campaign 
To draw a broader, national appeal, local activists reached out to anti-war 
groups, inviting them to support the No Dal Molin campaign. No Dal Molin members 
also joined the Patto Nazionale di Solidarietà e Mutuo Soccorso (PNSMS) in 
solidarity with other local Italian movements fighting to protect local resources and 
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territory. Through PNSMS, anti-base activists networked with other social 
movements, such as the campaign against the construction of a high-speed railway in 
Val di Susa, or protests against garbage dumps in Grottaglie. No Dal Molin activists 
stated, “An agreement (has been made) with mutual support for the various 
movements throughout the country. In this way, local movements, protecting local 
resources were all supporters at the national level.”70  As the No Dal Molin campaign 
expanded its networks, local activists formed the Presidio Permanente,
71
 and prepared 
for their first national protest on December 2. This demonstration attracted 
approximately 30,000 protestors in Vicenza, signaling the arrival of a major social 
movement.
72
   
On January 16, 2007, Prime Minister Prodi publicly announced his support for 
the new base at Dal Molin.  Anti-base activists immediately reacted to the 
announcements. Citizens and activists spontaneously marched through the historical 
center of Vicenza expressing their outrage. Eight thousand citizens held a candlelight 
vigil. Some protestors burned voter registration cards and party flags to voice their 
indignation at Prime Minister Prodi, who only months earlier had made an electoral 
pledge to decrease militarization.  Activists then occupied Vicenza railroad station. 
The protest march culminated at the Presidio, adjacent to Dal Molin air field. Marked 
by a giant white tent, the Presidio now functioned as “the permanent base of 
protest.”73  
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Party Politics and Political Opportunities 
Coalition dynamics within Prodi‟s ruling center-left government initially 
proved fortuitous for anti-base activists.  The slim, two-seat Senate majority over the 
center-right gave fringe parties in Prodi‟s nine-party coalition a disproportionate 
amount of power relative to their size.  Prodi‟s announcement to support base 
expansion in Vicenza, and Italian troops in Afghanistan under NATO, put his frail 
coalition to the test.  Far-left party members were aghast that Prodi had endorsed a 
deal negotiated under the pro-Bush Berlusconi government. Members from the Party 
of Italian Communists (PdCI), Communist Refoundation Party (PRC), and the Green 
Party all expressed deep reservations about what they perceived as the militarization 
of Italy‟s foreign policy.  The three far-left parties vowed to oppose the new base, thus 
opening the door for activists to form ties with members of the ruling government.  
PRC representative Alfio Nicotra quoted, "Romano Prodi's profoundly mistaken 
decision does not close the Vicenza question, but on the contrary, opens it...This is 
shown by the way people are mobilizing in Vicenza and by the requests we are getting 
to hold a national rally, whose goal would be to cut back foreign bases and reduce 
Italy's military servitude."
74
  
Activists took advantage of internal bickering within the center-left coalition. 
While Prodi‟s fragile government teetered on the edge of crisis over foreign and 
defense policy issues, the No Dal Molin campaign made preparations for a second 
national protest on February 17. The three far-left parties gave their support to 
Vicenza activists. Government representatives from these parties, including several 
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Senators and the Minister of Environment, joined protestors in Vicenza. The 
demonstration drew approximately 100,000 protestors.
75
   
Four days after the protest, Foreign Minister Massimo D‟Alema made an 
appeal to Parliament members to support U.S. base expansion in Vicenza, and Italy‟s 
commitment to NATO in Afghanistan. D‟Alema argued that the Vicenza base was 
essential for maintaining positive relations with the U.S., and “to change course would 
be a hostile act against the United States.”76  Despite his former ties to communists, 
D‟Alema‟s appeal did not win-over the radical left. Two far-left senators, Fernando 
Rossi (PdCI), and Franco Turigliatto (PRC), abstained from voting. To the delight of 
activists, the government failed to win majority support. Unable to garner the 
necessary votes from his own coalition, Prodi voluntarily resigned as prime minister. 
Prodi‟s fall raised several hopeful questions for activists.  If reinstated as prime 
minister, would Prodi change his stance on the Vicenza issue? Would a new 
government review the base agreement with the U.S.?   
Successful Mobilization  
Italian activists have praised the No Dal Molin campaign as the first major 
movement specifically targeting U.S. military bases in Italy, and a model for other 
local movements to follow.
77
  Mobilization success goes beyond the size of protests 
witnessed on December 2 and February 17.  Activists repeatedly pointed to the diverse 
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social, economic, and political background of participants, and the transformative 
effect broad collaboration had on the identity and outlook of Vicenza citizens.  Several 
attributes enabled the No Dal Molin campaign to maintain a high degree of 
cohesiveness up through the February 17 protest. 
First, the No Dal Molin Campaign maintained its local flavor with a concrete 
target and goal focused on stopping U.S. base expansion at Dal Molin. Moreover, the 
movement was organized by local Vicenza citizens with relatively little outside 
interference, giving the campaign an extra degree of credibility to supporters. An 
autonomous movement of the citizenry made it more difficult for the government to 
discredit the legitimacy of the movement. 
Second, the blend of younger, radical activists with older, more established, 
“ordinary” citizens had a positive impact on the campaign by appealing to a wider 
reach of the Vicenza community. Younger activists reported feeling much safer 
having “ordinary” citizens participate in the movement. Not only did the presence of 
ordinary citizens and families help moderate the movement‟s image, but as one local 
businessman recollects being told by a younger activist, “If it weren‟t for you guys, I 
think the police would have cracked down on us.”78  Conversely, the older activists 
and “ordinary” citizens were encouraged by the passionate resistance of younger 
activists.  An American peace activist in Rome observed how ordinary citizens who 
had always played by the rules learned it was acceptable to step beyond these 
boundaries, participating in civil disobedience.
79
  
Lastly, the movement successfully turned a local issue into a national 
movement. Not only did activists network with other local movements and anti-war 
groups across Italy, by early 2007, the anti-base movement had the full support of the 
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far-left political parties in Prodi‟s coalition. Support went beyond mere rhetoric. For 
instance, in Milan, the Refounded Communist Party organized twenty buses to 
transport activists and party members from Milan to Vicenza for the February 17 
demonstration.
80
  Moreover, party representatives and government officials joined 
activists on the streets of Vicenza.  
Strong Security Consensus 
As discussed above, anti-base activists reached a point of successful 
mobilization in Vicenza. Were they effective, however, in shaping base policy 
outcomes?  How did the Prodi government respond to domestic opposition against 
base expansion after the embarrassing collapse of his center-left coalition? At the very 
least, the February 17 protests exacerbated the center-left crisis by exposing popular 
dissent and elite division in the mainstream media. Rather than whither in ignominious 
defeat, however, the crisis emboldened Prodi‟s resolve to keep his coalition alive and 
push forward with his foreign policy agenda.   
Prodi‟s support for the U.S. alliance and NATO, and more concretely U.S. 
base expansion, is unsurprising if one accepts the existence of a security consensus 
among Italian elites. With fragile coalitions and frequent government turnovers, one 
would imagine it difficult for elites to find common consensus on any political agenda. 
Foreign and security policy, however, is one area where Italian political elites have 
found common ground. Thus one often finds broad support on key foreign and 
security policy issues, including those related to NATO and the U.S. alliance  
Italian Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations 
Italy‟s close security ties to the U.S. is embedded in the historical trajectory of 
U.S.-Italian relations, providing the elite security consensus a substantial degree of 
depth. Rome‟s favorable attitude towards NATO and the U.S. initially stemmed from 
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genuine strategic concerns and common threat perceptions after World War II.  Italy 
recognized the necessity of a permanent, peacetime alliance to secure its northeast 
border from Soviet aggression. U.S. forces also played an important role protecting 
Italian sovereignty from Yugoslavian threats to territorial claim.  Meanwhile, 
vulnerability at sea required Italy to forge an alliance with a major maritime power 
such as the United States to protect its southern coasts.
81
    
In the immediate postwar years, the Truman Doctrine and the reduced presence 
of British troops in the Mediterranean in 1947 enhanced the United States‟ role in 
Italy‟s postwar security.82   America‟s protectorate role for Italy and Western Europe 
became institutionalized under the Marshall Plan and NATO. Some Italian foreign 
policy observers noted that Italy‟s entrance into NATO, “assured for the following 
twenty-five years Italian support to all the initiatives of American foreign policy.”83 
The result  was “an almost structural inclination” on Italy to rely on the U.S. for 
security.
84
 
Throughout the Cold War, U.S.-Italian relations were marked by 
“extraordinary subservience to the United States on security policy.”85  As Douglas 
Forsyth argued, for much of the Cold War, “Italy followed the U.S. lead on crucial 
foreign policy issues consistently, almost slavishly, throughout the postwar era.”86  
Political elites, or more specifically Christian Democrat leaders, simply followed what 
could be deemed the traditional line of foreign policy.  Italy‟s virtual client state status 
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in the early postwar years naturally stemmed from its total political, military, and 
economic dependence on the United States. U.S. intervention in Italian politics, in 
particular, massive financial support for the Christian Democrats and other anti-
Communist parties, contributed to this dependence.   
The collapse of the Cold War did result in a more autonomous foreign policy 
posture. While overall relations remained strong, Rome and Washington faced 
disagreements regarding peacekeeping and intervention in Somalia and Bosnia, 
respectively. Despite occasional squabbles, however, Italy continued to maintain 
strong relations with the U.S. Maintaining close ties to the U.S. in the post-Cold War 
period as a matter of choice rather than necessity suggests the internalization of the 
Atlantic alliance by Italian elites.
87
 
Security Consensus in the Post-9/11 Era 
A review of Italian foreign policy priorities under the second Berlusconi 
(2001-06) and Prodi government (2006-08) is helpful in understanding the breadth of 
the security consensus, and how the consensus influenced government responses and 
movement outcomes. Despite Berlusconi‟s obvious pro-U.S., pro-Bush foreign policy 
stance, Italian academics diverge in their assessment of his foreign policy. Some 
scholars cite Berlusconi‟s foreign policy agenda as anomalous. Berlusconi broke from 
traditional Italian foreign policy by heavily tilting his position towards the U.S. at the 
expense of the European community.
88
 Others, most notably Osvaldo Croci, have 
argued that Berlusconi brought continuity to Italian foreign policy by sustaining its 
two pillars: the Atlantic alliance and the European Union (EU), despite throwing his 
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weight behind the “special relationship” with the U.S.89  Regardless of the “correct” 
interpretation, Berlusconi was undoubtedly pro-U.S.  This was apparent in his 
selection of the staunchly pro-U.S. Antonio Martino as defense minister, and Renato 
Ruggiero as foreign minister.
90
 September 11 and the invasion of Afghanistan also 
reaffirmed Italy‟s commitment to NATO when Italy dispatched 2,700 troops to 
Afghanistan to participate in “Operation Enduring Freedom.”  
 After Berlusconi‟s defeat in the April 2006 elections, Americans and Italians 
alike recognized that a shift to the center-left Prodi would result in a much more 
“balanced” foreign policy from Berlusconi. On the eve of Prodi‟s victory, Washington 
policymakers feared that Prodi‟s victory would “put American-Italian relations on 
ice.”91  Fears of a cooling of U.S.-Italy relations under a center-left regime were 
certainly legitimate.  Only a year earlier, Spain‟s pro-U.S. Jose Maria Anzar fell to the 
left-leaning Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero.  Zapatero immediately withdrew Spanish 
troops from Iraq, damaging U.S.-Spain relations.
92
 Moreover, Prodi made clear that 
his foreign policy priority would center around a more autonomous Europe.
93
  Prodi 
also  made the oft-quoted statement during his campaign, “I‟m going to tell the United 
States when it‟s right and when I think it‟s wrong,”94   Perhaps most disconcerting for 
the Bush Administration was the inclusion of three far-left parties in Prodi‟s ruling 
government. 
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Fears of alliance deterioration never materialized. Prodi managed to sustain 
positive relations with the U.S., even as he distanced himself from Berlusconi‟s U.S.-
centric position.
95
  As Charles Kupchan notes, Prodi could have easily exploited anti-
Bush sentiment in Italy for political gain. With his coalition crumbling, parting with 
Washington would have been an expedient way to strengthen his slim parliamentary 
majority. However, Prodi demonstrated his support for NATO by maintaining Italian 
troops in Afghanistan. He also maintained respect for the U.S.-Italian alliance by 
approving U.S. base expansion, despite significant domestic opposition from members 
of his own political coalition and civil society. 
Italian political elites value their security partnership with the United States, 
and in general, accept NATO and U.S. relations as a major tenet of national security 
policy. Encompassing the  bulk of the left-right political spectrum, the consensus is 
partially a function of political interests. Domestically, left coalitions may avoid 
damaging their relations to the U.S. to placate more moderate or right-leaning 
coalition members. Internationally, close ties to the U.S. may provide longer-term 
security benefits or boost Italy‟s international prestige. Thus, while the Italian public 
overwhelmingly disapproved of the Bush Administration‟s foreign policies, elites at 
the political center were willing to work with Washington. Political elites understand 
that maintaining ties to the U.S. are important to Italy‟s foreign policy interests.96 
Characteristic of the widespread depth in the security consensus, even when Italians 
and Americans disagree on specific policies, Italian elites prefer to keep the basic 
relationship functioning.
97
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Although interests may inform the security consensus, the tendency by both 
left and right governments to stay on the path of Italy‟s “traditional” foreign policy 
indicates that the consensus travels beyond political interests. Indicating greater depth, 
as argued earlier, the security consensus among Italian elites evolved as a process 
reinforced by shared norms and historical institutional legacies.
98
 Paralleling the 
domestic politics of other Cold War allies, the Christian Democrats and their 
American allies placed a “permanent freeze” on communists during the formative 
years of the U.S.-Italian alliance.
99
 The evolution of post-war domestic politics in Italy 
has kept left-leaning ideologues on the sideline of foreign policy and security debates. 
Like their Japanese counterparts, Italian political elites maintained a shared consensus, 
reified by processes of norm-sharing and repeated interactions with the U.S. over time. 
Through these endogenous processes, elites have internalized the significance of the 
U.S.-Italian relations and its international commitment to NATO.
100
   The consensus 
helps explain how Berlusconi received widespread support from the political right and 
left in the Chamber of Deputies in the initial decision to send Italian troops to 
Afghanistan.
101
 It also explains why Prodi continued to support NATO and U.S. 
related policies implemented by his political rival and predecessor.  Prodi, along with 
Foreign Minister D‟Alema, a former Communist, and the pro-American Defense 
Minister Arturo Parisi, were willing to work with the U.S., even if they intended to 
shift their foreign policy back to the traditional balance between NATO and the EU.   
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For the Italian government, base expansion in Vicenza should have been a non-
issue. There was little cost or risk for the Italians in providing Dal Molin airfield to the 
U.S. Part of Dal Molin was already designated as an Italian Ministry of Defense site, 
and Vicenza already hosted existing U.S. military facilities. Why, then, had bases 
become so politicized in Italy, and how did Prodi respond to anti-base pressure? While 
I answer these questions through the framework of the security consensus, in the 
Italian anti-base case, I argue that the security consensus interacted with other political 
variables. Coalition and party politics created a complicated, but exciting dynamic 
between state and civil societal actors in the Vicenza movement episode. 
Security Consensus, Coalition Politics, and Government Response 
 Understanding how the Prodi government responded to anti-base pressure 
requires stepping back to the Berlusconi era. Although Berlusconi agreed to base 
expansion in Vicenza, he requested that the project be put on hold until after the April 
2006 elections.
102
 Public opinion polls had already given Prodi‟s center-left coalition a 
slight edge over the center-right. Berlusconi feared that wider publicity for U.S. base 
expansion in front of an anti-Bush electorate would tip the scales further towards 
Prodi. The U.S. acquiesced to Berlusconi‟s suggestion, and put the base project on 
temporarily hold.
103
  
Unfortunately, for  him, Berlusconi lost the election. The base project now 
landed on Prodi‟s lap. Naturally, questions arose in Washington whether a coalition 
which included far-left parties would accept U.S. base plans brokered under the 
Berlusconi government. When Washington contacted Rome, the Italian government 
reassured the U.S. that it intended to continue with base plans at Dal Molin. However, 
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according to one foreign policy observer, Rome again asked for patience from 
Washington.
104
 Prodi was not necessarily opposed to U.S. bases. However, opposition 
from far-left parties within his fragile coalition made it difficult to discuss U.S. base 
expansion immediately following the election.  
Buck-passing 
Shortly after Prodi officially came to power in May 2006, the central 
government passed the Vicenza issue down to the local government.
105
 The base 
expansion project required consultation with local authorities on several technical 
issues such as building codes, zoning requirements, and safety and environmental 
regulations. Whether the timing was coincidental or deliberate, some U.S and Italian 
officials suggested that the Italian government had  “passed-the-buck” onto local 
governments to avoid any political fall-out at the national level. The Italian 
government had turned the politically-charged issue of U.S. military bases at the 
national level into a technical matter discussed at the local level. By passing the base 
issue to the local government, Prodi found the political space and additional time 
needed to persuade his far-left coalition partners to vote in favor of U.S. and NATO-
related policies.  
Since the central government had passed the buck to local authorities, it was 
now the Vicenza city government which bore the brunt of anti-base pressure. As 
argued earlier, citizens first directed their actions against the Vicenza city government, 
demanding the base issue be resolved through a public referendum. However, after the 
city accepted base expansion and rejected holding a referendum, activists shifted their 
actions against the Prodi government. Although the local Vicenza government 
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approved base expansion plans, it had no legal authority over bilateral basing 
agreements. As an issue of national defense and foreign policy, base agreements 
needed to be approved bilaterally at the level of states.  The local government, 
therefore, passed the base issue back to Rome. The ball was once again in Prodi‟s 
court, but now in an arena quickly filling with anti-base demonstrators not only from 
Vicenza, but across Italy. 
Whether intentionally or not, passing the base issue back and forth between the 
local and national government created ambiguity over Prodi‟s support for base 
expansion, even if Prodi supported U.S. bases in principle. Some Vicenza residents 
perceived indecisiveness on Prodi‟s part. A reversal, or at least a review of the Dal 
Molin base project remained possible.  In an interview with Corriere della Sera, the 
pro-base Vicenza Popular Bank president, Gianni Zonin, stated, “I am disappointed 
(with politicians). I do not like this buck-passing of responsibility between the 
municipal authority and the government.  This confusion must stop:  It must be either 
„yes‟ or „no,‟ with all due explanations.”106 With growing anti-base opposition in late 
2006, U.S. officials too had grown increasingly nervous with noisy demonstrations 
and increasing delays on the base expansion project. U.S. Ambassador Ronald Spogli 
arrived in Vicenza on January 9, 2007 to speak with Vicenza business leaders. Putting 
direct pressure on Vicenza business and government leaders, and indirect pressure on 
Prodi, the Ambassador stated if the Dal Molin project fell through, the U.S. would pull 
out of Vicenza. The U.S. would then consolidate the 173
rd
 Airborne Brigade in 
Germany, not Italy, within two years.
107
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 Prodi finally provided clarity on January 16, 2007, declaring at a press 
conference in Bucharest, “I am about to tell the U.S. Ambassador that the Italian 
government won't oppose the decision by the previous government and the town 
council of Vicenza to allow the expansion of the military base . . . Our attitude in 
regards to the U.S. is that of friend and ally."
108
  Prodi‟s acceptance of U.S. bases and 
NATO‟s Afghanistan mission signaled to both domestic constituents and international 
allies that he remained committed to the Atlantic alliance. However, Vicenza activists 
and far-left politicians immediately reacted, suggesting that buck-passing the base 
issue to circumvent domestic political tension had backfired.
109
  Demonstrations took 
place in Vicenza. Activists proceeded with preparations for a major national protest on 
February 17, 2007. Prodi now faced joint opposition from his far-left coalition 
partners and anti-base activists. Not only had the campaign grown in size, but it had 
also grown more militant. 
Prodi’s Rebound 
Anti-base movements, and more specifically two far-left Senators, packed a 
significant punch by rejecting Prodi‟s foreign policy agenda. The blow knocked Prodi 
out politically. Unfortunately, Prodi‟s resignation was self-defeating for the radical 
left-parties in his coalition. Prodi‟s knock-out had awakened his centrist senses. After 
conferring with President Napolitano, Prodi required all coalition partners to sign a 
twelve-point program, including "support for our foreign and defense commitments 
within the context of the UN and our membership of NATO and the EU.”110   
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 Richard Owen. “Prodi lays down terms for a new coalition.” The Times (London). February 17, 
2008.  
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Here, we see how coalition politics and the security consensus mutually 
reinforced one another, creating significant political obstacles for anti-base activists.  
The three far-left parties were genuinely opposed to U.S. bases and Italian troops in 
Afghanistan. However, to prevent Berlusconi from returning to power, and to maintain 
their position within the ruling coalition, the far-left parties acquiesced to U.S. base 
expansion and Italy‟s Afghanistan mission. A portion of the far left‟s support base, 
among others anti-war and anti-base activists, openly criticized these parties for 
bending their foreign policy principles.
111
 Anti-war activist Piero Maestri argued, “The 
Italian Communist Party is no longer against the system, but are now inside the 
system. The communist party is promoting a foreign and military policy for the 
system.”112  As Maestri suggested, extreme parties challenge the system, but once 
inside, they try to maintain their power, working within the system.  
Italy‟s political institutional arrangements ultimately constrained the original 
foreign and security policy preferences of radical left actors.  Thus coalition dynamics 
and institutional arrangements had the effect of reinforcing the dominant security 
consensus.  Anti-base movements, reaching limits bounded by the security consensus 
and institutional constraints, were never quite able to penetrate the state. Despite 
successful mobilization, anti-base activists found it increasingly difficult to win major 
concessions on U.S. base policies. The February crisis, while exposing several flaws 
in Italy‟s political institutional design, also affirmed that the majority of Italian 
political elites still valued strong ties to the U.S. The consensus does not imply that all 
Italian elites are pro-U.S, or even in favor of a strong Atlantic alliance. It only 
suggests that certain political and ideological constraints prevent political elites from 
veering too far off the path of the security consensus.  
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 This has led to yet another split from the various existing communist parties, leading to the 
formation of Sinistra Critica (the Critical Left Party).  
112
 Interview with Piero Maestri. Milan, Italy,  January 17, 2008.  
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  Ironically, the slim parliamentary majority which gave Prodi the leverage to 
“discipline” far-left parties so they could remain in power also contributed to his brief 
political fall. Taking advantage of Prodi‟s slim majority, center-right politicians 
abstained from voting in favor of Prodi‟s foreign policy agenda in an attempt to 
destabilize the ruling government.   Under “normal” circumstances, the majority of 
center-right politicians would have backed U.S. base expansion and Italy‟s NATO 
mission, giving Prodi‟s foreign policy at least two-thirds majority support. As one 
U.S. official retorted, “Vicenza should have never been an issue in the first place.”113  
Thus some of the blame for turning U.S. bases into a messy affair can be pinned onto 
the center-right. Needless to say, the center-right inadvertently provided anti-base 
activists a platform to turn a local NIMBY protest into a major national issue.  
Continued Anti-base Efforts 
Although Prodi‟s return to power on March 1 signalled the begining of a 
decline for anti-base activists, strong anti-base opposition persisted. Activists resorted 
to a wide range of protest activities: tree-planting, roadblocks, festivals, and boycotts 
targeting both the local and national government. On June 3, 2007, a group of activists 
interrupted Prodi during a public forum. Sitting in the audience, activists unexpectedly 
stood up, hollering and waving No Dal Molin banners. Activist leader Cinzia Bottene 
then stepped onto stage to directly confront Prodi. Putting him on the spot, she 
exclaimed: 
 
 “It‟s a disgrace that the city of Vicenza is not defended by the Italian 
government. We have even tried to put the matter to a public 
referendum so that the voices of the people can be heard but they have 
not even allowed us to do that. I am disappointed because I helped vote 
them in. We voted them in on the basis of a platform of military 
                                                 
113
 Interview with U.S. consulate official. Milan, Italy, January 18, 2008.   The official contends, “It was 
the center right, our normal allies (within the Italian government), that have allowed this to drag on to 
embarrass the center-left government. Thus the (political) right was complacent in supporting the base 
expansion, maintaining tension on the (base) issue. 
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spending (reduction) and active democracy. Where are those promises 
now?”114 
 
As if in direct response to Bottene, Prodi appointed EU Parliamentarian Paolo 
Costa as the government‟s special envoy for base expansion in Vicenza. Costa acted 
as an intermediary between all interested parties: Vicenza citizens, the city and 
national government, and the U.S military. All problems were now directly relayed to 
Costa. Costa did help negotiate several local zoning, traffic, and environmental 
concerns. He managed to convince the U.S. to change initial project plans by 
constructing the new base on the west rather than east side of Dal Molin airfield.  
Beyond this, however, there was no more substantive dialogue between the No Dal 
Molin movement and Costa (i.e. the national government). As one Minister of Defense 
advisor argued, all citizens who could be persuaded by rational means at this point had 
already been persuaded. Stopping the project, as activists demanded, was not an 
option.  
Fractures 
After the February 17 protest, different factions within the No Dal Molin 
campaign became more pronounced. Factions had existed even prior to this date, but 
these cleavages became more acute over time as the campaign broadened to 
incorporate a wider audience. Divisions ensued over strategy and the target of protests. 
The Presidio, the largest subset of the No Dal Molin campaign, became increasingly 
vocal against the center-left Prodi government. Presidio activists criticized even far-
left politicians, who opposed bases rhetorically, but avoided taking action in 
government. The Presidio maintained its grassroots orientation, claiming no allegiance 
to political groups, parties, or organizations. According to Presidio members, this 
group accounted for roughly 60-70% of activists in the No Dal Molin struggle.
115
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 Osti 2007. 
115
 Interview with Stefan Osti. Vicenza, Italy, January 16, 2008. 
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By contrast, a second distinct group, the Coordinamento Comitati (CC), 
continued to maintain ties with political parties and trade unions, working within the 
boundaries of formal politics. The CC distanced itself from the Presidio, wanting to 
avoid confrontation with the center-left government. Accounting for approximately 
20-30% of the movement, the CC continued to place hope in a solution to the Vicenza 
base issue through institutional and legal means. The, smallest faction, Comitato 
Vicenza Est,
116
 also split from the Presidio due to personality issues at the leadership 
level, specifically with those members in the Presidio who had disobbedienti roots.
117
  
 In mid-2007, the Presidio increased efforts to network with international 
groups, beginning with other anti-base movements in Europe. The Presidio also added 
an international team to coordinate with other anti-base groups around the world.
118
 
U.S. officials observe that the movement has become less focused on local issues and 
the specific Vicenza base, and instead shaped into a more general anti-war movement. 
As one consulate official notes,  increased criticism against the national government, 
and the transnational shift of the campaign indicates movement weakness as activists 
now recognize the Dal Molin project as a lost cause. What U.S. officials observe about 
the evolution of the movement correspond with activists description of the shift 
towards European-wide mobilization. It is also true that anti-base activists, particulary 
those associated with the Presidio, hold little hope that the Italian government will 
stand up against the U.S. Vicenza activists have not given up, however. Instead, they 
                                                 
116
 Vicenza Est is short hand for Comitato di cittadini e lavoratori di Vicenza che chiedono la 
conversione della Caserna Ederle – base militare USA [Vicenza citizens and workers committee on the 
conversion of Camp Ederle]. See their website at <http://www.comitatovicenzaest.splinder.com/>. [last 
accessed 2/1/08].  
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 The disobbedienti group arose from the militant Tute Bianche social movement, best known for their 
resistance during the G-8 summit anti-globalization movement. Disobbedienti members engage in 
direct action and civil disobedience against government authority. Realizing the importance of 
movement unity, representatives from each of the factions have been holding small group meetings to 
exchange information and maintain open lines of communication.   
118
 Other Presidio committees include coordinating teams for strategy, logistics, communications and 
media, and women‟s issues. 
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have turned their attention to the U.S. By disrupting and delaying the base project, 
activists hope to “be enough of a pain to the U.S,” that the U.S. eventually gives up on 
Vicenza as the site for a new base.
119
   
 The U.S. began clearing unexploded ordinances (UXO) at Dal Molin  in 
October 2007. Base officials hope construction to begin by summer 2008.
120
  
According to Italian security experts and U.S. military and government officials, the 
Dal Molin project is a finished deal. While U.S. officials are prepared for further 
delays arising from technical issues, activists no longer have the political clout or 
backing to upend the project. David Bustamante, Director of Public Affairs at the 
Milan Consulate, charged, “"I think it is a done deal. I don't think there is any turning 
back. This is what Prodi has said and what the local authorities have said."
121
 
Conclusion: Ecuador and Italy in Comparative Perspective 
Anti-base movement episodes in Ecuador and Italy increase the robustness of 
the security consensus framework by applying it to different geographic regions. 
Admittedly, some skepticism is warranted over the choice of Manta and Vicenza 
bases, which are not as strategically important as Subic Bay Naval Station or Futenma 
Air Station. The Ecuador anti-base episode in particular may be criticized as an easy 
test for anti-base movements. Unlike bases in Japan or the Philippines, the U.S. made 
little effort to retain the base, lowering the barriers to success for activists.  Despite 
these shortcomings, however, both cases do suggest that the degree of security 
consensus affects how governments respond to anti-base pressure, and how they align 
their position between domestic and international forces.  Moreover, the Ecuador and 
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 Of course, this means the U.S. base will have to go elsewhere, so it cannot be viewed as a complete 
victory. Interview with Stephanie Westbrook. Rome, Italy, January 23, 2008. 
120
 “Background: Dal Molin” document provided by Camp Ederle base official. January 15, 2008.  
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 See Barry 2007. 
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Italy cases demonstrate that the security consensus functions as a political opportunity 
or barrier for anti-base movements. 
In Ecuador, while some political elites pursued pro-U.S. foreign policies, a 
security consensus favoring strong security ties to the U.S. was not deeply entrenched 
among elite ranks. Over the course of its campaign, the No Bases Ecuador Coalition 
and other anti-base groups transformed a banal base agreement into a major national 
issue. While officials in the Mahuad and Guitierrez government blocked activists‟ 
attempts to nullify the base agreement, activists did find support from important 
government figures. Unlike Italy or Japan where elite support for anti-base movements 
was limited to “radical” politicians, in Ecuador, respected leaders such as current 
Interior Minster Gustavo Larrea, Foreign Affairs Minister Francisco Carrión during 
the Palacio government, Congressman Julio Gonzáles of the Pachakutik Party, and 
Manabí Province governor Vicente Veliz publicly took an anti-base stance even before 
Correa‟s ascent to power. Absent any strong security consensus, activists were able to 
work with sympathetic elites to prevent the renewal of the Manta Base agreement. 
Ultimately, President Correa rejected the Manta Agreement.  
On the other hand, a strong security consensus acted as a barrier against Italian 
anti-base movements. While the No Dal Molin campaign achieved success in 
mobilizing activists and drawing national media attention to their cause, to date, the 
movement has been less successful in their efforts to block the expansion of the U.S. 
base in Vicenza. Common in other movement episodes where governments exhibited 
a strong security consensus, the  Prodi government resorted to foot-dragging tactics to 
diffuse domestic pressure. While initially ambiguous on the Vicenza issue, Prodi 
eventually demonstrated his political resolve to maintain Italy‟s international 
commitments.  Even the debates which ensued after Prodi‟s brief fall reaffirmed the 
existence of an elite “consensus” and the Italian government‟s continued support for 
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U.S.-Italian relations. While the security consensus helped maintain generally positive 
relations between the U.S. and Italy, it posed a challenge to anti-base movements, and 
more generally, to leftist groups interested in pursuing policies contrary to the U.S.-
Italian security alliance.  
Ecuador and Italy provide an interesting comparison on the question of regime 
type as an alternative explanation to the security consensus. One might argue that the 
shift towards a left government in Ecuador enabled activists to achieve success on 
base policy outcomes. However, the Vicenza anti-base episode suggests that even with 
a center-left government in power, when a strong security consensus pervades among 
key political elites, elites will find ways to stave off domestic pressure to retain 
positive alliance ties to the U.S.  In the Italian case, a relatively strong security 
consensus made it difficult for anti-base activists to translate their movement demands 
into policy outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE SECURITY CONSENSUS IN SOUTH KOREA: 
RESILIENT, BUT GRADUALY EBBING 
 
"It's a crucial and legitimate government project that has much at stake, namely U.S.-
Korea relations." – ROK Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-Ung.1  
 
On May 4, 2005, 12,000 riot police entered Daechuri2 village in Pyeongtaek, 
South Korea, a small village 50 miles south of Seoul in Kyongi Province. Activists 
and local residents, refusing to leave their farmland, were making a desperate stand to 
block the expansion and relocation of United States Forces, Korea (USFK) 
headquarters to Camp Humphreys. While South Korean infantry and engineering 
troops erected barbed wire around the base expansion land outside Camp Humphreys, 
2,000 activists battled riot police who stormed Daechuri Elementary School, the 
makeshift headquarters of the Pan-South Korean Solution Committee Against Base 
Expansion in Pyeongtaek (KCPT).3  One hundred and twenty protestors, police, and 
soldiers were injured, and 524 protestors, mostly students and activists, were taken 
into custody.4 Immediately following the violence, the MND went on a public 
relations offensive, highlighting the violent tactics of protestors attacking an unarmed 
engineering brigade. The government’s public relations campaign severely damaged 
                                                 
1 ROK Defense Minister’s remarks regarding USFK base relocation to Pyeongtaek in the wake of 
activist resistance. Jihyun Kim. “Seoul forges ahead in Pyeongtaek.” Korea Herald. May 5, 2006.  
2 Although the focus of anti-base activists took place in Daechuri village, residents in adjacent Doduri 
village also took part in the struggle. For simplicity, I will refer to the villages of local resistance in this 
chapter as Daechuri. Both villages are within Pyeongtaek city’s jurisdiction.   
3 Various English translations of the national anti-base group in Pyeongtaek have appeared, but their 
official website refers to the coalition by this name and acronym. I will refer to the national-level 
coalition group as KCPT. 
4 Yonhap News Agency. “Daechu boongyo toiguh jibhang bandae 524 myeong yeonhaeng.” [Daechuri 
school razed, 524 protestors taken into custody]. May 4, 2006. 
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2006/05/04/2006050470455.html. [Last accessed 6/22/07]. 
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the credibility of South Korean anti-base activists in their struggle to block the 
expansion of Camp Humphreys. KCPT never fully recovered from the May 4 clash, 
and eventually faded away by the end of 2007.  
The outcome of the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement episode contrasts the 
outcome in the movement to shut down Kooni Firing Range in Maehyangri in 2000, 
described in the dissertation’s opening chapter. Protests in Maeyhyangri ended with 
U.S. and South Korean officials making several tactical concessions to anti-base 
activists. Additionally, the movement to revise the U.S.-ROK SOFA, spearheaded by 
anti-base leaders, ended in 2001 with partial (if only token) revisions. How does a 
“moderate” security consensus affect state-societal relations, and the effectiveness of 
anti-base movements on base policy outcomes? How did South Korea’s security 
alliance with the United States influence the behavior of the Korean government and 
the strategic interaction between state and society across several movement episodes?  
Lastly, what additional factors contributed to different anti-base movement outcomes, 
despite all three episodes falling under the national context of a moderate security 
consensus? 
Empirically, Chapters Five and Six present several anti-base movement 
episodes in a single country characterized by a moderate degree of security consensus. 
Theoretically, the two chapters demonstrate that even when movement episodes are 
“nested” within the same security consensus at the national-level, considerable scope 
for variation in processes and outcomes is possible. Chapter Five is devoted to the 
complex nature of the security consensus in South Korea. The security consensus is 
coded as “moderate,” suggesting that disagreement on some aspects of the U.S.-South 
Korean alliance exists, even though most foreign policy elites agree on the necessity 
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and value of the alliance.5 Although the security consensus has slowly ebbed over the 
decade, on issues central to the U.S.-ROK alliance, particularly U.S. troop presence, a 
baseline consensus continues to exist among political elites. I attempt to make sense of 
the seeming tension and contradiction between a “gradually ebbing” and “resilient” 
security consensus by evaluating evidence from existing laws and institutions, 
government documents, and elite statements.  In relation to measures of breadth and 
depth, the security consensus exhibits narrower breadth, with some division between 
progressive and conservative elites. However, a pro-U.S. consensus, embedded in 
domestic institutions and ideology, is marked by greater levels of depth. 
I open this chapter with a historical overview of South Korean anti-base 
movements. Next, I briefly discuss recent events regarding USFK transformation and 
base realignment.  Finally, I devote the bulk of the chapter to a discussion of South 
Korean national security and the U.S.-ROK alliance between 2000-2007.  After 
demonstrating the resilient nature of the security consensus in Chapter Five, Chapter 
Six investigates three different anti-base movement episodes in South Korea: the 
SOFA revision movement in 2000, the movement to shut down Kooni Firing Range in 
Maeyhangri in 2000, and the movement to block the expansion of Camp Humphreys 
in Pyeongtaek in 2005-2006. 
Origins of the South Korean Anti-base Movement 
Although outside observers tend to assume that anti-American or anti-USFK 
sentiments are a relatively recent phenomena, anti-Americanism and South Korean 
anti-base movements have deeper roots. Scholars and activists generally agree that the 
Gwangju Massacre in May 1980 helped propel anti-American sentiment in South 
                                                 
5 I thank J.J. Suh for helping me clarify the term “moderate” in the context of the U.S.-South Korean 
alliance. 
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Korea.6 While anti-American attitudes existed in South Korea even before 1980, the 
rise of such sentiments did not necessarily lead to an organized, systematic movement 
against U.S. military bases or USFK. Unification and pro-North Korean groups, 
particularly those influenced by national liberation (NL) ideology, had always taken 
an anti-American, anti-imperial stance while the mass public generally accepted U.S. 
military presence. In fact, prior to South Korea’s democratic transition in 1987, social 
and environmental externalities stemming from bases attracted little attention from the 
public. Moreover, government repression and security concerns functioned as 
structural barriers severely limiting mobilization against bases.7 
 Awareness of social costs and the first signs of a shift in public perception of 
U.S. bases took shape with the widely publicized brutal rape-murder case of Yoon 
Geumi in 1992.8 USFK-related crimes were taken more seriously as civic groups 
pushed for revisions to the unequal Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Local anti-
base movements and not in my backyard (NIMBY) protests existed prior to this point, 
but only from the mid-1990’s did civic groups at the national level attempt to form a 
broader coalition movement. In 1997, national civic groups joined forces with local 
residents across different regions where U.S. bases existed to form the Pan-National 
Solution Committee to Return U.S. Bases. The movement demanded the reduction and 
                                                 
6 The U.S. had no direct role suppressing mass demonstrations in Gwangju. However, because South 
Korea’s military chain of command was subordinate to USFK, South Koreans often cite that the release 
of the ROK 20th Division implied U.S. complicity, or at least acquiescence to Chun Doo Hwan’s 
decision to brutally crackdown protestors. See Kun-Young Park. “80 nyun-dae hanguk-ui  banmijoo-
ui,byun-hwa, jeonmang, geuligo ham-eui.” (South Korean Anti-Americanism, Change, Prospects, and 
Togetherness). Presented at Perspectives of Social Science in the 1980s from a 21st Century Perspective. 
Seoul, South Korea. October 7, 2005. Don Oberdorfer. The Two Koreas : A Contemporary History. 
New York: Basic Books, 2001.  Kun-Young Park. "A New U.S.-ROK Alliance: A Nine Point Policy 
Recommendation for a Reflective and Mature Relationship." Brookings Institution, Center for 
Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Washington DC, 2005b, p.23. 
7 Park 2005b, p.25.  
8 Yoo-kyung Koh. “Hanguk-ui banmi-gun-giji undong-gwa dongasia yundae” (Anti-US  
military base movements and East Asian solidarity). In Bipan Sahoehak Daehoe (8th Meeting). 4-5 
November 2005, 297-310. Seoul: College of Social Science, Seoul National University, 2005, p.297. 
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eventual return of U.S. bases in South Korea, as well as the restoration of sovereignty 
rights, peace, and reunification.9 
Despite the formation of the Pan-National Committee to Return U.S. Bases, 
most anti-base movements, led by local NGOs, continued to focus on regional issues. 
However, in early 1999, Foreign Minister Lee Joung-bin raised the issue of SOFA 
revisions. Local anti-base coalition movements in Kunsan and Daegu, and NGOs in 
Seoul such as the National Campaign to Eradicate Crimes by U.S. Troops (USA 
Crime), viewed the minister of foreign affair’s public statement for SOFA revisions as 
an opportunity to open a broader coalition. In addition to base-related issues, SOFA 
revisions also encompassed other issue areas such as the environment, labor, safety, 
and women’s rights. Thus anti-base activists and NGO leaders from various sectors 
established the broad-based coalition People’s Action for Reform of the Unjust SOFA 
(PAR-SOFA) in October 1999 to push Washington and Seoul for substantive SOFA 
revisions.10 
In early 2000, protestors staged numerous rallies and public campaigns 
pressuring the South Korean government to take a resolute stance in negotiations with 
Washington. Two events in 2000 also triggered large-scale protests, and provided fuel 
not only for SOFA revision movements, but other movements related to USFK and 
U.S. bases. The first event occurred near Kooni Firing Range in May. An A-10 aircraft 
dropped its payload early in an emergency procedure resulting in property damage in 
the nearby village of Maehyangri. With widespread media coverage, this event 
eventually triggered a major reaction as national level civic groups and NGOs joined 
                                                 
9 Koh 2005, p.298. 
10 Doo-hui Oh. “Ajik kkeun-naji ahn-eun SOFA gaejeong undong” (The unfinished SOFA revision 
movement) In Nogunri eseo Maehyangri kkaji  (From Nogunri to Maehyangri), 2001, 200-242. Seoul: 
Deep Freedom Press,  p.202; Katharine H. S. Moon. "South Korean Civil Society and Alliance 
Politics." In Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.-ROK 
Alliance, edited by Derek Mitchell. Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2004, p.146 
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forces with local residents who had been struggling to shut down Kooni Range since 
1988. The second event was the discovery of a USFK personnel dumping 
formaldehyde into the Han River, again prompting reaction not only from 
environmental groups, but the general public as well. By alerting USFK issues to the 
national public and mobilizing massive protests, the Maehyangri anti-base movement 
and PAR-SOFA pressured South Korean officials to take action on both issues in 
negotiations with the U.S. Both movements subsided with partial concessions granted 
in Maehyangri, and a revised SOFA signed by the U.S. and South Korea in 2001. 
Civic groups’ expressed major disappointment with the lack of substantive revisions. 
Despite a brief, sudden reawaking of the SOFA revision movement in 2002, anti-U.S. 
base related movements were unable to extract any further concessions from Seoul or 
Washington.  
USFK Base Relocation and Consolidation 
 With the relocation of U.S. bases centered almost entirely on Pyeongtaek after 
2004, activists moved away from SOFA issues and reoriented their struggle against 
the expansion of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. The realignment and consolidation 
of U.S. bases under the context of U.S.-ROK alliance transformation raised new 
challenges for South Korean anti-base activists. Until the past decade, the 
configuration of U.S. bases in South Korea remained virtually unchanged since the 
end of the Korean War. Most U.S. bases were concentrated north of Seoul (see Figure 
5.1 below).11  
 
                                                 
11 The large presence of U.S. troops along the demilitarized zone functioned as a “trip-wire” deterrent 
against North Korea, symbolizing America’s commitment to South Korea’s defense. See Doug Bandow. 
Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World. Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 1996. 
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Figure 5.1: Changes in U.S. installations in South Korea proposed under the 2002 LPP 
Source: United States General Accounting Office. "Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties 
Necessitate Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in South Korea." 1-35. Washington D.C.: GAO, 
2003, p.16.  
 
In light of several outstanding land disputes pertaining to U.S. bases, and the 
dilapidated state of existing USFK facilities, Washington and Seoul initiated the U.S.-
South Korea Land Partnership Plan (LPP) in 2001.  The LPP was designed as a 
cooperative effort between the U.S. and South Korea to “consolidate U.S. installations, 
improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South 
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Korean alliance by addressing some of the causes of periodic tension” associated with 
U.S. military presence in South Korea.12  Signed in March 2002, the LPP 
recommended closing 15 out of 41 installations, thereby consolidating forces onto the 
26 remaining bases without any reduction in troop numbers.13  Figure 5.1 above 
provides a map of selected U.S. installations under the LPP. 
The LPP quickly grew outdated in light of changing U.S. global force posture 
demands. The United States began considering different options regarding force 
deployment in South Korea in line with a general reassessment of global force posture 
conducted under the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and the DOD’s Overseas 
Basing and Requirements Study. The Pentagon’s reassessment of U.S. overseas 
presence would undoubtedly “diminish the need for and alter the locations of many 
construction projects” associated with the LPP.14   
In April 2003, high-ranking U.S. officials and South Korean officials discussed 
a much more comprehensive base realignment project superseding the LPP.15  The 
U.S. suggested moving U.S. troops away from the demilitarized zone.16  More 
importantly, the meeting concluded with a decision to relocate Yongsan Garrison, 
USFK headquarters in downtown Seoul, to a location approximately fifty miles south 
of the capital.17 By July 2004, Seoul and Washington had proposed a new vision for 
                                                 
12 United States General Accounting Office. "Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate 
Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in South Korea." 1-35. Washington D.C.: GAO, 2003, p.1. The 
LPP is organized under three components. 1) Installations: establish a timeline for the construction of 
new facilities and closure of installations; 2) Training Areas:  return training areas in exchange for use 
of South Korean ranges and raining areas while protecting the remaining training facilities; 3) Safety 
easements: Provide a list of require safety measures and procedures as well as a timeline for 
enforcement. See CBO 2003, p.8. 
13 US CINPAC Virtual Information Center. “Special Press Summary: Land Partnership Plan and 
Yongsan Relocation.” January 31, 2002.  
14 GAO 2003, p.3. 
15 CBO 2004, p.30.  
16 GAO 2003,  p.1.  
17 GAO 2003, p.13. The decision to relocate Yongsan Garrison dates back to a 1991 memorandum of 
understanding signed between Seoul and Washington. Unfortunately, dispute over relocation costs, and 
difficulty in finding an appropriate replacement brought the relocation process to a halt. 
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the U.S.-ROK alliance, including a greater role for the South Korean military in 
securing its own defense.  After ten rounds of negotiations under the Future of the 
Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA), both sides agreed to withdraw 12,500 U.S. troops 
by December 2008 from South Korea, relocate Yongsan Garrison out of Seoul, and 
consolidate the 2nd Infantry Division to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek.18 
 What was the political context behind USFK base relocation and realignment? 
Given Yongsan Garrison’s location in the heart of Seoul, both governments cited 
urban sprawl and the potential for friction between U.S. soldiers and Korean civilians 
as a reason for Yongsan’s relocation. This friction was particularly salient after a 
USFK armored vehicle crushed two junior high school girls in June 2002, triggering 
massive waves of anti-American protests. Second, the withdrawal of 12,500 troops 
and the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division south of the Han River raised intense 
fear among South Korean conservatives.  Amidst the rising threat of North Korean 
nuclear weapons in late 2002, some South Korean conservatives interpreted the 
relocation of troops away from the DMZ as a sign of weakened U.S. commitment to 
South Korea’s defense. Others criticized troop withdrawals and the relocation of the 
2nd Infantry Division as measures driven purely by U.S. national interests with little 
regard for its alliance partner.19 Moreover, some South Koreans associated Donald 
Rumsfeld’s comments regarding USFK relocation and impending U.S. troop 
                                                 
18 Pyeongtaek is approximately fifty miles south of Seoul.  U.S. State Department. Transcript of U.S 
and  ROK representatives discussing the Alliance Policy Initiative. “U.S. Troop Relocation Shows 
Strength of U.S.-Korea Alliance”.   July 28, 2004. < http://usinfo.org/wf-
archive/2004/040728/epf307.htm> [last accessed May 10, 2007].  The troop withdrawal was decided 
after the ninth FOTA round. See GAO 2003, p.13. 
19 With North Korea’s artillery most likely locked on Seoul, overly nervous Koreans argued that the U.S. 
was moving its troops to a safe location behind North Korean artillery range, leaving South Koreans to 
fend for themselves. 
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withdrawals as a form of punishment from Washington in reaction to the wave of anti-
U.S. protests in 2002.20   
A Moderate Security Consensus 
The political context of USFK transformation, and more specifically base 
relocation to Pyeongtaek, is embedded in a wider debate concerning the future of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance.  Although offering a wide range of predictions, U.S. and South 
Korean security experts unanimously contend that the alliance has undergone 
significant transformation since 2002.21  The consolidation and realignment of USFK 
on the Peninsula, the gradual withdrawal of 12,500 troops since 2003, and the 
impending transfer of war-time operational control by 2012 all attest to the changing 
nature of the alliance – whether for better or worse.  In addition to changes in the 
alliance, many U.S.-ROK alliance experts note changing South Korean attitudes 
towards the U.S. Most public opinion surveys indicate a negative change in attitudes, 
particularly among the younger generation.22  The generational gap and shifting trends 
in South Korean domestic politics have consequently polarized South Korean 
sentiments towards the U.S between progressive and conservative camps.23 President 
                                                 
20 The U.S. countered this claim, arguing that Yongsan’s relocation, an agreement signed well before 
recent tensions in the U.S.-ROK alliance, was driven predominantly by U.S. global military realignment 
after 9/11, rather than any reaction to South Korean public opinion towards the U.S. 
21 The literature here is far too numerous to cite. However, a few representative works include Park 
2005b; David I. Steinberg. Korean Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics. Armonk, 
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2004; Mikyoung Kim. "The U.S. Military Transformation and Its Implications for 
the Rok-U.S. Alliance." IFANS Review 13, no. 1 (2005): 15-39; Straub, David. "U.S. And Rok Strategic 
Doctrines and the U.S.-Rok Alliance." Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies 17 (2007): 165-86.; 
Chaibong Hahm. "South Korea's Progressives and the U.S.-ROK Alliance." Joint U.S.-Korea Academic 
Studies 17 (2007): 187-202; Sook-Jong Lee. "The Transformation of South Korean Politics: 
Implications for U.S.-Korea Relations." 1-31. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, Center for 
Northeast Asian Policy Studies, 2005. 
22 Eric Larson, Norman D. Levin, Seonhae Baik, and Bogdan Savych Ambivalent Allies? A Study of 
South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004; Derek Mitchell, ed. Strategy 
and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Washington D.C.: 
CSIS, 2004. 
23 Gi-Wook Shin and Kristine Burke. "North Korea and Contending South Korean Identities: Analysis 
of the South Korean Media; Policy Implications for the United States." KEI: Academic Paper Series 2, 
no. 4 (2007): 1-12; Chaibong Hahm. "The Two South Koreas: A House Divided." Washington 
Quarterly 28 (2005): 57-72. 
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Bush’s hard-line position towards North Korea during his first administration also 
fueled the polarizing trend in attitudes towards the U.S. To a lesser extent, this 
polarization is also present among elites, suggesting a decrease in the breadth or scope 
of the security consensus. Under these circumstances, how does one justify any 
consensus, even a moderate one, among South Korean political elites?  Here, the 
dimensions of breadth and depth are useful in determining the strength of the security 
consensus.  
Radicals, Progressives, and Conservatives 
A range of attitudes and perceptions exist regarding USFK and the U.S.-ROK 
alliance among South Korean bureaucrats, politicians, and academics. However, it is 
impossible to discuss attitudes regarding U.S.-ROK security relations without 
including North Korea. In fact, early in his administration, former President Roh Moo-
Hyun attempted to link North-South policy with U.S.-South Korean relations.24 
Attitudes towards U.S. forces and the trilateral relationship between North Korea, 
South Korea, and the United States from 2000-2006 can be roughly divided into three 
camps as seen below in Figure 5.2.   
 
  
Figure 5.2: Shifting Security Consensus Among Political Elites, 2000-2007 
                                                 
24 The dispatch of 5,000 ROK troops to Iraq was largely seen as a move to persuade the U.S. to avoid a 
hard-line stance towards North Korea and support the South in its sunshine policy with the North.  
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Radicals believe that USFK should withdraw from the Peninsula given North 
Korea’s weakened state. To radicals, U.S. forces are seen as a liability rather than an 
asset by hindering inter-Korea reconciliation. This attitude is best represented by the 
Democratic Labor Party and a minority faction in the former ruling Uri Party.  
Differing from radicals, progressives believe that U.S. forces are still necessary in the 
mid-long term. However, they believe that changes regarding U.S.-ROK relations 
should occasionally be initiated by South Korea to offset “unequal” relations. 
Progressives contend that South Korea’s interests are best served by balancing their 
foreign policy between U.S. alliance interests and North Korean rapprochement. 
Relations with one should not be sacrificed at the expense of the other.  The majority 
of mainstream progressives subscribe to this view. Moderate conservatives and 
progressives find common ground in maintaining U.S. forces for a limited period of 
time. However, conservatives argue that South Korea should react to U.S. policy 
rather than attempt to initiate changes in the alliance.25 For conservatives, foreign 
policy priority is given to the United States over North Korea. The current ruling 
party, the Grand National Party, holds this conservative view.  
Former President Roh’s Uri Party achieved some success in moving the alliance 
towards a more equal partnership, particularly in the area of wartime operational control. 
Yet there are limits to what the liberal party can achieve. In other words, a pro-U.S. 
security consensus is fairly well embedded in domestic institutions and ideology, 
suggesting significant depth, even as the breadth of the consensus among elites narrows. 
South Korea’s foreign policy apparatus is still heavily influenced by a conservative line of 
thinking, and an elite consensus continues to operate on issues pertaining to U.S.-South 
Korean security relations.  Boundaries exist as to how far progressive political leaders 
                                                 
25 Interview with Park Kun-Young. Catholic University. Seoul, South Korea. May 30, 2006. 
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can push policies which run counter to Washington.26  These boundaries are partially a 
function of the power asymmetries in the alliance relationship, but more immediate is 
the unacceptability of breaking away from existing norms which guide South Korean 
national security strategy. Integral to this strategy is the U.S.-ROK alliance. Therefore, 
despite the diversity in elite attitudes and perceptions regarding national security, 
progressive and radical political elites find it difficult to implement their preferred 
foreign policies.   
 Several studies confirm a significant gap between older and younger 
generation Koreans in their attitudes towards the alliance. Some in the progressive and 
radical camp point to change in U.S.-South Korean relations as inevitable. 
Conservatives in their sixties or older who experienced the Korean War and were 
indoctrinated with anti-Communist ideology are being replaced by the younger 386 
generation in positions of power.27  However, due to political and ideological 
structures embedded in South Korean security politics, high-ranking government 
officials in the foreign policy establishment and radical grassroots activists alike 
believe that the process of change is much more contested. Despite shifting attitudes 
and U.S.-ROK alliance transformation towards an equal partnership, the dissolution of 
the security consensus is not automatically given. Foreign Minister Yoon Young-Kwon, 
who served under the first half of the Roh Administration, states, “As some of the younger 
National Assembly members enter [government], they begin to realize through experience 
that their views are not reflective of the majority of society.  The original positions they had 
when they first entered office often change.”28 As an example, Yoon cites how several 
                                                 
26 Interview with former South Korean National Security Council official. Seoul, South Korea.  May 30. 
2006.. 
27 386 refers to those Koreans who, in the late 1990s and early 2000, were in their thirties, went to 
college in the 1980s, and were born in the 1960s. This generation experienced the student 
democratization movement during the 1980s. 
28 Interview with former Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Yoon Young-Kwon. Seoul, South Korea. 
May 26, 2006. 
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government officials and politicians wanted to elevate China as South Korea’s new 
powerful ally while distancing themselves from the United States.  However, this group 
shied away from their original stance after South Korea’s public dispute with China over 
the sovereignty of the ancient kingdom of Goguryeo.  Activists’ cynicism towards the 
government also suggests the resilience of the security consensus. Activists impatient with 
the slow pace of change from the “progressive” government expressed their frustration in 
2006 with the previous Kim Dae Jung and Roh Administrations. With many 386ers now 
holding positions in the Blue House and the National Assembly, activists initially expected 
these officials to promote change, breaking free from what they viewed as psychological 
dependence on the U.S. Once in power, however, these politicians who previously held 
radical views moderated their position.29   
Structural factors place a limit on the speed and extent to which the younger 
generation can bring about change or inject new progressive ideas into Korean politics.  As 
one South Korean security expert noted, “There are certain realities which cannot be 
ignored.  Even leftist-oriented National Assembly members cannot dare to say that we 
don’t need the alliance with the U.S. because the objective threat of North Korea still exists. 
As long as these structural factors do not change, there will be limits as to how far 
progressive politicians can bring change to the alliance.” 30  Interestingly, this type of logic 
applied to even former President Roh’s seemingly contradictory foreign policy behavior.  
Many expected Roh to distance himself from the U.S. after his infamous campaign pledge 
not to “kowtow” to the U.S, and to assert Korea’s sovereignty in the alliance relationship. 
Once in power, however, with the exception of North Korean policy, Roh more or less 
acquiesced to most of Washington’s security and foreign policy demands. These demands 
                                                 
29 Interview with several grassroots activists from KCPT. Pyeongtaek, South Korea. October 19, 2005. 
30 Interview with Park Kun-Young. Seoul, South Korea. May 30, 2006.  
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ranged from strategic flexibility, to USFK transformation, to the deployment of ROK 
troops to Iraq.  
Political and Ideological Structures 
Despite the polarization of South Korean attitudes towards the U.S, I argued 
above that political and ideological structures enable the security consensus to persist 
at a moderate level. These structures prevent elites from diverging too far from the 
security consensus. However, I do not deny that the security consensus has weakened 
over time. There was never any doubt in the consensus at the height of North-South 
tensions during the Cold War. Nor was there any doubt which country South Korea 
depended on for its national survival.  In fact, the national security laws made it illegal 
to publicly criticize the U.S. military and the U.S.-ROK alliance.  However, the fall of 
communism internationally and the near economic collapse of North Korea in the 
1990s loosened the staunch security consensus which persisted throughout the Cold 
War. The North-South summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il in 
June 2000 helped accelerate this decline as hopes of Korean reunification rekindled in 
South Korea.  GNP Representative Won Hee-Ryong reflects on this change, quoting, 
“The things that they say now in public would have been dangerous to say before the 
Kim Dae-Jung Administration. You would have been branded a communist. But the 
fact that you can say these things now openly in the National Assembly suggests that 
there has been significant change.” 31 
Political and ideological structures still remain, however, because the target 
and source of the security consensus - the external threat of North Korea and the U.S.-
ROK alliance - continue to persist in the minds of powerful elites.  Regardless of how 
benign some South Korean progressives perceive the North, foreign policy elites still 
                                                 
31 Interview with National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee Member Won Hee-Ryong.  Seoul, 
South Korea. June 19, 2006. 
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believe North Korea poses a threat given its nuclear ambitions and unpredictable 
behavior. South Korea continues to maintain strong defensive measures against the 
North, even as it pursues rapprochement with Pyongyang. Given the high stakes 
involved in a North-South conflict, and the uncertain security environment in 
Northeast Asia, South Korean political elites continue to place a priority on the 
alliance and U.S. troop presence. Figure 5.3 below illustrates how ideology and the 
domestic political environment function to maintain a security consensus in an era of 
decreased North Korean threat perceptions and changing alliance patterns. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Factors underpinning the security consensus among South Korean elites 
 
Figure 5.3 suggests that Korean political elites prefer maintaining their alliance 
with the U.S. because of North Korea’s continued threat, and uncertainty in Northeast 
Asia created by a rising China and strengthened U.S.-Japan relations. The historical 
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legacy of the Korean War and remnants of anti-Communist ideology also continue to 
color the perceptions of elite policy-makers, particularly those of the older, more 
conservative generation.  These “distorted” lenses which magnify elite threat 
perceptions function as an ideological barrier. Based on prevailing attitudes and 
perceptions of national security, conservative elites stifle any rhetoric which calls for 
the dismantling of the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
Both progressives and conservatives agree to the principles of the U.S.-ROK 
alliance. Where they disagree (and at times disagree with the U.S.), however, is in the 
policy means used to achieve security. In the past, progressives and conservatives 
have reacted sharply to different policy measures pertaining to the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
Table 5.1 below lists several recent issues which have divided conservative and 
progressive reactions on security issues.  
 
Table 5.1: Narrow breadth? South Korean Progressive and Conservative reactions to 
U.S. alliance related security policy issues. 
Policy Action ROK Progressive Reactions ROK Conservative Reactions 
Withdrawal of 1/3 
USFK forces 
-In general, seen as a positive step. -U.S. abandoning its commitment to 
the alliance 
Relocation of 
Second Infantry 
Division 50 miles 
south of Seoul 
-U.S. looking out for only its own 
interests by moving its troops out of 
artillery range while preparing for 
preemptive strike against North Korea 
- U.S. is less committed to the 
alliance by removing its “tripwire” 
position along the DMZ.  
Strategic 
Flexibility for 
USFK 
- U.S. may drag or implicate ROK into 
an unnecessary or unwanted conflict (i.e. 
Taiwan-China conflict). 
-Dispatching U.S. troops on short 
notice weakens deterrence effect 
Transfer of war 
time operational 
control to South 
Korean forces by 
2009 
- Prefers transfer of operational control 
by 2012, but generally seen as positive 
step 
-U.S. sees alliance as less important 
-Weakens deterrence 
- ROK military unable to acquire 
necessary capabilities by 2009 
Bottom line  Progressives want a more equal 
alliance partnership. 
Conservatives are reluctant to see 
any shifts in the alliance. 
 
 If managed poorly, domestic division, as well as tension between Seoul and 
Washington regarding the direction and strategic vision of the alliance, may lead to the 
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unraveling of the security consensus. These differences already point to a weakened 
consensus since the 2000 North-South summit. What prevents the security consensus 
and the alliance from unraveling completely, however, are the ideological and 
structural constraints mentioned earlier. These structures help perpetuate the security 
consensus within elite circles.32  Even with diverse opinions regarding U.S.-ROK 
relations, the security consensus held by elites, especially in the foreign and defense 
policy establishments, moderates more extreme views of the U.S.-ROK alliance.  The 
security consensus thus streamlines these diverse opinions in the policy-making 
process.  Figure 5.4 below indicates South Korean elites’ preference for cooperation 
with the U.S. In a study conducted by the East Asia Institute, 79% of South Korean 
opinion leaders preferred cooperating the most with the U.S., as opposed to 13% for 
China, and 1% for Japan. Note the greater preference for cooperation with the U.S. 
among elites than the general public. 
 
 
         Figure 5.4: Country which South Korea should cooperate with the most. 
           Source: EAI, DDFR, CIDE, COMEXI (July 2004). N=724. See Lee 2005, p.6. for analysis. 
                                                 
32 Of course, frequent dialogue between Seoul and Washington have also helped maintain the alliance 
relationship through its most tumultuous period between 2002-2004. See Park 2005b.  
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Evidence of the Security Consensus in South Korea 
North Korean Threat 
Based on the dimensions of depth and breadth, what evidence indicates a 
moderate, pro-U.S. security consensus in South Korea?  On the dimension of breadth, 
widespread recognition of a primary target or threat, such as North Korea, would 
suggest a need to maintain strong U.S. alliance relations. Despite decreasing North 
Korean threat perceptions, the South Korean public, and more importantly, South 
Korean elites, still identify North Korea as a threat. For example, in an EAI study 
asking South Koreans what constituted a “critical threat” to the national interest in the 
next ten years, global terrorism and North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons 
ranked first and second respectively.33  Regarding feelings of threat towards North 
Korea possessing nuclear weapons, a 2004 East Asia Institute-CCFR survey cited that 
39% of Koreans felt “very threatened” and 49% a “bit threatened” as opposed to only 
12% citing they felt no threat.34 The following year, Donga Ilbo conducted a similar 
survey where 61.9% of South Koreans stated they felt very or somewhat threatened by 
North Korea’s nuclear development, as opposed to 38.1% citing they felt little or no 
threat.35  The same survey also identified that a significant number of Koreans still 
found North Korea as the most threatening country to its security (See figure 5.5 
below). 
                                                 
33 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Global Views 2004: Comparing South Korean and American 
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. Chicago, IL: CCFR, 2004, p.11. Survey conducted July 5-16, 2004. 
n=1,000. 
34 Nae-Young Lee. “Changing South Korean Public Opinion on the U.S. and the ROK-US Alliance.” 
Paper prepared for a workshop on “America in Question: Korean Democracy and the Challenge of 
Non-Proliferation on the Peninsula.” Seoul, South Korea. May 10-11, 2005. 
35 “Dong-A Ilbo Opinion Poll on South Korean Attitudes Toward Japan and Other Nations” Conducted 
March 4-31, 2005. n=1500. see http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/poll-05-2.htm for survey 
methodology.  
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Figure 5.5: Which country do you feel is most threatening to the security  
of South Korea? Source: Dong-A Ilbo. N=1500. Survey conducted March 4-31, 2005.  
 
 Contributing to the depth of a security consensus, existing institutions such as 
the National Security Laws (NSL) also suggest that elites continue to perceive North 
Korea as a threat (and hence, the need for continued U.S. military presence), even if 
overall threat perceptions of the North have subsided. Although the NSL does not 
refer to North Korea by name, the South Korean government treats North Korea as an 
anti-state entity.36  The NSL is more than mere legal rhetoric, and is not taken lightly 
by the South Korean government. Even in recent years, the government has evoked 
Chapter 2, Article 7 against its citizens, which prohibits praising or sympathizing with 
                                                 
36 Chapter 1, Article 2 of the South Korean National Security Law defines an anti-state entity as 
“domestic or foreign organizations or groups whose intentions are to conduct or assist infiltration of the 
Government or to cause national disturbances.” Even without direct reference, the North Koreans 
perceive the NSL as a law aimed at their regime.  For instance, in a February 28, 2007 news article, the 
North Korean daily Nodong Sinmun expressed harsh criticism against the NSL, stating “The notorious 
National Security Law should have been thrown into the garbage bin of history with the advent of the 
June 15 (2000) era of reunification. But it is still in force, spurting poison… The fascist NSL should be 
repealed along with the disbandment of the Grand National Party (the South Korean opposition 
conservative party) that brings the whirlwind of confrontation, war and fascism to this land.” See BBC 
Monitoring-Asia-Pacific. “North Korea urges South to repeal its National Security Law.” February 28, 
2007. 
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anti-state groups.37  In January 2007, authorities arrested a middle-school teacher for 
using “pro-North Korean documents” to teach students about North Korea’s political 
system and nuclear program. The previous year, the Busan branch of the Korean 
Teachers and Educational Worker’s Union was placed under investigation after 
publishing a book on Korean reunification which advocated a pro-North position.38  
Police even investigated the use of North Korean marching music on KBS, the 
nation’s public broadcasting system. The song was aired as background music in a 
political parody animation segment in 2004. Authorities cited the musical airing as a 
possible violation of Chapter 2, Article 7, Clause 5, which bans using or distributing 
North Korean music, writings, and other artistic expressions.39 
The NSL debates in 2004 also highlight the persistence of the North Korean 
threat in the minds of Korean elites.  In 2004, several National Assembly members 
within the ruling Uri Party attempted to abolish the NSL to “reflect improved inter-
Korean relations.” President Roh and Unification Minister Jung Dong Young also 
supported repealing the NSL.40  However, conservatives harshly criticized the 
president and other progressive factions calling for the laws’ repeal. The conservative 
position was bolstered by both the Constitutional Court, which rejected claims that the 
NSL was unconstitutional given the “current security circumstances on the Peninsula,” 
and the Supreme Court, which accused Uri Party leaders of attempting to “strip the 
                                                 
37 According to Chapter 2, Article 7, those praising or sympathizing with anti-state groups may serve 
“up to seven years in prison for praising, encouraging, disseminating, or cooperating with anti-state 
groups, members or those under their control, being aware that such acts will endanger the national 
security and the democratic freedom.” 
38 Ji-Hyun Choi. “Materials praising North Korea found in teacher's home.”  Korea Herald. January 23, 
2007. 
39 Youn-Hee O. “Police probe broadcast of North Korean song.” Korea Herald. August 20, 2004.  
40 However, they emphasized violations against human rights as the primary reason for the laws 
abolition, rather than the reduced threat of North Korea, most likely to avoid further criticism from 
conservatives. See Jung Yun-Wook. “Jung tong-il ‘Gookbobup noh-ran-eun  in-gwon mun-jae-lan 
ddeut’” [Unification Minister Jung: The National Security Law as a Human Rights Problem]. Donga-A 
Ilbo. October 7, 2004, p.5. Kim So-Young. “President calls for repeal of security law.” Korea Herald. 
September 6, 2004. 
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country of its last defensive measures against the North.”41 A statement prepared by 
the Justice Department read, “Since the possibility of an attack, espionage, or other 
[subversive actions] by North Korea against our system remains open… we must 
remain fully prepared and exercise great caution…A state is unable to recover once its 
system collapses. Therefore a careless, loose judgment cannot be permitted when 
dealing with matters of a state’s security.”42 One might interpret calls to repeal the 
NSL by the president and other political elites as a sign of divergence in elite 
perceptions on national security and a weakening of the security consensus. While this 
is true, the fierce negative reaction by the GNP, the ensuing national debate, and the 
Supreme Court’s final ruling in favor of upholding the NSL suggests that security 
politics continue to fall under the jurisdiction of conservatives privy to the security 
consensus.  
Political elite perceptions of the North Korean threat are also confirmed by the 
debates surrounding the designation of North Korea as “main enemy” in the MND 
White Papers. The MND first used the “main enemy” phrase after the 1994 nuclear 
crisis. The MND continued to use the phrase until controversy ensued over its usage 
prior to the publication of the 2001White Paper. According to critics, referring to 
North Korea as the “main enemy” no longer seemed appropriate under the context of 
Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy and the North-South summit.  Government officials 
in the Blue House and Unification Ministry proposed using a milder term to avoid 
provocation of North Korea amidst inter-Korea cooperation.  
                                                 
41 So-Young Kim. “Controversy escalates over National Security Law.” Korea Herald. September 4, 
2004. 
42 Jin Hwan Suk. “Book dongjo-saeryuk tongil jeonseon wooryu…bohahn-beob paeji-neun moojang-
haejae/daebeob ee-lyeh juk pangyulmun pamun. [Fears of a strengthened pro-North united front… 
abolishing the National Security Laws means demilitarization/Supreme Court’s Exceptional Ruling] 
Hankyoreh.. September 3, 2004, p.1 (translated by author). 
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The MND eventually dropped the “main enemy” term in its 2004 white paper, 
using the less insidious phrase “direct military threat.”  As expected, conservative 
GNP politicians strongly opposed this shift, whereas ruling progressive Uri party 
members agreed that the removal of the term reflected the current state of inter-Korean 
affairs.  However, in the most recently published 2006 White Paper, the MND 
characterized Pyongyang’s efforts to increase its nuclear weapons capability as 
alarming and a “grave concern” to South Korea. The MND stated, “The DPRK's 
nuclear weapons development has affected our national defense posture in no small 
way. In particular, there is a spectrum of uncertainty, associated with resolving the 
DPRK nuclear issue that can confront us in various shapes and forms.”43  In a section 
titled, “North Korean Situation and Military Threat,” the MND recognized the North-
South exchanges which have taken place since 2000, but then proceeded by stating: 
 
On the other hand, North Korea conspires to split South Korean society 
in the name of national unity and to pit South Korea against the United 
States by agitating anti-American struggles and insisting upon 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.  As noted above, North Korea is 
very active in securing economic benefits from the South-North 
exchanges and cooperation. However, North Korea shows a lukewarm 
attitude when it comes to issues like tension reduction and military 
confidence-building leading to peace …on the Korean Peninsula.44 
 
Following the White Paper’s release in December, a senior MND official confirmed 
that the MND did indeed upgrade the level of threat from North Korea since the 2004 
White Paper.45 
In sum, political elites, particularly those in the conservative foreign policy and 
defense establishment, still acknowledge North Korea as a threat. Even progressive 
                                                 
43 ROK Ministry of National Defense. Defense White Paper 2006, p.5-6. 
44 ROK Ministry of National Defense.  Defense White Paper 2006, p.73-74. 
45 Jin Dae-Woong. “White Paper defines North Korea as ‘grave threat.’” Korea Herald. December 30, 
2006.  
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Uri Party members pushing for more conciliatory measures concede that the North 
Korean threat has not been completely eliminated.46 The continued threat, even if 
reduced, prevents the lingering security consensus among political elites from 
completely dissipating. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and its unpredictable 
behavior require political elites to maintain an air of caution regarding the North, 
preserving its security partnership with the U.S. 
U.S.-South Korean Alliance 
Under a moderate security consensus, the U.S.-ROK alliance still functions as 
the linchpin of South Korea’s defense. A national security strategy should emphasize 
this defensive alliance over other possible scenarios, such as regional security 
arrangements, or increasing bilateral military ties with China.  As such, the U.S.-ROK 
alliance is still viewed by most Koreans as a legitimate source of South Korea’s 
defense. Likewise, USFK is seen as an integral part of South Korea’s national 
security. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 indicate that the majority of South Koreans continue to 
view U.S. troops and the U.S. security alliance as important, even with 47% of 
Koreans favoring a gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2005.47  
 
                                                 
46 This dual perspective of North Korea is summed up in National Assembly member Lim Jong-In’s 
comments: “While being the threat to the nation's security, North Korea is also our partner.”  See Shin 
Hae-in. “Lawmakers clash over ‘main enemy.’” Korea Herald. November 19, 2004.  
47 Joong-ang Ilbo National Survey. Conducted August 24-September 10, 2005.  n=1200. Only 7% 
favored immediate withdrawal. Although the data refers to public opinion rather than elite perception, I 
add this to show that a surprisingly large number of South Koreans still admit that  U.S. troop presence 
serves useful for South Korean security, even as attitudes against U.S. policies have grown more 
critical.   
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       Figure 5.6: Importance of USFK for protecting South Korea's security, 1988-2005 
         Source: Office of Research, U.S. State Department.  
 
 
 
        Figure 5.7: Should South Korea maintain the security alliance after reunification,  
        1997-2004?  Source: Office of Research, U.S. State Department. 
 
As demonstrated above, the target and source of security for South Korea 
remain unchanged.  South Korea faces an external security threat from the North, as 
well as regional uncertainty involving larger Asian powers such as Japan and China. 
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Thus political elites agree, at least in principle, that U.S. forces in the mid to long 
term, are necessary for South Korean security. Other than radicals, very few South 
Koreans advocate alliance termination, immediate withdrawal of USFK, or the sudden 
removal of U.S. bases. Alliances persist even in the face of declining threats for 
various reasons. Asset specificities and institutional costs, as well as the formation of 
an alliance identity through close social interaction over time, have helped military 
alliances such as NATO survive even after the collapse of the Soviet Union.48 
Likewise, the institutional arrangements built within the U.S.-ROK security alliance, 
and the close interaction between alliance partners for over fifty years, produced an 
alliance identity between the two countries which continues to exist in the 21st 
century.49   
The elite security consensus is constituted and reinforced by institutions and 
identities undergirding the U.S.-ROK alliance. The security consensus takes into 
account material threat perceptions, but is also bound by historical legacies cemented 
by years of intense hostility between the North and South. The psychological 
dependence South Korea developed towards the U.S. during the Cold War also reifies 
the security consensus.50  Although the consensus is waning, it continues to place 
ideological and domestic political constraints in the security policy-making arena, and 
particularly on issues such as U.S. basing policy.  
In sum, a moderate, pro-U.S. security consensus persisted among South 
Korean political elites during the first half of this decade. Even as the breadth of the 
security consensus narrowed over time, conservatives, as well as a significant majority 
                                                 
48  Jae-Jung Suh. “Persistence and Termination of Military Alliances: NATO, the Soviet Union-Egypt, 
and the United States-Iran.” Unpublished Dissertation Chapter. University of Pennsylvania, 2000. 
49 Jae-Jung Suh. “Bound to Last? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Analytical Eclecticism,” in Rethinking 
Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, co-edited by J.J. Suh, Allen Carlson and Peter 
Katzenstein. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 
50 Wonhyuk Lim. "Transforming an Asymmetric Cold War Alliance: Psychological and Strategic 
Challenges for South Korea and the U.S." Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online 06-30A, 2006. 
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of progressive elites, continued to value security relations with the U.S. Of course, 
government officials in the more progressive Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun 
Administrations advocated greater self-reliance on defense issues. Attesting to the 
depth of the consensus, however, political and ideological constraints curbed the pace 
of these reforms, and frustrated the agenda of more radical elites demanding greater 
concessions from the U.S.51  Key elites dominating the security and foreign policy 
establishment marginalized voices claiming that the U.S. alliance functioned as a 
security liability rather than a common good.  Regarding anti-base or anti-USFK 
opposition, a moderate security consensus limited the impact of anti-base movements 
on base policy outcomes. However, anti-base movements in South Korea should not 
be construed as a lost cause. A moderate consensus, especially if on the decline, 
suggests at least the possibility of greater open political space for activists in the 
future. The next chapter extends the discussion of the security consensus by exploring 
how a moderate consensus influenced state-societal interaction and anti-base 
movement outcomes across several movement episodes in South Korea. 
 
    
 
 
                                                 
51 These concessions include an increase in alliance burden-sharing, further reductions in U.S. bases, 
and ceding influence to South Korea on North Korea and other regional issues.  
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CHAPTER 6 
OPERATING UNDER A MODERATE SECURITY CONSENSUS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THREE SOUTH KOREAN ANTI-BASE MOVEMENT 
EPISODES 
 
Chapter Five concluded by arguing that a moderate security consensus existed 
among South Korean political elites. How did this consensus impact anti-base 
movement effectiveness and policy outcomes in South Korea? Similar to movement 
episodes in Japan or Italy where anti-base movements faced a strong security 
consensus, a moderate pro-U.S. consensus among South Korean elites limited the 
impact of three anti-base movements since 2000: the SOFA revision movement from 
1999-2001, the Maehyangri movement to shut down Kooni Firing Range in 2000, and 
the Pyeongtaek movement to block the expansion of Camp Humphreys from 2005-07.  
Empirically, South Korean anti-base movement episodes ended in either partial 
concessions (Maehyangri and SOFA), or the status quo (Pyeongtaek). No movement 
episode concluded in outright victory, as in the Philippines or Ecuador under 
conditions of weak security consensus.  
Although the security consensus framework highlights limitations placed on 
anti-base movements under a moderate security consensus, the framework has 
difficulty explaining different outcomes when the degree of consensus remains 
relatively constant over time. Assuming that a moderate security consensus existed 
throughout all three episodes studied in this chapter (2000-2007), what explains the 
variation between status quo and partial concession outcomes?  
The security consensus functions as the most important political opportunity 
structure in my theoretical argument. However, as this chapter intends to demonstrate, 
a more complete explanation of base politics is possible by opening the causal 
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argument to other political opportunities and factors present within a given movement 
episode.1 These factors include the strategic value of bases and the cost of base closure 
to the U.S., the bargaining position of the South Korean government, and the 
“fortuitous” timing of U.S. military related accidents. Other factors endogenous to 
anti-base movements, such as movement strategy and internal dynamics among 
coalition members, also help capture different nuances within movement episodes.   In 
sum, by taking advantage of social movement analysis and movement episodes as the 
primary analytical unit, I intend to explain the factors and mechanisms leading to 
different outcomes in South Korean anti-base movement episodes. 
Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, I examine three anti-base movement episodes. The first 
episode, the SOFA revision movement from 1999-2001, ended with minor revisions to 
SOFA. Although no formal ties existed between the People’s Action for Reform of the 
Unjust SOFA  (PAR-SOFA) and the South Korean government, a more permissive 
opportunity structure created by a string of USFK mishaps in 2000 enabled PAR-
SOFA to play a key role in shaping the SOFA revision debate.  The second episode, 
the Maehyangri anti-base movement in 2000, also ended in partial concessions. The 
Maehyangri campaign reveals a set of pressure mechanisms against Seoul (and 
Washington) similar to those found in the Okinawan anti-base movement leading to 
SACO recommendations.  Finally, I devote the most attention to the Pyeongtaek anti-
base movement episode from 2005-2007, which ended in the status quo. This 
“anomaly” is explained by the exceptionally high security stakes associated with base 
expansion at Camp Humphreys, magnifying the strength of the elite security 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the discussion in Chapter 3 on political opportunities available at the prefectural 
level in the Okinawan anti-base movement. 
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consensus in this particular episode.2  Moving beyond structure, however, movement 
choices and government counterstrategies also accounted for this “failed” outcome. 
Over time, external obstacles, tactical errors, and the South Korean government’s 
tough counter-measures undermined and eventually destroyed anti-base opposition. 
SOFA Revision Movement  1999-20013 
The SOFA revision movement from 1999-2001 best illustrates the relationship 
between anti-base movements and base policy outcomes under a “moderate” security 
consensus. The Kim Dae-Jung Administration (1998-2003), the most progressive 
administration to date, provided activists a more permissive environment for anti-base 
mobilization. Moreover, President Kim, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MOFAT) in particular, expressed its desire for SOFA revision negotiations. Activists 
took advantage of the Administration’s more open stance on SOFA revisions. 
Additionally, activists adopted appropriate framing strategies which not only aided 
coalition building, but created space for government officials to use anti-base 
movements as bargaining leverage at the negotiating table.4 Thus, the early phase of 
the SOFA revision movement was marked by more cooperative relations between the 
state and civil society.  As the SOFA revision campaign progressed, however, the 
constraints imposed by a moderate elite consensus became increasingly apparent. The 
South Korean government had to tread carefully not to disrupt the U.S. alliance, 
                                                 
2 The base expansion project entailed the relocation of USFK headquarters from Seoul to Pyeongtaek, 
and the consolidation of the 2nd Infantry Division north of Seoul to Camp Humphreys. 
3 While not protesting against a specific military base, South Korean activists and the media interpret 
SOFA protests in the same category as anti-base movements. See “2002 nyun yeojoong-saeng 
bumdaewii chamgadanchae 63% ga pyeontaek bumdaewi chamga” (63% of civic groups involved in 
the 2002 Hyosoon-Miseon coalition group involved in Pyeongtaek umbrella coalition). Chosun Ilbo. 
May 17, 2006. Other scholars also classify SOFA revisions movements under the broader rubric of anti-
base protests. See Cooley 2008 and Calder 2008.  
4 An inappropriate framing strategy (i.e. “No more U.S. troops” or “Yankees go home.”), would have 
reduced the credibility of the SOFA revision movement, leading the government to dismiss activist 
demands. 
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eventually requesting restraint from civil society in what was increasingly perceived as 
anti-American protests.  
Mobilization 
 South Korea first requested SOFA revisions in 1995 after several crimes 
committed by U.S. soldiers sparked anti-U.S. demonstrations.5 However, after seven 
rounds of negotiations between May 1995 and September 1996, the two sides failed to 
reach any agreement. Neither side brought up the issue again publicly until April 
1999, when Foreign Minister Hong Soon-Young called for an early resolution to 
outstanding SOFA issues.6  Seoul was particularly interested in revising criminal 
jurisdiction procedures, granting the South Korean government custody of U.S. 
suspects at the time of indictment rather than conviction.  As the two governments 
prepared to restart negotiations in October 1999, activist leaders informally discussed 
preparations for a large campaign to press Seoul and Washington on SOFA revisions.  
On October 6, 1999, the People's Action for Reform of the Unjust ROK-US 
SOFA  (PAR-SOFA), formally launched its campaign. Protests coinciding with the 
first round of negotiations in October led to several arrests, but were otherwise low-
key. During this early phase of the PAR-SOFA campaign, activists focused on 
increasing media coverage to bring national attention to SOFA issues.7 Weekly 
protests took place outside the U.S. Embassy and other symbolic locations, with larger 
protests taking place prior to each round of negotiation.  
                                                 
5 The 1966 U.S.-ROK SOFA was amended previously in 1991. For more background on the SOFA 
revision movement, see Katharine H. S. Moon. "Korean Nationalism, Anti-Americanism, and 
Democratic Consolidation." In Korea's Democratization, edited by Samuel Kim, 135-58. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
6 President Kim Dae-Jung had pledged to address SOFA revisions during his election campaign. 
Interview with PAR-SOFA General Secretary Mun Jung-Hyeon. November 7, 2005.  
7 Oh 2001, p.207. PAR-SOFA also sent a letter to Foreign Minister Lee demanding concrete measures 
towards SOFA revision.  
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Several USFK mishaps in the early half of 2000 helped publicize the SOFA 
issue, playing into the hands of PAR-SOFA’s campaign strategy.  First, the murder of 
a bar hostess in February 2000 by a USFK soldier, and his brief escape from U.S. 
custody in April 2000 while awaiting trial, boosted PAR-SOFA’s claim that SOFA 
revisions were necessary. Two other events, a bombing accident caused by an A-10 
aircraft in Maehyangri, and revelations that a USFK member had dumped 
formaldehyde into the Han River, also fueled public support for revisions.8 The latter 
incident enabled activists and the South Korean government to push more aggressively 
for an environmental clause into the SOFA agreement.  
Potential for State-Society Cooperation 
 Key policymakers advocated SOFA revisions. For example, Foreign Minister 
Hong Soon-Young publicly raised the issue of SOFA revisions as early as 1999.  As 
civil societal pressure mounted, Hong’s successor, Lee Joung-Bin, announced his 
intention to request adding an environmental clause to SOFA.9  National Assembly 
members also urged the government to take a resolute stand on SOFA revision 
negotiations.  After the Maehyangri incident, dozens of parliamentarians from both 
progressive and conservative parties made repeated calls on the government to push 
for SOFA revisions. Representative Lee Chang-Bok of the ruling Millennium 
Democratic Party (MDP) and Lee Bu-Young of the conservative Grand National Party 
(GNP) sponsored a resolution signed by sixty-one National Assembly members to 
thoroughly revise the U.S.-South Korean SOFA to the standards of SOFA with 
Germany (or NATO) and Japan.  The resolution was eventually adopted by the 
Foreign Affairs committee and passed through the National Assembly.10 The 
                                                 
8 Protests in Maehyangri developed into a separate anti-base campaign, as I discuss later in the chapter. 
For more on the Maehyangri case, see Yeo 2006, Kim 2001.  
9 Korea Times. “SOFA Revision Plan Not Comprehensive.” June 5, 2000. Interview with former 
Foreign Minister Lee Joung-Bin. Bundang, South Korea, June 22, 2006.  
10 National Assembly Records - Main Assembly. 214th Assembly, 1st Meeting.  July 31, 2000.  
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willingness of key elites to demand SOFA revisions created political space for 
activists. In a rare moment, South Korean civil society and the government found 
themselves on the same side of the debate. 
Taking advantage of this political space between state and society required 
moderation on the part of activists. Even though some PAR-SOFA campaign 
organizers desired the complete withdrawal of USFK, these leaders understood that a 
large, credible coalition would never form under a “Yankee Go Home” banner. PAR-
SOFA secretary general Mun Jung-Hyeon argued, “The government isn’t going to 
take you seriously if you’re making unreasonable calls like withdrawal. We (needed) a 
reasonable, constructive frame which the government can work with, such as ‘revise 
the unjust SOFA.’”11  
Up to a certain point, the South Korean government welcomed civil societal 
demands for SOFA revision. Protests provided the Korean delegation additional 
leverage during negotiations. Widespread protests, triggered by a string of USFK 
mishaps, signaled to Washington that public sentiment was rapidly turning against the 
U.S. The Korean negotiators could turn to their American counterparts and credibly 
claim that the unequal SOFA Agreement generated domestic unrest, threatening the 
stability of the alliance. As one MOFAT advisor remarked, “When Korean negotiators 
come to the table with the U.S., they feel like they are the underdog. They feel a power 
imbalance. Thus they need grassroots support from people’s organizations.”12  
Constraining Effect of the Security Consensus 
While the South Korean government may have welcomed additional 
bargaining leverage against the U.S. derived from SOFA revision protests, the 
government also kept a cautious eye on civil society. Negotiations remained 
                                                 
11 Interview with PAR-SOFA General Secretary Mun Jung-Hyeon. Pyeongtaek, South Korea. 
December 9, 2005.  
12 Interview with Kim Sung-Han. Seoul, South Korea. January 4, 2006.  
  204 
deadlocked between Seoul and Washington, even as negative USFK incidents 
continued throughout 2000. Frustrated over the slow progress, activists grew 
increasingly critical of the Kim Dae-Jung government, and more radical in both anti-
USFK rhetoric and protest strategies.  Foreign Minister Lee requested that the public 
refrain from participating in anti-American demonstrations, quoting, “I hope that 
South Koreans will refrain from such undesirable, radical acts, as these could 
adversely affect Korea-U.S. relations.”13  After delaying SOFA negotiations for 
several months - a ploy activists claimed the government used to prevent anti-USFK 
sentiments from building further momentum - talks resumed in August 2000. As both 
sides entered into diplomatic gridlock, the government began to distance itself from 
activists’ more radical stance for major revisions. Seoul wanted to amend several 
SOFA clauses, but it did not want to push demands so far as to create a permanent rift 
in the alliance.14 President Kim Dae-Jung, who initially provided hope to civil societal 
actors that the government was finally listening, later criticized the more radical 
elements of protests. Kim stated, “We can criticize if the United States makes a policy 
which we feel is wrong, but this should not lead to anti-Americanism…the presence of 
U.S. forces serves our national interest.”15  Even with civil society penetrating the 
state under a “weakened” consensus, President Kim carefully balanced his response to 
domestic opposition with Korea’s alliance obligation to the U.S.16  
In the revised SOFA Agreement signed on December 28, 2000, the U.S. 
agreed to transfer U.S. suspects to South Korean authorities at the time of indictment, 
                                                 
13 Jiho Kim. Foreign minister pledges launch of talks soon for SOFA revision. Korea Herald. May 20, 
2000.  
14 Interview with former Foreign Minister Lee Joung-Bin. Bundang, South Korea,  June 22, 2006.  
15 Korea Herald. “Roots of anti-Americanism.” August 7, 2000.  
16 PAR-SOFA activists expressed diverging opinions towards President Kim. Some recognized that his 
campaign pledge to revise SOFA, and more open stance towards civil society, enabled activists to place 
a greater impact on policy decisions.  Others, like Father Mun Jung-Hyeon, remained skeptical of 
President Kim. Mun believed President Kim ultimately sided with the Americans rather than the will of 
the people. Interview with several former PAR-SOFA movement leaders. Pyeongtaek, South Korea. 
December 9, 2005.  
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but only in the case of egregious crimes, such as murder and rape. The two sides also 
added an environmental provision, as well as other procedural changes regarding the 
resolution of labor disputes, quarantine regulations, and rules for facilities construction. 
While the government expressed immense satisfaction over the revisions, PAR-SOFA 
denounced the outcome. Kim Tae-Kyung of Green Korea United lamented, “We feel 
very insulted. The results of the talks did not come close to meeting our demands for a 
thorough revision of the unfair agreement.”17 The general secretary of the National 
Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea stated, “Both the 
United States and Korea are boasting as if they have made a major breakthrough by 
agreeing on the handover of criminal suspects…but the U.S. side attached conditions 
to this agreement. We suspect that these conditions will make the pact useless.”18  
Highly dissatisfied with the outcome, PAR-SOFA members stated that the Korean 
government merely agreed to superficial revisions to quell anti-American sentiment.19  
Civil society did play a role in the final revision outcome, mobilizing popular 
support and pressuring Seoul to push for substantial SOFA revisions at the negotiating 
table. Key political elites were willing (and in fact eager) to revise several SOFA 
clauses, and were therefore initially receptive to civil society’s informal participation. 
However, the SOFA revision movement also highlights the limits placed on anti-base 
movement demands. A moderate consensus and overarching U.S.-ROK alliance 
concerns continued to constrain the role of social movements as the South Korean 
government settled for “token” concessions.    
                                                 
17 Jae-Soon Chang. “Civic groups react angrily to result of Seoul-Washington talks on U.S. troops.” 
Korea Herald. August 5, 2000.  
18 Chang 2005.  
19 Interview with secretary general of the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. 
Troops in Korea. January 10, 2006. Koh contends that the South Korean government had no genuine 
intention of revising SOFA. Instead, Seoul was more concerned with alliance preservation and keeping 
a lid on rising anti-American pressure. As one SOFA legal counselor noted, “the government tends to 
lack the political will to demand SOFA revisions unless they are pushed by the public.” Interview with 
Choi Seung-Hwan. Seoul, South Korea, November 17, 2005.   
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Maehyangri Anti-Base Movement 2000 
Like the SOFA revision movement, under a moderate security consensus, the 
Maehyangri episode ended in partial concessions.20 However, the mechanisms leading 
to this outcome follow a slightly different logic. PAR-SOFA activists initially shared 
the same basic goals as the South Korean government. In Maehyangri, however, state-
societal interaction was much more confrontational. Unable to penetrate the state, 
activists resorted to more radical tactics. By illegally breaching Kooni Firing Range 
and disrupting USFK training, activists put pressure on the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
Paradoxically, the existence of a strong, pro-U.S. security consensus created a target 
space for activists to pressure Seoul and Washington. Protestors disrupted USFK 
operations, attracted negative media spotlight on the South Korean government and 
U.S. military, dampened public attitudes towards the alliance, and perpetuated the 
image of South Koreans as “a bunch of ingrates” to Americans.21 The protests would 
have eventually generated an alliance crisis had Seoul left the protests unchecked. 
Therefore, to alleviate anti-base pressure and preserve alliance relations, the host 
government and the U.S. provided partial concessions.  
Origins 
The movement in Maehyangri began as a NIMBY struggle long before it 
developed into a national campaign. Built in 1955, the U.S. Air Force used Kooni 
Firing Range for strafing and bombing exercises. Located only 1.4 km from 
Maehyangri village in Kyeongi Province, USFK trained 250 days a year, averaging 
11.5 hours a day. According to one movement leader, about 700 families, or 4,000 
                                                 
20 Although  Kooni Firing Range eventually closed, I code the policy outcome as “partial concessions” 
since the base continued to operate until 2004. However, many activists cite the Maehyangri campaign 
as a major victory for Korean anti-base movements. 
21 This last point is further exacerbated by the media, with anti-base protests often (mis)interpreted as 
anti-American in nature,  
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residents were affected by noise pollution.22 After years of quiet suffering, on July 4, 
1988, residents from eight villages surrounding Kooni Range formed the Joint 
Committee on Noise Pollution and filed a petition to the MND and the Blue House. 
Receiving no response from either the ROK government or USFK, in December 1988, 
about 700 residents physically occupied the range. The range was occupied a second 
time by protestors in March 1989, eventually resulting in the USFK closing off the 
area and preventing any farming within the range’s premise.23  
Led by local resident Chun Mankyu, over the next decade, the local residents 
pushed both Korean and U.S. authorities to seek measures to reduce externalities 
arising from strafing exercises. Villagers claimed to have suffered casualties, physical 
and mental illnesses, and damaged property from misfirings over the last fifty years.24 
In 1997, the MND proposed a plan to relocate villagers to a safer location 
approximately five kilometers from the training range. Local residents strongly 
resisted the resettlement plan, arguing that it threatened their livelihood as fishermen. 
Residents instead filed a lawsuit against the ROK government in 1998 demanding 35 
billion won as compensation.25 
On May 8, an A-10 experiencing engine trouble dropped six 500 pound bombs 
to reduce weight as an emergency measure. Maehyangri villagers claimed seven 
people were injured and several houses damaged.26 Demanding justice and 
compensation, local residents formed the Maehyangri Resident’s Task Force. The 
local task force also discussed with outside civic groups the possibility of forming a 
larger coalition campaign. Fueled by the U.S.-ROK joint investigation committee’s 
conclusion that no damages were found by the A-10 bomb dropping, residents and 
                                                 
22 Kim 2001, p.245. 
23 Ibid, p.251. 
24 Ibid, p.251. 
25 Kang Seok-Jae. “Plight of Maehyangri residents.” Korean Herald, May 13, 2000. 
26 Ibid. 
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outside NGO activists organized the National Solution Committee to Abolish the 
Maehyangri Air Force Training Range (CAM).  
Strategy 
 On June 2, the day the joint U.S.-ROK investigation team presented their 
findings, PAR-SOFA leaders and approximately seventy NGO representatives, 
activists, and students traveled to Maehyangri to protest.27 PAR-SOFA initially 
functioned as the organizing body, acting as a broker between the local resident 
committee and a wide array of civic groups, most notably labor and student groups. 
These “outside groups” used the SOFA revision and Maehyangri incident to confront 
the South Korean government on broader U.S. military issues.  
CAM activists participated in a variety of activities such as protest marches, 
letter writing campaigns, festivals, and street performances. Activities took place in 
both Maehyangri and in Seoul. More militant activists illegally entered the firing range 
by cutting through barbed wire. In fact, the single most effective tactic was the threat 
and actual occupation of Kooni Firing Range. As one U.S. official lamented, “With 
protestors walking onto the range, we had to suspend training.”28 
To enhance organizational capacity and structure, local and national movement 
leaders formed a coalition campaign specifically devoted to the closure of Kooni 
Firing Range. On June 30, residents and activists formally launched CAM.  Local 
residents recognized that their struggle would never carry weight at the national level 
without the wider participation of civic groups and NGOs.29 In an essay analyzing the 
Maehyangri movement, CAM steering committee leader Kim Jong-il30 acknowledged 
                                                 
27 Kim 2001, p.251. 
28 Interview with former Office of Secretary of Defense, Asia-Pacific Affairs officer. Washington D.C. 
September 1, 2005.   
29 Interview with Maehyangri Resident’s Task Force secretary general Chun Mankyu. January 5, 2006. 
Kim 2001, p.26.  
30 No relation to the North Korean Leader. Kim Jong-il is affiliated with SPARK (Solidarity for Peace 
and Reunification of Korea). 
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the significance of this new coalition. According to Kim, solidarity through CAM 
aided the broader anti-base struggle in three ways. First, it helped transform a local 
movement into a “larger, more continuous, national movement.”31 Second, it brought 
further attention to USFK related problems. Third, CAM helped instill a sense of 
national consciousness.  
Of course, tension over movement direction and strategy existed between local 
and national groups. For instance, local Maehyangri Resident’s Task Force leader, 
Chun Mankyu, admitted that villagers were more concerned about government 
compensation or noise reduction rather than the larger political agenda carried by 
outside civic groups. Among others, this political agenda included demands for 
equality in U.S.-ROK relations, and peace and reconciliation with North Korea. One 
strategy which helped mitigate this tension was CAM’s adoption of a framing strategy 
focused on injustice and suffering. In particular, CAM highlighted the hazards and 
excessive noise generated by Kooni Range. Activists were aided by images of roaring 
jets conducting strafing exercises broadcast repeatedly in the media.32  
State-Societal Interaction 
On June 2, the first day strafing exercises resumed after the accident, local 
authorities arrested resident leader Chun Mankyu for entering the range and snatching 
the red marker flag used to signal on-going training exercises.  The following day, two 
hundred activists marched to Hwaseong police station to demand Chun’s release, only 
to be detained halfway by riot police.33  Activists made preparations for a mass protest 
on June 6, and threatened to occupy the range. As promised, on June 6, PAR-SOFA 
                                                 
31 Kim Jong-Il. 2001. “Maehyangri Pokgyeok-jang peh-swae tujaeng-ui pyung-gga-wa hyang-hu 
junmang” (An Overview of the Maehyangri Movement and Its Future Prospect). 
<http://mehyang.kfem.or.kr/>.  
32 A former Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) researcher who investigated safety issues at 
Kooni on behalf of the MND admitted that noise pollution was blatantly obvious. Interview with former 
KIDA official. Seoul, South Korea. November 9, 2005 
33 Kim 2001, p.255. 
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and the Maehyangri Resident’s Task Force Committee mobilized approximately 3,500 
residents and activists in Maehyangri.34  Activists demanded the closure of Kooni 
Range, and compensation for damages resulting from strafing exercises. After the rally, 
participants linked arms to form a human chain from Maehyangri village to the front 
gate of Kooni Firing Range. For the most part, protests were peaceful with only minor 
clashes reported between riot police and activists. 
As if in response to the previous day’s protest, the MND dispatched military 
medical personnel, members of the engineering corps, and heavy construction 
equipment to Maehyangri on June 7. The MND participated in “civilian support 
activities,” undoubtedly in an effort to quell rising tension.  The public works 
campaign included repairing damaged homes and improving village road conditions.35   
In mid-June, the MND announced training exercises would begin on June 19. 
The news immediately prompted activists to mobilize a second mass protest on June 
17. The government managed to block activists from entering the bomb drop zone on 
Nong Island by dispatching 2,000 riot police into the area. However, a handful of 
student activists managed to reach the isle by boat and stage a sit-in, again forcing a 
delay in the resumption of training.  
South Korean officials soon found themselves in a diplomatic bind. According 
to South Korean defense officials, residents did not understand the complex issue at 
hand and the necessity in keeping Kooni Range operable.36 MND assurances that the 
USFK would establish measures minimizing training hazards were unacceptable to 
CAM.  The MND proposed two possible solutions to resolve growing tension. The 
first option entailed relocating the training site. The second option involved relocating 
                                                 
34 Kim 2001,p.255. 
35 Kang Seok-Jae. “Government to announce measures to calm Maehyang-ri villagers.” Korea Herald. 
June 5, 2000.   
36 Interview with MND Director of Policy Planning. Seoul, South Korea. December 19, 2005.  
  211 
the residents. Although the MND initially preferred the second option, due to budget 
constraints and opposition from residents, the MND abandoned this route. Meanwhile, 
the MND assigned a high level ROK Air Force official to head negotiations with the 
U.S. and form a committee to study relocation plans. Negotiations between the USFK 
and MND focused on the issue of relocation and finding an alternative range site. In 
early July, an MND spokesman announced that the two sides were moving ahead with 
a plan to relocate the range about 1.5 km to a man-made shooting range on a tidal flat 
near Nong Island.37 
The MND acknowledged the “well-organized” resistance of the Maehyangri 
anti-base movement. As the MND Director of Policy Planning noted, “My deputy 
spent all his time in Maehyangri, speaking for hours with police, local officials, and 
residents. However, residents were not open to the government’s position.”38  At the 
same time, the MND was cognizant of its responsibilities to the U.S., and the negative 
repercussions to the alliance in the event that a strategically important training range 
were lost. Balancing between international and domestic pressure, the South Korean 
government negotiated an agreement with USFK to appease anti-base opposition. 
Both sides approved the relocation of the strafing range on a tidal flat. The USFK also 
agreed to cease using live ammunition during training.39 CAM immediately 
denounced the concessions, stating that their demands had not been appropriately met. 
From the South Korean government’s perspective, however, partial concessions 
alleviated anti-base pressure. Indeed, protests in Maehyangri subsided as activists 
redoubled their energies towards the ongoing SOFA revision movement. 
                                                 
37 Kang Seok-Jae. “South Korea, U.S. mull suspending use of Koon-ni strafing range.” Korea Herald. 
July 5, 2000.  
38 Interview with MND Director of Policy Planning. Seoul, South Korea. December 19, 2005. 
39 Interview with former Office of Secretary of Defense, Asia-Pacific Affairs officer. Washington D.C. 
September 1, 2005.   
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Given the strategic importance of Kooni Range, and Seoul’s desire to maintain 
positive alliance relations with Washington, why did the Maehyangri episode end in 
partial concessions rather than the status quo? On one level, one could dismiss the 
impact of social movements, arguing that policy changes amounted to token 
concessions. However, partial concessions do suggest that anti-base movements 
generated some degree of pressure against USFK and the South Korean government. 
This pressure mechanism is worth exploring. By forcing the suspension of USFK 
training, CAM created strains in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Pressure for concessions on 
base policies were magnified by activists’ use of the media which highlighted the 
injustices faced by local residents. A string of USFK mishaps in 2000, coupled with 
the ongoing SOFA revision movement, also increased the leverage of CAM’s 
opposition against Kooni Range.  In the end, the South Korean government had to 
balance between domestic pressure and international alliance commitments by making 
partial concessions to CAM.  
Pyeongtaek Anti-Base Movement 2005-2007 
Although the pro-U.S. security consensus remained relatively constant at 
moderate levels between 2000 and 2005, the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement episode 
ended quite differently from the earlier two movement episodes in 2000.40  Over the 
course of a year, KCPT members organized three major rallies, sponsored numerous 
publicity and protest events in Pyeongtaek and Seoul, and galvanized activists in a 
major showdown with riot police which drew extensive national media coverage. 
Despite the size and duration of the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement, and the early 
                                                 
40 However, some may argue that the security consensus declined during this period, triggered by a shift 
in foreign policy stance towards North Korea from the Clinton to Bush Administration, and the 
electoral victory of President Roh Moo-Hyun after a wave of anti-American sentiment in South Korea. I 
argue that these events may have narrowed the breadth of a pro-U.S. security consensus among elites, 
but not necessarily diminished the overall depth of the consensus embedded in ideology and domestic 
institutions. 
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initial success in mass mobilization, anti-base activists failed to achieve any of their 
major goals or demands from the South Korean government. Unlike the SOFA 
revision or Maehyangri anti-base movements, why was KCPT unable to achieve any 
major victory on the policy front? What explains the South Korean government’s 
particular response to KCPT?   
Anti-base movement “failure” in this episode is partly explained by the 
constraints of a moderate security consensus within the South Korean foreign policy 
establishment. One other factor magnifying the impact of the security consensus, 
however, creating even greater obstacles for KCPT, was the high security stakes 
attached to the expansion of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. Unlike Kooni Firing 
Range, a base of high strategic value in its own right, the process of base expansion at 
Camp Humphreys was linked closely to USFK transformation, and consequently, the 
future of the U.S.-ROK alliance. The South Korean government viewed base 
expansion in Pyeongtaek as a project absolutely essential to the preservation of the 
alliance. A moderate, pro-U.S. security consensus, coupled with the extremely high 
security stakes associated with base relocation and expansion at Camp Humphreys’, 
significantly shaped the nature and mode of interaction between movement and 
government actors. The South Korean government viewed activists as a public 
nuisance at best, and a group of radicals undermining U.S.-ROK relations and national 
security at worst.  Once the government resolved to quash anti-base opposition, 
activists stood little chance in winning even partial concessions. In addition to these 
structural challenges, KCPT leaders faced problems sustaining mobilization efforts as 
the movement episode unfolded. Some of these problems were internal to KCPT, such 
as increasing tension between moderates and radicals as the government worked to 
both co-opt and coerce different movement actors. Other problems were outside the 
control of KCPT.  For instance, the rise of other coalition movements around the same 
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time period, such as the anti-WTO movement in late 2005, or the anti-FTA movement 
in mid-2006, drew activist resources and public attention away from U.S. base issues, 
making it difficult for KCPT to sustain high levels of mobilization. 
Origins 
After Seoul and Washington announced the decision to relocate Yongsan 
Garrison in 2003, and the 2nd Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek in 2004, activists moved 
away from SOFA issues and reoriented their struggle against the expansion of Camp 
Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. The movement was led by the anti-base coalition group 
Pan-National Solution Committee to Stop the Expansion of U.S. Bases (KCPT). 
Although KCPT did not formally launch its campaign until March 2005, the seeds of 
the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement date earlier to two local coalition groups. A group 
of local activists formed the Citizens’ Coalition Opposing the Relocation of Yongsan 
Garrison in November 1990 when U.S. and Korean negotiators considered Pyeongtaek 
as a potential relocation site for Yongsan Garrison in the late 1980s. The coalition 
group, composed primarily of local NGOs, evolved into the Citizens’ Coalition to 
Regain Our Land from U.S. Bases in 1999, and then the Pyeongtaek Movement to 
Stop Base Expansion (Pyeongtaek Daechaekwi) in 2001 prior to the announcement of 
the LPP.  
In April 2003, the South Korean and U.S. government formally announced the 
decision to relocate Yongsan Garrison to Pyeongtaek. The MND also announced its 
plan to expropriate land surrounding Camp Humphreys for base expansion. Of the 
designated base expansion land, the MND planned to acquire 240,000 pyeong (about 
199 acres) of land from Daechuri village. Thus villagers organized the  Paengseong 
Residents’ Action Committee (Paengseong Daechaekwi or Jumin Daechaekwi) in July 
2003 to prevent the MND from taking over their farmland. After the conclusion of the 
U.S.-ROK Future of the Alliance Talks (FOTA) in 2004, the MND agreed to grant the 
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U.S. a total of 3,490,000 pyeong  (about 2,897 acres) of land, 2,850,000 pyeong (about 
2,366 acres) coming from Daechuri and Doduri village.41  Figure 6.1 below indicates 
the area of expansion, tripling the size of Camp Humphreys from 2005.  
 
 
        Figure 6.1: Camp Humphreys base expansion 
        Source: Hankyoreh 21, KCPT  
 
The conclusion of FOTA ratcheted the gravity of the situation. Hence in May 2004, 
Father Mun Jeong-Hyeon, the former PAR-SOFA movement leader, met with leaders 
of both the local Pyeongtaek anti-base coalition and the anti-base Residents’ Action 
Committee. At that point, Father Mun, along with other prominent NGO leaders, 
decided that the various anti-base movements in Pyeongtaek needed to unify under 
one national campaign. In early 2005, Mun and other anti-base leaders organized 
KCPT.  
 
 
                                                 
41 The figures come from KCPT, http://antigizi.or.kr/. The MND reports 3,620,000 pyeong of land 
being provided to the USFK (about 3,005 acres). See Yoon 2006. 
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Mobilization 
Similar to the ATM movement in the Philippines, mobilization structures were 
already in place through existing anti-base networks formed in previous campaigns 
such as the Maehyangri and the SOFA revision movements.42 Several leaders who 
served on various committees in previous coalition campaigns, such as Father Mun, 
Yoo Young-Jae from Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK), or 
Kim Yong-Han from the local chapter of the Democratic Labor Party, were part of 
KCPT’s executive committee. However, KCPT organizers made a conscious decision 
to include several representatives from the local Pyeongtaek anti-base coalition and 
the village-level anti-base Resident’s Committee on leadership positions to give local 
actors a voice in the campaign.43  KCPT held their first at-large leaders’ meeting with 
representatives from member groups on March 3, 2005. By July 2005, activists had 
successfully organized an anti-base coalition campaign linking national-level NGOs, 
local civic groups, and village residents into one large umbrella coalition. What was 
originally a local movement in Pyeongtaek had now become a national struggle. 
Approximately 120 organizations from labor, student, women’s rights, agriculture, 
human rights, peace, unification, and religious groups were directly or nominally 
involved in the campaign.  
The significant overlap among individual organizations in multiple coalitions 
makes it difficult to diagram KCPT’s coalition structure. Additionally, many 
organizations were only nominal members of KCPT based on their association with 
other coalition movements supporting KCPT.  The number of civic groups directly 
                                                 
42 Many of the same organizations and activists in earlier movements reappeared in the Pyeongtaek 
anti-base struggle. See “2002 nyun yeojoong-saeng bumdaewii chamgadanchae 63% ga pyeontaek 
bumdaewi chamga” (63% of civic groups involved in the 2002 Hyosoon-Miseon coalition group 
involved in Pyeongtaek umbrella coalition). 
43 Minutes to KCPT at large leaders’ meeting #1.  March 3, 2005.  KCTU conference room. Seoul,  
South Korea.  
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and consistently active in the Pyeongtaek anti-base struggle amounted to a few dozen 
groups.  Figure 6.2 below attempts to outline the basic organizational pattern of 
KCPT.  This is followed by Table 6.1 which provides a profile of KCPT’s 
organizational composition, goals, and, strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Membership of People’s Task Force to Stop Expansion of Bases in  
Pyeongtaek (KCPT).  Note: Overlapping circles represent organizational rather than individual 
member overlap. 
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Table 6.1 Brief Profile of People’s Task Force to Stop Expansion of Bases in 
Pyeongtaek (KCPT) 
Leading Organizations44 Pyeongtaek Anti-Base Task Force (Coalition with several other local 
civic groups), Paengsong Residents Task Force to Stop Base Expansion, 
Korean Peasants’ League (KPL), PeaceWind, Solidarity for Peace and 
Reunification of Korea (SPARK), Korean Confederated Trade Union 
(KCTU), Confederation of Korean Student Assembly 
Representative Sectoral 
Membership  
Peace,Trade Unions, Students, Farmers, Women, Religious 
organizations, Human Rights, Environment 
Decision-making Process Loose coalition with meetings open to civic group members. Key 
movement decisions decided by KCPT Steering Committee. 
Organizational Goals and 
Related Advocacy 
Local: Block expansion  of US bases in Pyeongtaek; Protection 
residents; land and livelihood 
National: Peace and stability on Korean Peninsula  
Framing  Injustice (livelihood of residents, multiple eviction over years); Peace 
(instability on Korean Peninsula) 
Strategies Target citizens to raise public awareness about plight of residents and 
USFK; Organize and encourage local residents; Form broad domestic 
coalition 
Tactics National (large rallies – July 10, 2005 December 10, 2005, Feb 12 2006; 
May 4-5, 2006, May 13, 2006 ) marches, forums, press conference, 
nationwide public awareness campaign with civic groups, music concert 
at Gwanghwamun; Local (daily candlelight vigil, festivals, house 
occupation, camp-out at Pyeongtaek station, petitioning, street dramas, 
photo gallery, road blockades) 
 
Mobilizing strategies required maintaining support from local and national 
NGOs as well as the unmobilized masses. The bulk of the organizing work was 
conducted by activists residing within or near Pyeongtaek. Organizers also included 
“local” activists representing national-level civic groups such as PeaceWind or 
SPARK, but living in Daechuri village during the campaign. Representatives from 
national and regional organizations who were coalitional members of KCPT attended 
                                                 
44 I have listed only a few representative organizations actively involved in KCPT.  Listing South 
Korean civic groups involved in anti-base movements is difficult because most organizations are only 
nominally members by their association with a local or regional coalition group. For instance, all 
member organizations of the Korean Confederated Trade Union (KCTU) are counted as member 
organizations of KCPT, regardless of whether individual organizations are actively involved or not in 
the anti-base struggle. On the other hand, individual activists in groups such as the National Campaign 
for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops, or Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, may be extensively 
involved with anti-base issues. However, because of limited resources, their organization as a whole 
cannot take part in the actual mobilization, finance, or strategic planning of the movement. 
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the members-at-large meetings. These individual representatives were then responsible 
for mobilizing their local chapters for large events and rallies. Labor unions and 
student groups, such as KCTU and Hanchongryon, provided the manpower and warm 
bodies at larger protests. Communication was largely conducted through the internet 
and mass e-mailing.45  
KCPT relied primarily on two types of frames: frames of injustice focused on 
the issue of livelihood and the forced expropriation of farmers’ lands, and frames of 
peace which claimed that U.S. base expansion destabilized Korean and Northeast 
Asian security.  Despite the variegated agenda of national level NGOs under KCPT, 
the campaign successfully maintained a semblance of unity by placing the local land 
expropriation issue as their central focus.46 While KCPT may have been more 
concerned about peace and sovereignty issues, the plight of elderly farmers forcefully 
evicted from their homeland were more likely to gain traction with the wider public.  
Framing the anti-base debate in a manner that highlighted immediate consequences, 
such as the forced eviction of elderly farmers, was much more effective in capturing a 
wider audience than using abstract frames such as peace and stability in Northeast 
Asia. Therefore, the support and participation of local residents was essential for 
KCPT.  KCPT invested significant resources to mobilize and sustain the morale of 
local residents in the wake of government threats and monetary bribery. 
KCPT used various tactics to mobilize the public. According to PeaceWind 
activists living in Pyeongtaek, the most effective means of mobilization was a six 
                                                 
45 Interview with KCPT steering committee member, Pyeongtaek, South Korea. November 6, 2005; 
Interview with Hangchonryon member from Hanshin University, Pyeongtaek, South Korea. November 
6, 2005. 
46 In reality, there was always internal dissension regarding tactics, strategy, and even goals of the 
movement.  After violent clashes between police and protestors, differences between grassroots 
organizations and established NGOs on the base relocation issue became much more pronounced. 
Grassroots organizations continued to focus on the rights of residents, while larger NGOs challenged 
the legal process, lack of transparency, and strategic motives behind base relocation and other USFK 
related issues.  
  220 
week, twenty city publicity campaign tour around the country.  KCPT activists 
contacted regional NGOs in advance about their visit, particularly labor groups who 
had the largest mobilizing capacity. These groups would then contact other local civic 
groups and NGOs to listen to Father Mun and other KCPT members discuss the 
Pyeongtaek base relocation issue.  In addition to labor groups, KCPT made special 
efforts to publicize their events to students, keeping in close contact with student 
unions.47 Second, NGOs sponsored both press conferences and public forums, inviting 
the press, government officials, and other activists to discuss pending base-related 
issues. Third, KCPT sent out electronic newsletters to all member organizations as 
well as individual members who had subscribed to the listserv.  Lastly, KCPT used 
visual media, art, photo exhibitions, music, and street theater to publicize their cause.  
 In addition to the mobilizing tactics above, KCPT organized three large 
rallies to attract media attention and raise public awareness about the negative impact 
of U.S. base relocation to Pyeongtaek. Framing the rallies as “Grand Peace Marches,” 
these were held on July 10, 2005, December 11, 2005, and February 12, 2006 in 
Pyeongtaek. Gwanghwamun in downtown Seoul also provided a stage for anti-base 
protestors. In addition to occasional protests near the U.S. Embassy, from August 9 to 
October 25, 2005, celebrity folk singers Jeong Tae-Choon and his wife Park Eun-Ok 
performed behind the Kyobo Center as KCPT members handed out leaflets and flyers 
to the crowd. In January 2006, farmers brought attention to U.S. base issues by driving 
tractors all around the country bearing signs to stop base expansion at Camp 
Humphreys.  
Despite KCPT’s mobilization efforts and large protest numbers ranging 
anywhere from 5,000-10,000 protestors, the movement was hampered by several 
                                                 
47 KCPT internal document. Organizational meeting notes. February 17, 2005, 10:00am. Seoul, South 
Korea. 
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external circumstances and internal constraints. The movement gradually strengthened 
throughout the summer of 2005, highlighted by a rally with 10,000 protestors outside 
Camp Humphreys on July 10. The event drew national attention, and KCPT’s 
momentum sustained through November. With winter approaching, however, other 
events such as the APEC summit in Pusan, and the WTO meeting in Hong Kong, 
“distracted” NGO groups from base issues. NGOs had to devote attention to their own 
parochial struggles.48 Activists also attributed the weakened support of labor unions in 
the anti-base campaign as an obstacle to mobilization. In the midst of financial 
scandals, and a rift between moderate and conservative labor union members within 
KCTU, the labor coalition was unable to devote significant attention to the Pyeongtaek 
issue.49  The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations beginning 
in May 2006 only detracted labor’s attention further away from U.S. base issues.50 
Strategy 
The major difference in strategy between KCPT in South Korea, and more 
successful movements such as the Anti-Treaty Movement in the Philippines, was the 
lack of coordinated, well-devised strategies directed at the South Korean government. 
ATM used a two-prong strategy aimed at both the mass public and government elites. 
Nominally, KCPT activists mentioned targeting the South Korean government, 
particularly the Blue House, the MND, and the Pyeongtaek city government. However, 
the bulk of KCPT’s strategy was oriented towards the larger public and “raising the 
national conscious of South Koreans,” rather than the South Korean government.51  In 
                                                 
48 Interview with Father Mun Jung-Hyeon. November 7, 2005. Pyeongtaek, South Korea. Bae Hye-
Jeong; “Interview with KCPT activist Lee Ho-Sung.” Minjung-e Sori.  December 11, 2005.  
49 Interview with Pyeongtaek Democratic Labor Party official and activist Kim Yong-Han. Pyeongtaek, 
South Korea,  November 7, 2005. 
50 However, labor activists in KCPT helped organize a joint rally against U.S. imperialism with the anti-
FTA coalition. A short attempt was made to link military bases and the FTA as an anti-U.S. struggle.  
51 Public speech at Gwanghwamun, Father Mun Jung-Hyeong. Seoul, South Korea. October 11, 2005. 
Seoul, South Korea. Interview with Father Mun Jung-Hyeon. Pyeongtaek, South Korea, November 7, 
2005.  Some may argue that the institutional arrangements between base issues in the two countries 
differed because base treaties in the Philippines required Senate ratification. Philippine anti-base 
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an initial KCPT planning meeting in February 2005, organizers listed two primary 
objectives of the movement: 1) inform and formulate national public opinion; and 2) 
form strong solidarity with residents to stop the expansion of bases.52 Explaining why 
KCPT focused on society rather than directly targeting the government, Father Mun 
Jung-Hyeon stated, “I don’t try to solve problems with politicians, because I don’t 
expect them to change. Instead we must focus on society. Then we can see change.”53  
Mun acknowledged KCPT was ultimately trying to push the government to change. 
However, some activist leaders such as Mun and Yoo Young-Jae believed influencing 
public opinion was more effective in pressuring the government to shift policy on 
security issues than direct government appeals. KCPT’s inaugural declaration 
illustrated the movement’s focus on the mass campaign: 
 
We cannot tolerate the lives of Pyeongtaek residents to be shaken so 
violently. Nor can we tolerate the serious threat posed by USFK 
relocation and permanent military dependency.  Therefore, we are 
going to fight with all our strength to block the expansion of U.S. bases 
in Pyeongtaek.  We are going to use a variety of methods, both on and 
off-line, and through media outlets, to wage a public campaign to 
inform the mass public the problems associated with military base 
expansion and the expanded role of USFK. Through demonstrations at 
every level, we are going to engage in an intense struggle against our 
government, which has deliberately ignored its people.54 
 
                                                                                                                                            
activists could therefore affect policy outcomes by directly lobbying government officials.  However, 
the South Korean National Assembly, while not voting directly on base relocation, had the power to 
veto this process by voting on the budget allocated to the base relocation project. Voting in favor of the 
budget implies approval of the base expansion plan. Thus in principle, KCPT activists could have also 
oriented their strategy towards National Assembly members as in the Philippines.  Although KCPT 
mobilized too late to affect the December 9, 2004 ratification, NGO groups did attempt to lobby 
National Assembly members to open a new hearing on the Yongsan base relocation bill. See National 
Assembly Records, Unification and Foreign Affairs Committee, 250th Assembly, 16th Meeting. 
December 7, 2004. 
52 KCPT internal document. “Organizational Meeting Notes.” February 17, 2005.  
53 Interview with Father Mun Jung-Hyeon, Pyeongtaek, South Korea, November 7, 2005.  Mun notes, 
however, that there are others within the KCPT steering policy committee who do not necessarily 
subscribe to this view. These members believe activists should directly pressure the government to 
promote policy change. 
54 KCPT Inaugural Declaration [translated by author]. Available at KCPT’s website www.antigizi.or.kr/ 
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As mentioned earlier, a strategy targeting the mass public required careful 
framing of the issue. To draw public attention, activists carefully constructed their 
slogans to take into account the local nature of the struggle and the plight of evicted 
residents.  The goal was to attract those who may not necessarily have subscribed to 
the political views of anti-base activists, but agreed with KCPT on principles of 
human rights. Support from the Residents’ Action Committee was therefore 
essential.55 To maintain a local-oriented strategy, activists from national civic groups 
relocated to Pyeongtaek and occupied houses vacated by residents who had already 
taken the government’s financial compensation. Villagers and activists repainted 
homes, painted murals evoking images of peace and village life on the outside of walls, 
and converted abandoned buildings into public spaces, including a library and café.  
Residing in empty houses was also a tactic used to prevent the government from 
beginning base construction.   The government would not bulldoze houses still 
occupied by elderly residents and activists.  KCPT activists also participated regularly 
in the nightly candlelight vigils held in Daechuri, organized festivals, and welcomed 
visitors to Pyeongtaek and Daechuri village.   
To raise national consciousness and influence public opinion on U.S. base 
issues, KCPT needed media support.  This required activists to refrain from making 
more radical calls such as the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. bases and troops. 
Hence KCPT resorted to more neutral slogans such as “Stop the Expansion of U.S. 
Bases.”  The rallies in July and December 2005, and again in February 2006, were 
used to attract media attention. Progressive internet media outlets such as OhMyNews 
and The Village Voice (Minjung-e Sori) devoted extensive coverage to the Pyeongtaek 
anti-base movement on their webpage. Hankyoreh, a major progressive-leaning daily 
                                                 
55 The loss of resident support in early 2007 was a major blow to KCPT. KCPT had to reformulate their 
entire campaign after villagers signed an agreement with the government in January 2007 to relocate by 
April 2007.  
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also provided frequent, favorable coverage. Hankyoreh 21, the weekly magazine 
produced by the same media company devoted a section each week to Daechuri 
residents and KCPT’s campaign.  Daechuri residents and KCPT activists appeared on 
the cover story three times. Acknowledging their struggle, the editors even chose 
Daechuri residents as “people of the year” for their final 2006 cover story.  
The Security Consensus and State-Society Relations 
 The preceding section suggests initial successful mobilization on the part of 
KCPT.  How, then, did the South Korean government respond to anti-base 
mobilization? Examining the interaction between KCPT activists and the national 
government helps explain how the security consensus shaped the state’s response to 
anti-base pressure, and reveals why anti-base movements were engaged in what would 
ultimately become a losing battle.  Aside from the lack of faith in the government’s 
ability to address KCPT’s immediate concerns, activists had very few influential elites 
to turn to who would promote their agenda inside the halls of government.56  Unlike 
the ATM movement in the Philippines, KCPT had very few elite “insiders” aiding 
them in the anti-base campaign. The few elites who were sympathetic to the 
movement, or at least in agreement with KCPT in opposing the enlargement of Camp 
Humphreys for USFK transformation, were found in the National Assembly.  
Minimal Elite Support 
Several representatives within the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) and the 
ruling Uri Party offered their support to KCPT, and tried to raise the relocation issue 
within the National Assembly.  The two National Assembly members most actively 
supporting KCPT’s struggle were Uri Party member Lim Jong-In, and DLP floor 
leader and Unification and Foreign Affairs subcommittee member Kwon Young-Gil. 
                                                 
56 The lack of elite access was another reason why KCPT’s efforts focused more indirectly on the mass 
public, rather than spending resources on a strategy which directly targeted the government.  
  225 
Representative Lim was by far the most active politician, meeting regularly with 
residents and activists, and organizing public forums bringing together activists and 
MND officials to promote dialogue.57  Lim also addressed the base relocation issue 
and plight of Daechuri residents to other National Assembly members and government 
officials in hopes of convincing the National Assembly to reopen a hearing regarding 
the base relocation project to Pyeongtaek. Lim made clear to the public that the entire 
base relocation process was conducted without the input of Daechuri residents who 
were now being forcefully evicted.  In addition to Lim, after the May 2006 clash 
between protestors and police, six Uri Party National Assembly members stepped 
forward with a public statement calling the government to hold discussions with both 
NGOs and Daechuri residents. The Uri Party representatives made three specific 
demands on the government: To stop using strong-arm tactics against civic groups and 
residents; to release those students and activists arrested during the May 5 clash; and 
to withdraw all riot police and military soldiers occupying the expanded base land area 
which were dispatched to Daechuri since early May 2006.58 
DLP floor leader Kwon Young-Gil, who played an active role in the 2000 
Maehyangri anti-base movement, also expressed his support for KCPT and Daechuri 
residents. In the December 2004 subcommittee meeting concerning Yongsan’s 
relocation, Kwon repeatedly questioned the deputy MOFAT minister over the 
necessity of such a costly transfer. He criticized the government’s lack of transparency 
in outlining the underlying motives and costs of base relocation which were negotiated 
                                                 
57 Representative Lim’s office sponsored a public forum in October 2005, and an open dialogue 
between Daechuri residents and MND officials on November 3, 2005. 
58 National Assembly press conference public statement. “Pyeongtaek mi-goon gijee hwak-jang gal-
deung hae-gyul-eul eui-han woori-ee ip-jang” (Our view on the resolution of the conflict over the 
expansion of Pyeongtaek base).  May 16, 2006.  Available from bulletin on Representative Lim’s 
homepage. http://www.wedrea.or.kr [last accessed May 20, 2006]. The six representatives were Woo 
Won-Sik, Yoo Seung-Hui, Lee In-Young, Lim Jong-In, Jung Chung-Rae, and Choy Jae-Chun.  
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between Seoul and Washington.59 Kwon also met with Father Mun on several 
occasions to assess the situation in Pyeongtaek and lend moral support to KCPT. 
Kwon, and his DLP colleagues Chun Young-sae and Dan Byung-Ho even made 
personal visits to Daechuri in a show of solidarity with activists and residents. DLP 
members were especially critical of Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-Woong, stating 
they would call for his resignation in the Assembly. They also reprimanded President 
Roh and Prime Minister Han in their negligent handling of the base relocation issue.60 
Yet the handful of National Assembly members sympathetic to KCPT’s cause 
had very little power to persuade their fellow representatives on the Pyeongtaek issue. 
The small faction in the Uri Party and the few DLP members calling for a re-
examination of the base relocation project in May 2006 were a minority voice in the 
Assembly. Moreover, the National Assembly as a whole did not carry the same clout 
in base politics as the Philippine Senate. Most of this power was held in the National 
Security Council61, or bureaucracies such as the MND and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), institutions where anti-base activists had few allies and 
little access.62 The leverage the bureaucracies held over the National Assembly can be 
seen again in the December 7, 2004 Unification and Foreign Affairs subcommittee 
hearings. In an exchange between Deputy MOFAT Minister Choi Young-Jin and 
Representative Kwon Young-Kil, Kwon repeatedly demanded the release of FOTA 
                                                 
59  National Assembly Records, Unification and Foreign Affairs Committee, 250th Assembly, 16th 
Meeting. December 7, 2004, p.23. 
60 "Lim Jong-In. ‘Pyeongtaek-eun migoon jiju-ae maleum-gwa sojaknog-ee sash-woo-neun gyuk’” (Lim 
Jong-In: In Pyeongtaek, fighting with the U.S. landlords). Chosun Ilbo. May 14, 2006. 
http://www.chosun.com/national/news/20605140267.html [last accessed May 20, 2006]. 
61 In the early half of President Roh’s tenure, foreign policy decision-making power rested with the 
National Security Council rather than MOFAT. Inside the NSC, the more pro-U.S. “alliance faction” 
prevailed over the “independence faction,” advising the President to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance 
through specific policy measures such as USFK relocation to Pyeongtaek and the expansion of Camp 
Humphreys. I thank Kim Sung-Han  and J.J. Suh for pointing this out. 
62 In the Philippines, anti-base activists had the sympathy of bureaucrats, such as Alfredo Bengzon, 
vice-chairman of the Philippine base negotiating panel, and an unnamed DFA official who leaked a 
draft copy of the Treaty to ATM activists.  
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transcripts to examine the details outlining the motives behind Yongsan Garrison’s 
relocation to Pyeongtaek. However, Deputy Minister Choi sidestepped the issue. Choi 
claimed that even if documents were declassified, there was no guarantee Assembly 
members would receive access to the transcripts.63 Without pushing the issue any 
further, subcommittee members acquiesced to the MOFAT deputy minister’s plea to 
quickly approve the base relocation bill. The bill passed in a 14-1 vote in favor of base 
relocation.   
Without the ability to form ties with influential elites on base issues, anti-base 
activists were unable to penetrate the state. Ultimately, anti-base activists’ efforts were 
thwarted because of the perpetuating security consensus held among political elites, 
particularly those within the foreign policy establishment.  Anti-base movement 
leaders who were more open to dialogue with government officials also noted this 
obstacle. KCPT policy steering committee chair Yoo Young-Jae stated, “We’ve talked 
with several politicians and scholars, and we feel that a big problem is that regarding 
U.S. power, they (Korean elites) have a fear, or seem defeatist, and are unable to break 
free from that mentality. That’s the biggest problem.  On the other hand, the nation as 
a whole wants to move past (that mentality).”64 Activist-scholar Jung Wook-Shik  
observes that South Korean political elites either blindly acquiesce to the demands of 
their patron, or because of fears of abandonment, dare not pursue policies which 
counter U.S. policy preferences.65 Even within the National Assembly, the voting 
record of National Assembly members on USFK base relocation indicates how 
political elites continued to support security policies in line with the security 
                                                 
63 National Assembly Records, Unification and Foreign Affairs Committee, 250th Assembly, 16th 
Meeting. December 7, 2004, p.25. 
64 Interview with Yoo Young-Jae, Seoul, South Korea. August 22, 2005. 
65 Jung Wook-Shik. 2005. Dongmaeng-ae dut.  (Alliance Trap). Seoul, South Korea: Samin Press, p.15. 
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consensus. Voting on December 9, 2004, 145 representatives voted in favor of base 
relocation while only 27 opposed.66   
Government Response 
Given the moderate security consensus regarding U.S.-ROK security relations, 
the Roh Administration had to walk a fine line in responding to anti-base pressure 
while also managing its alliance relations with the U.S.  For South Korea, the 
agreement signed with the United States approving Yongsan’s relocation and the 
consolidation of the 2nd Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek was an “inevitable process” 
needed to “strengthen the U.S.-South Korean alliance and deter war from [breaking 
out] on the Peninsula.”67 The MND noted that extensive delays in the relocation 
project caused by activists would result in a breach in diplomatic trust with 
Washington. Several other security experts referred to the signed 2004 base relocation 
agreement as a “promise” to the United States, sealed by the National Assembly’s 
ratification.68 President Roh also recognized the potential for further deterioration in 
the alliance if the Korean government failed to fulfill its end of the bargain on base 
relocation.69   
At the same time, the South Korean government needed to be careful not to 
attract negative publicity.70  Using force could potentially inflame anti-American 
sentiment and strengthen support for KCPT. A Pyeongtaek city official working with 
                                                 
66 National Assembly Records - Main Assembly. 250th Assembly, 14th Meeting. December 9, 2004, 
p.72. Nineteen members abstained from voting. 
67 Special Statement Prepared by the MND Minister of Defense, Yoon Kwon-Woong. May 4, 2006. 
MND News Brief. “Pyeongtaek migoon giji eejeon jaegeumtoh opda” [No reevaluation of Pyeongtaek 
base relocation]. May 3, 2006. 
http://mnd.news.go.kr/warp/webapp/news/print_view?id=5ae9967224cc3de6665c2c17  [last accessed 
May 8, 2006]. 
68 Ibid. Also see comments by KIDA analyst Cha Doo-Hyun in KBS Simya Toron transcript. June 8, 
2006 
69 Interview with General Cha Young-Koo. Seoul, South Korea. December 19, 2005. Cha was the 
Director for Policy Planning in the MND, and a key player in the FOTA negotiations with the U.S. 
70 This was particularly true for the MND, which was managing the technical aspects behind base 
relocation project. 
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the MND and USFK on the relocation project quotes, “The MND is acting very 
cautiously regarding forced eviction of residents because the residents are connected 
to anti-American movements. Evicting residents isn’t that big of an issue. It happens. 
But if residents are forced out, the MND is worried that the anti-American voice will 
become stronger or face negative reaction from the public.”71 How, then, did the South 
Korean state respond to civil societal pressure while maintaining its alliance 
obligations to the U.S.?  Influenced by a moderate pro-U.S. security consensus, and 
the belief that the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance rested with base relocation and 
expansion in Pyeongtaek, the government outmaneuvered KCPT and Daechuri 
residents by employing strategies of delay, co-optation, and coercion. 
In a twist of irony, the South Korean government ignored and isolated KCPT 
by focusing on the local residents. The MND made a sharp distinction between 
activists and residents, constantly referring to KCPT as “outside forces” (woebu 
saeryuk) engaged in a political struggle.  More than concern for the rights of local 
residents or the national interest, the MND claimed that KCPT was more interested in 
promoting its own political agenda such as USFK withdrawal.72  In a briefing report, 
the MND stated, “Last May, external forces [KCPT activists] began residing in 
Pyeongtaek and joined forces with residents opposed to relocation. But rather than 
discuss compensation or other livelihood issues, they [KCPT] were opposed to base 
relocation all together making dialogue [with residents] difficult.”73  In a follow up 
press briefing by Defense Minister Yoon, the MND accused anti-base movements of 
                                                 
71 Interview with Pyeongtaek City official, Office of ROK-US Relations. Pyeongtaek, South Korea. 
February 9. 2006.  
72 Special Statement Prepared by the MND Minister of Defense.Yoon Kwang-Ung. May 4, 2006. MND 
News Brief. “Pyeongtaek migoon giji eejeon jaegeumtoh opda” [No reevaluation of Pyeongtaek base 
relocation]. May 3, 2006. 
http://mnd.news.go.kr/warp/webapp/news/print_view?id=5ae9967224cc3de6665c2c17  [last accessed 
May 8, 2006]. 
73 MND Press Briefing. “Migoon giji eejeon sa-ub gwalyeon” [Related to U.S. base relocation]. May 3, 
2006 
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making unrealistic proposals. Yoon also blamed KCPT for creating an impasse in 
negotiations between the MND and local residents.74 The MND claimed that KCPT 
had discouraged residents from taking the government’s compensation, and instead, 
encouraged them to demand a re-evaluation of the entire base relocation project.75   
After KCPT’s first major protest in July 2005, the MND decided to hold 
further discussions with activists and Daechuri residents, hoping residents would sell 
their land voluntarily if given greater compensation. However, for the remaining 
residents, the issue was not about compensation, but about democratic principles and 
their livelihood as farmers.  With residents and activists refusing to leave, the MND 
announced it would conclude the eminent domain process in mid-December and 
acquire the remaining 20% of base expansion land.76  By January 2006, the MND had 
legally purchased all the land, despite residents and activists still residing in the village. 
The government certainly had the power to expel residents and activists by this period.  
The MND, however, decided to wait until spring to forcibly remove KCPT activists 
and residents. As activists and Pyeongtaek city officials cited, the Korean government 
was not likely to “throw out grandmothers in the dead of winter.”77 At this stage, the 
South Korean government was willing to delay base expansion rather than risk a 
violent confrontation.78   
                                                 
74 KCPT and the Residents’ Committee were skeptical of the MND’s willingness to negotiate. The 
government claimed it held at least forty-five meetings with both pro and anti-base residents, and 150 
formal and informal consultations. Activists, however, stated that the government met the anti-base 
faction only once for any real dialogue. See MND Press Briefing. May 3, 2006; KBS Sima Toron 
Transcript, June 9, 2006. 
75 Special Statement Prepared by the MND Minister of Defense, Yoon Kwon-Woong. May 4, 2006. 
76 To the consternation of KCPT, the court ruling on eminent domain actually completed a month early 
on November 23, 2005. See Kim Do-Gyun. “Handal ab-dang-gyujin jae-fyul jeol-cha” [Ruling process 
pushed forward one month]. Minjung-ee Sori. November 22, 2003.  
77 Interview with Peace Wind activist. KCPT headquarters. Pyeongtaek, South Korea, December 12, 
2005.  Interview with Pyeongtaek City official, Office of ROK-US Relations. Pyeongtaek City Hall. 
Pyeongtaek, South Korea. February 9. 2005. 
78 Activists hoped to delay the government long enough, either until another hearing opened regarding 
base relocation in the National Assembly, or until USFK altered its expansion plans to allow Daechuri 
residents to keep their land.  From KCPT’s perspective, delaying the eminent domain process enabled 
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In February 2006, USFK relayed to the MND that the South Korean 
government needed to push ahead with the land acquisition, declaring “time was not 
unlimited.”79 Originally, USFK had expected the land to be transferred to them by 
December 31, 2005. However, the MND explained to USFK its situation with anti-
base resistance, and agreed to transfer the base land by the end of February. Of 
particular concern for USFK was Congressional funding for base relocation and USFK 
transformation. At the time, USFK believed that land transfer needed to be completed 
prior to USFK Commander Burwell Bell’s report to Congress on March 7.  General 
Bell was expected to provide an assessment and update on military strategy and 
operational requirements in review of the Defense Authorization Request for fiscal 
year 2007. As one U.S. military official explained, USFK feared the Appropriations 
Committee would not provide all the funds necessary to push ahead with USFK 
relocation if General Bell informed Congress that the expansion land had still not been 
entirely secured.80 The same USFK official continued that the MND was in a difficult 
position “trying to find a neutral ground, mediating between its citizens and its 
security strategy.”81 The above statements suggest that the MND was dragging its foot 
on the base relocation issue. To maintain the alliance and push ahead with the 
transformation project, USFK expressed to the MND that Seoul needed to follow 
through and “make good on its part in a timely fashion.” At the time though, USFK 
understood the situation faced by the MND, and was not heavily pressuring Seoul to 
speed up the land transfer.82  
                                                                                                                                            
residents to stay on the land. Even a day longer on their land constituted a tactical victory for activists 
and residents. 
79 Interview with USFK officials. Pyeongtaek, South Korea, February 3, 2006. 
80 Interview with USFK officials. Pyeongtaek, South Korea, February 3, 2006. 
81 Interview with USFK officials. Pyeongtaek, South Korea, February 3, 2006. 
82 By January 2007, however, General Bell was publicly expressing his displeasure with the delay. His 
remarks prompted Foreign Minister Song Min-Soon to reassure the U.S. that base relocation would 
“proceed as agreed.” See Jin Dae-Woong. “Seoul reassures U.S. on base relocation.” Korea Herald. 
January 11, 2007. 
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However, by April 2006, the MND had shifted from its tactic of delay and 
foot-dragging to one of resolution and force.  At this point, it becomes clear how the 
security consensus influenced the government’s response to anti-base protestors, 
shaping the ensuing policy outcome. One month earlier, MND workers were sent to 
Daechuri to dig a trench and erect barbed wire around the expanded base area to 
prevent residents from continuing their farming. However, MND workers aborted 
their plan as several hundred protestors set fire to fields and physically took over two 
of the backhoe tractors used to dig trenches.83  Thus in early April 2006, Defense 
Minister Yoon stated, “The delay in base relocation is coming close to a point where it 
may create a diplomatic row with the United States. Therefore, from here on out, we 
will strengthen our possession over the designated base land.”84  The following day, 
the MND posted an article on its website titled, “Delay in Pyeongtaek base relocation 
may ignite into a diplomatic problem.” The article outlined reasons why the process 
was being delayed and its impact on the national interest.85  A few days earlier on 
April 8, the MND had sent 750 workers accompanied by approximately 5,000 riot 
police to begin filling in the farmers’ rice irrigation system with concrete. The MND 
blocked the irrigation canals to prevent residents’ attempts to continue farming.  
Protestors fought with riot police and prevented workers from destroying two canals, 
but workers managed to fill in at least one canal with concrete.86   
                                                 
83 Franklin Fisher. “Camp Humphreys residents braced for conflict.” Stars and Stripes. April 7, 2006. 
<http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=35432&archive=true> [last accessed May 8, 
2007].  
84 Park Chul-Eung. “Pyeongtaek migoon giji eejeon jiyeon-ddaen whegyo munjae bihwa.” [Delay in 
Pyeongtaek base relocation may spark into a diplomatic problem]. MND News Brief. April 11, 2006. 
http://mnd.news.go.kr/warp/webapp/news/print_view?id=d8144dfa704233b67b8872 [last accessed 
May 8, 2006]. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Franklin Fisher. “Protestors stop workers from blocking canals near Humphreys.” Stars and Stripes. 
April 9 2006. http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=35484&archive=true [last 
accessed June 5, 2007]; KCPT/Village Voice. “Gookbangboo, ahb-dojeok kyungcha-lryuk dongwon-
hae sooro gotgot pagoi.”  (MND mobilizes overwhelming police force, canals destroyed in several 
places).  April 7, 2006. 
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Even after these measures, activists and residents continued to cut through 
barbed wire and plant rice crops. The concrete the MND used to fill the irrigation 
canals were also smashed by activists, allowing water to flow again onto the farmland. 
The MND offered direct negotiations on May 1, but after key leaders such as Kim 
Jitae of the village Resident’s Committee boycotted talks with the MND, Korean 
officials hinted they would abandon negotiations and secure the land by force. Sensing 
the gravity of the situation, Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook called an emergency 
meeting to resolve the stalemate. Han urged the MND and police to look for peaceful 
means of resolving the dispute, and concluded the meeting with an agreement between 
residents and MND officials to settle the issue through dialogue.87  
After agreeing to dialogue, however, the MND instead went on the offensive 
and launched a national media campaign on May 3. The MND announced it would 
dispatch thousands of riot police and ROK soldiers into Daechuri village.  Fearing 
potential public backlash by sending ROK troops (accompanied by riot police) to 
establish a barbed wire perimeter around the base expansion area, the MND pre-
empted KCPT in the national media. In a special press conference, Minister Yoon 
explained the current situation of the base relocation project, the reasons why riot 
police needed to be dispatched, and the exact nature of work ROK soldiers would be 
undertaking in Daechuri. Minister Yoon made clear that soldiers would be unarmed. 
ROK soldiers’ duties were limited to erecting barbed wire around the perimeter of the 
expanded base land.  In his briefing to the nation, Yoon outlined the history of the 
Yongsan relocation project and the purpose of base expansion. He then described how 
the MND consulted the residents numerous times about the importance and 
inevitability of the base relocation project.  The MND was portrayed as reasonable and 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.antigizi.or.kr/zboard/view.php?id=news&page=1&sn1=&divpage=1&sn=off&ss=on&sc=o
n&select_arrange=headnum&desc=asc&no=137. [last accessed June 7, 2007]. 
87 Jin Dae-Woong. “Seoul may halt dialogue with farmers over U.S. base.” Korea Herald. May 2, 2006.  
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willing to continue dialogue with residents. In contrast, the government framed KCPT 
as irresponsible radicals bent on inciting residents for their own political purposes. The 
MND added that the delay in base relocation caused by KCPT “outsiders” were 
costing South Korean taxpayers millions of dollars.   
Preparing the nation for potential violence, on May 4, the MND in a show of 
force sent 2,800 engineering and infantry troops to dig trenches and set up 29 km of 
barbed wire two meters in depth to prevent activists from entering the expanded base 
land. These troops were accompanied by 12,000 riot police.  As soldiers and riot 
police entered Daechuri before dawn on May 4, KCPT activists in Daechuri quickly 
alerted their members through e-mail and telephone, mobilizing about 1,000 activists, 
mostly students, labor union members, farmers, and peace activists.88 About 200 
students linked arms and lay flat inside Daechuri Elementary School, the makeshift 
headquarters of KCPT.  As morning approached, riot police physically removed 
hundreds of activists and students barricading themselves inside KCPT headquarters 
and bulldozed the building. As soldiers were setting up the barbed wire fence, several 
activists managed to break through the perimeter and began beating unprotected 
soldiers with bamboo poles. About 120 police, soldiers, and protesters were injured 
and 524 students and activists were detained in the two day fiasco.89 Of those detained, 
no Daechuri residents were taken into custody. The MND used this information to 
support their claim that the conflict stemmed from the “outside forces” of KCPT rather 
than local residents. 
                                                 
88 Kil Yoon-hyeong.  “Yeongwonhi dol-ee-kilsoo eobs-eu-lee: jakjeon-meong yeo-myeong-ui hwang-
sae-ul.” (The point of no return: Operation: "Hwangs-ae-ul at Dawn”) Hankyeoreh 21, May 16, 2005. 
p.14. 
89 Lee Joo-Hee. “Cheong Wa Dae says no more delays to Pyeongtaek base plan.” Korea Herald,  May 6, 
2006; Yonhap News Agency. “Pyeongtaek migun giji haeng-jeong daejibhaeng daechi naheuljjae.” 
(Fourth day of Pyeongtaek anti-base protest). Chosun Ilbo. May 7, 2006.  
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The violence in Pyeongtaek, instigated primarily by student activists who were 
not necessarily KCPT members, created a devastating blow to the anti-base movement.  
The MND and conservative mainstream media capitalized on the violence, claiming 
how activists had beaten unprotected soldiers who were merely engaged in manual 
labor.90  Consequently, the general public held anti-base and anti-American activists 
responsible for the violence in Pyeongtaek.  Public opinion polls released by the Prime 
Minister’s office indicated that 81.4% of Koreans were against the protestors’ use of 
violence, and 65.8% opposed NGO and civic group involvement in the relocation 
issue.91  Moreover, rifts within the anti-base movement began to widen as more 
moderate civic groups and NGOs began distancing themselves from the radical core of 
KCPT.92   
With its remaining resources, KCPT attempted to mobilize one last major 
stand. The coalition group organized a candlelight vigil in Seoul on May 13, and a 
protest in Pyeongtaek on May 14 to denounce the stationing of 8,000 riot police in 
Daechuri, and the violence “sanctioned” by government forces the previous week. 
Again, in a display of power and resolve, the government sent 18,000 riot police to 
Daechuri. To prevent any activists from entering Daechuri, the government blocked 
off all roads into the village, establishing four different checkpoints. With the 
exception of Daechuri residents, government officials, and mainstream media, nobody 
was allowed to enter the village. As one resident lamented, the entire village had been 
                                                 
90 Lee Seok-Woo. “2m jookbong gong-gyeok. Goon-sok youngji choso buswu.” (Attack with 2m 
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  236 
put under de facto martial law. 93  Unable to enter the village, the 5,000 activists who 
came in support of KCPT and Daechuri residents ended up protesting either at the 
train station, or in a village adjacent to Daechuri. Aside from a few scuffles, the 
protest in general remained peaceful. The government managed to subdue KCPT, both 
physically and mentally, and cut KCPT off from any national support the activists 
desperately sought.  
After the May 4-5 incident, the office of the Blue House and Prime Minister 
stepped forward in response to the violent clashes and the delay in the relocation 
process. The Blue House issued a statement after the clash, reaffirming its support for 
USFK base relocation and expansion. Noting that the eviction of residents was 
inevitable, the Blue House stated, “Hereafter, the base relocation project must progress 
without any more setbacks to avoid further losses to the national interest.”94 
Presidential spokesman Jung Tae-Ho also made similar statements, again citing the 
delay’s diplomatic and economic costs and the importance of base relocation for the 
U.S.-ROK alliance.95   
Fearing another clash between police and protestors, Prime Minister Han 
Myeong-Sook, herself a former activist, issued a much anticipated public statement in 
a live national broadcast. In her televised speech, she expressed regret and sadness for 
the previous weeks’ violence, and sympathy and concern for residents forced to 
relocate. Her message implored activists to use restraint, and to express differences in 
                                                 
93 Not even public transportation was allowed to enter the village. I walked 8km and, to the 
bewilderment of activists, through all four checkpoints to enter the village that day. I was allowed 
through the first three checkpoints with a U.S. passport, and only allowed through the final checkpoint 
after showing a government-level visa and reasoning with the police I was conducing research under 
U.S. State Department funding (Fulbright).  Ironically, the peace activist “guarding” the entrance to the 
village also requested identification, and it was not until I contacted Father Mun that I was given 
clearance into the village. 
94 Yonhap News Agency. “Chungwahdae ‘giji eejeon chajil obsi chujin-dwhe-ya.’” [Blue House: 
“Base relocation must progress without setbacks]. May 5, 2006.  
95 Lee Joo-Hee. “Cheong Wa Dae says no more delays to Pyeongtaek base plan.” Korea Herald,  May 6, 
2006. 
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opinions in a legitimate and peaceful manner.  However, taking the same position as 
the MND and Blue House, Prime Minister Han reiterated the importance of the base 
relocation project in maintaining positive bilateral relations with the United States. 
Prime Minister Han declared, “Fellow citizens, as you know well, from the Korean 
War up until today, our alliance with the United States has been the basis of our 
national security, national defense, and economic development. The firm preservation 
of the ROK-U.S. alliance is necessary for our society and country’s stability and 
development.”96  Emanating from the prime minister’s office rather than the MND or 
MOFAT, the statement signified the seriousness of the South Korean government in 
pushing ahead with base relocation. Table 6.2 below summarizes KCPT’s activities 
and the unfolding conflict with the government which eventually lead to KCPT’s 
decline. 
                                                 
96 Transcript of Prime Minister Han Myeong-Sook’s national address. Seoul, South Korea. May 12, 
2006. Available at <http://www.chosun.com/politics/news/200605/200605120148.html> 
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Table 6.2.: Chronology of Events in the Pyeongtaek Anti-Base Movement 
Date Event 
2001  Oct   Local Pyeongtaek Movement to Stop Base Expansion organized 
2003  April US and ROK announce Land Partnership Program 
          July  Paengsong Resident’s Action Committee to Stop Base Expansion organized 
2004  July FOTA talks between ROK and U.S. 
          Dec Ratification of Yongsan relocation plans by National Assembly 
2005  March  Pan--South Korean Solution Committee Against Base Extension in Pyeongtaek 
organized 
          July 10  First major rally with 10,000 protestors held outside Camp Humphreys 
          Nov 23 MND legally acquires remaining base expansion land held by residents  
2006  March  15 MND enters Daechuri village to conduct surveys for base construction on farmland 
          April 8 MND fills in irrigation canals. Protestors and riot police clash 
          May 4-5 MND enters Daechuri to fence of base expansion land and destroy activist 
headquarters at Daechuri elementary school; Violent clashes between 
police/military. 
         May 12 Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook makes formal statement calling for peaceful 
dialogue between activists and the government.. 
         May 14-15 Major protests in Seoul and Pyeongtaek. 18,000 riot police block activists from 
entering Daechuri. No violent clashes reported. Thousands of riot police remain in 
Pyeongtaek to prevent further breaches. 
         June 5 Daechuri village chief and KCPT leader Kim Ji-tae turns himself in to authorities. 
Kim is subsequently arrested and not released until December 28. 
         July 5-11 Protestors take part in a peace march from the Blue House (in Seoul) to 
Pyeongtaek.  
          Nov 8 MND adds 2.8km of barbed wire to secure land not fenced in May  
2007 Feb 13 After 12 rounds of negotiation, Daechuri residents reach agreement with South 
Korean government to take government compensation and relocate by end of 
March. 
          Apr 9 Residents leave Daechuri. KCPT continues campaign in a new direction.  
Source: KCPT events calendar http://antigizi.or.kr/zboard/zboard.php?id=strg_history. Hankyeoreh 21. 
May 15, 2006. p.16 
 
Denouement 
 The Pyeongtaek issue carried the attention of the national media for the next 
month. The prime minister also met with activist leaders in mid-May to discuss 
peaceful resolutions to the Pyeongtaek issue. Other than agreeing to restraint and non-
violence, however, the core differences between the government and activists 
remained the same. On June 5, Kim Jitae, Daechuri village head and chair of the 
Residents' Committee, turned himself in to local authorities as a condition for 
resuming talks between residents and the South Korean government. The government 
wanted to question Kim regarding his alleged role in fomenting illegal protests.  
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Rather than releasing him after questioning, however, Kim was arrested and placed in 
prison until December 28. Kim’s arrest dealt an incredible moral blow to the local 
residents. Although anti-base protests continued, by June 2006, various umbrella 
coalition groups, particularly the labor and farmers’ groups, had shifted almost entirely 
away from the anti-base movement to prepare for protests against the upcoming U.S.-
South Korea FTA negotiations. 
 The government again sent around 15,000 riot police on September 13 to 
destroy empty homes where activists and the handful of residents were residing.97  In 
October 2006, workers began leveling the land for construction as the government 
continued negotiating with the residents. The South Korean government and Daechuri 
residents finally signed an agreement on February 13, 2007, with the residents 
agreeing to move out by March 31 to nearby Paengseong Nowhari. With the village 
residents’ decision made independently from KCPT, KCPT put forth a statement 
stating they would respect the agreement. However, the anti-base struggle which had 
focused on Daechuri up to this point now needed a new direction.98 
The Pyeongtaek episode demonstrates the constraining role of the security 
consensus for South Korean anti-base movements in the politics of overseas military 
bases. The security consensus held by host state elites created a situation where the 
South Korean government needed to balance between its alliance obligations to the 
U.S. while staving off domestic pressure from anti-base movements. Responding to 
this dilemma, the South Korean government chose to drag its feet and temporarily 
                                                 
97 Min-Jung Lee and Ahn Hong-Gi. “Doduri 32 chae modu cheolguh.” (32 buildings in Doduri all 
destroyed).  OhMyNews. September 12, 2006. 
http://www.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=359437&ar_seq=2 [last accessed 
6/4/07]. Yonhap News Agency. “Pyeongtaek binjib cheolguh.” (Empty houses in Pyeongtaek 
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http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2006/09/13/2006091360124.html. [last accessed 6/4/07]. 
98 See KCPT bulletin board. “KCPT Planned Project for 2007”. February 13, 2007. 
http://www.antigizi.or.kr/zboard/zboard.php?id=notice&no=696. [last accessed 6/28/07].  
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delay the process of base expansion while co-opting local residents.  However, foot-
dragging for an extended period also raised diplomatic costs with the U.S.  Given the 
initial USFK transformation timeline to relocate Yongsan Garrison and the 2nd 
Infantry Division to Camp Humphreys by 2008, the South Korean government did not 
want to jeopardize its alliance relations with the U.S.99  Thus the MND shifted tactics 
in April 2006. The MND used overwhelming power to block off protestors from the 
designated base expansion land, and co-opted local residents while isolating national 
civic groups. Meanwhile, the use of radical tactics, which were effective in 
Maehyangri, backfired for KCPT. The MND’s media campaign launched against anti-
base movements after violent clashes on May 4-5, and their strategic efforts to isolate 
activistis by only negotiating with residents, ultimately led to the devolution of the 
movement. 
Conclusion 
None of the three anti-base movement episodes covered in this chapter resulted 
in major policy changes. Working under the constraints of a moderate elite security 
consensus, South Korean anti-base movements were relatively limited in their efforts 
to institute change in basing policy outcomes. Even though South Korean elites 
experienced some disagreement over U.S. alliance-related policies, for the most part, 
the foreign policy and national security establishment continued to value the alliance 
and U.S. military presence. A moderate consensus persisted, in part because the 
consensus had become embedded within domestic institutions and ideologies favoring 
close security ties to the U.S. 
The security consensus framework remains limited, however, in helping us 
understand subtle variation in outcomes among different South Korean anti-base 
movement episodes. Under conditions of moderate security consensus, two episodes 
                                                 
99 Base relocation has now been pushed back to 2012.  
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ended in partial concessions, while one ended in the status quo. To account for the 
status quo outcome in Pyeongtaek, and the subtle differences in mechanisms leading 
to partial concessions in the SOFA revision and Maehyangri episodes, I examined 
additional factors and political opportunities within each movement episode.   
As this chapter demonstrates, the ability to disaggregate below the level of 
state and incorporate social movement analysis allows us to examine processes and 
mechanisms not captured by traditional approaches to international relations. The 
three anti-base movement episodes presented in this chapter were all initially 
successful in forming a broad-based coalition, attracting large numbers, and drawing 
national media attention. However, internal movement dynamics and external 
circumstances varied across movements as episodes unfolded. For instance, in 
Maehyangri, tactics such as illegally breaching into a USFK firing range to disrupt 
training exercises, effectively pressured Seoul and Washington to consider some form 
of concessions. On the other hand, similar radical tactics in Pyeongtaek resulted in 
violence, generating negative publicity for activists and revealing further divisions 
within the movement. Furthermore, failure to proceed with base expansion at Camp 
Humphreys entailed extremely high security costs for the South Korean government. 
Hence, the South Korean government appeared much more resolute in the Pyeongtaek 
case, using coercive tactics to dismantle anti-base opposition.  
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CHAPTER 7 
ALLIANCE RELATIONS AND THE  
SECURITY CONSENSUS ACROSS TIME 
 
The preceding chapters demonstrated how alliance relations and the degree of 
security consensus influenced basing policy outcomes by shaping the patterns of 
interaction between the host government, anti-base movements, and the U.S.  Process 
tracing events in a single movement episode, the case examples provided a “snapshot” 
of anti-base movements in the Philippines, Japan, Italy, Ecuador, and South Korea. By 
restricting the analysis to a limited time frame, the concept of security consensus 
remained “fixed.”  
What happens when the security consensus changes over time? For instance, 
how would increasing security ties between the Philippines and the U.S. in their fight 
against terrorism impact protests against U.S. military presence in the Southern 
Philippines?  What if Japanese leaders, fearing alliance entanglement, decided to 
pursue a more independent security policy and abandon its current alliance 
relationship with the U.S.? Would host governments react differently against anti-base 
movements? Would activists in these countries find greater success under conditions 
of a weakened security consensus? Conversely, would social movements find it much 
more difficult to influence basing policies if key elites coalesced more tightly around a 
security policy centered on the U.S.?  Addressing these questions, this chapter 
examines variation in the security consensus across time. 
Shifting the analysis from single movement episodes to a diachronic analysis is 
important on two accounts. First, examining episodes across different time periods 
allows us to test the robustness of the theory by adding within case comparisons. 
Shifts in the security consensus should lead to different configurations of state-societal 
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interaction, thus producing different policy outcomes over time. Second, a diachronic 
analysis provides more leverage on the predictive power of my argument. For 
example, under conditions of a weakened security consensus, we expect greater 
movement success as patterns of interaction between activists and security policy-
makers move from confrontation to greater cooperation. Conversely, even with a spike 
in anti-base movement opposition, base policies should remain unchanged if host 
nation political elites continue to accept the U.S. alliance and U.S. bases as part of its 
greater national interest.  
This chapter is divided into two parts. Part one begins by presenting a brief 
“theory of security consensus.” To account for change in the elite consensus over time, 
the concept is treated as a dependent variable. I raise two relevant questions: what are 
the micro-foundations of the security consensus, and how does it change over time? 
After accounting for change, part two treats the security consensus as the independent 
variable as in previous chapters. Applying the theoretical framework outlined in 
Chapter 1, I explore how variation over time in the security consensus alters 
movement and government strategies, hence leading to different policy outcomes. I 
use  the Philippines and Japan/Okinawa in a paired comparison to demonstrate why 
the prospects for Philippine anti-base movement effectiveness decreased over time, 
but remained fairly constant in Okinawa. In the conclusion, I discuss the possibility of 
increased effectiveness for South Korean anti-base movements. 
A Theory of Security Consensus 
Elite perceptions of national security and their understanding of the U.S. 
alliance do not change overnight. As discussed in Chapter 1, institutional and 
ideational factors underlying the security consensus gives the concept an inherent 
stickiness. Nevertheless, elite perceptions and beliefs about national security, and 
more specifically bilateral security alliances and U.S. bases, are mutable.  What 
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factors result in shifts in the security consensus? Specifically, what exogenous or 
endogenous changes alter political elites’ perceptions and beliefs of the U.S. security 
alliance? 
In Chapter 1, I argued that external threat perceptions bear significant weight 
in the formation and persistence of the elite consensus. In addition to material 
capabilities, threat perceptions are informed by domestic and ideational variables such 
as identity, ideology, and historical legacies. This suggests that ideational factors 
indirectly shape the security consensus via threat perceptions. However, factors such 
as historical legacies, beliefs, ideology, and domestic institutions may also directly 
feed into and reinforce the security consensus. Hence, a shift in any one or 
combination of these factors could potentially lead to shifts in the security consensus. 
Figure 7.1 below illustrates several factors which help form and perpetuate an elite 
consensus supporting the U.S. alliance and U.S. bases. 
 
Figure 7.1: Sub-factors leading to the security consensus 
 
Continuity 
While the security consensus may shift for numerous reasons, a change in one 
particular variable does not necessarily produce change on the outcome variable. The 
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security consensus does not shift easily for two reasons. First, the three sub-variables 
which provide depth to the security consensus - institutions, historical legacy, and 
ideology/identity - are themselves not easily mutable. For instance, historical legacies 
do not easily fade, even if they are reinterpreted over time, or their impact mitigated 
through generational change. As an example, Chinese leaders continue to invoke the 
hundred years of humiliation instigated by Western imperialism. The legacy of Nazi 
fascism also profoundly shapes how German political elites think about security policy 
and foreign affairs.1 Thus historical legacies and collective memory continue to shape 
the worldview of foreign policy elites and their interactions with the outside world.   
Likewise, institutions, embedded in well-known beliefs and practices, do not 
easily change. The path dependent logic of institutions enables policy continuity, even 
when elites are confronted with environmental change.2 Of course, if we acknowledge 
that institutions are placed within “concrete temporal processes,” as argued by 
historical institutionalists, change is plausible.3 However, this implies a slow 
evolutionary process rather than sudden transformation.  
Second, because the security consensus hinges on collective perceptions and 
ideas, a consensus, by definition, tends to be rigid. A shift in the consensus requires a 
shift in ideas, beliefs, or perceptions of numerous individuals. If a large number of 
powerful elites all hold vested interests in maintaining the security consensus, one or 
two individuals transmitting alternative ideas will not easily shatter the existing order 
of beliefs. In short, the intersubjective nature of the security consensus provides the 
concept a degree of stability over time. 
 
                                                 
1 Berger 1998. 
2 Mark Blyth. "The Transformation of the Swedish Model: Economic Ideas, Distributional Conflict, and 
Institutional Change." World Politics 54, no. 1 (2001), p.4.  
3 Kathleen Thelen. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." Annual Review of Political 
Science 2 (1999), p.369. 
 246 
 
Change 
If shared perceptions and collective beliefs are relatively “sticky,” what brings 
about change in the security consensus? I argued above that the variables which 
constitute the microfoundations of the security consensus are not easily mutable. But 
they do change. And like other ideational variables, the security consensus can shift 
over time. As suggested above, shifts often occur gradually. A change in external 
threat perceptions is the most obvious variable to examine when identifying shifts in 
the security consensus.  As indicated in Figure 7.1, elite attitudes and beliefs about 
bilateral alliances are likely to shift with changes in threat perceptions. This logic is 
supported by the correlation between threat perceptions and alliance durability found 
in the quantitative alliance literature.4  Change in threat perceptions may itself be 
triggered by changes in the structural environment and shifts in the balance of power. 
For example, growing U.S. military and economic superiority over the Soviet Union 
by the mid-1980s corresponded with shifts in beliefs and attitudes about the Soviet 
threat.  Germany’s rapid rise at the turn of the century also heightened British threat 
perceptions. Faced with the German challenge to British naval superiority, British 
leaders warmed to the idea of an alliance with France. Casting aside their colonial 
bickering, the two sides signed the Entente Cordiale in 1904.  
Shifts in the elite consensus may also be produced by domestic and 
institutional change within the target state. Challenging structural accounts, Mark 
Haas argues that U.S. leaders’ beliefs about the Cold War corresponded closely with 
domestic-ideological and institutional changes within the Soviet Union. Thus U.S. 
policymakers’ belief that the Cold War had ended stemmed from their perception of 
                                                 
4 See Scott Bennett. "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984." American Journal 
of Political Science 41, no. 3 (1997): 846-78; Brett Ashley Leeds, and Burcu Savun. "Terminating 
Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?" Journal of Politics 69, no. 4 (2007): 1118-32. 
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Gorbachev’s reform and his commitment to political liberalism.5  Change within the 
system of internal political governance may also alter the relative strength of the 
security consensus among elites, and therefore elite attitudes towards alliance partners. 
For instance, regime change may bring leaders with a different set of beliefs and 
ideology into power.  If ideology draws alliance partners together, regime change may 
potentially weaken (or strengthen) the security consensus among elites, leading to a 
new phase in alliance relations, or new alliance configurations all-together.6 Regime 
change may also facilitate institutional shifts, which alter elites’ understanding of 
national security and U.S. relations over time. 
Although change is usually gradual, external shocks or major events, such as 
the collapse of the Cold War, or the terrorist attacks of 9-11, function as critical points 
leading to shifts in the consensus. These “shocks” may cause elites to recalibrate (or in 
extreme cases, fundamentally alter) their existing beliefs and perceptions about 
national security and the value of the U.S. alliance.7 For instance, Chinese aggression 
in the Taiwan Straits, or a successful North Korean nuclear test would likely 
strengthen the security consensus among host government elites in the Asia-Pacific 
region.8 Other “shocks,” such as Korean reunification or Chinese democratization, on 
the other hand, would potentially weaken the security consensus with the reduced need 
of forward deployed bases in the region.  
 
                                                 
5 Haas 2007, p.146. 
6 Leeds and Savun  2007, p.1121. The record here is mixed. Leeds and Savun (2007:1121) do find a 
correlation between regime change and alliance termination, whereas other scholars, such as Bennett 
(1997), do not. 
7 Jeffrey Legro presents a more nuanced theory explaining how shocks lead to new thinking, or in this 
case, a shift in the security consensus. Applying Legro’s theory into my argument, if an external shock 
shatters the existing consensus, and elites are able to consolidate around an alternative idea, a new 
consensus emerges. See Legro 2007, p.14. 
8 Shocks are more likely to produce conditions which immediately strengthen, rather than weaken the 
security consensus.  On the other hand, the security consensus is more likely to weaken gradually rather 
than abruptly. 
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Security Consensus Across Time 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3, below provide estimates of the general trend over time in 
the degree of security consensus, indicating an increase (or strengthening) in the 
Philippines, and relatively little change in Japan. These figures should be treated as 
notional trends, based on my own qualitative assessment of U.S.-host relations.9  
 
 
            Figure 7.2: Security consensus over time in the Philippines 
 
 
            Figure 7.3: Security consensus over time in Japan 
                                                 
9 The concept of the security consensus is not easily quantifiable. In the preceding chapters, I used 
primarily qualitative indicators within historical narratives to determine the strength (or weakness) of 
the security consensus at a given moment in time. The figures below are used only as heuristics to 
illustrate how the security consensus framework operates over time.   
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In the Philippines, rising Chinese territorial ambitions and the sudden upsurge 
of Communist and Muslim separatist movements in the late 1990s helped rally 
Philippine elites to renew security ties with the U.S. Increased threat perceptions 
helped forge a pro-U.S. alliance consensus, manifest in the return of U.S. military 
forces and the strengthening of bilateral security ties. Meanwhile, the consensus 
among Japanese elites, encased within domestic security norms and institutions, 
remained relatively constant up through the first decade of the millennium. External 
threats such as North Korea’s nuclear saber-rattling and China’s growing regional 
ambitions continue to prop an elite consensus favoring the U.S. alliance and the 
network of bases. However, in recent years, the Japanese polity has shown greater 
willingness to adjust its norms and institutions, most significantly the revision of 
Article 9. The long-term future of Japan’s elite security consensus is open for debate, 
but for now, it continues to remain relatively strong. 
According to the security consensus framework, anti-base movements are most 
effective under conditions of weak security consensus. Therefore, I hypothesize that 
the probability of anti-base movement effectiveness, defined in terms of policy 
concessions from the government, is negatively correlated with the degree of security 
consensus. Movement effectiveness increases with the weakening of the security 
consensus, and decreases with its decline, ceteris paribus. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 provide 
a general trend of movement effectiveness across time.10 Of particular note is the 
Philippines. The security consensus framework suggests that the probability of anti-
base movement effectiveness decreased over time as the elite security consensus 
                                                 
10 Of course, numerous factors internal to social movements, and other exogenous factors may also 
influence movement effectiveness. As with Figures 7.1 and 7.2, however, Figures 7.3 and 7.4 are used 
as a simplified heuristic to depict the relationship between the security consensus and social movement 
success.  I do not naively suggest that only the security consensus matters in social movement 
outcomes. However, I do believe the security consensus bears much weight in an anti-base movement’s 
ability to win major policy concessions from the government.  
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increased in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, in the post-SACO period, Okinawan anti-base 
activists faced difficulty pushing forth their demands with protestors marginalized by 
Tokyo political elites.   
 
 
Figure 7.4: Probability of anti-base movement effectiveness in the   
            Philippines 
 
 
 
  Figure 7.5: Probability of anti-base movement effectiveness in Japan 
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Philippines 
 As argued in Chapter Two, Philippine elites were divided in their position over 
the future of U.S.-Philippine relations in 1991. Contributing to the lack of consensus 
was the popular belief that U.S. bases no longer played an important role for 
Philippine national security given the internal nature of security threats.11  Yet, by the 
end of the decade, the majority of Philippine political elites eagerly awaited the return 
of U.S. “visiting forces.” If elite discourse suggested a weak security consensus in the 
early 1990s, how did a consensus linking national security priorities with the U.S. 
alliance reemerge by the end of the decade? Why did Philippine elites, including 
several Senators who voted to oust the Americans in 1991, later come to embrace the 
return of U.S. forces and strengthened security ties? 
 Three related issues transpired in the decade after Subic Bay’s closure which 
helped solidify the importance of the U.S. security alliance. First, the heavy financial 
burden of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) modernization program sent 
Manila scouring for additional economic assistance. Second, the Philippines faced 
increasing threats to national security in the late 1990s. A greater sense of 
vulnerability triggered by Chinese adventurism in the Spratly Islands increased the 
salience of external threats in the Philippines. Additionally, the Philippines 
experienced an upsurge in internal insurgencies from Communists and Muslim 
separatist groups in the late 1990s. These two factors - increased threat perceptions 
and the demands of military modernization – catalyzed the revival of U.S.-Philippine 
security relations in the late 1990s. Lastly, if U.S.-Philippine relations had not warmed 
enough by the beginning of the 21st century, 9-11 and the global war on terror sealed 
the revitalized alliance by further consolidating elite support.  
 
                                                 
11 Renato Cruz de Castro. "Twenty-First Century Philippine-American Security Relations: Managing an 
Alliance in the War of the Third Kind." Asian Security 2, no. 2 (2006), p.107. 
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AFP Modernization 
U.S.-Philippine relations hit an all time low after the Philippine Senate booted 
the Americans off the island. Snubbed by the Philippines, the U.S. downgraded its 
political and military relations with Manila. With the loss of the U.S. security 
umbrella, the Philippines needed to quickly modernize its military.12 To fill in the 
security void, the Philippine government passed the Philippine Modernization Act in 
February 1995. The military modernization program shifted more emphasis towards 
external defense with military hardware and weapons systems upgrades for the 
Philippine Navy and Air Force.13 After much wrangling in the Philippine Congress 
over the AFP’s proposed budget, the Philippine government passed the AFP 
Modernization Act (Republic Act 7898) in February 1995.  The Act proposed 331.62 
billion pesos (about $13.24 billion in 1996 dollars) over a fifteen year period for 
military modernization. 
Even after the passage of Republic Act 7898, a new round of debate ensued 
about whether the Philippine economy could sustain such a hefty increase in military 
spending. Philippine legislators, concluding that the Philippine government would be 
unable to finance the modernization bill in its entirety, proposed a budget limit of 170 
billion pesos. The Philippine Congress and the AFP finally reached a compromise, and 
divided the modernization program into two sub-programs. The appropriated budget 
would only cover sub-program 1, which would receive 164.55 billion pesos to develop 
the AFP’s core capabilities.14 Congress also set a ceiling of 50 billion pesos (about $2 
                                                 
12 The 1951 U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty still remained in effect, however. 
13 The government planned to purchase fighter jets, air-defense radars, offshore patrol vessels, and 
amphibious landing transport ships.  See Renato Cruz de Castro. "Societal Forces as Sources of Military 
Doctrine and Posture: The Case of the AFP Modernization Program, 1991-2003." in Asia in the New 
Millennium: APISA First Congress Proceedings, edited by Amitav Acharya and  Cai To Lee. 
Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2004, p.207.  
14 AFP Modernization Program Management Office. Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization 
Program Primer. Information also available at 
http://www.afpmodernization.mil.ph/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=30 
[last accessed 3/1/08].  
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billion in 1996 dollars) for the first five years of the fifteen year program.15  Just as the 
AFP and Congress ironed out cost issues, the Asian Financial Crisis presented a new 
challenge to military modernization. The peso depreciated by nearly 40% against the 
U.S. dollar, requiring the Air Force and Navy to suspend several weapons orders such 
as fighter planes and offshore patrol vessels.16    
Increased Threats 
Coincidentally, it was the conflict in the Spratly Islands with China which 
strengthened the Philippine government's resolve for military modernization. Tensions 
flared in February 1995 when the Chinese navy occupied Mischief Reef, territory in 
the Spratly Island group claimed by the Philippines. In response to the construction of 
an alleged military outpost,17 President Fidel Ramos dispatched warships and fighter 
jets to the area. The following month, the AFP seized several fishing boats, detaining 
sixty-two Chinese fishermen.18 Although both sides sought diplomatic solutions to 
resolve the conflict, the Philippines remained wary of Chinese intentions in the South 
Sea.  Further sightings of Chinese naval vessels in the region, and the construction of a 
helicopter landing pad for the People’s Liberation Army in 1997, continued to fuel 
tension. Philippine policymakers now identified China as the primary, long-term 
security threat.19 
 In addition to external threats posed by China, the Philippines faced an upsurge 
in several internal insurgencies in the late 1990s. Until at least 1995, the number of 
communist insurgents had been declining from a peak of 25,000 guerillas in 1988 to a 
                                                 
15 Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. Tenth Congress, Second Regular Session. Joint 
Resolution No. 28. “Joint resolution expressing the approval by both houses of congress of Republic Act 
No. 7898.”December 19, 1996. 
16 De Castro 2004, p.210. 
17 China claimed the platforms were intended to provide shelter for fisherman. 
18 Philip Shenon. “Rival Claims to Island Chain Bring Edginess to Asia's Rim.” New York Times, April 
5, 1995. Section A;  Page 11;  Column 1.  
19 Renato Cruz de Castro. "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold 
War or an Alliance for the 21st Century?" Asian Survey 43, no. 6 (2003), p.977. 
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low of 5,000 in 1995.20  The number of Muslim separatists had also declined sharply 
from approximately 26,000 fighters in 1987 to around 14,000 in 1991.21  However, 
this trend reversed in the mid-late 1990s. NPA numbers steadily increased, reaching to 
11,930 members in 2001. The number of guerilla fronts also expanded from 58 in 
1995 to 70 in 2000.22  Regarding Muslim separatist groups, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF), increased their level of violence, engaging in full-blown combat against the 
AFP by the end of the decade. Although MILF numbers continued to increase, a new, 
Muslim separatist group, the Abu Sayyaf, posed an even greater security risk. 
Operating as a transnational network, the Abu Sayyaf successfully plotted several 
bombings and kidnappings in the Southern Philippines.  
 In light of rising external threats and heightened internal disorder, improved 
security ties to the U.S. suddenly looked appealing. To Philippine elites, the Mischief 
Reef incident signaled revisionist intentions behind China’s rise as a major regional 
power. If previously lost in impassioned debates against U.S. bases, Philippine elites 
now recognized the important balancing role served by U.S. military presence in Asia. 
A renewed defense commitment between the two countries acted as a hedging strategy 
against Chinese incursion into the Spratlys. Furthermore, Philippine counter-threats 
against China rang hollow given the dismal state of the Philippine military. Thus, 
strengthening security ties with the U.S. offered a quick resource boost to the 
underfinanced, poorly equipped AFP.23 U.S. military assistance could also be directed 
against the Communist and Muslim separatist insurgencies, freeing resources for AFP 
modernization. 
                                                 
20 Charles Morrison, ed. Asia Pacific Security Outlook 1997. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 1997, 
p.97. 
21 Morrison 1997, p.98. 
22 de Castro 2006, p.109. 
23 de Castro 2003, pp.977-78. 
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 To revive the U.S.-Philippine security alliance, officials began negotiating an 
agreement in 1996 which would legally enable U.S. troops and ships to operate on 
Philippine territory. After two years of negotiations, Washington and Manila signed 
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1998. Most immediately, the VFA 
guaranteed legal status to U.S. troops partaking in joint military exercises in the 
Philippines. In a mutually beneficial move, the VFA functioned as a means for 
Washington to help develop the AFP’s operational strategy and create joint operability 
between the two forces. The VFA also opened access to air and naval facilities in the 
Philippines, facilitating rapid deployment of U.S. troops in the event of a crisis. The 
Philippine Senate subsequently ratified the VFA in 1999.  The agreement not only 
permitted U.S. troops to take part in large-scale training exercises such as the Balikitan 
exercises in early 2000, but arranged a new framework for AFP modernization.24 
9-11 and the Global War on Terror 
 If events and circumstances in the late 1990s helped mend U.S.-Philippine 
relations, 9-11 provided the ideological glue. As the first Asian state to support the 
Bush Administration’s global war on terror, the Philippines immediately pledged to 
grant overflight rights and logistical support. In a State Department broadcast, 
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly praised the Philippines for its “early, 
principled, and unequivocal support to the international fight against terrorism.”25 A 
joint statement produced during President Arroyo’s November 2001 meeting with 
President Bush in Washington affirmed that both countries would “work on a 
vigorous, integrated plan to strengthen the Philippine security forces' capacity to 
                                                 
24 Ibid. p.979. Balikatan, translated as “shoulder-to-shoulder”, are annual joint exercises to improve 
combat planning, combat readiness, and interoperability in support of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. 
The exercises had been suspended since 1993, but resumed in 2000 with 2,500 U.S. troops.  
25 U.S. State Department, Office of International Information Programs. “U.S. Official Praises 
Philippine Anti-Terrorism Effort.” November 16, 2001. Available at 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/11/mil-011117-usia03.htm> [last accessed 
3/4/08]. 
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combat terror and protect Philippine sovereignty.”26  The joint statement continued by 
offering an integrated plan which would “include a robust training package, equipment 
needed for increased mobility, a maintenance program to enhance overall capabilities, 
specific targeted law enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation, and a new 
bilateral defense consultative mechanism.”27   Bush also pledged to promote a ten-fold 
increase in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to $19 million for fiscal year 2002, an 
additional $10 million in military goods and services to assist the AFP, and another 
$10 million to support counterterrorism and law enforcement assistance.28 Figure 7.6 
below indicates the amount of U.S. economic and military assistance given to the 
Philippines from 1993 to 2006.  
 
 
        Figure 7.6: U.S. military and economic assistance to the Philippines 
          Source: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “U.S. overseas loans and grants”              
          http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/index.html 
 
                                                 
26 White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Joint Statement Between the United States of America 
and the Republic of the Philippines.” November 20, 2001. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011120-13.html [last accessed 3/4/08]. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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The two spikes beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000 roughly coincide with the 
onset of VFA negotiations and the war on terror, respectively. 
Figure 7.7 provides a list of the number of publicly known joint military 
exercises between the U.S. military and the AFP, indicating the greater extent of 
military cooperation since the passage of the VFA. 
 
 
     Figure 7.7: Number of joint military exercises between the U.S. military and         
            the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Source: Docena 2007, p. 54-56.  
 
In early 2002, 600 U.S. troops and special operation force members began training 
and conducting joint operations with the AFP to combat the Abu Sayyaf. After 
Afghanistan, the deployment to the southern Philippines marked the single largest 
deployment of U.S. forces in the war on terror since 9/11.29  The impact of joint 
counter-terrorist efforts received widespread praise after Philippine forces, with the 
assistance of the U.S. military, killed top Abu Sayyaf leader Abu Sabaya in a 
firefight.  Abu Sabaya had mastermind the kidnapping of dozens of foreigners, 
including an American missionary couple in 2001. 
                                                 
29 Eric Schimtt. “U.S. and Philippines Setting Up Joint Operations to Fight Terror.” New York Times. 
Section A, Column 2, p.1. January 15, 2001. 
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 By 2003, the fight against terrorism had cemented alliance relations, adding a 
new level of depth to the security consensus. In the first official state visit of a U.S. 
President to Manila in over 30 years, President Bush and President Macapagal-Arroyo 
confirmed that “the U.S.- Philippine partnership (had) taken on new vitality and 
importance in the context of the global war on terrorism.”30  This echoed an earlier 
meeting in Washington when Bush reaffirmed U.S. commitment to support the 
Philippines in destroying terrorist networks. In a joint statement, both sides confirmed 
that “the U.S.-Philippine security partnership has never been healthier.”31 
 The shift in elite attitudes favoring a stronger U.S.-Philippine alliance was not 
limited to just a few elites at the top. Unlike 1991, a widespread consensus existed 
both within the executive and legislative branches of government. This consensus was 
reflected in Manila’s response to civil societal opposition against the VFA.32  
Although activists sustained numerous large, vocal protests against the VFA for over a 
year, very few elites were sympathetic to anti-VFA activist demands. Elites repeatedly 
stated that the VFA tied directly into the Philippine’s national interest. The strong 
consensus favoring ratification of the VFA, and hence a strengthened U.S.-Philippine 
alliance, made it difficult for activists to gain any real traction in the VFA debate. 
Anti-VFA Protests 
 Anti-base activists did not disappear with the closure of U.S. bases in 1992.  
Groups instrumental to the movement, such as BAYAN and NFPC, continued their 
resistance against the U.S. military under new formations. For example, NFPC helped 
                                                 
30 Malacanang Palace, Office of the Press Secretary. “Joint Statement Between the Republic of the 
Philippines and the United States of America.” October 18, 2003.   
31 White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Joint Statement Between the United States of America 
and the Republic of the Philippines.” May 19, 2003. 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030519-3.html> [last accessed 3/5/08] 
32 While the anti-VFA protest was not directed against U.S. military bases, the arguments used by 
activists were similar to those found in anti-base protests. The VFA related directly to U.S. military 
presence in the Philippines. Many activists also feared that the VFA would eventually lead to the return 
of permanent bases.  
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establish a new organization, the People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup (PTFBC), to 
address environmental damages at Subic and Clark base. In November 1994, NFPC 
and other organizations such as the League of Filipino Students, Gabriela, and 
BAYAN organized a rally during Clinton’s visit to the Philippines to oppose the 
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).33 Although President Fidel 
Ramos and Foreign Secretary Romulo favored ACSA, the Senate viewed the proposal 
suspiciously. Senator ada  and Senator Mercado (now the chair of the Defense 
Committee), who had voted “no” to bases earlier, questioned how the Philippine 
government could permit foreign troops and facilities from entering the Philippines 
without a treaty covering legal arrangements.34 Proposals potentially suggesting the 
return of U.S. forces continued to evoke negative reactions among a significant 
number of elites. The Philippine government eventually rejected ACSA.35 
Anti-base (or anti-U.S. military) groups mobilized in a similar fashion against 
the VFA. Mobilization took place as early as 1996 when rumors first circulated about 
possible negotiations granting U.S. troops legal status on Philippine soil. The NFPC 
again played a pivotal role, initiating the anti-VFA movement with Free Legal 
Assistance of Government (FLAG). After Manila and Washington signed “VFA-1,”36 
anti-VFA groups escalated their efforts as negotiations for “VFA-2” entered full-
swing. Political, social, and religious groups, led by BAYAN, formed a broad 
                                                 
33 The proposed ACSA permitted the U.S. entry into Philippine ports to refuel and resupply ships. The 
U.S. could also spend up to $12 million dollars on supplies and parts. See Daniel Boone Schirmer. U.S. 
Bases by Another Name: ACSA  in the Philippines. Brooklyn, NY: Philippines Bases Network, 1995, 
p.7. 
34 Schirmer 1997. 
35 De Castro 2003, p.977. 
36 “VFA 1” prescribes the legal status of U.S. troops in the Philippines. However, the Philippine 
government insisted that the VFA also address issues of reciprocity for Philippine defense and military 
officials visiting the U.S. Thus, the two sides added a counterpart agreement -  “VFA 2” – which 
guaranteed Filipino military personnel visiting the U.S. the same legal rights prescribed to U.S. military 
personnel training in the Philippines. Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines. “The 
Visiting Forces Agreement (A Primer), 1998, p.19. 
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coalition group known as “Junk VFA” to persuade the Senate not to ratify the VFA.37  
Activists held anti-VFA rallies and protests nearly weekly as the date of Senate 
deliberations edged closer. Protests took place on July 13, 1998 as Philippine 
negotiators under the new Estrada Administration met their U.S. counterparts.  
Activists also planned a succession of protests near the U.S. Embassy to coincide with 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s visit on July 21. Defense Secretary William 
Cohen was given the same courtesy a month later when activists protested outside 
AFP Headquarters during his visit.  In September, the Kilusansa Pambansang 
Demokrasya (KPD) rallied outside the Senate building, and organized a caravan 
march from the former grounds of Clark Air Base to Subic Bay. The Junk VFA 
Movement sponsored two days of protests in Manila and several cities throughout the 
Philippines on September 15-16 to coincide with the date of the Senate’s rejection of 
U.S. bases in 1991.38 Protests continued throughout early 1999 as the Senate held 
VFA hearings. Charged as an affront to Philippine sovereignty, activists highlighted 
the adverse social and environmental impact of even “visiting” troops.39 Above all, 
activists feared that the VFA would eventually lead to the permanent stationing of 
U.S. troops and the return of permanent bases.40 
 
 
                                                 
37 NFPC Secretariat Cora Valdez-Fabros notes that a separate anti-VFA coalition, “No to VFA,” also 
formed due to ideological differences with members of Junk VFA. No to VFA was represented largely 
by the “rejectionist,” or RJ strand of the political left. The RJs splintered from the CPP in the early 
1990s, rejecting the basic principles of Marxist–Leninist–Maoist thought. Of the two coalitions, the 
larger Junk VFA attracted significantly more publicity and media attention. Interview with Cora 
Valdez-Fabros. Quezon City, Philippines. March 6, 2005.  
38 Although organizers expected a turn-out of 30,000, only 1,000 protestors arrived in Manila due to 
torrential rains. See Tonia Macapagal and Angie Rosales. “Rains fail to dampen rally protesting VFA.” 
The Manila Standard. September 17, 1998.  
39 For a comprehensive list of reasons behind VFA opposition, see the “Arguments of Anti-VFA - De 
La Salle University Stand on VFA.”  http://poligov.tripod.com/antivfa.html. [last accessed 3/10/08].  
40 Interview with Herbert Docena. Quezon City, Philippines. March 13, 2006. 
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State-Societal Interaction 
Similar to the base treaty in 1991, the VFA required ratification in the 
Philippine Senate. Before opening the VFA debate to the entire Senate, the VFA was 
sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the National Defense and Security 
Committee for their recommendation.  Between January 26 and March 11, 1999, the 
Defense and the Foreign Relations Committees conducted six public hearings – three 
within the Senate, and three in different cities around the Philippines – inviting nearly 
one hundred experts to share their reaction to the VFA. To gather a wide range of 
opinions, particularly those opposed to the VFA, the Senate invited academics, 
lawyers, activists, NGO workers, and local officials.  
Anti-VFA activists attempted to counter government claims which linked VFA 
ratification to the national interest. Targeting elites, Junk VFA members devised 
strategies nearly identical to those used in the Anti-Treaty Movement.41 However, 
activists found it nearly impossible to form ties with sympathetic elites as they had 
done only eight years earlier. Unlike 1991, Philippine elites in 1999 had a much 
different perception of national security and the U.S. alliance. In 1991, elites were 
divided in their attitude towards the U.S. alliance. Unable to justify the security logic 
behind U.S. bases, nationalist sentiments overpowered any justification to retain U.S. 
military presence.  
By 1999, the tide had changed. Eighteen of the twenty-three Senators voted in 
favor of the VFA. In their deliberation speech, all eighteen pro-VFA Senators pointed 
to the security benefits accrued from the VFA and strengthened U.S. alliance relations. 
Senate President Blas Ople, initially reluctant in approving the VFA, quoted, “And 
because we remain a militarily weak nation, this security alliance with the United 
                                                 
41 Internal Junk VFA notes and documents.  Copies obtained from personal collection of Corazon 
Fabros and NFPC Archives. 
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States remains a major anchor of our national safety, security, and freedom. How to 
give substance and effect to this treaty in a post-Cold War world that remains fraught 
with risks, is the very aim and purpose of the Visiting Forces Agreement.”42  In a 
similar vein, Senator Franklin Drilon stated, “It will not be often that an opportunity to 
strengthen our capability to enforce our common interests with the United States will 
present itself. The VFA is one such opportunity we cannot afford to miss, for without 
the Visiting Forces Agreement, any thought of arming ourselves in defense of our 
interests or to deter aggression will be meaningless.”43 
To demonstrate the breadth and depth of the new founded security consensus 
among political elites, it is worth mentioning the shift in attitude of three members of 
the “Magnificent Twelve” who voted against U.S. bases in 1991: Joseph Estrada, 
Orlando Mercado, and Juan Ponce Enrile.44 Now as President and National Defense 
Secretary, respectively, former senators Estrada and Mercado strongly endorsed the 
VFA, imploring the Senate to pass the agreement as a matter of national interest. 
Defense Secretary Mercado argued that the VFA “should not be considered a 
document independent of the country’s national defense strategy…but considered 
within the context of a more comprehensive policy on national defense and 
security.”45 Both Estrada and Mercado’s “turnabout,” from their Senate days spurred 
the wrath of anti-VFA activists. Ironically, Senator Enrile, who eight years earlier 
                                                 
42 “The VFA: Paradigm Shifts in the Security and Freedom of Nations.” Speech by Senator Blas Ople, 
Senate President Pro Tempore and Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 1999, in Senate 
Legislative Publications Staff. The Visiting Forces Agreement: The Senate Decision. Manila: Senate of 
the Philippines, 1999, p.1.  
43 “A Choice of National Interest.” Speech by Senator Franklin Drilon, May 3, 1999, in Senate 
Legislative Publications Staff. The Visiting Forces Agreement: The Senate Decision. Manila: Senate of 
the Philippines, 1999 p.52  
44 In addition to Senator Enrile, two other members of the Magnificent Twelve still served in the 
Philippine Senate: Aquilino Pimentel Jr. and Teofisto Guingona Jr. Both Senators voted against the 
VFA.  
45 Senate Legislative Publications Staff 1999, p.227.  
 263 
 
vehemently denied any external security threat justifying the need for U.S. bases, 
spent a substantial portion of his speech evoking the China threat. He quoted: 
 
“China…has clearly and unequivocally initiated an aggressive move 
against our national interest and that we are far too weak militarily and 
economically today to provide ourselves with an adequate defense 
against such a clear and present danger to us without the assistance of 
our Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States of America; and so 
the need for the Visiting Forces Agreement to enable our military 
forces and those of the United States to work together.”46  
 
In almost direct contradiction to his speech in 1991, Enrile continued, “I 
am…constrained to admit that our defense alliance with the United States is probably 
the only viable security umbrella and certainly the only one we can count on today in 
the event of need.”47 
If most Senators appeared staunchly in favor of the VFA, the consensus held 
even tighter in the executive branch of government. The executive summary of the 
VFA focused on the Agreement’s “vital importance…to the continued potency of the 
Mutual Defense Treaty…and (its) effectiveness as a deterrent to a potential 
aggressor.”48 More concretely, the VFA “provide(d) the AFP with the opportunity to 
enhance its defense capabilities by taking part in U.S. military assistance and training 
program.”49 Joint military exercises with U.S. troops enabled the AFP to adopt new 
strategies and technologies.50  In other words, Philippine elites linked the VFA and 
strengthened security ties to the U.S. with AFP modernization. The VFA also 
minimized the cost of the AFP modernization program by improving external 
                                                 
46 “Imperatives of National Survival.” Speech by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, May 3, 1999, in Senate 
Legislative Publications Staff. The Visiting Forces Agreement: The Senate Decision. Manila: Senate of 
the Philippines, 1999 p.68.  
47 Ibid., p.66.  
48 Senate Legislative Publications Staff 1999, p.195. 
49 Ibid, p.205. 
50 Ibid, p. 205. 
 264 
 
capabilities without expending exorbitant amounts on additional resources. During a 
public hearing, National Security Advisor Alexander Aguirre reminded the Senate that 
the country faced threats on two fronts, one internal, and one external, but remained 
hindered in its security response because of limited resources. Therefore, the U.S. 
alliance remained the best option to deter potential aggressors.51 
By the end of the decade, new external security threats and the sense of 
urgency felt by Philippine elites to modernize its military resulted in the reemergence 
of an elite security consensus. The consensus favored strengthened U.S. alliance 
relations and the return of “visiting” U.S. forces. Under this political environment, 
activist demands were drowned out by Philippine elites’ insistence on VFA 
ratification. Granted, mobilization against the VFA did not reach the magnitude of 
protests in 1991. Unity was hampered by the split within the Philippine left, which 
resulted in two different anti-VFA coalitions. Nevertheless, protests continued 
frequently for over a year as the Philippine public awaited the Senate’s verdict. Anti-
VFA activists received the backing of several prominent Catholic leaders, including 
the outspoken moral leader of the EDSA revolution, Cardinal Jamie Sin. Yet, unable 
to penetrate the strong consensus and form ties with sympathetic Senators as in 1991, 
the anti-VFA movement failed to translate their demands into actual policy 
outcomes.52 Even if anti-VFA movements had reached levels of protest similar to 
those in 1991, the security consensus framework predicts that Philippine elites would 
have undermined activist mobilization.    
Since 9-11, U.S. “visiting forces” have remained entrenched in the Philippines. 
In the post-9-11 period, even with countries rejecting U.S. military requests for access, 
                                                 
51 Ibid, p228 
52 Public opinion regarding the VFA paralleled opinion of U.S. bases in the early 1990s with 36% 
against and 63% in favor of temporary visits of U.S. soldiers to participate in military exercises. See 
Social Weather Station Survey, question on VFA, 1998.  
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the Philippines has “repeatedly complied…explicitly endorsed ...and actively 
supported” U.S. military presence in the Philippines.53  The consensus, while 
reformulated by national security threats in the mid-late 1990s, has slowly become 
embedded within Philippine domestic institutions. Herbert Docena argues, “Although 
domestic opposition to U.S. presence remains strong, the political forces that favor the 
U.S. continue to dominate the country’s political system.” Activists opposed to U.S 
military presence and activity in the Philippines have thus found it much more 
challenging to influence security policy decisions pertinent to the U.S.-Philippines 
alliance.54 In particular, the strengthening of an elite security consensus over time has 
made it difficult for anti-base movements (or anti-U.S. military protests) from winning 
major concessions from host governments.  
Okinawa 
Security Consensus after 9-11 
Whereas the strengthening of the security consensus over time explains change 
in movement outcomes in the Philippines, in Japan, the high degree of security 
consensus maintained since the mid-1990s should correspond to very little change in 
the status quo. That is, Okinawan anti-base movements continue to face immense 
challenges due to the U.S.-Japan alliance structure and the pervading consensus held 
by elites. Although Japan continues to increase its own military role in regional 
security affairs, flirting with revisions to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, 
Japanese elites still place the U.S. alliance near the center of its national security 
policy. Delays and co-optation through token concessions and economic incentives 
                                                 
53 Herbert Docena. "At the Door of All the East: The Philippines in United States Military Strategy." 
Quezon City, Philippines: Focus on the Global South, 2007, p.106. 
54 Activists note their success over the Angelo dela Cruz incident. Protestors pressured President 
Macapagal-Arroyo to withdraw Filipino troops from Iraq after Iraqi insurgents kidnapped a Filipino 
truck driver, Angelo de la Cruz. Iraqi insurgents threatened to execute de la Cruz unless Manila 
withdrew its 51-member humanitarian force. While the case was a clear victory for protestors, the issue 
did not apply directly to Philippine national security interests such as the VFA.  
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have helped Tokyo maintain positive alliance ties to the U.S. at the expense of 
Okinawan anti-base movements.  
Security Consensus in the 21st Century 
Chapter Three argued that U.S.-Japan relations strengthened in the mid-late 
1990s, despite brief tensions generated by the 1995 rape incident. This elite security 
consensus showed little sign of waning entering the twenty-first century.  Immediately 
after 9-11, Japan supported the U.S. “war on terror” by passing the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measure Law. The initial support for the war on terror extended Japan’s 
offshore support for U.S. military activity based on the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-
Japan Defense Cooperation. However, Japan took this a step further by deploying SDF 
forces beyond Japanese waters.55 For instance, Japan permitted Aegis destroyers to 
escort Japanese ships sent to provide logistical support to U.S. forces in the Indian 
Ocean. Security cooperation with the U.S. extended to other issue areas such as theater 
missile defense and the Iraq War. Supporting the U.S.-led invasion in Iraq, Japan 
dispatched a small contingent of ground forces to participate in reconstruction 
projects. According to Japan specialist Thomas Berger, “a broad spectrum of elite 
opinion [which] had solidified in support of the alliance” in the late 1990s enabled 
Japan to quickly adjust to the new U.S.-Japan alliance in the post 9-11 world.56 
 An analysis of Japan’s domestic politics this decade supports the persistence of 
an elite security consensus. Richard Samuel’s examination of domestic factions within 
the Japanese security debate reveals four broad discourses: neoautonomists, pacifists, 
middle power internationalists, and normal nationalists. Based on Samuel’s typology, 
Figure 7.6 below maps the various security discourses found in Japan. 
                                                 
55 Berger 2004, p.56.  
56 ibid, p.54. 
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Figure 7.6: Typology of security discourses within the Japanese polity 
Source: Figure adopted from Richard J. Samuels Securing Japan : Tokyo's Grand Strategy and 
the Future of East Asia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007, p.112. 
 
Although multiple discourses exist, the normal nationalists and middle power 
internationalists have alternated in power for the last six decades.57  Note how these 
two groups, located on the right-half of the spectrum, are most closely aligned to the 
U.S.  Moreover, the Koizumi-Abe strand of normal-nationalists have dictated security 
policy since 2001. Although the normal-nationalist camp, divided between revisionists 
                                                 
57 Samuels 2007, p.197. The normal-nationalists would like to see Japan return to the status of a 
“normal” nation – a nation which is capable of using its own military to defend itself against attacks. 
This group is divided between two groups: revisionists, who want to revise Article 9, legitimating the  
SDF with the use of force, and pragmatists (or realists), who view revisionists provocation of its Asian 
neighbors as unnecessary, and instead, provide for security without evoking Japan’s imperial past . The 
middle-power internationalists are also internally divided between Asianists and mercantile realist 
strands. Middle power internationalists are more cautious about expanding Japan’s military role. 
Mercantile realists, questioning the growth of Japan’s military role, continue to favor close ties to the 
U.S.. The Asianists, while accepting the U.S. alliance, argue at the same time that Japan should not 
ignore its Asian neighbors. Both groups emphasize economic over military power, and contend that 
Japan’s security policy legitimacy should stem from international institutions . See Samuels pp.126-27. 
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and pragmatists, hold different visions for the SDF, neither strand has ever been 
divided on the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance.58   
  Under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi (and briefly under his 
successor, Shinzo Abe), the revisionists enhanced the salience of military power in 
Japanese national security.  Symbolized by the JDA’s elevated status to Ministry of 
National Defense in 2007, the transformation of Japanese security policy may have 
stretched the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine and Article 9 to its limits.59  However, 
the strong security consensus built around the U.S.-Japan alliance remains intact. As 
Peter Katzenstein observes, “Japan has embraced what looks like a grand strategy of 
unquestioned security alignment with the United States. In an era in which the 
American imperium is under siege, Japan is deeply invested in enhancing its special 
relationship with the United States.”60  Japan’s recent assertiveness may thus be 
interpreted as an updated version of the Yoshida Doctrine, with key elements such as 
the U.S. alliance and the hosting of U.S. bases in place. As Mike Mochizuki notes, 
even if constitutional revisions do take place, Japan will likely continue to restrain its 
use of military force in operations not directly impacting Japan’s national security.61    
The historical legacy of Japan’s imperial past and the postwar institutional 
security arrangements imposed by the U.S. helped produce norms and domestic 
structures which prevented Japan from pursuing a military-first security policy.62  
Relying instead on the U.S. security umbrella for external defense, these structures led 
Japan to formulate security policy in more comprehensive terms, focusing heavily on 
                                                 
58 ibid, p.177. 
59 Samuels 2007, Ch. 4. Thomas Berger, however, believes the Yoshida Doctrine makes “more sense 
today than ever,” attested by Japan’s ever tighter coupling with the U.S. See Berger 2004, p.54-55. 
60 Katzenstein 2007, p.31. 
61 Mike Mochizuki. "Change in Japan’s Grand Strategy: Why and How Much?" Asia Policy 4 (2007), 
p.195. 
62 Katzenstein and Okawara, p.92.  
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economic power.63   In other words, prevailing norms and institutional arrangements 
required Japanese policymakers to embed the structure of the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance into Japan’s national security framework. Thus the security consensus, still 
deeply entrenched in Japanese norms and institutions, remains strong in the twenty-
first century. 
From SACO to the Henoko Struggle 
 Chapter Three ended with a discussion of the SACO policy recommendations 
and the conditional return of Futenma Air Station, which in its best light, amounted to 
token concessions. The SACO report in December 1996 marked the conclusion of the 
first cycle of protest in the “third wave.”  Yet twelve years after the SACO Agreement, 
Futenma remains open as Tokyo and Okinawan anti-base activists wrangle over the 
construction of Futenma’s replacement facility in Henoko Bay. To understand why 
anti-base movement’s failed to make substantial progress on the Futenma issue a 
decade after SACO requires examination of additional movement episodes in the post-
SACO period.  In this section, I highlight how the pervading security consensus and 
the use of compensation politics by the Japanese government led to a virtual standstill 
in the Futenma relocation issue.  
As noted earlier, Futenma’s relocation did not amount to anti-base victory. 
Outlined in the final SACO report, Futenma’s return was contingent upon the 
construction of an offshore replacement facility in the Henoko district of Nago City. 
By relocating Futenma within Okinawa, the Japanese government managed to split the 
anti-base struggle into internal local factions. As Miyume Tanji notes, “In the post-
SACO period, the protest actors inevitably splintered into smaller, multiple 
groups…(and) became geographically scattered and regionalized.”64  Specifically, 
                                                 
63 Ibid, p.92. 
64 Tanji 2006, p.163.  
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Nago City residents were split between pro and anti-base factions. Pro-base LDP 
members in Okinawa with close ties to Tokyo supported the offshore base, hoping to 
obtain large subsidies from the Japanese government. Although these members 
supported the mayor of Nago City, the mayor initially supported the anti-base 
position. Hoping to shift Mayor Tetsuya Higa’s position on the bases, several officials 
from Tokyo met Nago city officials in a closed door meeting to persuade Higa to 
support the offshore facility. Indeed, Higa emerged from the meeting with a different 
attitude. While not explicitly endorsing the base, he allowed Tokyo to begin 
topographical surveys in preparation for base construction.65  
Henoko district in Nago City became the focal point of post-SACO anti-base 
movements in Okinawa. Political parties, labor unions, teacher’s associations, 
women’s groups, and environmental groups launched a fresh campaign aimed at 
blocking the construction of the offshore facility. Unlike earlier Okinawan anti-base 
movements directed by political parties and unions, however, shimin, or local citizens, 
carried the anti-base mantle forward. At the core of this shimin struggle was the 
Henoko Life Protection Society, a committee formed in January 1997 by twenty-seven 
residents opposed to the offshore heliport.66 The group pitched a large tent (later 
replaced by a prefabricated structure) by Henoko’s fishing port, naming their 
makeshift headquarters the “struggle hut.”  The Society was based on the identity of 
local Henoko residents, and characterized by the participation of older residents who 
experienced the Battle of Okinawa.  
Several other anti-base groups in Nago and Northern Okinawa organized in 
solidarity with the Society in opposing the heliport construction. Four labor unions in 
Nago formed the Five Party Coalition in February 1997 with the specific goal of 
                                                 
65 Ibid 2006, p.164 
66 Ibid 2006, p.164. 
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supporting the Henoko Life Protection Society and enlarging its support base.67 This 
coalition was joined by Okinawa Peace Center, an island-wide coalition of labor 
unions, in hopes of drawing in support from trade unions in various areas of Okinawa. 
Two more anti-base groups formed in April: the Society of Nago Citizens Opposed to 
the Heliport, and the All-Nago Citizens’ Group Against the Heliport.68 Like the 
Henoko Life Protection Society, these two groups defined themselves as a “citizens” 
movement, distancing themselves from any political affiliation. The shimin-led anti-
base movement represented local residents rather than any political group or 
ideological position. Of course, political parties and unions still served an important 
role by bringing in mobilization resources and experience. However, they played more 
of a supporting rather than lead role in the post-SACO anti-base movement.69  
As the number of anti-base groups in Nago City proliferated, activists 
organized a broader coalition composed of twenty-one groups to promote a 
referendum in an effort to derail base relocation plans. Named the Nago Citizens’ 
Referendum Promotion Council, the coalition channeled anti-base opposition into the 
political process by proposing a city-wide referendum to vote in favor or against the 
offshore facility.70 The anti-base coalition used multiple frames to draw attention to 
the struggle against the offshore base.71 Anti-base literature and flyers evoked anti-
Japanese sentiment. Okinawans were reminded of Tokyo’s past deceitfulness: Japan’s 
sacrifice of Okinawa during World War II, and the continued presence of the U.S. 
military even after Okinawa’s reversion in 1972.  By highlighting that Futenma’s 
replacement facility represented U.S. rather than Okinawan interests, activists 
                                                 
67 Ibid, 2006, p.165. 
68 Ibid, 2006, p.165. 
69 Ibid 2006, p. 168. 
70 Ibid 2006, p. 167. 
71 For instance, flyers produced by the Japanese Communist Party (February 2000) and the Okinawa 
Committee for Struggles against the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit addressed multiple grievances stemming 
from U.S. bases.  
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contradicted official statements that Tokyo was working to address Okinawan 
grievances. The anti-base coalition also adopted an environmental frame by focusing 
on the dugong – a sea mammal related to the manatee. Realizing that the endangered 
dugong inhabited Henoko Bay, activists claimed that the offshore base would destroy 
the dugong population. The dugong became the unofficial symbol of the anti-base 
struggle during this phase of the movement, which helped draw in environmental 
NGOs and other activists from mainland Japan. The dugong appeared on anti-base 
flyers, t-shirts, and badges with slogans such as, “Money disappears in a moment, but 
nature, if protected lasts forever,” or, “On the beautiful sea and beautiful island that 
cultivates life, we do not need the offshore base…”72 
On December 1997, 51.3% of Nago residents voted against the offshore 
heliport in Henoko.73 Despite this victory for the anti-base coalition, Tokyo, weighing 
the importance of the U.S. alliance, continued to skirt around anti-base opposition. 
The central government refused to openly discuss base issues with any top officials in 
the Okinawan prefectural government for nearly ten months after Governor Ota 
rejected Prime Minister Hashimoto’s appeal for the construction of the offshore 
heliport.74 The Futenma relocation issue eventually transferred to the hands of the next 
governor, the LDP backed Inamine Keiichi, and the new administration headed by 
Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo. With new leadership in Okinawa, Obuchi reopened 
financial flows, pledging 10 billion yen to Inamine’s government and making a 
personal pledge to find a solution to Futenma’s relocation.75  To further placate anti-
base opposition, Prime Minister Obuchi announced in April 1999 that Nago City 
(along with Kyushu) would host the 2000 G-8 summit. In preparation for the summit, 
                                                 
72 Inoue 2007, p.177. 
73 Yonetani 2001, p.78. 
74 Ibid 2001, p.78. 
75 Ibid 2001, p.80. 
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Tokyo pledged an annual 100 billion yen stimulus package to Northern Okinawa 
(where Nago City was located) for the next ten years with the first 100 billion yen 
redirected to Okinawa beginning in 2000.76  The economic incentives worked their 
magic. In December 1999, Nago City consented to the construction of an offshore 
heliport, under the stipulation that Tokyo meet several conditions, including a fifteen 
year limit on military use of the offshore base.  Tokyo had again played its hand well, 
relying on compensation packages and other economic incentives to soothe over anti-
base opposition. By inducing local communities to accept large-scale public works 
and providing additional material incentives, Tokyo pacified anti-base opposition. 
Economic incentives helped separate more radical elements of anti-base opponents 
from those who were willing to tolerate bases, so long as they were well-
compensated.77  
Rifts within the Nago anti-base movement deepened with more grassroots 
movements overshadowed by party political machines in the 1998 Nago City mayoral 
election. As the movement gained exposure globally, the tension between pro-base 
residents’ material interests and the global aspirations of anti-base Okinawans trying 
to reach out to a broad, international audience became more pronounced. For instance, 
when environmental and peace groups from mainland Japan arrived in Henoko 
wearing “Save the Dugong” buttons, Henoko residents retorted, “Our life is more 
important than the dugong’s.”78 Masamichi Inoue notes, “Tokyo’s carrots and sticks, 
when fused with the pro-base group’s desire to revitalize the local economy, slowly 
but steadily permeated from the top to the bottom of Nago’s pyramid-like pro-base 
mobilization structure.”79  Of course, Tokyo exploited these tensions through 
                                                 
76 Ibid 2001, p.80. 
77 For a discussion on compensation politics as a government strategy in Okinawa, see Mulgan 2001.  
78 Inoue 2001, p.188.  
79 Ibid 2001, p.166.  
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compensation politics. With indirect support from Tokyo, pro-base groups captured 
the mayoral race, while the Nago anti-base coalition withered as a cohesive 
movement. 
Into the 21st Century 
Twelve years have passed since the SACO agreement, yet Futenma Air Base 
continues to operate. Have anti-base movements completely failed in their struggle 
against U.S. bases?  Table 7.1 below highlights several movement episodes during the 
past ten years.   
 
Table 7.1: Anti-base movement episodes in Okinawa80  
Date Event Movement’s  Immediate 
Goal 
Government Response 
September 1995-
December 1996 
Rape of 12 year old 
school girl 
Base Reduction/SOFA 
revision 
SACO recommendations: 
Base land return including 
Futenma Air Station. 
Noise reduction policies. 
June 1997 -
December 1997 
Announcement of 
Henoko as 
replacement facility 
site of Futenma  
Referendum in Nago City 
to block construction of 
offshore replacement 
facility. 
Government officials sent 
to influence referendum 
outcome. 
July 2000 Upcoming G8 
Summit 
Raise international 
attention about Okinawan 
bases. Stop offshore 
facility plan. 
Government pledges 
massive economic 
subsidies and public 
works projects 
August 2004  Helicopter crash at 
Okinawa 
International 
University 
Compensation for crash; 
suspend military flights 
over civilian areas; early 
return of Futenma Base 
Government investigates 
crash; Pledges to push 
forward with relocation 
plans. 
April 2004 - Sept 
2005 
Drilling surveys in 
Henoko Bay 
Block geological survey 
and drilling of seabed 
through canoe protest.  
Government cancels 
offshore plan. Announces 
new plan expanding 
Camp Schwab. 
 
At the very least, it is safe to conclude that anti-base movement outcomes over the 
past decade have been mixed. Over the course of several movement episodes, anti-
base movements were able to win tactical concessions, such as the inclusion of 
                                                 
80 This list excludes anti-base mobilization aimed at influencing election outcomes, such as the 1998 
and 2006 Nago City mayoral elections, or the 1998 and 2006 gubernational elections. The distinction 
between formal and informal politics regarding bases in Okinawa is often blurred. 
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Futenma’s relocation in the 1996 SACO report, the rejection against an offshore 
heliport in the 1997 referendum, and the blocking of Tokyo’s attempt to push ahead 
with the “coral reef” base plan in 2005. At each point of “victory,” however, the 
Japanese government countered the activists’ tactical gains by putting forth new 
proposals keeping U.S. bases in Okinawa and managing positive alliance relations 
with the U.S.  As activists correctly pointed, the Futenma agreement originally 
outlined under the SACO report amounted to base relocation rather than reduction.81 
In a catch-22, activists may successfully block new base plans for Northern Okinawa, 
but in doing so, enable Futenma Air Station to remain open.  
  To their credit, anti-base activists were effective in blocking the offshore 
replacement facility plan. In April 2004, a group of activists paddled into Henoko Bay 
in canoes to physically prevent the DFAA from conducting geological drilling 
surveys. After five hundred consecutive days of resistance, local Henoko activists 
prevailed as the government removed the scaffolds from the water in September 2005.  
However, as activists valiantly “paddled” against the government, Tokyo and 
Washington entered negotiations to discuss U.S. military realignment in Okinawa. In 
October 2005, the U.S. and Japan announced it would scrap the offshore facility plan. 
Rather than building on top of a reef as engineered in the offshore plan, the two sides 
agreed to a “coastal plan” which would expand nearby Camp Schwab. To 
accommodate the functions of Futenma, the government planned to build a V-shaped 
                                                 
81 On the contrary, Japan and the U.S. believe this relocation is tantamount to a reduction. As one U.S. 
official stated, “The Futenma base will be moved from an area where 80,000 live to one where only less 
than 2,000 reside. You cannot say this is not burden reduction. If the return of the base is realized, a 
military base that is located in a densely-populated area will be moved to the north, where there is a 
small population . . .This will be very beneficial for Okinawa.” Interview with Naha U.S. Consul 
General Thomas G. Reich by Tsuyoshi Matsumoto of the Ryuku Shimpo.  November 22, 2005. 
Transcript available on Naha Consulate website. “Consul General Speaks to Ryukyu Shimpo on DPRI.”  
< http://naha.usconsulate.gov/wwwh-interview20051122.html> [last accessed 11/23/07] 
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runway extending Camp Schwab into the sea.82 In addition, the U.S. announced the 
relocation of 7,000 U.S. marines to Guam on the condition of Futenma’s relocation.   
Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush signed the USFJ realignment plan, 
committing Japan to take on a greater role in the U.S.-Japan security alliance.83 Tokyo, 
however, forged this new agreement without any consultation with the local or 
prefectural government in Okinawa. Okinawans, including the LDP governor Keichi 
Inamine, were outraged that Tokyo had again neglected their voice.  
The strong security consensus, specifically national elite perceptions and 
beliefs regarding U.S. bases and the U.S.-Japan alliance, have stalemated base policy 
outcomes for over a decade.  The inability of anti-base movements to achieve 
significant base reductions is likely attributed to both internal movement problems as 
well as structural factors.84  The major challenge faced by Okinawan anti-base 
movements, however, is fundamentally structural. The U.S.-Japan alliance structure, 
and the perceptions and beliefs held by elites regarding this relationship, pose a 
formidable obstacle for activists. Activists challenge what elites perceive as essential 
to Japan’s national interest.  In turn, Tokyo’s response to anti-base pressure is shaped 
by the strong security consensus. Internal weaknesses and division are endemic to 
most anti-base movements, but governments also generate internal conflict or exploit 
tension by  employing strategies of co-optation or coercion against anti-base groups. 
From a diachronic standpoint, the continuity of the security consensus in Japan has 
                                                 
82 Yoshikazu Makishi,. "U.S. Dream Come True? The New Henoko Sea Base and Okinawan 
Resistance." Japan Focus #502 (2006). <http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/1819> [last 
accessed 11/15/07]. 
83 See Japan Ministry of National Defense. Defense of Japan 2006. Chapter 4, Section 2. 
<http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2006/4-2-1.pdf> [last accessed 11/23/07]. Later the U.S. 
announced it planned to withdraw 8,000 Marines.  
84 The base policy changes which have taken place have largely been initiated by the U.S., who 
continue to work with Tokyo in maintaining a stable force presence in the region, while circumventing 
Okinawan base opposition.  
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limited anti-base movement effectiveness, and kept movement outcomes relatively 
static over the course of a decade.   
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated the relationship between the security consensus and 
movement effectiveness diachronically in the Philippines and Japan. By allowing 
“variability” in the security consensus, particularly in the Philippine case, I showed 
how change in the security consensus over time resulted in different patterns of action 
between state and society, thereby producing different outcomes. As an elite security 
consensus regarding U.S. relations strengthens over time, movement effectiveness 
should decrease as patterns of interaction between activists and security policy-makers 
move from cooperation to greater confrontation. Thus, in the Philippines, anti-base 
activists who found allies within the Philippine Senate in 1990-91 were increasingly 
marginalized as Philippine elites tightened their alliance with the U.S.  In the security 
scarce environment of the 1990s, Philippine elites embraced the U.S. alliance as the 
best guarantee against national security threats.  
Although not discussed at length in this chapter, we should expect greater 
movement “success.” when the security consensus weakens over time. As the host 
government moves away from a U.S.-alliance centered security policy, political space 
opens for activists to penetrate the state and form ties with elites. For anti-base 
movements to achieve success, however, activists must still employ the right strategies 
and frames while taking advantage of the available political opportunity to “penetrate” 
the state. With a gradual ebbing of the security consensus, South Korea is one 
potential country where anti-base activism may bear greater policy impact in the 
future. Granted, a moderate security consensus embedded in institutions and ideology 
continues to place constraints on anti-base movement effectiveness. However, a major 
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“shock” such as North Korean reunification could ultimately shatter this elite 
consensus, empowering civil society on USFK and U.S. alliance related issues. 
 With relatively wide breadth and maximum depth, the elite consensus in Japan 
remains virtually unchanged from the mid-1990s. Anti-base movements continue to 
challenge U.S. military bases in Okinawa. However, for the foreseeable future, the 
impact of Okinawan anti-base movements appears limited.  Barring major structural 
changes in the elite consensus and U.S.-Japan security relations, Tokyo will continue 
to marginalize anti-base opposition, offering token economic concessions to Okinawa 
in an effort to retain U.S. military bases. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ALLIANCES, ANTI-BASE MOVEMENTS, AND THE  
FUTURE OF U.S. BASING STRATEGY  
 
In this dissertation, I investigated two central questions. First, when and how 
did anti-base movements affect U.S. base policy decisions. Second, how did host 
governments maneuver between domestic politics and U.S. relations in the wake of 
anti-base opposition. The central claim was that elite beliefs and perceptions regarding 
U.S. relations in the context of national security a) functioned as a political 
opportunity structure inhibiting or facilitating movements and b) influenced patterns 
of movement-government interaction leading to particular policy outcomes.  
As highlighted in the Philippines and Ecuador cases, anti-base movements 
were more likely to influence basing policy outcomes under conditions of weak 
security consensus. A weak consensus, leading to policy incoherence and division 
among elites, enabled activists to penetrate the state. With easier access to elites, anti-
base forces presented an alternative security agenda by demanding the removal of U.S. 
bases. Not only did anti-base activists challenge elites advocating a pro-U.S. foreign 
policy stance, their demands resonated with several key elites responsible for base 
policy decisions. Therefore, by forming ties with sympathetic elites, activists played 
an important role in pushing for major base policy changes.   
Conversely, as demonstrated by Okinawan, Italian, and to some extent South 
Korean anti-base movements, activists often faced stiff resistance from governments 
under conditions of strong or moderate security consensus. Shaped by and embedded 
within historical legacies, anti-communist ideology, and domestic institutions, a core 
consensus favoring alliance relations with the U.S. persisted among key elites in 
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Tokyo, Rome, and Seoul. Moreover, in Japan and South Korea, heightened external 
threat perceptions stemming from the North Korean nuclear threat and China’s 
regional ascension helped solidify a consensus favoring U.S. bases in the post-Cold 
War era.  Certainly, voices demanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces existed within the 
polity. However, these alternative views, often carried by elites on the political fringe, 
were typically isolated or ignored. Facing major anti-base protests, host governments 
attempted to diffuse domestic pressure to prevent U.S.-host state alliance relations 
from deteriorating.  
 In crisis situations created by powerful anti-base opposition, host governments 
occasionally provided limited concessions in an effort to quell protests.   For example, 
Tokyo and Washington commissioned the SACO Report in response to intense 
protests triggered by the 1995 rape incident in Okinawa. On the whole, however, the 
presence of a strong or even moderate security consensus reduced anti-base movement 
effectiveness. Despite large-scale mobilization, basing policies remained virtually 
unchanged. When concessions were provided by host governments, they were often 
token in nature. Prioritizing national security, host governments thwarted anti-base 
pressure by using a range of strategies from delay to co-optation to coercion. In sum, a 
dominant elite consensus favoring U.S. force presence and strong ties to the U.S. 
functioned as a powerful ideological barrier against anti-base movements.  
Theoretical Issues 
My theoretical argument embraces insights from both international relations 
and comparative politics. The security consensus framework draws from the political 
process model found in the social movement literature. It also resonates with 
arguments presented by statist realists addressing the role of domestic politics in 
international relations. However, the concept of “security consensus,” constituted by 
ideas, institutions, and ideology in addition to material-based threat perceptions, 
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borrows extensively from insights found in the constructivist perspective of 
international relations. This should encourage other scholars to continue exploring 
innovative research situated at the intersection of both subfields.   
Unit of Analysis 
 A potential challenge for scholars conducting research at the nexus of 
international relations and comparative politics is the levels of analysis problem. As 
this dissertation demonstrates, however, drawing social movement analysis into 
international relations theory creates space for intellectual innovation in the choice of 
a proper unit of analysis. Shifting the unit and level of analysis below the level of 
states to movement episodes opens the door for a more complex, richer, set of 
explanations.  At the same time, this analytical move does not negate the important 
role of the state, or the national context in which anti-base movements are embedded 
in.  By thinking about anti-base movements at the level of countries and movement 
episodes, this dissertation is able to address important theoretical and empirical 
questions across disciplines.  
Middle-Range Theories 
The theoretical framework laid out in Chapter One is open to criticism that I 
present an overwhelmingly structural account of base politics. The security consensus, 
as a “super-variable,” creates an excessively parsimonious argument, determining base 
policy outcomes simply by the presence or absence of elite ideational cohesion.  This 
criticism is echoed more generally by social movement scholars who find fault with 
POS. Critics contend that POS promises to explain too much, while at the same time 
ignoring the role of agency.1 As Gamson and Meyer argue, “The concept of political 
                                                 
1 David Meyer, 2004a. "Protest and Political Opportunities." Annual Review of Sociology 30 (2004), 
p.126; Also see Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper. Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, 
and Emotion. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 
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opportunity structure is . . . in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect 
of the social movement environment.”2   
The empirical chapters assuage any appearances of advocating a purely 
structural account of base politics. In the case studies, I described movement 
mobilization in detail, building evidence that activists indeed achieved high 
mobilization strength in all the cases.3  In the Philippines and Ecuador, I showed how 
anti-base activists actively supported and formed ties with sympathetic elites. 
Penetrating the state, activists presented an alternative security discourse eventually 
adopted by enough key elites to change base policy outcomes.4 
A purely structural argument would directly link a weak security consensus to 
changes in base policies. My analysis suggests that the link and underlying causal 
mechanisms are more complicated. Nor is it inevitable that a weak security consensus 
always leads to base withdrawals or other major changes. For example, despite the 
weak security consensus in Ecuador, Washington and Quito would have likely re-
signed the Manta Base Agreement had anti-base activists not escalated the issue into a 
national controversy. One might counter this claim by arguing that a leftist president, 
such as Rafael Correa, would not have accepted U.S. military presence. However, 
careful process tracing of events show that the shift against Manta, which took place 
even before Correa’s election, rose from the bottom up. In short, the Manta case was 
not a pure elite-driven process dictated by a weak security consensus. Movement 
strategies, such as the decision to host the international No Bases conference in Quito, 
                                                 
2 William Gamson and David Meyer. "Framing Political Opportunity." In Comparative Perspectives on 
Social Movements : Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, edited by 
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 275-90. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996, p.275. 
3 The one partial exception may be the anti-base movement in Manta, Ecuador.  
4 An alternative discourse against U.S. bases already existed in the Philippines prior to the formation of 
anti-base movements in the early 1980s. This position was magnified by the Anti-Treaty Movement. 
While the anti-base faction were never in the majority, they had built enough momentum in the elite 
Senate to reject U.S. bases.  
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or disseminating information to elites based on extensive research in Manta and the 
Colombia-Ecuador border, also played an important role in outcomes. 
Even under conditions of strong or moderate security consensus where 
movements seem to demonstrate significantly less impact, outcomes were still 
dependent upon the action of agents. For instance, government elites in South Korea 
could have used force earlier to remove local residents in Pyeongtaek. However, the 
government, partially out of fear in escalating anti-American sentiment, opted to delay 
coercive tactics until the spring of 2006. The MND’s public relations campaign prior 
to the dispatch of riot police also worked brilliantly in undercutting public support for 
KCPT.  Hence, even though a strong security consensus significantly shaped the 
patterns of engagement between state and society, the choices of actors still mattered. 
Using brute force during the development phase of KCPT in 2005, or failing to 
adequately explain and interpret government actions in Pyeongtaek to South Korean 
citizens could have potentially altered outcomes. Derailing the entire relocation 
process may have been a stretch, but greater concessions to KCPT, such as a reduction 
in base size, were in the realm of possibility.5 In sum, while the consensus constrains 
or facilitates what actors can or cannot do, it does not determine outcomes itself. A 
larger part of the story revolves around the choices of movement and government 
actors within structural boundaries. 
Addressing Regime Type in the Base Politics Literature 
Scholars of base politics, most notably Alexander Cooley and Kent Calder, 
have pointed to regime type as a major factor influencing base politics. Base 
agreements appear most stable in consolidated democracies, and most unstable during 
                                                 
5 While U.S. and Korean officials stated this was a non-option, in the face of unrelenting anti-base 
opposition and a resurgence of anti-U.S. public opinion, I presume both governments would have been 
more amenable to KCPT demands. For instance, KCPT wanted both governments to reassess base 
location plans, questioning the need for the entire relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek, 
or the addition of recreational facilities such as a golf course.  
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periods of democratization.6 Given the correlation between democratic transitions and 
mass mobilization, one might find it surprising that a dissertation examining anti-base 
movements makes no direct reference to regime type. This section addresses regime 
type as an alternative explanation to the security consensus framework.  Although one 
may pit regime type and the security consensus as competing explanations, to a certain 
extent, the two approaches to base politics may actually complement one another.  
The relationship between regime type and base politics is most succinctly put 
forth by Alexander Cooley.7 Cooley develops a compelling theory explaining “when 
and why bilateral military basing agreements become accepted, politicized, or 
challenged by host countries.”8  While the argument rests on two interacting variables 
– the regime’s political dependence on U.S. bases, and the contractual credibility of 
political institutions – the latter variable, understood through variation among regime 
types, provides much of the analytical heavy-lifting. In brief, consolidated 
democracies provide the most credible institutions, and therefore the most stable 
environment for basing agreements.   According to Cooley, the institutional features of 
consolidated democracies – procedural legitimacy, institutional stability, and 
consolidated party systems - help “lock-in” basing commitments.9 Under consolidated 
democracies, basing agreements are accepted when host governments remain 
dependent on security contracts. Even when host governments are not dependent on 
U.S. bases for political, economic, or security benefits, the institutional features of 
democracies help depoliticize base issues. As a set of broader routine, bilateral 
                                                 
6 Cooley 2008, p.16-17; Calder 2007, p.112-14. 
7 Cooley 2008. 
8 Cooley 2008, p.3.  
9 Ibid 2008, p.15-16. Procedural legitimacy refers to institutional procedures, such as legislative 
ratification, which give basing contracts greater domestic credibility. Institutional stability refers to the 
delegation of basing issues to bureaucracies. The base policymaking process becomes “entrenched” by 
the increasing number of “veto players” who have a stake in maintaining bases. Lastly, consolidated 
party systems “tend to moderate the political stance of controversial  foreign policy and sovereignty  
issues.” 
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security arrangements, basing issues “are generally removed from everyday party 
politics and debates.”10  
Conversely, base agreements are most unstable during phases of democratic 
transition when contractual institutions are least credible. The lack of procedural 
legitimacy, jurisdictional ambiguity, and weak party systems which reward ideological 
or nationalist mobilization in democratizing countries, all bode poorly for U.S. bases.11  
Basing agreements are highly politicized during regime shifts. In particular, host 
regimes not dependent on base contracts for security or other benefits “are…the most 
likely of all base hosts to unilaterally abrogate the contract and evict the U.S. 
military.”12 
Lastly, authoritarian regimes provide a mixed bag. The lack of independent 
institutions allows a central figure to dictate the terms of basing agreements. As long 
as the regime remains dependent on the security contract and feeds political, economic, 
and/or security benefits to the ruler, basing agreements remain relatively stable. 
However, the lack of independent institutions also places the future of bases directly at 
the whims of dictators. As regime dependence on U.S. security contracts decreases, 
the leverage of dictators increase vis-à-vis the United States. Base issues, therefore, 
become politicized, characterized by increasing demands from host governments. 
These demands may include greater economic compensation, revisions to SOFA, or a 
reduction in the number of troops or bases.   
On one level, Cooley’s analysis of base politics and my own are not competing 
explanations because we focus on different questions, looking at slightly different 
outcomes. First, my analysis focuses on a narrower aspect of base politics: the impact 
of anti-base movements. Second, although Cooley and I are both interested in basing 
                                                 
10 Ibid 2008, p.21.  
11 Ibid 2008, p.18. 
12 Ibid 2008, p.21. 
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policy outcomes, our dependent variables mean different things. For Cooley, outcomes 
refer to the politicization and stability of basing contracts. In my analysis, policy 
outcomes is taken as a measure of movement effectiveness or movement success.  
Disclaimers aside, how does the security consensus framework address the 
question of regime type in base politics?  While recognizing that both approaches have 
something unique to offer in the analysis of base politics, I contend that the security 
consensus subsumes regime type explanations. For the security consensus framework 
to hold against Cooley’s argument, the empirical cases need to demonstrate that major 
domestic opposition to bases and base policy changes were determined by anti-base 
movement opposition under conditions of weak security consensus rather than weak 
domestic political institutions. Conversely, the stability of base agreements should 
derive from the security consensus rather than the contractual credibility of political 
institutions under democracies. I test the weight of both arguments by briefly 
investigating base politics in Italy, South Korea, and the Philippines which appeared in 
both works. I also include an analysis of base politics in Spain, reinterpreting Cooley’s 
analysis through the security consensus framework. 
Italy 
 According to Cooley’s theory, during the Cold War, Italian acceptance of U.S. 
bases stemmed from two factors: Christian Democrat dependence on U.S. security 
contracts, and the credibility of domestic political institutions. The democratic nature 
of Italian politics kept basing issues depoliticized even after the Cold War and the 
decline of the Christian Democrats. Although Italy’s reliance on U.S. bases 
significantly diminished without the Soviet threat, democratic institutions helped 
legitimize U.S. military presence in Italy.  
 Offering a different explanation, in Chapter Four, I argued that the stability of 
U.S. bases on Italian soil rested with the security consensus, not the political 
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institutions associated with regime type. The high degree of regime dependence on 
U.S. security contracts during the Cold War, noted by Cooley, is reflected in the 
existence of a strong security consensus.  Key elites shared a common understanding 
that U.S. bases functioned as a necessary component of Italian national security. Over 
time, Italian elites internalized the norms and values shared under the Atlantic alliance, 
transforming NATO into a key pillar of Italian foreign policy. The strong consensus 
persisted despite Italy’s fragmented, and at times, unstable political party system. For 
example, on the eve of Prodi’s 2006 electoral victory, U.S. officials feared the Italian 
government would renege on the Vicenza base expansion agreement signed by Prodi’s 
conservative predecessor and political rival, Silvio Berlusconi. That he did not is more 
a testament to the security consensus and Italian elite understanding of the Atlantic 
alliance, rather than democratic political institutions.  
 On the other hand, the contractual environment may be less stable than Cooley 
warrants in Italy because of frequently changing electoral laws and the 
disproportionate strength of minor parties. Moreover, even under consolidated 
democracies such as Italy, security contracts are less transparent and credible than 
Cooley assumes. In interviews with U.S. consulate and Italian security experts, no one 
was able (or perhaps willing) to verify the existence of an overarching, bilateral 
agreement guaranteeing Dal Molin airfield for the expansion of the 173rd Airborne 
Brigade.13 In fact, No Dal Molin activists cited the lack of transparency and the central 
government’s failure in informing Vicenza citizens about base expansion in a timely 
fashion as a major grievance.14  In sum, the democratic institutional logic put forth by 
                                                 
13 As one Italian security expert and Ministry of Defense advisor argued, most documents related to 
U.S. bases have been kept secret until recently. The few documents which are available tend to be 
vaguely worded. Interviews with activists also corroborated this statement. Interview with Italian 
security expert. January 22, 2008. Rome, Italy. 
14 The lack of transparency and the undemocratic nature of basing agreements were also listed as a 
major grievance by South Korean anti-base activists in Pyeongtaek.  
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Cooley fails to explain the politicization of the recent Vicenza movement episode, and 
the continuity of favorable U.S. basing policies in Italy   
In the Italian case, it appears that the security consensus subsumes regime type. 
The moderation of left parties on foreign policy issues is explained by the dominance 
of the security consensus, and reinforced by democratic institutions and party politics. 
In other words, stable, democratic institutions feed into the security consensus. 
Moreover, Italian elites may exhibit greater support for U.S. security relations and 
bases precisely because they share the same democratic principles. Contrary to 
Cooley’s interpretation, bases are not necessarily depoliticized in Italy, as witnessed 
by major anti-base protests from 2006-2007.  However, we expect basing policy 
outcomes to remain relatively unchanged due to the strong degree of security 
consensus held by Italian political elites. Placing a high value on U.S.-Italian relations 
and the NATO alliance, Italy will continue to play a critical role in U.S. overseas 
basing strategy for the foreseeable future.  
South Korea 
The South Korean case also uncovers discrepancies between Cooley’s theory 
and my own. Cooley links greater politicization of USFK related issues from 1996-
2002 to Korea’s relatively recent democratization and the uncertain contractual 
environment in South Korea. Democratization indeed empowered civil society to 
intensify criticism without having to fear a brutal government crackdown. Despite 
greater politicization, however, U.S. force presence, SOFA, and other base related 
issues remained relatively intact.   
Cooley interprets the contractual environment in South Korea from 1996-2002 
as unstable, with democratic institutions still undergoing the consolidation process. I 
offer a different interpretation. Strong alliance ties and the persistence of the security 
consensus helped weather much of the political storm, leading to few changes on 
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basing policy issues.  Cooley is correct in noting the politically charged issue of U.S. 
military presence from 1996-2002.  Perhaps this is due to the unstable contractual 
environment given the democratizing nature of South Korea’s political institutions as 
argued by Cooley. Analyzing anti-base movements through Cooley’s theory, as South 
Korea moves towards greater democratic consolidation, we should observe a decrease 
in anti-base protests. Yet in 2006, South Korea once again witnessed major clashes 
between the South Korean government and civil society over U.S. military issues.15 
Will base politics become routine in South Korea, or as Katharine Moon has argued, 
will South Korea’s vibrant, growing civil society suggest even greater politicization of 
U.S. base issues in a period of consolidated democracy?16 If the security consensus 
persists at moderate levels, anti-base protests will only have a limited impact on base 
policy outcomes. However, if we continue to see a gradual ebbing of the consensus, as 
argued in Chapter Five, we should not only expect to see greater contestation from 
civil society, but greater changes in base policy outcomes as well.  
Philippines  
The Philippines in 1991, marked by conditions of weak security consensus, 
corresponds to the unstable contractual environment found in Cooley’s argument. The 
overthrow of Marcos and low contractual credibility of political institutions in the 
aftermath helped politicize U.S. bases, leading to the ouster of U.S. forces. My 
argument explains this outcome and the pivotal role of anti-base movements based on 
the weak security consensus held by elites. Which interpretation provides a closer fit 
between theory and evidence? 
Examining the Philippines case longitudinally gives us some leverage. Both 
Polity IV scores, which evaluates “concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic 
                                                 
15 A democratic institutional argument would counter this criticism by arguing that base policy 
outcomes remained unchanged during this period.  
16 Moon 2003. 
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authority in governing institutions,” and Freedom House scores which measure the 
degree of political and civil liberties, have remained fairly constant since 1990.17  If 
the contractual environment of U.S. bases remains unchanged as indicated by 
measures of democracy for the Philippines, we should expect the same level of base 
politicization in 1991 as 2001. 
What are the legitimating mechanisms which have helped depoliticize U.S. 
military presence in the Philippines today?18 With constant threats of coups, and the 
fluidity of party politics, it is unclear whether credible political institutions are intact 
in the Philippines. The acceptance of U.S. forces since 1999, therefore, is better 
explained by the re-emergence of the security consensus among key Philippine elites, 
as argued in Chapter 6.  Thus, the stable contractual environment guaranteeing U.S. 
military related agreements today, such as the 1999 VFA and the 2002 Mutual 
Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), is shaped more by the strong security 
consensus rather than consolidated democratic institutions.  
Spain 
 A case study in Cooley’s research not found in my dissertation is the Spanish 
case. Does the security consensus framework apply to additional cases found in 
Cooley’s work, but not my own? Rather than challenging the institutional argument 
presented by Cooley, I use his analysis to probe whether my framework applies to 
Spanish anti-base movements in the 1980s.   
The security consensus was relatively weak in Spain in the early 1980s. Spain 
was loosely aligned with the West during the early years of the Cold War. However, 
                                                 
17 Polity IV scores have been locked at 8 (out of 10 with 10 being most democratic) since 1987. 
Freedom House scores have generally hovered between 2 and 3 (on a 1-7 scale, 1 being most free) since 
1987.  
18 The absence of permanent bases may be the simplest answer. Moreover, U.S. troops are primarily 
located in the Southern Philippines, far from the political capital. However, as Herbert Docena notes, 
the constant rotation of U.S. forces has de facto re-established a permanent U.S. presence in the 
Philippines, even without U.S. bases. 
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unlike other strong U.S. allies such as Germany and Italy, Spain remained outside 
NATO until 1981. The ideological and institutional ties shaping elite perceptions and 
beliefs regarding the U.S. alliance were not fully developed during this period.  This is 
reflected in the 1982 presidential election when Felipe Gonzalez of the Socialist Party 
(PSOE) ran on an anti-NATO party platform. While Gonzalez remained ambivalent 
about U.S. base presence, other PSOE and Communist (PCE) members voiced their 
opposition to both NATO and U.S. bases.19 Meanwhile, anti-base activists routinely 
organized large demonstrations outside U.S. bases in Rota, Zaragoza, and Madrid.  
Gonzales eventually backtracked from his initial anti-NATO stance, 
successfully guiding Spain’s entry into the Atlantic community in 1982. However, 
base issues remained unsettled. In the mid-1980s, the PSOE pushed for more 
favorable basing terms. Spanish base negotiators listed the closure of the Torrejón air 
base as a high priority. After two years of negotiations, the U.S. and Spain concluded a 
new basing arrangement reducing U.S. troop presence in Spain by 40%. Furthermore, 
Spanish negotiators extracted additional economic and military benefits. Most 
importantly, the U.S. agreed to withdraw forces from bases in Torrejón and 
Zaragoza.20  
 Cooley attributes the politicization and outcome of base politics during this 
period to the instability of political institutions resulting from Spain’s recent 
democratization. I do not necessarily counter this explanation. However, the 
correlation between strong anti-base mobilization, a weak security consensus, and 
major shifts in base policy outcomes makes it worth exploring the security consensus 
framework in the Spanish case. Did anti-base movements and the conditions of weak 
security consensus contribute to base closures during the 1986-88 negotiations? A 
                                                 
19 Cooley 2008, p.76. 
20 Ibid 2008, p.79. 
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fundamental question is whether anti-base movements helped Gonzalez solidify his 
position entering base negotiations with the U.S. in 1986.  Did anti-base activists work 
with sympathetic elites, pushing the government to negotiate more favorable base 
terms?  
 On one hand, base policy outcomes may have been purely elite driven. Even 
without major protests, the PSOE would have likely pushed for a new basing 
agreement. A movement-based account, however, posits that absent major protests, 
PSOE members would not have formulated and sustained a coherent position 
challenging current basing arrangements. A weak security consensus enabled activists 
to work in tandem with anti-base elites to push forward an alternative basing 
agreement. Even if activists and elites shared the same preferences, it may have 
required anti-base movements to help elites project and clarify their true positions 
publicly. My discussion does not challenge Cooley’s interpretation of the Spanish case 
per se. It only suggests reconsidering the case from the vantage point of social 
movements, evaluated in the context of U.S.-Spain relations and the pervading elite 
security consensus at the time.  
In sum, I differ from Cooley by arguing that bilateral relations and the salience 
of national security weighs heavily in the politics of military bases. The security 
consensus conditions elite response to domestic base opposition irrespective of regime 
type. I argue that the depoliticization of U.S. bases has less to do with the consolidated 
nature of democratic institutions, and more to do with the existing security consensus 
permeating key elites in host countries.  
Despite empirical discrepancies between Cooley’s analysis and my own work, 
the two theories are not necessarily incompatible. In certain respect, the two 
arguments may complement one another since Cooley does not specifically address 
anti-base movements in his own theory, nor do I specifically discuss regime type in 
  293 
my own argument.21 It may be beyond mere coincidence that allied countries where 
the security consensus remains strongest – Germany, Italy, Japan, or South Korea - 
also happen to be consolidated democracies. Upon closer examination, the three 
mechanisms discussed by Cooley which contribute to depoliticization -  procedural 
legitimacy, internal jurisdiction, and party politics - actually feed into the sources of 
security consensus.22  For example, the bureaucratization of base politics in countries 
like Japan helps perpetuate and institutionalize elite perceptions and beliefs about U.S. 
bases and the Japan-U.S. alliance. Likewise, the consolidation of political parties helps 
solidify the dominant position of elites favoring a strong security consensus. Thus elite 
attitudes and beliefs, buffered by the institutional mechanisms suggested by Cooley, 
help stabilize basing agreements despite the presence of major anti-base protests. 
The Future of U.S. Basing Strategy  
The 2004 Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) marks the first major 
transformation of U.S. global force posture since the post-World War II era.23  Initial 
adjustments to American force posture were already in motion with the end of the 
Cold War. Following strategic and operational changes outlined in the Pentagon’s 
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Bush Administration mandated a 
thorough review of U.S. global force posture. In particular, the review addressed the 
                                                 
21 Regime type is taken for granted in my analysis, partly because the phenomenon of anti-base 
movements is most acute in post-democratized societies. Regime type matters when exploring anti-base 
movements because it affects the probability of successful mobilization (i.e. authoritarian regimes tend 
to quash civil societal attempts at collective action), as well as the degree of state penetration.   Anti-
base movements will find it more difficult to penetrate strong, autocratic states compared to democratic 
states which provide access through institutional procedures and formal channels. Kent Calder also 
addresses the interaction between anti-base movements and regime type, examining the distinction 
between centralized and decentralized democracies as an intervening variable on policy outcomes. See 
Calder 2008, p.123.  
22 The impact of institutions in Cooley’s argument corresponds to the dimension of “depth” in my 
coding of the security consensus.  
23 The GDPR is also known as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). Global 
defense posture  “comprises the size, location, types, and capabilities of forward military forces. It 
constitutes a fundamental element of our ability to project power and undertake military actions beyond 
our borders” (DOD 2004, p.4).  
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shift from static defense to expeditionary operations, new advances in military 
technology and capabilities, and increasing uncertainty in the strategic environment.24  
The Pentagon began its review process prior to the events of 9-11.  However, 
this cataclysmic event reinforced the dire need for a flexible strategy and new global 
force posture. An overseas basing strategy needed to reflect “new” threats such as 
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the insurgencies 
unfolding in Afghanistan (and subsequently Iraq).25 Additionally, the strategy needed 
to contend with the possible realignment of traditional alliances and the addition of 
new strategic partners.26  
The network of overseas military bases is intimately linked to the U.S. national 
security strategy. The presence of forward-deployed troops, equipment, and supplies, 
and the portfolio of bilateral arrangements permitting global U.S. military presence are 
not mere policy choices, but an extension of strategy itself.27  Overseas bases exist as 
“the skeleton upon which the flesh and muscle of operational capability will be 
molded.”28  More specifically, bases provide strategic deterrence, territorial control, 
logistics and transportation capabilities, and alliance support.29 They facilitate 
communication, command, and control, and intelligence-gathering. Overseas bases are 
the physical units generating the basic structure of U.S. global defense posture.  
However, global defense posture is defined beyond the number of installations and 
                                                 
24 Department of. Defense. "Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture: Report to Congress." 
Washington D.C., September 17, 2004. 
25 The OBC acknowledged new threats along the “arc of instability” spanning from West Africa, the 
Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and the Andes. However, the OBC also cautioned against 
ruling out traditional, great power rivalries in Asia or Europe.  Additionally, the OBC’s review of U.S. 
global force posture recommended adopting a comprehensive definition of threats, taking into account 
human rights violations, natural disasters, and epidemics. Finally, the review criticized the DOD-centric 
analysis of global force posture, recommending greater interagency cooperation in any future 
assessments.    
26 DOD 2004, p.2. 
27 Overseas Basing Committee. "Interim Report of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military 
Facility Structure of the United States." Arlington, VA: Overseas Basing Committee, 2005, p.4 
28 OBC 2005, p.4. 
29 Calder 2007, 39; Blaker 1990; Harkavy 1989, p.17. 
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troops.  It encompasses security cooperation with alliance partners through different 
legal arrangements.30 Therefore, an overhaul in global force posture not only reflects 
operational changes, such as greater flexibility and enhanced rapid deployment 
capabilities, but an expanded role for alliance partners.31 
This dissertation speaks directly to the last category - the role of alliance 
partners. U.S. global force posture both “presupposes and determines” the network of 
political relations forged between the United States and alliance partners.32  The ability 
to build or share facilities, place troops, store munitions, or pre-position equipment 
implies a bilateral relationship between the host nation and the U.S.  Bases not only 
fulfill a military function, they represent a political arrangement with “bilateral, 
international, cultural, and economic consequences.”33  Unfortunately, U.S. strategic 
needs and the political realities presented by host nation politics are not always 
congruent, resulting in bilateral and internal domestic friction. As Kent Calder argues, 
bases are “embattled garrisons”: strategically important but politically vulnerable.34  
As discussed in this dissertation and other volumes addressing the politics of 
bases, a central characteristic of base politics is its two-level nature.  The international 
environment shapes bilateral relations, which in turn establishes the permissive 
conditions for U.S. bases in host countries. However, the domestic politics of host 
nations have an enormous bearing on the status and operation of U.S. forces. Thus, 
well before President Bush’s August 2004 message on global defense posture, the U.S. 
had already embarked on an ambitious diplomatic campaign, consulting with dozens 
of allies about changes in U.S. overseas force deployment.35  
                                                 
30 DOD 2004, pp.7-8.  
31 Ibid. 2004, p.9.  
32 OBC 2005, p.8. 
33 Ibid 2005, p.10. 
34 Calder 2007, p.9 
35 DOD 2004, p.14.  
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 The OBC took a positive step by identifying the political risks associated with 
the current direction of U.S. global force posture. Currently, the U.S. relies on a mix of 
traditional alliances and new partners to hedge against future threats.  The former 
provides predictability and greater reliability for cooperation and access in the event of 
conflict. The latter gives the U.S. improved access and proximity to global hotspots. In 
the final review, the OBC reiterated the importance of traditional alliance partners, and 
advised the DOD to reassess the timing of troop withdrawals in major host countries, 
particularly Germany. At the same time, the OBC called for caution when relying on 
new alliance partners. Specifically, the U.S. should not assume the possibility of long-
term relations prior to any formalized agreement.36 Bilateral arrangements with new 
partners lack a mutual history of support. Furthermore, new partners characterized as 
fledgling democracies or autocracies, particularly those concentrated in Africa and 
Central Asia, do not guarantee long-term political stability. Admitting that U.S. soft 
power is on the decline, the OBC correctly suggested that base planners consider the 
motives behind new basing agreements, such as short-term economic gains versus 
long term national interests.37 In light of domestic anti-base opposition, the security 
consensus framework offers four sets of policy implications related to U.S. overseas 
basing strategy. 
1. Managing the Security Consensus 
While the OBC recognizes domestic instability as an issue affecting U.S. force 
presence and basing access, particularly with new security partners, it also assumes 
that our traditional allies will generally accept U.S. basing arrangements. This 
assumption is warranted if we accept the security consensus hypothesis. Even when 
faced with serious civil societal pressure against U.S. forces, host government elites 
                                                 
36 OBC 2005, p.8. 
37 Ibid. 2005, p.10. 
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are likely to stave off movement pressure and manage its alliance relations with the 
U.S. if a security consensus exists.  
Unfortunately, global attitudes regarding U.S. leadership have shifted in recent 
years, suggesting a decline in the security consensus.38 As argued throughout this 
dissertation, an eroding security consensus enables activists to exploit elite division, 
magnifying domestic opposition against U.S. military presence.  This was illustrated 
in the Philippines, where a weak security consensus, undoubtedly accelerated by the 
democratization movement and the post-Cold War security environment, led to base 
closure. Turkey is another case where the lack of elite consensus and domestic 
opposition resulted in the rejection of base access and over-flight pass for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.   
The U.S. has little direct control over the degree of security consensus within 
host governments. The consensus shifts with changes in the external security 
environment and internal domestic political factors which Washington may or may not 
be able to influence. Where possible, however, the U.S. can take action by promoting 
policies which foster mutual trust, respect, and transparency among alliance partners.  
If host nation acceptance of U.S. forces rests on shared national interests, Washington 
must demonstrate to their allies that they too have a stake in U.S. global defense 
posture.  Quid pro quos function as effective leveraging tools in base politics, but a 
stable network of overseas bases cannot be sustained entirely through compensation 
politics. U.S. military presence and foreign bases must also fit into the host nation’s 
national interest and overarching security framework. 
                                                 
38 Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes Project. “America’s Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. 
Concerns Over Iran, Hamas.” June 15, 2006; Stephen Walt. Taming American Power: The Global 
Response to U.S. Primacy. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005; Chalmers A. Johnson. Nemesis: The Last 
Days of the American Republic. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007. 
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A common perception among anti-base activists (and some host government 
elites) is that U.S. global defense posture exists solely for the benefit of U.S. interests. 
Certainly U.S. strategic imperatives trump all other motives behind the planning of 
overseas basing strategy. And on reflection of some questionable U.S. foreign policy 
behavior in the past – meddling in domestic affairs, propping up dictatorships, or 
circumventing human rights conventions - anti-base activists have good reason to 
believe that U.S. military presence functions more as a force of evil rather than good. 
Often missed from this perspective, however, is the understanding of security as a 
collective good, and the possibility that U.S. bases at times function as a stabilizing, 
balancing force. For instance, in the Asia-Pacific, a region plagued with historical 
animosities, mutual distrust, and relative insecurity, the U.S. military functions as the 
stabilizing linchpin.  
Managing the security consensus requires greater diplomatic effort on the part 
of the U.S. in clarifying its strategic goals and objectives to host nation partners. This 
warrants a larger role for the State Department on overseas basing issues, and more 
generally in international affairs – a view shared by several senior officials in the 
second Bush Administration including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. More 
specifically, the U.S. needs to bolster public diplomacy. One possible solution is the 
resurrection of the United States Information Agency (USIA), a position advocated by 
Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain. Until its closure in October 
1999, USIA used a wide range of overseas information programs to foster mutual 
understanding between the United States and other nations. Before its functions were 
transferred to the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs, USIA maintained 190 
offices in 142 countries with the broad goal of explaining and supporting American 
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foreign policy and promoting U.S. national interests.39 Unfortunately, as McCain 
argued, “Dismantling an agency dedicated to promoting America and Americans 
amounted to unilateral disarmament in the struggle of ideas.”40 Whether conducted by 
the State Department, or an independent agency such as USIA, the U.S. needs to 
communicate its strategy and values clearly and persuasively to other nations.  
To manage the security consensus, the U.S. should also consider extending its 
network ties to opposition political members in host countries.41  The goal is to 
demonstrate to both incumbent and opposition political leaders that host country’s 
have a national security stake in maintaining close security ties to the U.S.  Alexander 
Cooley has advocated a “political hedging” strategy by maintaining contacts with 
opposition political groups and actors.  A hedging strategy ultimately lowers the risk 
of major base policy upheavals in the event of regime change or other domestic 
political windfalls.42 We cannot assume that our traditional allies will indefinitely 
accept or refrain from seriously challenging U.S. strategic imperatives when 
contingency plans implicate host countries.  
2. New Allies, Bad Friends? 
I echo the words of caution issued by the OBC as the U.S. pushes to sign 
basing agreements with new allies and partners.  Weak institutions and the political 
uncertainty of democratic transitions create an unstable environment for U.S. bases. 
Therefore, the U.S. should weigh other options before signing deals with authoritarian 
regimes, or even nascent democracies.43 Along similar lines, Kent Calder predicts an 
increase in “bazaar politics” – when host nations “haggle and play aggressive dual 
                                                 
39 See archived website of the former United States Information Agency. 
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/factshe.htm > [last accessed April 3, 2008].  
40 John McCain. “Hone U.S. Message of Freedom.” Orlando Sentinel. June 28, 2007.  
41 This prescription is also advocated by Alexander Cooley and Kent Calder. See Cooley 2008, p.273; 
Calder 2007, p.239 
42 Cooley 2008, p.273; Calder 2007, p.239.  
43 Cooley 2005. 
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games” in an effort to extract as much as possible from the U.S. – as Washington 
forges new ties with regimes in Central Asia and the Middle East.44   I offer a 
somewhat different explanation (but arrive at the same conclusions as Calder and 
Cooley) why some of our new allies may not make the best friends in the long term.  
Unlike Washington’s traditional alliance partners, new defense cooperation 
agreements forged with volatile regimes lack the long-standing historical legacy, 
ideology, or institutional mechanisms which help reinforce a strong security consensus 
among government elites. New basing agreements, such as the CSLs negotiated in 
Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia, are signed by host states under the pretense of 
short term gains through foreign aid, military assistance, or political legitimacy. The 
lack of deeper security interests or shared values suggests a precarious bilateral 
relationship.  
A weak or absent consensus makes basing arrangements much more 
susceptible to change based on events and circumstances. Diplomatic confrontation, 
civil societal opposition, or base-related incidents which would normally not warrant 
the abrogation of base agreements under conditions of strong security consensus, 
could potentially trigger major base policy changes. The diplomatic fall out between 
the U.S. and Uzbekistan and the ouster of U.S. forces from the K2 base in 2005 is 
instructive. U.S. criticism against the Karimov regime’s brutal crackdown against 
protestors in Andijon resulted in restricted nighttime flights and heavy airlift from K2. 
Eventually, the Uzbekistan government terminated the SOFA Agreement, resulting in 
the withdrawal of U.S. forces.45 
The news is not all bad regarding new alliance partners. While elites in African 
or Central Asian states lack a strong consensus supporting U.S. security arrangements, 
                                                 
44 Calder 2008, p.140, 113.  
45 Cooley 2008, pp.230-31. 
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we should expect more favorable attitudes towards U.S. bases in Eastern Europe.46 
The U.S. has or is currently negotiating basing agreements with Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Poland. As members of NATO, elites in these countries are generally supportive 
of U.S. policies, and place a high value in their strategic partnership with 
Washington.47  Elites not only perceive NATO membership and close ties to the U.S. 
as a means of boosting international reputation, but also as a deterrent against Russian 
influence.  
 In sum, DOD plans to expand its overseas basing network in regions such as 
Africa, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe have resulted in several new basing 
agreements since 2001 – some with democracies, others with more questionable 
democratic credentials. The U.S. should exercise caution when selecting new partners 
for basing agreements. States with similar regional security goals, interests, and values 
as the U.S., shared by the majority of host government political elites, make the best 
partners for U.S. overseas basing strategy.  
There is some truth that basing agreements are unstable under weak 
democracies. Unfortunately, the U.S. cannot simply avoid dictatorships or fledgling 
democracies across the board. Often times, strategic interests necessitate working with 
less than ideal regimes to secure larger objectives. Difficult trade-offs must be made. 
On one hand, by adopting what other nations perceive as hypocritical policies, the 
U.S. creates the potential for “blowback.” On the other hand, the international 
environment is constantly changing. FOLs or CSLs critical today may be unnecessary 
                                                 
46 Cooley also finds greater stability in Bulgaria and Romania as a result of their consolidated 
democratic status and the stability of domestic political institutions. See Cooley 2008, pp. 244-46 
47 This does not mean, however, that anti-base opposition will not take place in NATO countries. This is 
currently the case in Czech Republic, where anti-base protestors are mobilizing to block the 
establishment of a missile defense radar installation. More generally, NATO membership itself was 
contested by a sizeable percentage of the population. I thank Matthew Evangelista for pointing this out. 
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ten years from now, enabling base planners to discount longer term basing 
arrangements.  
Perhaps the best strategy is a diversified portfolio of bases. The U.S. should 
maintain several MOBs with traditional allies or new partners where the security 
consensus runs high. When securing FOLs or CSLs with new partners, the U.S. should 
weigh in on domestic political factors affecting the mid-long term stability of 
agreements. The U.S. should clarify the role of U.S. presence with host nations. 
Money talks, and quid pro quos may initially attract political elites. But for longer 
term arrangements, the U.S. will have to foster stronger diplomatic ties to host states 
so that elites themselves perceive a security stake in its partnership with the U.S. 
3. Afghanistan and Iraq 
 What implications can be drawn for U.S. bases in Afghanistan and Iraq? 
Regardless if the U.S. denies the “permanent” status of these bases, current signs 
indicate that they will remain in place for at least the mid-long term.48 In Afghanistan, 
protests against the U.S. military have erupted on numerous occasions. The most 
dramatic incident occurred in late May 2006 when a U.S. military convoy truck 
recklessly slammed into traffic, killing several people. Exasperating the situation, U.S. 
soldiers fired into a crowd as angry Afghanis rioted on the streets.49  
 U.S. forces continue to face protests and violent armed opposition in 
Afghanistan.50 At least within Kabul, however, Afghan leaders, most importantly 
President Harmid Karzai, share the belief that U.S. military and NATO forces must 
remain in Afghanistan if the regime is to survive. U.S. bases are integral to 
                                                 
48 Carl Hulse. House Resolution Rejects Permanent Bases in Iraq. Washington Post. July 26, 2007. 
Cooley 2008, p.266. 
49 Carlotta Gall. “Afghans Raise Toll of Dead From May Riots In Kabul to 17.” New York Times.  June 
8, 2006. The death toll eventually climbed to 20. 
50 In a more violent example of anti-base opposition, Taliban insurgents led a brazen assault on an 
American base in Kunar Province, killing nine U.S. soldiers. See Carlotta Gall. “Nine American Die in 
Afghan Attack.” New York Times. July 14, 2008. 
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Afghanistan’s national security. Thus, the central government is not likely to push for 
major changes on base related issues until the country stabilizes. With that said, U.S. 
planners should remain wary of political instability and insecurity outside of Kabul. 
Afghanistan’s fragmented provinces and President Karzai’s inability to influence 
warlords outside of Kabul makes predictions on base politics difficult. One of 
Washington’s priorities in Afghanistan is to assist Kabul in expanding its capacity to 
govern beyond the capital region. A true security consensus cannot exist as long as 
provinces function independent of Kabul.  
 Political fragmentation and sectarian violence obfuscate any direct policy 
prescriptions from the security consensus framework to Iraq.  Prime Minister Nuri Al 
Maliki is heavily dependent on U.S. forces for Iraq national security. Therefore, he is 
unlikely to demand major withdrawals in troop levels in the immediate future. 
However, anti-U.S. forces - both the violent and non-violent variants – place 
considerable pressure on the fragile Iraqi government to reduce U.S. military presence 
as soon as possible. Noteworthy is the influential Shiite cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, who 
has repeatedly called for the withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces. While the Iraqi 
government needs U.S. forces to stay afloat, it is difficult to argue that a strong 
consensus favoring permanent U.S. military bases will exist once Iraqi forces take 
over security functions. It is highly plausible that a few permanent U.S. bases will 
remain open in Iraq.  But Iraqi political elites will likely see major U.S. presence as a 
political liability. Mounting civilian casualties, abuse scandals, and the recklessness of 
private military contractors have already pushed Iraqi officials to demand greater 
regulations against the U.S. military, as well as private military corporations.  In a best 
case scenario, anti-base opponents will push Iraqi elites to extract further benefits from 
the U.S. in exchange for a permanent presence. In the worst case, anti-base elements 
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will use violent means to raise the political costs for elites favoring to keep American 
forces inside Iraq for the long-haul. 
4. U.S. Bases and the Local Community 
 Base politics scholars have recommended that policymakers address the 
“micro-politics” of bases which adversely impact bilateral relations.51 This includes 
addressing base issues at the local level, where most anti-base movements are 
rooted.52 Currently, the U.S. military hosts numerous community relations programs 
which enable local residents and U.S. military members to interact through sports, 
community service, and cultural activities. U.S. military members visit local schools 
and provide free tutoring or English language instruction.  
While these programs improve community relations between the U.S. military 
and local residents, they tend to draw-in community members from the “pro-base 
side.”  Base commanders and public affairs officers do not necessarily avoid dialogue 
and discussion with anti-base residents. However, an attitude persists among base 
officials that everybody who can be potentially persuaded has already been persuaded, 
with the remainder opposing U.S. bases for ideological reasons.53 As one commanding 
officer wrote to an activist, “We have to agree to disagree.”54  My own observations of 
relations between local residents and the U.S. military corroborate the sentiments of 
base officials. Understandably, base commanders do not want to spend time and 
energy interacting with those who resent their presence and refuse to listen to the 
“voice of reason.” Community networks, however, are an important part of base 
politics. Implementing concrete measures addressing (or preventing) problems arising 
                                                 
51 Cooley 2008, p. 272.  
52 Andrew Yeo. "Local National Dynamics and Framing in South Korean Anti-Base Movements." 
Kasarinlan 21, no. 2 (2006): 34-69. Lutz 2008. 
53 Interview with base officials at Yongsan Garrison and Camp Humphreys in South Korea, and Camp 
Ederle in Vicenza.  
54 Letter from Major General Frank Helmick, Commanding General, United States Army Southern 
European Task  Force,  to a Vicenza activist. November 19, 2007. 
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from base presence such as crime, pollution, or noise, help build credibility and trust 
behind U.S. intentions within the local community. If directly meeting anti-base 
residents and activists is a non-starter, working with local community leaders to 
explain the reasons and benefits behind U.S. military presence may work as an indirect 
method of disseminating information.55  
Anti-base Movements: Local and Global 
Finally, we return to the central topic of this dissertation: anti-base movements. 
Where do anti-base movements fit into base politics and overseas basing strategy? 
Anti-base protests are only one component of base politics. At times, however, they 
exert a powerful impact on base policy decisions. Unfortunately, the patterns, motives, 
and behavior of anti-base movements, and their ability to undermine bilateral relations 
and U.S. basing strategy are not always clearly understood.  U.S. base officials, 
diplomats, and policy-makers often evaluate anti-base movements as a monolithic 
entity. In reality, anti-base movements, as described in the empirical sections of this 
dissertation, are comprised of different actors. Each address the issue of bases from 
slightly different angles. The variety of anti-base protestors range from local residents 
focused on NIMBY issues, to “professional” activists deeply engaged in broader, 
transnational social justice movements. Likewise, activists with different political 
agendas join anti-base movements to assert their particular cause, such as the 
environment, sexual crimes and abuse, or demilitarization. When mobilized 
effectively, civil society not only creates tension between alliance partners, but 
threatens the permissive environment for U.S. global force posture.   
In the previous section, I covered several policy implications and prescriptions 
for the U.S. government on overseas basing strategy. What insights and lessons can be 
                                                 
55 This point was raised by the base commander at Camp Humphreys. Interview conducted on 
December 7, 2005.  
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drawn for anti-base movements?  I offer three sets of recommendations for activists 
regarding anti-base movement strategy and advocacy. The first suggestion stems 
directly from the security consensus framework: when possible, activists should form 
ties with political elites. As discussed in the introductory chapter, U.S. base policies 
are ultimately decided by government officials. Therefore, anti-base movements gain 
greater leverage and influence on basing policy outcomes when forming ties with 
sympathetic elites. This was certainly the case with successful anti-base movements 
such as the Anti-Treaty Movement in the Philippines and the No Bases Coalition in 
Ecuador. Although not included in this dissertation, ties between Puerto Rican anti-
base activists and several U.S. Congressional representatives helped activists shut 
down Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Vieques in 2001. The support of several 
prominent U.S. political figures such as Hillary Clinton and Jesse Jackson, and direct 
involvement of U.S. representatives such as Nydia M. Velazquez and Luis V. 
Gutierrez increased publicity and political leverage for the Vieques movement.56 
Encouraging anti-base movements to form ties with sympathetic elites seems 
self-evident. Yet, one might find surprising the level of resistance to this suggestion by 
some activists. Ties to political elites raise the specter of co-optation. The lack of trust 
in politicians, the political establishment, or more generally, formal politics, often 
stem from activists’ own experience and interaction with government officials over the 
course of several movement episodes. This attitude was expressed by several anti-base 
activists in South Korea, Japan, and even the Philippines. Activists in Vicenza also 
faced heated discussions over strategy: should they maintain support for radical left 
parties? At the local level, should movement leaders move from informal to more 
formal avenues of politics?57  Although the wariness of movements in engaging 
                                                 
56 See Katherine T. McCaffrey. Military Power and Popular Protest: The U.S. Navy in Vieques, Puerto 
Rico. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 2002. 
57 E-mail correspondence with No Dal Molin activist  Enzo Ciscato. May 15, 2008.  
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formal political actors is understandable, research across several anti-base movement 
episodes suggests that movements which form alliances with political elites and 
engage base politics through both formal and informal channels tend to have a greater 
impact on basing policy outcomes.   
Second, activists must seek broad coalitions with diverse groups, even at the 
risk of inter-coalition division and factionalism. Although no strict formula for anti-
base coalition formation exists, the trajectory of most anti-base movements begins at 
the local level, eventually  shifting scale to the national or transnational level. Scale 
shift occurs when movement leaders at the local level, acting as brokers, contact or 
reach out to outside civil societal groups and NGOs.58 Broad anti-base coalitions are 
advantageous with greater mobilizing capacities, which in turn generate greater 
publicity and media attention. This was the case in the movement to shut down Kooni 
Firing Range in Maehyangri. Maehyangri was virtually unheard of, despite protests by 
local villagers to close Kooni Range since the late 1980s. Without the involvement of 
numerous NGOs and civic groups, the bombing accident in Maehyangri in 2000 
would likely have gone unnoticed. Fortunately, a year before the accident, a 
documentary about the plight of Maehyangri residents’ in 1999 drew the attention of 
several NGOs, including Green Korea United (GKU). After the accident, GKU and 
other civic groups involved in the PAR-SOFA campaign latched onto the Maehyangri 
issue, committing their support to local anti-base leaders. Local anti-base activists 
alone would not have been able to build the pressure necessary to force U.S. and South 
Korean officials to the negotiating table.  
Lastly, and related to the previous point, activists need to adopt framing 
strategies which attract a broad formation, but at the same time minimize 1) potential 
                                                 
58 Activists representing organizations at the regional or national level may also act as brokers, offering 
their support even before local movement leaders reach out to outside groups.  
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within group factionalism and  2) the alienation of local anti-base groups within the 
larger coalition. Anti-base movements in the Philippines and South Korea which led to 
full or partial concessions formed under politically neutral campaign banners, such as 
the Anti-Treaty Movement or People’s Action for Reform of the Unjust SOFA. These 
neutral slogans helped draw in other civil societal actors often wary of joining anti-
base groups associated with groups on the far left.59 Friction between local and 
national groups also loomed large in several anti-base coalitions, such as those in 
Okinawa. Successful movements in the Philippines and Ecuador were able to avoid 
these tensions, partially because the movement’s center of gravity began at the 
national rather than local level. For other coalitions with a strong local base, however, 
such as those in Vicenza and Pyeongtaek, “outside” groups worked to ensure that local 
grievances were not neglected by the broader framing of the movement. The length 
and scale of mobilization experienced by KCPT and the Dal Molin Campaign would 
not have taken place without bridging the more abstract claims for peace and 
sovereignty with more tangible frames such as forced eviction or environmental 
destruction. 
In studying anti-base movements in different parts of the world, I noticed many 
striking similarities and patterns. Anti-base activists used similar frames, often a 
mixture of local rights and justice claims embedded within more abstract peace and 
sovereignty frames. Movements relied on loose coalition structures as their mode of 
organization. Although opposed to U.S. bases and U.S. policies, activists targeted the 
host government rather than the United States. Perhaps the least profound, but most 
symbolically meaningful similarity was the anti-base movements’ predilection for 
                                                 
59 Debate over the use of moderate versus radical tactics took place within ATM and PAR-SOFA. By in 
large, however, the overarching strategies called for moderation, thus providing political space for more 
politically neutral NGOs, such as environmental organizations, to enter the coalition.   
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large tents. My first visit to the Presidio – the large, white tent functioning as the 
headquarters of the No Dal Molin campaign – evoked earlier memories of candle-light 
vigils in the Pyeongtaek greenhouse, or conversations in the tent-like structure at 
Henoko.  The Tuesday night public forum I witnessed inside the Presidio felt surreal, 
as if the same discussions of strategy, same criticisms, same words of hope and 
encouragement, were transported from Pyeongtaek in 2005 to Vicenza in 2008. 
These similarities and patterns warrant further research on anti-base 
movements as a global or transnational phenomena. This dissertation has focused 
almost entirely on domestic anti-base movements. However, a growing transnational 
anti-base network also exists, alluded to in Chapter Four.  As “rooted cosmopolitans,” 
many local anti-base activists have formed ties with other anti-base campaigns facing 
similar struggles in an effort to reduce or abolish U.S. bases around the world.60 From 
a policy perspective, U.S. officials may brush aside transnational anti-base movements 
for now. However, if local grievances remain unaddressed, anti-base activists will win 
additional support for their cause. They will continue to deepen ties not only among 
themselves, but with the un-mobilized mass public and political elites.  For example, 
peace activists across Europe have already mobilized to support anti-base initiatives in 
the Czech Republic. Populist support for left-leaning elites in Ecuador, Bolivia, and 
Venezuela may also complicate U.S. basing initiatives in Latin America.61 
 Chalmers Johnson writes, “The American network of bases is a sign not of 
military preparedness but of militarism, the inescapable companion of imperialism.”62 
Although it may be a slight stretch to equate U.S. global force posture with formal 
empires of the past, this is exactly how many opponents of military bases interpret the 
                                                 
60 Tarrow 2005, pp.28-29. 
61 Mahyar A. Amouzegar et al. Evaluation of Options for Overseas Combat Support Basing. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2006, p. xxxv. 
62 Johnson 2004, p.24. 
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network of U.S. overseas bases. As visible symbols of American power abroad, bases, 
at times, elicit intense political reactions. U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan and 
Iraq today have continued to fuel anti-base sentiment well into the twenty-first century 
as parts of the world grow wary of U.S. militarism. For sure, we can expect more anti-
base protests in the future. The global anti-base movement strives to channel and 
transform the local NIMBY nature of anti-base protests into a transnational NIABY 
(not-in-anyone’s backyard) movement.  The key question is whether anti-base 
movements progress to the point where overseas basing strategy becomes increasingly 
costly or untenable because of political opposition in critical combat support or access 
regions.63  Relying more heavily on CSL and FOL bases may help address (or avoid) 
NIMBY grievances. However, the U.S. will need to diligently pursue parallel political 
and diplomatic solutions if it wishes to sustain its overseas basing network into the 
long-term future. 
 
                                                 
63 On the importance of strategic access, see Eric V. Larson. Assuring Access in Key Strategic Regions: 
Toward a Long-Term Strategy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004. 
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